Pacific Theological
Seminary
Berkeley, Calif.

THE ART BINDERY
BERKELEY, CA

THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY

A JOURNAL OF THE FAITH, WORK AND THOUGHT OF CHRISTENDOM

Edited by Silas McBee

Volume II

HUMPHREY MILFORD
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON, EDINBURGH, MELBOURNE, AND BOMBAY
NEW YORK: GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
1914

KS1
C766
V2

Copyright, 1914,
By George H. Doran Company

14864

CONTENTS

Volume II

March to December, 1914

Anglicanism and Reunion.
By James Gilliland Simpson..... 361

Attitude of German Protestant Theology to the Bible, The.
By Adolf von Schlatter, Doctor of Theology..... 99

Broad Churchmanship: A.D. 1500–1900.
By John Elliotson Symes, M.A..... 617

Brown, Francis, D.D., LL.D.
Unity in Scholarship..... 277

Bull, Henry Power.
Spiritual Factors of Unity..... 461

Carpenter, William Boyd, D.D., D.C.L.
John Tauler..... 876

Churches and the Social Problem, The.
By Philip Snowden, M.P..... 433

Church of England in Relation to Other Reformed Communions, The.
By W. H. Griffith Thomas, D.D..... 604

Clarke, C. P. S.
School and College Settlements of the Church of England..... 419

Classen, Walter.
The Decay and the Growth of Ethical and Religious Ideas among Industrial Workers in Germany..... 642

Confession of Christ, The.
By Henry Churchill King, D.D., LL.D..... 253

Constructive Quarterly from Within, The.
By William Sanday, D.D., LL.D..... 1

Cremona's Last Letter to the Editor of this Journal, The Late Bishop of..... 874

Curtis, William Alexander, M.A., D.Litt.
Faith and Its Place in the Christian Religion..... 111

Decay and the Growth of Ethical and Religious Ideas among Industrial Workers in Germany, The.
By Walter Classen..... 642

Deissmann, Adolf, D.Theol., D.D.
International and Interdenominational Research of the New Testament 786
Jerusalem the Holy City 314

Departure of Archbishop Platon, The.
By Charles Johnston 550

Devine, Edward T., Ph.D., LL.D.
Social Work in America 818

Eastern Orthodox and the Anglican Communions, The.
By F. W. Fuller, S.S.J.E 299

Education and Religion among Working-men.
By William Temple, M.A 188

Experiment in Co-operation, An.
By W. F. Lofthouse, M.A 627

Faith and Its Place in the Christian Religion.
By William Alexander Curtis, M.A., D.Litt. 111

Faith as It Is Understood by an Orthodox Divine.
By The Most Reverend Platon 167

Faith: Its Nature and Work.
By Peter Green 133

Frere, Walter Howard, D.D.
A Programme of Christian Conference 264

Gardner, Edmund Garratt, M.A.
The Poet of the Franciscan Movement: Fra Jacopone da Todi 446

Garvie, Alfred E., M.A., D.D.
Nonconformity: Its Ideals and History 476

Generic Christianity.
By Shailer Mathews, A.M., D.D 702

Glover, Terrot Reaveley.
Unity in the Spiritual Fact 20

Gore, Charles, M.A., D.D.
The Place of Symbolism in Religion 50

Grandmaison, Léonce de, S.J.
Lucie, Félix-Faure Goyau 653

Green, Peter.
Faith: Its Nature and Work 133

Greer, David H., D.D., LL.D.
A Study in Anthropomorphism 578

Guerry, W. A., M.A., D.D.
Progress a Permanent Element in Religion 805

Harvey, T. Edmund, M.P.
John Woolman 224

Holland, Henry Scott, M.A., D.D.
The Religion of a Moving, Changing World 241

Hügel, Baron Friedrich von, LL.D.
On the Specific Genius and Capacities of Christianity, Studied in Connection with the Works of Professor Ernst Troeltsch. First Article..... 68
Second Article..... 673

Independent Teaching in France in the Last Ten Years: French Clergy in the War.
By Eugène Tavernier..... 850

International and Interdenominational Research of the New Testament.
By Dr. Adolf Deissmann..... 786

Jerusalem the Holy City.
By Adolf Deissmann, D. Theol., D.D..... 314

Johnston, Charles.
The Departure of Archbishop Platon..... 550

John Tauler.
By William Boyd Carpenter, D.D., D.C.L..... 876

John Woolman.
By T. Edmund Harvey, M.P..... 224

Kay, D. M., D.D.
The Value of the Old Testament to the Church..... 773

King, Henry Churchill, D.D., LL.D.
The Confession of Christ..... 253

Labour Movement in Religion, The.
By Francis Herbert Stead, M.A..... 197

Late Bishop of Cremona's Last Letter to the Editor of this Journal, The..... 874

Lawrence, William, D.D., LL.D.
Religious Liberty and Religious Education..... 868

Layman's Thoughts on the Church and the World, A.
By Eugene Stock, D.C.L..... 403

Leger, J. Augustin, D.Litt.
Wesley's Place in Catholic Thought..... 329

Lofthouse, W. F., M.A.
An Experiment in Co-operation..... 627

Loofs, Dr. Friedrich.
Solo Verbo: Lutheransim and Mysticism..... 733

Lucie Félix-Faure Goyau.
By Léonce de Grandmaison, S.J..... 653

Maher, Michael, S.J., D.Litt.
The Nature of Divine Faith: A Catholic Account... 143

Mathews, Shailer, A.M., D.D.
Generic Christianity..... 702

Mercier, His Eminence, Cardinal.
Towards Unity..... 27

Morin, Léopold Fréderic Germain, Litt.D., F.R.S.L.
The Spirit and the Future of Catholic Liturgy..... 527

Nature of Divine Faith: A Catholic Account, The.
By Michael Maher, S.J., D.Litt..... 143

Nonconformity: Its Ideals and History.
By Alfred E. Garvie, M.A., D.D..... 476

Obbink, H. Th.
Personal Faith..... 724

On the Specific Genius and Capacities of Christianity, Studied in Connection with the Works of Professor Ernst Troeltsch.
By Baron Friedrich von Hügel, LL.D. First Article 68
Second Article..... 673

Orthodox Ritual in the Divine Service of the West.
By Archpriest Leonid Turkevich..... 519

"Outside the Church No Salvation."
By Jean Rivière..... 487

Pace, Edward A., Ph.D., S.T.D.
Philosophy and Belief..... 755

Personal Faith.
By H. Th. Obbink..... 724

Philosophy and Belief.
By Edward A. Pace, Ph.D., S.T.D..... 755

Place of Symbolism in Religion, The.
By Charles Gore, M.A., D.D..... 50

Platon, The Most Reverend.
Faith as It Is Understood by an Orthodox Divine.. 167

Poet of the Franciscan Movement: Fra Jacopone da Todi, The.
By Edmund Garratt Gardner, M.A..... 446

Programme of Christian Conference, A.
By Walter Howard Frere, D.D..... 264

Progress a Permanent Element in Religion.
By W. A. Guerry, M.A., D.D..... 805

Puller, F. W., S.S.J.E.
The Eastern Orthodox and the Anglican Communions..... 299

Religion of a Moving, Changing World, The.
By Henry Scott Holland, M.A., D.D..... 241

Religious Liberty and Religious Education.
By William Lawrence, D.D., LL.D..... 868

Renascence of Catholic Lyricism, The.
By Robert Vallery-Radot..... 384

Ritson, John H., M.A.
The Scriptures as a Bond of Co-operation..... 590

Rivière, Jean.
"Outside the Church No Salvation"..... 487

Roberts, Richard.
Some Reflections on the Christian Priesthood..... 374

Sanday, William, D.D., LL.D.
The Constructive Quarterly from Within..... 1

Schlatter, Adolf von, Doctor of Theology.
The Attitude of German Protestant Theology to the Bible..... 99

School and College Settlements of the Church of England.
By C. P. S. Clarke..... 419

Scriptures as a Bond of Co-operation, The.
By John H. Ritson, M.A..... 590

Simpson, James Gilliland.
Anglicanism and Reunion..... 361

Snowden, Philip, M.P.
The Churches and the Social Problem..... 433

Social Work in America.
By Edward T. Devine, Ph.D., LL.D..... 818

Solo Verbo: Lutheranism and Mysticism.
By Dr. Friedrich Loofs..... 733

Some Reflections on the Christian Priesthood.
By Richard Roberts..... 374

Spirit and the Future of Catholic Liturgy, The.
By Léopold Fréderic Germain Morin, Litt.D., F.R.S.L..... 527

Spiritual Factors of Unity.
By Henry Power Bull..... 461

Stead, Francis Herbert, M.A.
The Labour Movement in Religion..... 197

Stock, Eugene, D.C.L.
A Layman's Thoughts on the Church and the World 403

Study in Anthropomorphism.
By David H. Greer, D.D., LL.D..... 578

Symes, John Elliotson, M.A.
Broad Churchmanship: A.D. 1500–1900..... 617

Symonds, H., D.D., LL.D.
War and the Need of a Higher Nationalism..... 838

Tavernier, Eugène.
Independent Teaching in France in the Last Ten Years: French Clergy in the War..... 850

Temple, William, M.A.
Education and Religion Among Workingmen 188

Thomas, W. H. Griffith, D.D.
The Church of England in Relation to Other Reformed Communions..... 604

Thomson, W. R., B.D.
The Votaries of Personality..... 557

Towards Unity.
By His Eminence, Cardinal Mercier..... 27

Turkevich, Archpriest Leonid.
Orthodox Ritual in the Divine Service of the West.. 519

United Christendom and Islam, A.
By Samuel Marinus Zwemer, D.D..... 506

Unity in Scholarship.
By Francis Brown, D.D., LL.D..... 277

Unity in the Spiritual Fact.
By Terrot Reaveley Glover..... 20

Vallery-Radot, Robert.
The Renascence of Catholic Lyricism..... 384

Value of the Old Testament to the Church, The.
By D. M. Kay, D.D..... 773

Votaries of Personality, The.
By W. R. Thomson, B.D..... 557

War and the Need of a Higher Nationalism.
By H. Symonds, D.D., LL.D..... 838

Wesley's Place in Catholic Thought.
By J. Augustin Leger, D.Litt..... 329

Zwemer, Samuel Marinus, D.D.
A United Christendom and Islam..... 506

THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY

Edited by SILAS McBEE

The Editorial Board

IN AMERICA

Archbishop Platon, The Russian Cathedral, New York
Rev. Peter Ainslie, D.D., Baltimore
Rev. William Adams Brown, D.D., New York
Rev. W. P. Du Bose, S.T.D., Sewanee
President Robert A. Falconer, C.M.G., Toronto
Chancellor J. H. Kirkland, LL.D., Nashville
Bishop Francis J. McConnell, Denver
President W. Douglas Mackenzie, LL.D., Hartford
Dean Shailer Mathews, D.D., Chicago
George Wharton Pepper, Philadelphia
Robert E. Speer, D.D., New York
Rev. Henry Van Dyke, LL.D., Princeton
Rev. W. H. van Allen, D.D., Boston

IN CHINA

Rev. J. Campbell Gibson, D.D., Swatow
President F. L. Hawks Pott, D.D., Shanghai

IN GERMANY

Excellency Dr. von Bezzel, Munich
Professor Dr. Adolf Deissmann, Berlin
Professor Dr. F. Loofs, Halle
Professor Dr. von Schlatter, Tübingen
Pastor Julius Richter, D.D., Berlin

IN GREAT BRITAIN

The Bishop of Winchester, Farnham Castle
Rt. Hon. Arthur James Balfour, M.P. London
Rev. James Denney, D.D., Glasgow
Professor T. R. Glover, Cambridge
Arthur Henderson, M.P., London
Very Rev. W. R. Inge, D.D., London
Rev. James Hope Moulton, D.D., Manchester
Rev. W. P. Paterson, D.D., Edinburgh
Rev. William Sanday, D.D., Oxford
Rev. Principal Selbie, D.D., Oxford
Rev. William Temple, Repton

IN INDIA

The Bishop of Bombay, Bombay
Principal A. G. Fraser, Ceylon
Professor A. G. Hogg, Madras

IN NORWAY

Professor Sir Lyder Brun, Christiania

IN RUSSIA

Professor Nicholas N. Glubokovsky St. Petersburg
Professor S. V. Troitzky, St. Petersburg
Professor John Sokoloff, St. Petersburg
Professor Wladimir P. Ribinsky, Kieff
Prof. Theodore J. Titoff, Kieff

IN SWEDEN

Professor Dr. Nathan Söderblom, Upsala

Committees in America Great Britain and the Continent include as writers and co-operators:

Rev. John J. Wynne, S.J.
Mgr Shahan, D.D.
Professor E. A. Pace, D.D.
Rev. John J. Burke C.S.P.
Andrew J. Shipman, LL.D.,
and others, *in America*

Father Thurston
Father Sydney Smith
Wilfrid Ward
and others, *in England*

M. Georges Goyau
Mgr Batiffol
M. Leonce de Grandmaison
and others, *in France, Belgium, and Italy*

Other members of the Editorial Board will be added from the Continent and the Orient

THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY

THIS JOURNAL has been founded on the conviction that a constructive treatment of Christianity will make for a better understanding between the isolated Communions of Christendom. The destructive method has had its full opportunity and will continue to have it and ought to have it. But it has developed no power to unite and it is most effective in promoting division.

It is not neutral territory that is sought, where courtesy and diplomacy would naturally tend to avoid issues and to round off the sharp edges of truth and conviction, but rather common ground where loyalty to Christ and to convictions about Him and His Church will be secure from the tendency to mere compromise or to superficial and artificial comprehension. The purpose is to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence and to induce a better understanding and a truer sense of fellowship.

This journal is and must be unofficial. The Churches are not and in the nature of things cannot make themselves responsible for it. It will be responsible for the kind of writers admitted to its pages, but the writers alone will be responsible for what appears over their own names.

Two conditions are imposed: First, that the Faith and Work and Thought of each Communion shall be presented in its absolute integrity including and not avoiding differences; and second, that no attack with polemical animus shall be made on others.

THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY recognizes the need that is finding expression in every organized Christian Church—the need of the impact of the whole of Christianity on the race. It has no scheme for propagating a system for the unity of Christian Churches. It will therefore have no editorial pronouncements. It offers itself rather as a Forum where the isolated Churches of Christendom may reintroduce themselves to one another through the things that they themselves positively hold to be vital to Christianity.

THE CONSTRUCTIVE invites the free, living and deliberate statement of actual, operative belief.

1373

THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY

A Journal of the Faith, Work and Thought of Christendom

Edited by SILAS McBEE

THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY is issued in March, June, September and December of each year.

ALL EDITORIAL COMMUNICATIONS should be addressed to Silas McBee, Editor, THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY, 200 Fifth Avenue, New York.

ALL BUSINESS COMMUNICATIONS should be addressed to the publishers, George H. Doran Company, 38 West Thirty-second Street, New York.

Subscriptions from the United States or Canada may be placed through any bookseller or with the publishers direct. Yearly subscription, payable in advance, $2.50. Single numbers, 75 cents.

Entered as second-class matter at the post-office, New York, N. Y.
Copyright, 1914, by George H. Doran Company. All rights reserved.

CONTENTS FOR MARCH, 1914

Volume Two. Number One.

THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY FROM WITHIN

"What I have aimed at doing is not to take a bird's-eye view of the universe, but rather by a few prominent examples to bring out the kind of help which THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY furnishes towards the mutual understanding of the different parts of Christendom."

By William Sanday, D.D., LL.D., Christ Church, Oxford....1

UNITY IN THE SPIRITUAL FACT

"We admit that our task is to 'follow' Him, but we do not realize that this means not merely an external obedience, or even a loyal and sympathetic obedience, to such commands as He left His Church initially, or as He gives to us still as individuals, but also to follow Him through His experience of God, so far as this is possible for people so different from Him, into identification with His thought and His life Godward, manward, every way. No one will call this an easy ideal, but the whole Christian community depends upon the loyalty with which every member down to the least significant cherishes it. It is not easy to write of such ideals, and I will not now write more of it beyond this—that, so far as I can see, Unity is only to be reached as we draw nearer in God-given power to this ideal, all of us."

By Terrot Reaveley Glover, Fellow and Classical Lecturer, St. John's College, Cambridge, University Lecturer in Ancient History; an English Baptist. Among his publications are

CONTENTS—Continued

Life and Letters in the Fourth Century, Studies in Virgil, The Conflict of Religions in the Early Roman Empire.....20

TOWARDS UNITY

"There is no philosophy without synthesis. There is no completed philosophy without an integral synthesis. Unity is not only, in the aesthetic point of view, the seal of greatness, the note revealing order, but it is the condition *sine qua non* of stability, the essential law of equilibrium and durability. . . . All the philosophers who plead for the synthetic interpretation of all the data of their consciousness plead for sincerity. But what is sincerity but the orientation of the soul in reference to the truth? Now, to say *truth* is the same as saying intellectual representation adjusted to reality. In the realm of philosophy unity is the law, but the sceptre can belong only to the understanding."

By His Eminence, Cardinal Mercier, Archbishop of Mechlin, Primate of Belgium, President of the Royal Academy, and Director of the Class of Letters and of Moral and Political Sciences at Louvain.....27

THE PLACE OF SYMBOLISM IN RELIGION

"This Modernist attitude of mind towards the physical miracles is sufficiently widespread to make it very well worth while to examine it. . . . Christians of all religious communions must be deeply interested to know how far the Modernist interpretation can be taken as an accepted interpretation of the narrative in the Gospels and the clauses in the Creed."

By Charles Gore, M.A.,D.D., Bishop of Oxford, Editor of *Lux Mundi*, and author of *The Church and the Ministry, The Creed of the Christian, Bampton Lectures, 1891, The Body of Christ, Orders and Unity*, etc., etc. Dr. Gore was Librarian of the Pusey Library, Oxford, 1884-93, Canon of Westminster, 1894-1902, Bishop of Worcester, 1902-4, and Bishop of Birmingham, 1905-11.....50

ON THE SPECIFIC GENIUS AND CAPACITIES OF CHRISTIANITY, STUDIED IN CONNECTION WITH THE WORKS OF PROFESSOR ERNST TROELTSCH

"I come here to attempt the presentation of the fundamental strivings and thinkings, in matters of the specific genius, claims and capacities of Christianity, of Professor Ernst Troeltsch of Heidelberg. Such a presentation, to be effective, should be clear, yet clearness here is very difficult. Life itself is, not clear, but vivid. And even the deeper Sciences—those with most of concrete content, such as History and Psychology,—and also Philosophy, will remain always outdistanced, not in clearness, but in volume and vividness of content, by Life wheresoever it is profound."

By Baron Friedrich von Hügel, who has devoted his life to historical criticism as applied to biblical documents, to psychology and philosophy as applied to religious experience, and to the consolidation of such studies among his fellow Roman Catholics. His most recent publications are *The Mystical Element of Religion,* and *Eternal Life*.....68

THE ATTITUDE OF GERMAN PROTESTANT THEOLOGY TO THE BIBLE

"To the observer in the distance it must appear as if the sway of the Bible over the German Protestant Church is seriously shaken and exposed to great fluctuation. This thought is not only found in foreign literature, but it also agitates many who are in the thick of German life. But to clearer sight it is evident that the Bible is the fixed point which calls forth, dominates and draws to itself our religious history. . . . If we look at the present course of our religious history we must acknowledge that the religious power and authority of the Scriptures have stood the surprising test magnificently in modern German religious history."

By Adolf von Schlatter, Doctor of Theology (Halle), Professor of Theology and New Testament Exegesis at Tübingen, since 1898, and Fellow Director of the New Testament Ecclesiastical Seminar at that University; formerly Professor of New Testament Exegesis at Greifswald, and of Systematic Theology at Berlin. He is the author of many works on the New Testament, and has, with Dr. Cremer, edited a number of volumes on the history of the early Church. His most recent publications are *Die Theologie des Neuen Testaments und die Dogmatic, Wie Sprach Josephus über die christliche Dogma*.....99

FAITH AND ITS PLACE IN THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION

"It is eloquent of the significance of Faith as an element in Religion that we speak of Religions as the *Faiths* of the World, of their adherents as *Believers,* and of Christian Churches as the *Creeds* of Christendom. Popular and scientific usage thus combine to base a comparison of religious systems and organizations upon the objects and the contents of their belief. They assume, with justice, that what a person or a people believes is fundamental, is decisive for character and conduct, is determinant of vital institutions and activities."

By William Alexander Curtis, M.A., D. Litt., Professor of Systematic Theology in the University of Aberdeen since 1903. Dr. Curtis, who is a member of the National Church of Scotland, travelled in Greece and Italy in 1897-8 as Research Fellow of Edinburgh University, and received his training for the ministry in the same University. He also studied at Heidelberg, Leipzig, and Oxford. He is the author of *A History of Creeds and Confessions of Faith in Christendom and Beyond*.....111

CONTENTS—Continued

FAITH: ITS NATURE AND WORK

"I cannot define 'Faith' as anything less than the response of man's whole nature to God. And that response of the whole nature must involve each of the distinctive activities of man's nature as a centre of knowledge, will, and affection, and in a true faith God must be known as the sole Good, chosen as the sole Goal, and loved as the sole Object of desire."

By Peter Green, Canon of Manchester, and for the last twelve years in charge of large working-class parishes in that city. Canon Green was a member of the party of English clergy who visited South Africa on the "Mission of Help" to the Church in Africa. He has written chiefly on practical topics of parochial work (*How to Deal with Lads*, *How to Deal with Men*), and on devotional subjects (*Studies in Popular Psychology*, *Studies in the Cross*) 133

THE NATURE OF DIVINE FAITH: A CATHOLIC ACCOUNT

"In the view of the Catholic Church, then, this Faith which is so essential, which comes of hearing, which requires a preacher who has been sent, which assures us that the world was created by God, that its Creator exists and will reward those that seek Him, and which is necessary in order that we may be well pleasing to God, is not a mere prehensive act of the will, not a blind instinct, not a religious sense or relish, not confidence in the gratuitous mercy of God, but an intellectual assent to testimony, an acceptance or embracing by the understanding of revealed truth."

By Michael Maher, S.J., D. Litt. (University of London), Professor of Mental Science at Stonyhurst College, and Director of Studies at St. Mary's Hall; author of *Psychology, Empirical and Rational*, *Tatian's Diatesseron*, and articles in *The Catholic Encyclopaedia* and reviews 143

FAITH AS IT IS UNDERSTOOD BY AN ORTHODOX DIVINE

"Faith is the first foundation stone on which Christianity itself is built, and on which it builds all the faithful into one body, which is the Church of Christ. . . . Through the medium of man's nature in the Saviour, men become convinced that for them too it is possible and necessary to live the life which is knowable by faith only. In this way faith presents the aspect of man's personal relation to Christ the Saviour. It is not merely an agreement of our intellects to the truths of salvation contained in divine revelation, but an assimilation of these truths by our hearts, and, so to speak, their transmutation into our very life and activity. As the activity of believers in Christ, our activity is the

natural result of our free, vital and hearty trust in Christ as the Son of God, as our Saviour and Redeemer, through Whom all the means of salvation and all the blessings of our spiritual life are granted to us, in Whom is hidden our very life."

By The Most Reverend Platon, Russian Archbishop of North America and the Aleutian Islands.....167

EDUCATION AND RELIGION AMONG WORKING-MEN

"Inasmuch as education is the development of everything about a man which distinguishes him from an animal or a machine, inasmuch as it disciplines his intelligence, quickens his imagination and widens his sympathy—in so far it is breaking down barriers between the man and God. As we labour for the coming of the Kingdom we must . . . be ready to work in the ways adapted to the circumstances and claim all methods for Christ, even if they are employed at present mainly by agnostics or atheists, if only they tend to produce a fuller manhood. For he who liberates or develops any man's manhood, has been an agent in the creation of a child of God."

By William Temple, M.A., Headmaster of Repton School, since 1910, and President of the Workers' Educational Association. Mr. Temple is the son of the late Archbishop of Canterbury; he is a graduate of Balliol, was president of the Oxford Union in 1904, Fellow and Lecturer in Philosophy at Queen's College, Oxford, 1904-10. He is the author of *The Faith and Modern Thought*, *The Nature of Personality*, of the chapters on "The Divinity of Christ" and "The Church" in *Foundations*, and of numerous articles in reviews and periodicals.....188

THE LABOUR MOVEMENT IN RELIGION

"*The Labour Movement in Religion* is a phrase by no means universally accepted. It strikes on many ears with an unfamiliar sound. It has often been challenged. . . . It is not to be classed along with the Labour Movement in politics, in art, or in journalism, as one among many parallel movements, or as one among many branches of the same tree. Rather the Labour Movement in Religion is the Labour Movement become self-conscious, aware of its meaning, cognizant of its whence and its whither, and of its place in the general process of life. All the other phases of which mention has been made are sectional and partial. This is central. This gives cohesion and compactness to the whole movement."

By Francis Herbert Stead, M.A., Warden of Robert Browning Settlement, Walworth, England, the initiator, with Mr. C. Booth, of the conferences that resulted in National Committee on Old Age Pensions, 1898, and convener of Browning Hall Conference on Housing and Locomotion. Mr. Stead was graduated with hon-

ours from the University of Glasgow; he also studied at Halle, Giessen, Göttingen and Berlin; prepared for the Congregational ministry and became pastor of Gallowstreegate church, Leicester, in 1884. He has written a *Handbook on Young People's Guilds*, *The Kingdom of God*, and *How Old Age Pensions Came To Be*. . 197

JOHN WOOLMAN

"He had no advantage of learning or eloquence by which to win attention, but through the pure simplicity of his words there shines a spirit singularly tender, revealing itself continually in Christ-like thought and action. Little more than a column is devoted in the *Dictionary of National Biography* to the slender details of his life and writings; he belongs to those uncanonized saints to whose memory no Bollandists devote their pious labours."

By T. Edmund Harvey, M.P. for Leeds since 1911, and Warden of Toynbee Hall, 1906-11; member of London County Council, 1904-7; member of Central (Unemployed) Body, 1906-10; Honorary Secretary, with Prof. M. E. Sadler, of the Educational Settlement Committee. Mr. Harvey is a member of the Society of Friends and has written a study of *The Rise of the Quakers*. . 224

THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY

A Journal of the Faith, Work and Thought of Christendom

Edited by SILAS McBEE

THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY is issued in March, June, September and December of each year.

ALL EDITORIAL COMMUNICATIONS should be addressed to Silas McBee, Editor, THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY, 200 Fifth Avenue, New York.

ALL BUSINESS COMMUNICATIONS should be addressed to the publishers, George H. Doran Company, 38 West Thirty-second Street, New York.

Subscriptions from the United States or Canada may be placed through any bookseller or with the publishers direct. Yearly subscription, payable in advance, $2.50. Single numbers, 75 cents.

Entered as second-class matter at the post-office, New York, N. Y.
Copyright, 1914, by George H. Doran Company. All rights reserved.

CONTENTS FOR JUNE, 1914

Volume Two. Number Two.

THE RELIGION OF A MOVING, CHANGING WORLD

"These world-religions, then, are protests against Change. They rely on its elimination. They have no place for it. Yet the whole world has committed itself to Change. It has accepted motion as its law of life. . . . There is just one religion in the world which has seen in motion the law of human life, the key to man's being. . . . No other religion has a message or an interpretation to deliver to a changing world. If it may not possess itself of the mind of Christ, then, its mind will be necessarily formed outside the frontiers of religion."

By Henry Scott Holland, M.A., D.D., Regius Professor of Divinity and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford; formerly Canon of St. Paul's; editor of "The Commonwealth" and author of essays in *Lux Mundi*, and in volumes on Church Reform and Good Citizenship, of *Logic and Life*, *Fibres of Faith*, etc. 241

THE CONFESSION OF CHRIST

"It is hopeless to expect the Christian world to be satisfied with any union of Christian people that definitely excludes from its fellowship those whose desire to be loyal disciples of Christ cannot be doubted. Where Christ has already received the church cannot reject. . . . In other words, our Christian union must be as wide as our Christian unity of spirit. In life, in statement of belief, in worship, in institutions, in form of government—in

all alike—the one essential is that we should confess Christ. This is the one great primal confession. Less than this is not Christian; more than this is exclusive."

By Henry Churchill King, D.D., LL.D., President of Oberlin College, lecturer at Haverford College, at Yale and at Harvard, Trustee of Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, president of the Religious Education Association, 1907-8. Dr. King is the author of *Reconstruction in Theology, Theology and the Social Consciousness, The Ethics of Jesus*, etc. 253

A PROGRAMME OF CHRISTIAN CONFERENCE

"There is a large and increasing opportunity at the present time for conference between Christians of divided allegiance with a view to a better mutual understanding. . . . Here then is an attempt to outline a programme of Christian Conference. The burning questions of the controversy of the day come at the end of the programme. . . . Neither in 'this mountain' nor yet 'in Jerusalem' is the ultimate Worship of God: but in a heavenly Zion, common to them both, and not yet attained. May it not be that, in the mercy of God, even our mean divisions may be used and overruled to lead us on a good stage thitherward?"

By Walter Howard Frere, D. D., of the Community of the Resurrection; Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Southwark, 1895-1909; Select Preacher at Cambridge in 1901 and 1910. Author of *The Use of Sarum, New History of the Book of Common Prayer, English Church History 1558-1624*, and of other historical and liturgical works. 264

UNITY IN SCHOLARSHIP

"How far from anything like corporate church unity the utmost closeness of fellowship on the lines of scholarly union must remain, I am fully conscious. But it is still true that prejudice and distrust between religious bodies demand a solvent, and that no great union is possible without the individual touch. . . . Such is the guild of scholars, and within that guild, it may be hoped, will be developed at least some of the leaders who shall show us the way, at length, out of our labyrinth of sectarianism, into the broad and picturesque and fertile country of religious fellowship, in which diversity shall be for enrichment and not for separation, and the great ends of religion shall be pursued by all religious people, side by side. In such a unity, so led, religion will at length establish its universal dominion."

By Francis Brown, D.D., LL.D., President of Union Theological Seminary since 1908, and associated with the Seminary as instructor, as Associate Professor of Biblical Philology, and Professor of Hebrew and Cognate Languages since 1879. Author of *Assyriology, Its Use and Abuse, A Hebrew and English Lexicon*

of the Old Testament (with Prof. S. R. Driver and Prof. C. A. Briggs), *The Christian Point of View* (with Prof. G. W. Knox and Prof. A. C. McGiffert), etc. 277

THE EASTERN ORTHODOX AND THE ANGLICAN COMMUNIONS

"But the problem which I venture to propose for discussion . . . is the question whether the visible unity of the Church Militant here on earth can ever be in abeyance; and any discussion of that problem ought, if it is to be conducted on Catholic lines, to be based on the witness of Scripture and Tradition and the History of the Church. At least that is my conviction."

By F. W. Puller, S.S.J.E., Superior of St. Edward's House, Westminster. After a remarkable parochial work at Cardiff among the working people, Father Puller joined the Society of St. John the Evangelist in 1880. He spent eight years in mission work among the Kaffirs and colored people of Capetown, and five years in the heart of the native reserve of Kaffraria. In 1912 he accepted an invitation to lecture on the Church of England in St. Petersburg before a society of distinguished ecclesiastics and lay members of the Russian Church. These lectures have since been published. Father Puller has also published various controversial and doctrinal works dealing with the Catholicity of the Church of England. 299

JERUSALEM THE HOLY CITY

"To a trembling sick woman the Saviour once spoke the words, 'Be whole of thy scourge.' " The International Health Bureau, organized "to combat the ravages of disease in Jerusalem, has had the courage to adopt these words, divine alike in their gentleness and their boldness, and to say to the Holy City, 'Be whole of thy scourge.' . . . This great work of civilization, in which all nations and faiths represented at Jerusalem have united together, is inspired by a common love of the Holy City."

By Adolf Deissmann, D. Theol. (Marburg), D.D. (Aberdeen, St. Andrew's, Manchester), Professor of New Testament Exegesis in the University of Berlin since 1908; lecturer at the Summer School of the Free Churches, Cambridge, in 1907, and lecturer at Upsala in 1910; author of *Die Neutestamentliche Formel "in Christo Jesu," Bibelstudien* (first English edition in 1901), *Licht vom Osten* (first English edition in 1910), *Paulus*, etc. 314

WESLEY'S PLACE IN CATHOLIC THOUGHT

"The remarkable fact is, therefore, by no means an accident, that Alexander Knox, who had learnt from Wesley himself how to appreciate, in the ancient Liturgy of the Church of England,

the treasured wisdom of Christianity, should have, in his turn, taught the English Tractarians the same lesson; and that, in this way, however indirect, John Wesley should have begotten John Henry Newman."

By J. Augustin Leger, D.Litt. (Paris), Professor of English in the Naval College, Brest; a French Catholic layman who has made an exhaustive study of the life and teaching of John Wesley. The first volume of his extended biography, *La Jeunesse de Wesley*, was published in Paris in 1910.....329

ANGLICANISM AND REUNION

"It is supremely important that we should not allow ourselves to be beaten out of the conviction that we are working towards a synthesis of faith and order, and not a compromise of theory and practice. Some may be content to call this the spirit of 'Edinburgh,' but it is a pity to prejudice a great movement of Christian thought by seeming to confine it to what is really one of its conspicuous results rather than its inspiring cause. . . . The vision had been growing long before the World's Conference was conceived and is even now operative in a far wider circle. Wherever Loyalty and Liberalism are not regarded as mutually exclusive ideas, wherever Authority and Freedom are cherished with an equal passion, there it is."

By James Gilliland Simpson, Canon of St. Paul's Cathedral, London, since 1911, and formerly Principal of the Scots Episcopal Theological College, Principal of Leeds Clergy School, and Canon of Manchester.....361

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE CHRISTIAN PRIESTHOOD

"The Church therefore appears first of all as a society existing in the world in order to offer itself in sacrifice and intercession for the world; and it symbolizes and focuses its activity in the Eucharist. The Eucharist is the Church's great central affirmation of its unity with Christ in His offering of Himself to God; it is the key, the interpretation of the Church's life. The priestly office of the Church is not, however, contained exclusively within the eucharistic act. Its entire life is eucharistic. It is priestly in all its worship and its work; and what it does in the Eucharist is to gather up all its life, in worship and in work, and offer it to God in a symbolic act."

By Richard Roberts, minister of the Presbyterian Church at Crouch Hill, London. Mr. Roberts, who is a Welshman, has written several books, the most widely known being *The Renascence of Faith*, and was the convener of the Committee on the Instruction of Youth of the Presbyterian Church of England. . .374

CONTENTS—Continued

THE RENASCENCE OF CATHOLIC LYRICISM

"While politicians are persisting in serving up to the masses, in the name of the laic spirit and of Progress, the pernicious puerilities of the *Encyclopédie* now superannuated, while certain professors of the Sorbonne are madly bent upon ruining our world-wide reputation for straight thinking and clear speaking, while the fashionable stage and fashionable fiction are rehashing in senile fashion their tiresome physiologies, while the reviews are leading opinion astray upon fictitious glories, and the magazines are exalting stage-players, mountebanks, dancers and courtesans, it is good to turn aside for a moment from all this din and grimacing, and, entering into the silence that is within, to give ear to the new and mysterious sounds which are awakening from out of the very depths of the French soul."

By Robert Vallery-Radot, Editor-in-Chief of *Cahiers*, a French Catholic review of literature and art published in Paris in the interest of the movement which is described in this article. M. Vallery-Radot is the son of René Vallery-Radot, the son-in-law and biographer of Louis Pasteur. 384

A LAYMAN'S THOUGHTS ON THE CHURCH AND THE WORLD

"I protest with my whole soul against the doctrine that such a state of things [a divided Christianity] is right in itself. It is wrong! I do believe that God's gracious providence has, in this as in so many other earthly circumstances, brought good out of evil; but that does not make the evil in itself good. Nor can I see any real remedy in schemes for 'exchange of pulpits' and the like. Let all possible combinations and co-operations be fostered. If we cannot in this dispensation hope for organic union, let us do what we can to minimize the evils of disunion; but do let us make up our minds that nothing short of organic union is in accordance with our Lord's high-priestly prayer, or will have the power to make the world believe in the one Saviour."

By Eugene Stock, D.C.L., for thirty-three years Secretary of the Church Missionary Society; editor of that Society's publications, and of the Church of England Sunday School Institute; a member of the House of Laymen from its establishment in 1885; author of *The English Church in the Nineteenth Century*, a *History of the Church Missionary Society*, and many other works on missions. 403

SCHOOL AND COLLEGE SETTLEMENTS OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND

"Altogether in spite of failures and disillusions, the story of its School and College Missions has been a notable chapter in the history of the Church of England. The movement is full of promise

for the future, and an assurance that that Church is no dead branch, but living and fruitful in good works."

By C. P. S. Clarke, Vicar of High Wycombe, Bucks; Head of Christ Church (Oxford) Mission, Poplar, East, 1901-1907; curate of the Mission and warden of Christ Church House, 1898-1901; vicar of Fenton in the Potteries, 1907-1911; author of *Everyman's Book of Saints*. 419

THE CHURCHES AND THE SOCIAL PROBLEM

"We desire to see the Church exercising a dominating influence over the minds and actions of men and women because we believe that it, of all institutions, is the one specially qualified to prepare the way for the establishment of the coming of the Kingdom of God upon earth. The religious instinct is deeply embedded in human nature, and there is an almost universal longing among the people who can now stand aloof from the Churches, for the help of a Church which will satisfy their craving for the spiritual life. The Church has only to show that it really sympathizes with the people, that it is anxious to help them, that it shares their hopes and desires, to become again a real, living, vitalizing, and catholic Church."

By Philip Snowden, M.P. for Blackburn since 1906; Chairman of the Independent Labour Party, 1903-1906, and author of many articles and pamphlets on Socialism.. 433

THE POET OF THE FRANCISCAN MOVEMENT: FRA JACOPONE DA TODI

" 'He suffered patiently many tribulations from the Lord Pope Boniface, who was ill informed; but was afterward liberated. He composed many songs of praise in the vernacular, of lofty doctrine and full of sweetness, and cried out manfully against the life of the said Pope Boniface.' "

By Edmund Garratt Gardner, M.A., Barlow Lecturer on Dante at University College, London; a lay scholar of the Roman Church, who has devoted much time to research in Italian libraries and archives, and more recently to the study of mysticism and kindred subjects; the author of a number of volumes on Italian literature and history. 446

THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY

A Journal of the Faith, Work and Thought of Christendom

Edited by SILAS McBEE

THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY is issued in March, June, September and December of each year.

ALL EDITORIAL COMMUNICATIONS should be addressed to Silas McBee, Editor, THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY, 200 Fifth Avenue, New York.

ALL BUSINESS COMMUNICATIONS should be addressed to the publishers, George H. Doran Company, 38 West Thirty-second Street, New York.

Subscriptions from the United States or Canada may be placed through any bookseller or with the publishers direct. Yearly subscription, payable in advance, $2.50. Single numbers, 75 cents.

Entered as second-class matter at the post-office, New York, N. Y.

Copyright, 1914, by George H. Doran Company. All rights reserved.

CONTENTS FOR SEPTEMBER, 1914

Volume Two. Number Three.

SPIRITUAL FACTORS OF UNITY

"Unity is a vital growth. It is not merely that God by the working of His Spirit makes men peaceable, overrules their dispositions, brings good out of evil in us. There is much more than this in the Divine origin and growth of unity. Is it not in the revelation of Himself, which God has given us in His Son Jesus Christ, a revelation of grace and truth, that the foundations are laid?"

By Henry Power Bull, Provincial Superior of the American Province of the Society of St. John the Evangelist, and priest-in-charge of the Church of St. John the Evangelist, Boston. Father Bull is one of the Mission Priests of the Society. For ten years, 1901 to 1911, he was Superior of the Society's House at Capetown, South Africa, and was largely engaged in mission work amongst the Kaffirs. For the last two years of his stay in South Africa he was editor of *The Church Chronicle*, the organ of the South African Church. He came to Boston at the beginning of 1911. . **461**

NONCONFORMITY: ITS IDEALS AND HISTORY

"As the purpose of THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY is to draw more closely together the members of different denominations, and as mutual knowledge is the best means of mutual respect, I desire to present my conception of the Nonconformist ideal, and my estimate of its history, in order to emphasize not any

aggressive or exclusive aspect which it may at some periods have presented, but rather the conciliatory and truly catholic element which I find in it, and on account of which it has my loyal and devoted adhesion."

By Alfred E. Garvie, M. A., D.D., Principal of New College, Hampstead, London, since 1907; President of the Congregational Union of Scotland in 1902, Professor of the Philosophy of Theism, Comparative Religion and Christian Ethics in Hackney and New Colleges, 1903-7. Dr. Garvie is the editor of the *Westminster New Testament*, a contributor to *Hastings' Dictionary*, *The Expositor*, etc., and among his publications are *The Ritschlian Theology*, *The Gospel for Today*, *The Christian Certainty*.....476

"OUTSIDE THE CHURCH NO SALVATION"

"Few formulas have the property of being so ill understood and, consequently, arousing so many prejudices as the classic adage, 'Outside the Church no salvation.' . . . A hardness at once absurd and cruel is imputed to it, on the pretext that it would condemn to eternal damnation all men who have had the misfortune of not knowing it. . . . As theology understands it, the aphorism in dispute, on the contrary, not only escapes all the troublesome consequences which it is sought to deduce from it, but it expresses one of the profoundest and most touching truths of revelation."

By Jean Rivière, Professor in the Grand Séminaire, Albi, France; author of *Le dogme de la Rédemption*, an English translation of which was published in London in 1909.....487

A UNITED CHRISTENDOM AND ISLAM

"When in Africa or Asia the true disciples of Christ face Islam and fight for the faith once for all delivered to the saints they are all Christians, Churchmen and Catholics in the deepest sense of those words. Christians because they follow Christ, not Mohammed; Churchmen because they are incorporated into His mystical body, and not into the earthly fellowship of a Moslem brotherhood; Catholics because they belong to that church which existed before the Hegira and will exist even after Islam is forgotten in Arabia, the cradle of its birth. It strengthens one's faith and love to confess in strategic centres like Cairo and Constantinople: '*I believe in the Holy Catholic Church.*' "

By Samuel Marinus Zwemer, D.D., Editor of *The Moslem World*, associated with the School for the Training of Missionaries to Mohammedans, in Cairo, and also with the Nile Mission Press; Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society; missionary at Busrah, Bahrein, and other stations in Arabia. Among his publications are *Arabia, the Cradle of Islam*, *Raymond Lull, Islam, A Challenge to Faith*, etc.....506

CONTENTS—Continued

ORTHODOX RITUAL IN THE DIVINE SERVICE OF THE WEST

"Though it is customary to speak of the differences between the fragments of once united Christendom, it would be unjust to say that the differences between Christians of different confessions have altogether swallowed up the oneness of their original foundation."

By Archpriest Leonid Turkevich, Rector of the Orthodox Ecclesiastical Seminary at Tenafly, N. J., since 1907, and Professor of Biblical History and Theology. After receiving his theological degree from the Imperial Ecclesiastical Academy of Kieff, Mr. Turkevich taught in the Ecclesiastical Seminary at Ekaterinoslav and in the Ecclesiastical School of the Government of Kursk. He then took Holy Orders. He has contributed articles to Russian Church magazines in St. Petersburg and in Kursk, and also to the American publications of the Orthodox Church. He is the author of *A Summary of the Russian Ecclesiastical Magazines for 1906* . . **519**

THE SPIRIT AND THE FUTURE OF CATHOLIC LITURGY

"I am one of those, then, who think that the Church, if she wishes her liturgy to be once more accessible to the people, will find herself obliged, in time, to give a larger or smaller share of it to the language of the people. . . . I am no prophet, but it appears to me that the Church would be presenting a great and beautiful spectacle to the world if such a combination as this could some day be realized; that it would then be more Catholic than ever, speaking, as on the Day of Pentecost, the tongues of all the peoples of the world; that it would also be more One, not only in faith and charity, but even in the voice of its people resounding once more, full of life and understanding, to 'glorify with one heart and one mouth God, the Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ.' "

By Léopold Fréderic Germain Morin, Litt. D. (Oxford), F.R.S.L., a Benedictine of the Abbaye de Maredsous, Belgium; a member of the Academy of Vienna, an associate of the Société des Antiquaires de France; author of numerous works on ancient Christian literature, especially in the fourth and twelfth centuries, published for the most part in the *Revue Bénédictine de Maredsous*, from 1884 up to the present time; editor of the *Anecdota Maredsolana*, and the discoverer of various ancient Latin texts of the early fathers. **527**

THE DEPARTURE OF ARCHBISHOP PLATON

"When Archbishop Platon came to this country, the Russian Orthodox Church was, in a sense, a closed community, shut in by

the difficulties of language, by the strangeness of its ritual, by a certain aloofness of attitude, the fruit, perhaps, of the long seclusion of the Eastern Orthodox Church. This closed community Archbishop Platon has opened up to the world, with a spiritual energy, a warmth of heart, a gift of religious sympathy which give his work a significance that will endure."

By Charles Johnston, author of *Paul and Philo*, in the December number of this journal.....**550**

THE VOTARIES OF PERSONALITY

"Professor Ward has noted the tendency of Theism to pass over into Absolutism, and has accounted for it in a highly instructive way. It is due partly to the 'besetting sin of speculative thinking'—the sin *i.e.* of 'hypostatizing abstractions'—and partly to the presence of 'a religious spirit of self abasement.' This latter remark is of special interest. The history of religion frequently shows us mysticism straining at the leash of a hard theistic philosophy, that has seemed to set a 'legal' personality over against a judicial God. But, as we have sought to show, Theism may transcend this point of view without falling into the besetting sin that Ward condemns. In so far as it succeeds in doing so, it appeals to the 'votaries of personality' and affords theology a basis on which constructive work may be done."

By W. R. Thomson, B. D., minister of the United Free Church at Bellshill, Scotland. Mr. Thomson filled a charge in Cape Town, South Africa, for five years, and has recently conducted the late Dr. Orr's class in Apologetics at the United Free Church College, Glasgow. His only published work is a brilliant set of essays, *In Dickens' Street*.....**557**

A STUDY IN ANTHROPOMORPHISM

"When, therefore, we examine the moral sense within us, of which we are conscious in the consciousness of ourselves, we find not only a sense of the Infinite involved, but a sense of the Infinite in us; and that God is as real as we are, Whom ethically we predicate and ontologically affirm. Whither can we go to escape Him? Whither can we flee from His presence? If we climb up to heaven, if we make our bed in hell, if we take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, behold He is there, because *we* are there!"

By David H. Greer, D.D., LL. D., for sixteen years rector of St. Bartholomew's Church, New York; for four years Bishop Coadjutor, and since 1908, Bishop of the Diocese of New York. Author of *The Historic Christ*, *From Things to God*, *Visions*, etc.....**578**

THE SCRIPTURES AS A BOND OF CO-OPERATION

"The Bible has given rise to more controversy than any other book in the world. . . . But in the stillness of the Bible House

Library . . . we recall those men who through the centuries have been translating the Holy Scriptures . . . and we instinctively think of them not as men who differed, but men who in the perfect unity of the Church triumphant are swelling the one 'great multitude which no man can number, out of every nation, and of all tribes and peoples and tongues.' "

By John H. Ritson, M. A., late Brackenbury Science Scholar, Balliol College, Oxford; entered the Wesleyan Methodist ministry in 1891; became joint Secretary of the British and Foreign Bible Society in 1900; member of Continuation Committee of Edinburgh Missionary Conference and Chairman of its Special Committee on Christian Literature; has visited mission fields in many parts of the world.....**590**

THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND IN RELATION TO OTHER REFORMED COMMUNIONS

"One of the most welcome features of the present movement towards Christian unity is the way in which each Church is endeavouring to state its own position in order that its attitude may be understood and its contribution to the sum total of Christian thought and life realized. As a help in this direction it is proposed to inquire into the precise relation of the Church of England to other sections of Reformed Christendom from the sixteenth century to the opening of the nineteenth."

By W. H. Griffith Thomas, D.D., Professor of Old Testament Literature in Wycliffe College, Toronto, since 1910, formerly vicar of St. Paul's Portman Square, London, and Principal of Wycliffe Hall, Oxford. Among his publications are *The Catholic Faith, Methods of Bible Study, The Work of the Ministry*.....**604**

BROAD CHURCHMANSHIP: A.D. 1500-1900

"The Church of England appeals to the authority of the Bible and of the Early Church; but Orthodoxy always demands adherence to the traditional interpretations of these authorities. . . . The history of the past reminds us that the beliefs of one age have constantly proved incredible to the next; and that Revelation is a gradual process which naturally involves continual variations. The Church, like individuals, has to recognize that in her infancy she thought as a child and believed as a child, but that as she grows, she must ever be putting away childish things."

By John Elliotson Symes, M.A., Sometime Principal of University College, Nottingham; formerly Cambridge University Extension Lecturer; author of *Newcastle Sermons, Political Economy, The Prelude to Modern History, The French Revolution*....**617**

AN EXPERIMENT IN CO-OPERATION

"The societies are all persuaded that the social problem is a religious problem; that obedience to Christ involves a definite

attitude and purpose in industrial, commercial and social life, and that no association of Christians can endure its Master's judgment hereafter, unless it faces the task of testing the presuppositions and practices of society by His laws."

By W. F. Lofthouse, M.A., tutor in Old Testament Languages and Literature, and Philosophy at the Handsworth Methodist College, Birmingham, General Secretary of the Wesleyan Methodist Union for Social Service, and author of an important work on *The Family*.....627

THE DECAY AND THE GROWTH OF ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS IDEAS AMONG INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN GERMANY

"In conclusion I can only say this and nothing else. The decision depends on us. Whether the vitalizing ethical social ideas in our working classes can win the mastery depends on those endowed with education and far-seeing vision. Pioneers must by living out their ideas make themselves fellow citizens of the workers. To live and to serve the people, this after all is actually the only thing which gives an aristocracy the right to live—it is the highest Christian social ideal."

By Walter Classen, author of *Sociales Rittertum in England, Grosstadtheimat, Zucht und Freiheit;* a co-operator in the "Volksheim" in Hamburg, and widely known for his work in behalf of education among juvenile labourers in Germany.....642

LUCIE FÉLIX-FAURE GOYAU

"The sacrifice of her life she made and renewed again and again, in full consciousness and joyfully. During the long agony of ten days and ten nights, it was remarked that the dying woman in moments of unconsciousness awoke when the name of Jesus was spoken in the prayers that were being recited near her. An unbeliever, who witnessed this, was profoundly touched by it. 'She responds to that name,' he said, 'as a soldier answers, "Present" at the call to battle.' "

By Léonce de Grandmaison, S. J., Editor of *Etudes*, and *Recherches de Science Religieuse*, Paris; author of *The Witness of the Spirit*, in the December issue of this journal.....653

THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY

A Journal of the Faith, Work and Thought of Christendom

Edited by SILAS McBEE

THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY is issued in March, June, September and December of each year.

ALL EDITORIAL COMMUNICATIONS should be addressed to Silas McBee, Editor, THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY, 200 Fifth Avenue, New York.

ALL BUSINESS COMMUNICATIONS should be addressed to the publishers, George H. Doran Company, 38 West Thirty-second Street, New York.

Subscriptions from the United States or Canada may be placed through any bookseller or with the publishers direct. Yearly subscription, payable in advance, $2.50. Single numbers, 75 cents.

Entered as second-class matter at the post-office, New York, N. Y.
Copyright, 1914, by George H. Doran Company. All rights reserved.

CONTENTS FOR DECEMBER, 1914

Volume Two. Number Four

ON THE SPECIFIC GENIUS AND CAPACITIES OF CHRISTIANITY, STUDIED IN CONNECTION WITH THE WORKS OF PROFESSOR ERNST TROELTSCH

"Entire peoples clash in arms, gigantic industrial struggles pulse across continents and oceans, immense physical discoveries and inventions almost annihilate time and space. Yet engrossing, and deeply important (also in their help or hindrance to our moral and spiritual upbuilding and faith) as are these wild, vast, fleeting things all around us, it is not they, but it is this upbuilding and faith, and the ultimate realities which they touch, which indeed penetrate and occasion them, that are the greater and the greatest things experienced by man. And even simply as the utterances of one who, amidst the amazing distractions of our times, steadily perceives and proclaims this abiding pre-eminence of religion, Troeltsch's writings stand amongst the most impressive, because most circumspect and veracious, testimonies to the indestructible need and conviction that the human mind and conscience, still, at bottom, can find rest alone in God, its home."

By Baron Friedrich von Hügel, LL.D., whose first paper appeared in the March issue, 1914 673

GENERIC CHRISTIANITY

"Other foundation can no man lay than that which is laid, Jesus Christ our Lord. Any form of Christianity that is not in attitude and fundamental sympathies at one with the religious

spirit of historical orthodoxy, however it may reject the philosophies or dramatic pictures and analogies in which this spirit was expressed, will be ecclesiastically sterile. As one thus comes to see that there is a divine, vital Christianity at work in the world morally fructifying social evolution, satisfying its religious needs, saving men's souls, and transforming social conditions, he will also see that the different Christian groups, despite differences in their doctrines or polity, possess this generic Christianity. . . Such an observer will be filled with something nobler than tolerance. He will feel that as a Christian nothing Christian is foreign to him; that while he may believe certain forms of Christian thought and organization are less developed and even inferior to those which satisfy him, he will also believe that through them all is beating the gospel and the spirit of Jesus Christ."

By Shailer Mathews, A.M., D.D., Dean of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago.....702

PERSONAL FAITH

"A certain religious atmosphere is required as a necessary condition to the acceptance of the gift of the Scripture: God giving His Son as a Saviour of the world. But when this is so, and I think it irrefutable, then it is inconsiderate to require intellectual agreement as a primary condition from one longing for bliss. One cannot acknowledge the Scripture as the Word of God before having heard out of the Scripture the voice of God, speaking to him. One cannot believe the supernatural birth of Christ before having felt the all-controlling power of His personality. One cannot consent to the biblical doctrine before having seen that it is a doctrine of salvation for his own soul."

By H. Th. Obbink, Professor of Theology, Utrecht, Holland. 724

SOLO VERBO: LUTHERANISM AND MYSTICISM

"Modern mystics, then, are hard to convince. Threateningly and with self-assurance the Zwikauer prophets took leave of Luther in 1522, when he tried to explain their errors to them. We too meet with similar proud self-assurance in the ringing complaints of modern mystics over Church narrowness when we try to criticise their thoughts. . . . But for the sake of the thousands who because of the prophets of modern mysticism will have no understanding of historical Christianity if one does not show them where the limitations and dangers of this mysticism lie, it is the duty of all friends of constructive Christianity to emphasize the fact that the strength of Christianity does not lie in the knowledge acquired by the mystic of all times, even by the pre-Christian ones, but in *solo verbo*, in the historical revelation alone."

By Dr. Friedrich Loofs, Professor of Church History in the University of Halle.....733

CONTENTS—Continued

PHILOSOPHY AND BELIEF

"The 'convictions about Christ and His Church,' which find expression in these pages, may be regarded as internal relations; and it is well that they first of all should be fully understood. The various meanings of faith, orthodoxy and similar things that lie at the foundation should be brought to view, if only to make clear the doctrinal positions that may later be explained in detail. 'Loyalty to Christ' implies that He is accepted as the chief corner-stone on which all constructive work must rest."

By Edward A. Pace, Ph.D., S.T.D., Professor of Philosophy in the Catholic University, Washington, D. C., since 1891; member of American Psychological Association and of American Philosophical Society.....*755*

THE VALUE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT TO THE CHURCH

"The late Ecumenical Patriarch—His Holiness Joachim III—was pleased twelve years ago to show a friendly interest in the work of the Church of Scotland in Constantinople. . . . With some of the clergy at the Patriarchate the writer of this article had the privilege of friendly discussion. The memory of the Christian courtesy of these dignitaries of the Eastern Church may, the writer hopes, have availed to banish unworthy narrowness from what is written. We conclude that it is easy to think too highly of the written form of a Divine Revelation. The Founder of the Church encourages the view that stereotyped ideas and forms cannot be a substitute for a continuous vitality. The sacred Scripture of the Hebrews was highly honoured but also critically interpreted by the evangelists and apostles; and it remains indispensable for the Church."

By D. M. Kay, D.D., Professor of Hebrew in St. Mary's College, University of St. Andrews, Fife, Scotland. Dr. Kay was stationed for five years (1897-1902) in the Church of Scotland Mission in Constantinople. He contributed a translation from Syriac and from Greek of the Apology of Aristides to the *Ante-Nicene Fathers,* Vol. 9; published an English version of Dalman's *Die Worte Jesu,* and wrote the section on "Susanna" in the *Oxford Apocrypha,* recently published by Dr. Charles.....*773*

INTERNATIONAL AND INTERDENOMINATIONAL RESEARCH OF THE NEW TESTAMENT

"International and interconfessional investigation of the New Testament is a parallelogram of forces. Along one line it pushes boldly forward, along another it looks carefully about, digging, boring, testing, rejecting, learning and often unlearning. Daily gathering fresh enthusiasm for their sublime object, scholars of every people and denomination push towards the same great goal

which science has set before them,—the discovery of new truth. The fact that hundreds upon hundreds of specialists, as generation follows generation, devote their best powers to the Old Book, yet never can make an end to their investigations, proves the inexhaustibleness of its contents. And the fact that even in the fire of sharpest criticism it has victoriously asserted its life-power, may well give to those who believe they should protect its sacredness by outward means, courage to leave the New Testament, with proud confidence, yet longer in the brightest light of modern investigation."

By Dr. Adolf Deissmann, Professor in the University of Berlin, whose article on "Jerusalem the Holy City," appeared in the issue for June, 1914.....786

PROGRESS A PERMANENT ELEMENT IN RELIGION

"The Church has no more dangerous foe to combat than that spirit of ultra-conservatism which allows her clergy and leaders to get out of sympathetic touch with and understanding of the times in which we live. Each age calls for a restatement and reinterpretation of Christianity in terms of the thought and scholarship of the age so that men may understand it and be saved by it. . . . While there are great mysteries in Christianity, and always will be, there are no mysteries which cannot be investigated. Separate mysteries under the light of fuller knowledge may disappear and become merged in that sense of 'Greater Mystery,' which includes all the rest and which must ever remain beyond our ken."

By W. A. Guerry, M.A., D.D., Bishop of South Carolina; Chaplain and Professor of Homiletics and Pastoral Theology in the University of the South, 1893-1907.....805

SOCIAL WORK IN AMERICA

"Without Christianity social work would never have taken its present forms, would never have made such extraordinary progress, and would not today stand in such profound humility and such boundless faith before the greater tasks of the future."

By Edward T. Devine, Ph.D., LL.D., Editor of *The Survey*, General Secretary New York Charity Organization Society, Director, New York School of Philanthropy, Professor of Social Economy in Columbia University; author of *Economics, The Practice of Charity, Social Forces,* etc.....818

WAR AND THE NEED OF A HIGHER NATIONALISM

"The human race and nothing less is the Family of God. The nations then are members of the Family of God. . . . Here, as it seems to me, is the most urgent task for all lovers of unity. It must take time and a long time. The habit of mind needed for

the production of the Higher Nationalism cannot be planted and become a flourishing growth in a day. . . . The organized Church is the medium for the realization of this new international ideal. And since for its production no present organized Church or the whole aggregate of Church organizations suffices, we must earnestly, patiently, and above all candidly expose the causes of the failure of organized Christianity, and lay broader foundations upon which we can all take our stand, and build up by united effort a city that shall indeed be foursquare."

By H. Symonds, D.D., LL.D., Vicar of Christ Church Cathedral, Montreal, since 1903; formerly Professor of Divinity in Trinity University, Toronto, and Headmaster of Trinity College School, Port Hope; Chairman of the Protestant Board of School Commissioners in Montreal.....838

INDEPENDENT TEACHING IN FRANCE IN THE LAST TEN YEARS: French Clergy in the War

"The readers of THE CONSTRUCTIVE will surely feel that there was occasion for making a résumé . . . of the difficulties that French Catholics had to surmount in order to protect and to develop independent teaching. . . . They have succeeded in spite of all the difficulties which have been renewed and, especially during the last ten years, continually increased. . . . The conduct of the clergy during the war has done a great deal to hasten and to make permanent this change. For twenty-five years the ministers of religion . . . have, like other citizens, been compelled to become soldiers. . . . In the midst of soldiers and a soldier himself, the priest, whom the free-thinker pretends to treat as an inferior citizen, has suddenly proved a living manifestation of the spirit of discipline and sacrifice."

By Eugène Tavernier, for thirty years a collaborator in *l'Univers,* and in his youth secretary to Louis Veuillot, its editor; he has contributed numerous articles to *The Nineteenth Century,* and is the author of the sections on "Louis Veuillot" and "Vladimir Soloviev" in *The Catholic Encyclopedia.* Among his publications are *La morale et l'esprit laique, La religion nouvelle,* and *Louis Veuillot, l'écrivain, le lutteur, l'homme*.....850

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

"Individualism as such has run its course. The liberty to beget children and to turn them over to the State to train is the claim of those who would undermine religion and liberty. We are just at the beginnings of the readjustments of our habits to the principle of religious liberty. We of this country are fortunate in not having the encrustated traditions of older nations to break. We have, however, work enough ahead to demand statesmanship, clear thinking, and patience. Religious education in the midst

of religious liberty involves the rehabilitation of the forces of the parents, the home and the Church—that they may work with the school and other institutions and influences in the creation of a citizenship based on religious faith and fired with the spirit of religious liberty."

By William Lawrence, D.D., LL.D., Bishop of Massachusetts; Dean of the Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge, 1888-1893, Overseer of Harvard University since 1894; author of *Visions and Service, Life of Roger Wolcott, Study of Phillips Brooks*, etc. 868

THE LATE BISHOP OF CREMONA'S LAST LETTER TO THE EDITOR OF THIS JOURNAL

"If those, who in whatsoever manner preside over and govern the three great Christian Churches, would begin to treat each other as brethren, eschew angry and invidious language, and give proof of that charity of which Jesus Christ gave us so many and such sublime proofs, our minds would be prepared to receive the truth, from whatever quarter it came." 874

JOHN TAULER

"The mystic has always rested upon spiritual interpretations of life. This has been his weakness, and his strength. Today, when materialism has suffered defeat, when the materialistic defences of Christian belief have been put in doubt and when materialistic explanations of life have been abandoned, mysticism comes again into her kingdom. Thought and knowledge have co-operated in this, but there are other stimulating experiences which may tend to develop psychological energy besides that of knowledge."

By William Boyd Carpenter, D.D., D.C.L., Bishop of Ripon, 1884-1911; Hulsean Lecturer (Cambridge), 1878; Bampton Lecturer (Oxford), 1887; Noble Lecturer (Harvard), 1904; Honorary Chaplain and Chaplain-in-Ordinary to the Queen, 1879-1884. Among his publications are *Permanent Elements of Religion, Christian Reunion, A Popular History of the Church of England*. . 876

THE
CONSTRUCTIVE
QUARTERLY

A JOURNAL OF THE FAITH, WORK
AND THOUGHT OF CHRISTENDOM

MARCH, 1914

The Constructive Quarterly from Within

By W. Sanday, D.D.,
Christ Church, Oxford.

The Constructive Quarterly has now been in existence for nearly a year. As I write, the third number lies before me; and that number already contains something of a retrospect and criticism of the course which the Quarterly has taken. The question is already raised how far it fulfils the promise of its title. How far does The Constructive Quarterly really construct, and what sort of prospect does it hold out of really constructing in the future? The criticism—if so it is to be called—is of the friendliest character. The distinguished author would appear to have been drawing his conclusions from a single number. It seemed to him

that the opening number was somewhat desultory and miscellaneous, that it did not grapple closely enough with its proper task of construction.

It is interesting to see that the representative of so conservative a Church should be so sanguine, that Archbishop Platon—of all men—should expect the arena of debate to be thrown open so soon. But I cannot help wondering whether he still retains his first impression. Wherever there is a series, it is impossible to reveal the full character of the series at the start. If I am not mistaken, the second and third numbers have added much to the self-disclosure of the first. To me, I confess, it is quite astonishing how much has been done in so short a time. Does not the Archbishop himself feel that the apparent aimlessness of most, if not all, of the first list of articles has even now disappeared? Is there not even now discernible a thread—and a very marked thread—of deliberate purpose running through them? Perhaps, even where this is not the case, the result may be due to accident—because for some reason or other the lead that had been given could not be taken up and followed out. Anyone who has had to do with editing will know how the best laid schemes of the editorial mind may from such causes "gang aft agley."

I did not put to myself the question which Archbishop Platon has put when I received the first number; but I do put it to myself now. And it is because I am inclined to answer it quite differently, and yet with some confidence, that I have asked leave to present an alternative view to the Archbishop's. In doing so, however, I would not be thought to underrate the value of the Archbishop's suggestions. As coming from him it is especially noteworthy that he should advocate the policy "of devoting at least a part of each number to the discussion of this or that particular point of our faith by representatives of various Confessions."

I have no doubt that the Editor will take due note of this.

In the introductory article which headed the first number it was explained:

> "The plan is to bring together members of all Communions who will write constructively of the Christianity they profess and practice in order that others may know their Communion as they themselves would desire to have it known. It is not neutral territory that is sought, where courtesy and diplomacy would naturally tend to avoid issues and to round off the sharp edges of truth and conviction, but rather common ground, where loyalty to Christ and to convictions about Him and His Church will be secure from the tendency to mere compromise or to superficial and artificial comprehension. The purpose is to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence, of mutual knowledge, of mutual desire for fellowship. In such an atmosphere it should be easier to believe in others at their best, without minimizing the real causes of separation."

A little lower down we were told that the object of the QUARTERLY was that the isolated Churches of Christendom might "reintroduce themselves to one another." Heaven knows that such "reintroduction" was sorely needed! The only question would be whether the process should be described as a "reintroduction"—as though it were repeating something that had been done before. Can it be truly said that the leading Confessions of Christendom have ever been properly made known to each other? A parting in anger is not exactly what we mean by an introduction.

I am permitted, then, to give my grounds for believing that THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY is proving itself a real medium for making known, or making better known, the different Christian Confessions to each other. I need not assume that we are quite without knowledge. But I believe that the QUARTERLY has added very substantially to that knowledge. And I am allowed to illustrate this from my own experience. I must try to put into words the effect which my reading of these first numbers has had upon my own mind.

I.

I am well aware how fallible these pictures which I am going to attempt to draw must necessarily be. They cannot be more than the subjective reproduction of the effect conveyed to an individual mind. I give them simply for what they are worth, with apologies beforehand for all their shortcomings.

I venture to begin with that great Communion to which Archbishop Platon himself belongs. We owe to him a "message" in the first number, as well as the later criticism in No. 3. The message is brief; but it contains not a few "words to the wise." Taken together with the powerful and weighty article "Orthodoxy in its Essence" by Professor Glubokovsky in No. 2, I must confess for myself that it has given me a clearer and more definite conception of the Orthodox Church or Churches than I had ever had before.

The picture presented to me is very imposing. One has to remember that it is a picture of the religious faith of more than 100,000,000 of human beings. An Anglican is very conscious that his Church is at most the Church of a single nation and the *disjecta membra* of a communion scattered over a number of others; it has its hold upon him and he would not willingly exchange it for any other, but it is a modest growth compared to the colossus by its side. The colossus towers like an oak, which is as deep rooted as it is wide spreading,

> *quae quantum vertice ad auras*
> *aetherias tantum radice in Tartara tendit.*

By sheer mass and bulk such a communion impresses the imagination. But the effect is heightened when we take into account its inner coherence, solidarity and homogeneity. There is not in the whole world a Church that is so completely "at unity in itself." This would still be true when all allowance has been made for a certain amount of recalcitrance on the part of some of

its national branches. Apart from this centrifugal action of nationalities, the members of the Eastern Church have the strongest sense of solidarity that can well be conceived. A similar effect is produced in the Church of Rome; but it is produced by strictness of discipline, and is consistent with a far greater variety of types and tendencies.

The impression of imposing mass in the Eastern Church is far from being external only. It is the result of a deep inner harmony, of logical and spiritual cohesion. I am tempted to quote in full a passage which brings out this with unusual power.

"First of all, Orthodoxy is absolutely independent of all historical National realizations; it is these latter, on the contrary, that are nourished and live by it, yet by no means exhausting it and only preparing the ground for better and wider adaptations. Orthodoxy from this point of view is an inexhaustible Christian energy, which flows from its original source with uninterrupted continuity and never changes or grows weaker. It is clear that by these attributes it becomes one with Christianity itself as the living agent of divine grace. But in the history of the world, the Christian stream was by degrees divided into a multitude of brooks which sometimes became so far separated one from another as entirely to forget the common source. To all these particularizations Orthodoxy contrasts itself in the dignity of central unity, whole in its essence and immutable at all historical progressive stages. The contrast with Christian denominations decidedly asserts that they are but partial reflections of Christian unity, whereas Orthodoxy claims for itself entire fulness of Christianity both in being and in contents."

We observe at the outset a slight preoccupation with the problem of Nationalities alluded to above. This is a problem of which the Orthodox Church is itself conscious. But at the same time—if we may judge by Professor Glubokovsky's article, as I believe we may—it has it well in hand, and the full settlement of it is only a matter of time. In other respects the Church hardly seems to have any problems, consciously present to it, at all. A Church in which fundamental principles are so strongly grasped, in which they are reduced to such simple forms and in which those forms so completely penetrate and

pervade the whole structure, hardly has room for problems—at least when it is thus contemplated with wholehearted allegiance from within. As the writer goes on to explain:

"It results therefrom that, in its inward trust, Orthodoxy thinks [of] itself as Christianity in its primordial completeness and incorrupted entirety. It marks its separation from other Christian denominations principally not as truth from errors, but in the quality of a whole compared with its parts. It is then the latter that separate themselves from it and for their justification and assurance of their autonomy are driven to insist on direct individualization with sharp underlining of their distinguishing traits and of a dissimilarity which would exclude both mixing and transmission. Through its very entirety Orthodoxy does not feel therefore any inward need, for it bears in itself all parts and has neither occasion nor inclination to differentiate itself from them. By the peculiarity of its very nature, Orthodoxy contains everything in itself and instils it into the closest harmonic union of all the organs of the Body of the Church."

There is no question of reconciling whole and parts, because it is assumed that the parts are organically related to the whole. There is no question of reconciling outward and inward, because it is assumed that the one is the pure and adequate expression of the other. There is no question of reconciling past and present, because it is assumed that past and present are not merely harmonious but identical, with their identity secured by unbroken continuity of transmission.

No wonder that the adherent of such a system looks round upon his position with absolute content and satisfaction. He is not troubled by self-criticism. His criticism is reserved for those who are without. In regard to them his attitude is uncompromising. It might be thought that a body like the Orthodox Church would have much in common with Old Catholicism. As compared with the Church of Rome, the attitude of both is very similar; both claim to observe the pure and original faith, stripped of all accretions and distortions. Accordingly we are told that Old Catholicism,

"on giving proofs of and testifying to its faithfulness with regard to dogmas and Church canons of the Ancient undivided Church of the seven Oecumenical Councils, desire [s] and demand [s] that Orthodoxy should straightway acknowledge it without uniting it with one of the existing Orthodox Churches, and outside such unity. What is proposed and demanded here is not reunion as such . . . but a mere intercommunion, which with such want of propriety is practised in the West in all kinds of intercommunions. Down to the present time these Old Catholic pretensions [have] proved unsuccessful and were, as they deserved, met with a decided refusal."

It is not surprising that such an attitude is felt to need something of an apology, and the writer goes on to give it.

"Now, on the part of Orthodoxy there was neither haughtiness, nor capriciousness, since it was called for by the very essence of the matter. When, therefore, the Old Catholics use their endeavours to attain quite different relations, they self-evidently show that they as yet have not penetrated in their life the depths of Orthodoxy and did not grow [have not grown] so close together as to be with it one in spirit, in its Christian disposition, which continues to remain with them rationalistic and Western."

This passage is very significant, and it is one that other communions, especially Protestant communions, should carefully bear in mind. With their less exalted self-consciousness as to the principles and implications of their own church order, it will seem to them that the language used has a certain real hauteur behind it—and it would perhaps be well for Orthodox writers, in their intercourse with the Western world, to remember that their words are apt to bear this construction. I think we can see that it is not so really. What the writer says is perfectly true; from his standpoint, the attitude which he assumes is "called for by the very essence of the matter." In the West we are apt to think of "intercommunion" as standing for a great deal; intercommunion, with us, means a great step on the road to reunion. But to an Orthodox Churchman this is a superficial and external view. The only relation that satisfies him is an organic relation; any kind of union that is short of organic is for him no union at all.

We must all of us learn to look facts straight in the

face; and Professor Glubokovsky, by the ability, definiteness and frankness of his paper, has gone far to enable us to do this, and so has laid us under a deep obligation.

II.

To the position that I have been attempting to describe above there is yet one addition to be made. It did not come in the way of the Russian contributors to enlarge upon it, but it may be taken as a matter of common knowledge. It applies especially to Russia; but, in view of the leading place which the Russian Church occupies, it must be held to put a stamp upon the Eastern Church as a whole. I refer to that deep fund of piety which lies at the bottom of the Russian character. In the Russian people there is a natural seriousness, an inborn sense of spiritual things, deep potentialities of religious emotion, a vein of imaginative mysticism, which mark it out as capable of great things in religion. This is an immense asset, and one that—although it has been always there—may lead to developments of expression in the future that can hardly be guessed at from the past.

It must be of the greatest value to the smaller national communions to have at their head one of such assured strength and stability. The Western observer also must needs look upon it with profound respect. If he cross-examines himself in the light of Professor Glubokovsky's article, he will find many a term invested for him with new and deepened significance. And yet, when he comes to compare the history of the Eastern Churches with the history of the West, he will find himself moved to certain questions which in the East are perhaps less consciously realized. The part of the world to which he belongs has had a more strenuous and varied intellectual and moral history. It has compressed into its nineteen centuries a greater multiformity of experience.

In certain directions it has thought more and learnt more. And, in the light of its own experience, there are some problems affecting the East that come home to it with greater force than they are perhaps likely to do on their own ground.

I will venture to specify three problems in particular: (1) the problem of reason; (2) the problem of liberty; (3) the problem of civilization.

(1) I could not help being impressed in Professor Glubokovsky's article by his frequent references to rationalism, and by the wide range which these references seem to cover. References were also made to science and scientific method. It almost seemed as if these were simply grouped together under the general head of rationalism. I could not find any clear differentiation between the right science which everyone would wish to accept and the wrong rationalism which an earnest Christian would desire to avoid. I cannot help asking myself whether Russian or Orthodox theology has really worked out this distinction. For us in the West it is the most urgent of all the problems that we have to deal with. And it is the more urgent because in this region there are no short cuts; the problem will have to be worked out in close detail all along the line.

I seem to see in Professor Glubokovsky something of a temptation to shelve this question, or at least to treat it as though it were answered long before it really is. But in fact the question will not allow itself to be shelved. There are no doubt certain stages of culture at which scientific inquiry and religion are so far apart that they do not seem to come into collision. But that is a stage that cannot last indefinitely. As science advances it creates a habit of mind; and that habit cannot be confined to certain closed compartments from which there is no outlet into the sphere of religion. The religion of the past has expressed itself in history, and cannot be adequately studied apart from this historical expression.

But there is also such a thing as a science of history; and the data of which religion makes use are not exempt from the operations of this science. In the last resort religion and science must come to terms. We cannot evade the issues, even if we would; but in point of fact there is really no reason why we should wish to evade them. Right religion and right science cannot collide; it is only the wrong varieties of both that really conflict. I am well aware that the process of discrimination is long and difficult; it is yet a great way from having reached its end. But I am afraid that for Orthodox theology the time of severer trial—and indeed, over a great part of the field, of severer work—is still to come.

This conclusion has been reached by an analysis of knowledge and its methods. It is no less apparent if we look at the state of things actually existing. In spite of all the solidarity of Russian religion, there is too much evidence of serious leakage at both ends of the social scale. The higher circles of Russian society are well known for their openness to foreign influences. I suppose that these circles are as cosmopolitan as any in the world; and they share in the cosmopolitan laxity in matters of religion. I sympathize with Professor Glubokovsky in his protest against the tendency to judge his Church by the writings of Count Tolstoy; but these writings are only one indication among many. Then there are also the products of Nihilism and Anarchism. All Churches have doubtless much to do in the way of re-assimilating lost classes; and the task of Orthodoxy is by no means the easiest.

(2) If these classes are to be won back, another problem that will have to be solved is the problem of liberty. The Russian Church and the Russian State are together passing through a period of difficult transition. It is not long since the exercise of authority in both was despotic. That state of things is not likely to return. But the full reconciliation of liberty and order, in a

country where the balance has been hitherto so uneven, is not likely to be accomplished in a day.

(3) Lastly, there is the problem of civilization. A painful light has been thrown upon the defects of some at least of the Orthodox Churches by the recent Balkan War. And in Russia itself there is still too much danger of *pogroms*, Jewish ritual trials, and the like. The manifestations of genuine religion and of superstition lie too near each other. It is possible to have splendid religious material side by side with very imperfect Christianity.

I do not enumerate these things in any spirit of fault-finding; we have all too much to do to keep any where near our own ideal. But I do not doubt that patriotic Russians have anxieties quite as great as those of other nations.

III.

From one great Communion I pass over to another.

The central position of the Church of Rome has not yet received quite so much illumination as that of the Orthodox Church. At the same time the two articles which may be said to have a bearing on this are very welcome. I do not know that I have ever seen a better defence of the apparent exclusiveness and intolerance of the Roman Church than that which is given by Mr. Wilfrid Ward. It is a defence which holds good not for that Church alone but for all other Christian bodies in different degrees. It supplies the real justification of that which is apt to look like arrogance in the attitude of the Eastern Churches. It is no less a defence of the denominational principle in Anglicanism and the divers forms of Protestantism. There is not a single body represented in THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY that may not be glad to appeal to this article. And it may be appealed to with the greater freedom because of the admirable temper in which it is written, so completely devoid of anything like arrogance itself.

Father Wynne's article on the "Reforms of Pius X" is also a timely contribution. Those of us who have the most mixed feelings as to the events of this pontificate as a whole will do well to think of the single measures by which it has been marked as parts of a larger scheme, and it will also be well that they should remind themselves of the character and antecedents of its author.

This applies not least to the subject of which I am next going to speak. The outstanding feature in THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY so far, from the side of the Roman Communion, has been its treatment of the Church of France. We see here the nearest parallel to the light thrown on the Church of Russia. Three articles have been devoted to the French Church: there is a general survey by M. Georges Goyau in No. 1, a sketch of the French School of Early Church History by Mgr Batiffol in No. 2, and a pleasing account by Dr. Max Turmann of the social and religious work done in a low quarter of Paris in No. 3. Taken together, these articles present a picture which deserves our best attention.

As he followed the events which led to the abrogation of the Concordat and the separation of Church and State in 1905, an English reader often found himself strongly moved. He was moved by the harsh measure which seemed to him to be dealt out to the Church by the State, by the want of consideration with which the whole question was approached and the evident *animus* on the part of the secular authorities. In a somewhat lower degree he was moved by the difficult and uncompromising attitude taken up at Rome. It seemed to him that, in one way or another, the negotiating parties ought to have been able to make better terms for the unfortunate sufferers by the new legislation. It always behoves a foreign observer to be sparing of criticism where he knows so little of what went on behind the scenes. It may have been that at that particular con-

juncture the feeling on both sides was too strong to be seriously modified. It must at least be admitted that the Roman authorities took a high line, that they did not allow spiritual interests to be subordinated to material. We must give them full credit for this, whatever doubts we may have ourselves as to the nature of the questions at issue. In any case those who were most concerned, the lower clergy and the main body of the faithful, had little voice in the matter. They had to pay the reckoning, whatever it might be:

Quidquid delirant reges plectuntur Achivi.

Too much should not be made of this; because there is no doubt that the French archbishops and bishops suffered in equal proportion to their flocks. They suffered, nominally by their own act, but really in obedience to the Power behind them.

It is really affecting to think of the losses that the poor people had to submit to. It was not only that (with some slight deduction for pensions) there suddenly dropped out of the budget for worship the lump sum of 35 million francs (£1,400,000, $7,000,000) hitherto payable. As a consequence of the failure of the negotiations, what I understand to be accumulated funds amounting in all to 331 million francs (£13,240,000, $66,200,000) were confiscated by the State. The archiepiscopal and episcopal residences, the presbyteries and theological seminaries had to be given up within a year. Beyond this, the use of the churches was allowed, but on precarious terms. I gather from another source that the reduction of stipends is such that the ordinary parish *curé* is literally

"passing rich on forty pounds a year,"

so far as any assured income is concerned. It should be added that already before this (in 1901) the religious

orders had been very drastically treated. They numbered in all more than 30,000 men and 129,000 women, with landed property valued at more than £40,000,000 ($200,000,000)[1]. I do not know exactly what is the proportion of expulsion and confiscations; but the orders that are left are only the shadow of their former selves.

I can only say that if any such wholesale plundering and persecution (for it is nothing less) had taken place on this side the Channel, all Europe would have rung with protests and denunciations. There would have been something to be said for emphatic protest; the cause of justice ought to be asserted, and not allowed to go by default. It must however, be confessed that the patience shown by the French Church was the more utterly Christian; by its actions the French Church has associated itself with those Hebrew converts who "took joyfully the spoiling of their goods;" it has literally obeyed the Gospel precept, "whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also."

It should be remembered that these sacrifices were imposed not only by the intransigent State but by the orders proceeding from Rome. M. Goyau has chosen the right phrase when he speaks of "silent and docile heroism." Even the first martyrs were more violent in the way in which they replied to their persecutors.

The same docility, on a grand scale, has marked the reception of the disciplinary measures which the Pope and the Curia have felt called upon to take with a view to the suppression of Modernism. Here again one who looks at the matter from without is compelled to allow himself certain reservations. It will be easier for him to sympathize with some sides of the action that was taken than with others. The process of attempting to separate

[1]Hauck-Herzog, *Realencyklopädie*, Suppl. ii, 460.

wheat from tares in this world must always be difficult. A very delicate position has been created for French scholars, and for Roman Catholic scholars generally. But, whatever we may think of this, it must be confessed that the French clergy in particular, and indeed Roman Catholic students and scholars everywhere, have behaved with really exemplary meekness and patience under their trials. They have withdrawn from their advanced posts and concentrated their forces in the rear, waiting for the time to come (as I earnestly hope it may come) when the advance may be resumed under more hopeful auspices.

It is remarkable—and yet in a sense not so much remarkable as natural—that this period of trouble and calamity from without should coincide with what would seem to be a real movement of recovery and revival from within. Mgr Batiffol has sketched for us, with all his accustomed grace, the revival of French scholarship and learning, under such leaders as Duchesne, de Smedt, Tixeront, Dom G. Morin. I am not sure that this is to be set down on the credit side of the untoward conditions of which I have been speaking. It is rather a product of the preceding age than of the nearer past and of the present. It is the natural fruit of the liberty accorded under Leo XIII, and not of the restrictions imposed since. The result of the policy that now prevails remains to be seen. For the moment it must rather starve and check the growth of the tender plant than encourage it. At the same time I have faith in the scholars of the younger generation with whom lies the promise of the future. It is they who have shown so much patience and self-restraint, and I cannot think that the "vital spark" in them has been stifled. It will only mean that for a time they must keep to more neutral ground.

It is rather on the practical and pastoral side that since the beginning of the present century there has been

a perceptible increase of zeal and devotion, the fruits of which are beginning to be felt. The very triumphs of secularism have tended to mitigate its old animosity. The old invectives against the wealth and pride of the Church have lost their object. The appetite for plunder is satiated; and the more violent members of the attacking party are beginning to be somewhat ashamed of themselves. One gathers that, especially among the working classes, there is less truculence of opposition; the priest can come and go on the duties of his calling with greater freedom.

It is evident from M. Goyau's Report that special efforts have been made for the improvement of religious education. The young of both sexes are being sent out into the world with a better equipment; they will be better able to hold their own and to maintain the cause of the Church in the rough and tumble of life. The ministrations of women have been especially successful in gaining ground. The article of M. Max Turmann is a delightful description of what has been and is being done by the self-denying efforts of their quiet devotion.

Just one more remark before I leave the French Church. The secularizing measures have had one result that was not exactly desired or expected. It was hoped that they would weaken the hold of the Papacy on the French people; but the opposite of this has happened. By the breaking of every tie which bound the Church to the State, the latter has lost its power of influencing events, of interposing to protect the local clergy from undue pressure on the part of their superiors or of Rome. The tearing up of the Concordat has served the cause of centralization; it has strengthened the hands of the hierarchy, and it has made the hierarchy in its turn more and more dependent upon Rome. In other words, it has put an end to Gallicanism, and made the Church of France as Ultramontane as the rest.

IV.

From Germany as yet not much has come. The principal article has been that on the *Sola Fide* by Professor Friedrich Loofs. That on Church and State by Dr. Hermann von Bezzel, while it stands alone upon its subject, must needs be of less importance. On the other hand, Dr. Loofs' contribution is of more importance than it may seem. It is far from being a mere question of technical theology. The reader is really carried up to the very heart of the German Reformation. He who understands the real spirit of the *Sola Fide* will understand the deepest spiritual motive in the Reformation. Dr. Loofs does not, I think, expressly say so, but I imagine that he feels that the full appreciation of this point is the real issue which makes so much of the recent controversy directed against Luther ineffective. The real driving force in Luther was the strength of his conception of faith. It is this which constituted his religious greatness and which throws into the shade his undoubted defects.

Of all the surveys that we have had so far, the least successful for its purpose seems to me to be that by Dr. Shailer Mathews, entitled "The Awakening of American Protestantism." It is not that I should have much to question in the substance of the article, but the style does not seem to me very happy, and indeed I could have wished that the whole article had been written in a rather different key.

Something of a corrective is supplied by the article that stands next in order—that by Bishop F. J. McConnell on "Conversion." This brings out just that spiritual side of things to which scant justice had been done in the statement that goes before it. There seems to be a tendency in the American articles to lay stress on the more external problems of the religious situation. But, taking Dr. Shailer Mathews along with Dr. Seth

Low and Professor W. Adams Brown, a fairly adequate conception may be formed of these.

There is something very pleasing in the survey of the Canadian Churches by President R. A. Falconer of Toronto. It is written in a simple unassuming style, entirely free from rhetorical strain and exaggeration, with an intelligent outlook over the wide spaces that are covered, and in a spirit that is hopeful without elation and suffused with a mild and tempered wisdom.

My space is exhausted; and it is perhaps well that it should be so, because from the point of view that I have taken the portion of the field which most conspicuously remains for consideration is our own Islands. It may be well that these, if they need to be treated, should be treated by another pen. But really what I have aimed at doing is not to take a bird's-eye view of the universe, but rather by a few prominent examples to bring out the kind of help which THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY furnishes towards the mutual understanding of the different parts of Christendom. Already within this short period from its inception, the QUARTERLY seems to me to have fulfilled, and more than fulfilled, the promise of its programme. I can only hope that it will proceed further upon the same lines.

In conclusion, I will venture to set down one practical suggestion which has occurred to me in the process of writing. Even with no more than three numbers before me—and of course every succeeding number will add to the range of our experience—it is impressed upon me that the special object of the QUARTERLY will be most likely to be gained if each contributor, in stating his own case, were to set before his mind some typical representative of another communion to whom he would wish to commend it. If Dr. Shailer Mathews, for instance, had made it his aim to convince, or at least attract, Professor Glubokovsky or Mr. Wilfrid Ward, I have a feeling that his article would have come out differently. What we

want to do is not to offer openings for criticism of the communion to which we belong, but rather to bring out its good points in such a way as to enable others to form their judgment of it with a greater degree of sympathy and equity.

Unity in the Spiritual Fact

By T. R. Glover,
St. John's College, Cambridge.

If it is safe at all to sum up great movements in single phrases, the common feature of all the developments that have made the modern world is concentration on fact. The Roman church had built an immense edifice of dogma and tradition; Erasmus and Luther took men back as near as they could get them to the original facts—to the original Greek text of the New Testament with the closest loyalty they could command in scholarship—to the central simple truths of Christian experience. The whole scientific movement for three centuries has been one long endeavour in the same direction—to cease to anticipate, to make sure, to verify—and the fruits of it we are beginning to see. The whole economic development of the nineteenth century rested on the application to practical life of discoveries tracked down by close observers—steam and electricity were not new inventions, but their powers of service had escaped notice. Is it reasonable to suppose that again in the spiritual region progress will follow a quiet and disinterested concentration on fact? I think so.

There is no doubt that the Christian church in the nineteenth century passed through a difficult time, but since 1500 that has been true very acutely of every century, and in every generation men have been conscious of peculiar difficulties and have shaped for themselves new ideals of the church. The first decade of this century has had its own character and we are face

to face with the serious attempt to make more available the new light and the new life which, we are conscious, are stirring among us. Can we win the world at last for Christ? is one question; and we have signs that the younger men and women think it can be done and mean to try. But can a divided Christendom prevail? and here there hovers before us the ideal or the dream—the conception, at any rate—of a re-united Christendom. These are great ideals, but great ideals mean time and thought and work, and haste here means delay. In this short paper I should like to suggest one or two lines along which I think a great deal of work will have to be done before we can discuss Unity as a practical question with much profit.

First of all, we have (in political phrase) to remember our constituencies. So far as I can read the conditions of other churches, they resemble those of my own. The great mass of our people—I am afraid I may be told my discovery is not very new—are laity, men and women. What is more, they are most of them engaged in the life of trade, earning livings for themselves and their children, and they have been doing so from an early age. Education in the technical sense ceased early for them. This means that it will take a long time to convince them of anything new. Now add to this, their tenure—let me say at once, our tenure—of what we do know, of what we have learnt from our fathers and grandfathers—all the traditions of family, country, race, and church,—and let us remember all the homely proverbs about "what is bred in the bone" and "dyed in the wool." So much we apprehend—yes, and no more. I am an English Baptist, trained and long resident in England; all my affinities are with Scottish Presbyterian stocks; and again and again I am struck with the endless difficulty my Scottish friends have in taking in even the elements of the situation, in which English dissenters are placed, especially in villages.

It was only the other day I met a Scotsman domiciled in America who could not understand how we can tolerate being Pariah dogs; while we, as Hosea Biglow put it, "We begin to think it's natur'." I do not write this in any controversial way; I merely wish to have it remembered that we are all of us full of race-marks and place-marks, which I think it would be a great pity to lose. I do not want to rid myself of a Covenanting ancestry and tradition any more than my Anglican friends (apparently) want to turn Baptist. Only, if we are to begin to think or talk about Unity, we must know one another—and know one another's grandparents too. A Scottish professor, who knows something of many churches in England, said to me that the Anglicans suspect the Free Churchmen of Unitarianism of one kind or other, and the Free Churchmen the Anglicans of Romanism. It is easy to see how both sets of suspicions arose; there is some ground for them, but in neither case is the suspicion warranted if one know the whole mass of people suspected. We have to remember that with our divisions, with every one of them, are associated loyalties and principles, which men hold as they do all convictions, because they must, and because they see and know this thing or that thing and will not let it go.

This brings me to my second point, which is as universally obvious as my first—that, as our divisions and even our sub-divisions all rest eventually on loyalty to truth, even if it be (as always in human thought) truth partially seen and partially understood, and loved wholly, then we must be careful that, while we pursue the conception of unity, we do not lose the boundless advantage that comes from the independent quest of truth. The cause of truth has notoriously suffered in some churches from the very success with which "unity" has been imposed upon them. I mean that God's ways are not very obvious; His world is multiple and various, and we know

very little about it—very little about the material world, very little about the spiritual world. Milton was right when he defended "sects and schisms" on the ground that they represented what in modern phrase we should call independent research. We are not near enough yet to the possession of all truth to do without the aid of lovers of truth whom we may find one-sided and objectionable but who are at any rate in earnest. As Lord William Cecil writes in his *Changing China*, "Unity is very valuable, but it can never be so valuable as are truth and honesty." We must frankly recognize that our "sects" will continue as long as men care for truth and only know it in part—and that looks as if it would be a long time.

We shall however be content to wait, if we mean by "unity" not "uniformity," not "reunion," but a frank recognition of one another on the terms of Christian co-operation, if we are willing to seize all opportunities of knowing one another from within, and working together at the redemption of the world for Jesus Christ and in Him. Such common work will always tend to broaden its scope. If we go so far, the next step is surely a short one, we feel, and from that we take another step, and are surprised at last to find how far we have travelled together and how pleasantly. It is like falling in love, if it may be said;—it was not expected, or meant, but association grew pleasant and then was found to be indissoluble.

My third point brings me on to controversial ground. We do not yet quite know the full value, the whole of the aspects of spiritual experience. There must, we feel, be a common element in all Christian experience, but the nature of that experience is very hard to know. Letting alone for the moment spoken words used to convey what we mean to outsiders, what of the unspoken words, terms, pictures, symbols, or whatever they are, in which we figure to ourselves what we think and what we have

experienced? How far do they help us to understand what we have been through, or hinder us? All language, of course, we are told, is symbol. Do we over-use the symbol in describing the experience? When we say, as Paul said, "The Lord stood beside me and put strength into me," what exactly do we mean? Some men will say they are conscious of a presence at their side, as a man will sometimes feel, somehow or other, that there is a person in the room behind a screen, or that he is being watched. (Don't let us say telepathy, till we are clearer as to our meaning.) Some, on the other hand, are merely conscious of being brought (is that too strong a word?) through a difficult situation—helped? perhaps, but they hesitate as to words; while others are quite clear and say promptly: "The Lord clearly stood by you."

That is an easy instance. Now I turn to the Eucharist and I would ask, quite frankly (I hope), "What happens there?" We all know what some people tell us—how Christ gives Himself there in a peculiar way. The question I would ask is this: How do you *know?* Can you essentially differentiate the experience which you have in the sacrament from what others (are they more hesitant people? I don't know) associate with prayer, or with obedience? I find that St. John of the Cross disbelieved generally in visions and auditions and such-like forms of consciousness of the divine presence; that St. Teresa said the best things she knew came to her not by revelation but by obedience; I ask, then, of what value as evidence is the consciousness of Christ's peculiar presence in the Eucharist? We live among psychologists, and I will borrow the sort of question they ask about all religious experience: When you speak of what you experience in the Eucharist, are you sure your mind is not putting up a story on you? If you had been trained otherwise, if you had not been told about this, would you have thought of explaining your experience quite in this way? Would you have differentiated

it (I ask again) from the experience in prayer? If we say that certain temperaments feel God best by one means, or in one way, and others in another, then do we not concede (more or less) that sacrament and prayer are each in essence an opening of the door to Christ? He at all events is always there. (The force of gravitation is always pulling at my pen-knife, but I generally keep it in my pocket and it does not fall. If I let it go, gravitation has its chance.) Shall we say, Christ is always at our door, but we do not always open it; but, when it comes to Sacrament and prayer (and obedience), then we definitely and deliberately open the door, and therefore have a new experience of the entering Christ? (Cf. Apoc. 3: 20.) That is, that in the Sacrament it is not Christ who does something different, but we; and He only as we let Him.

I know quite well that other views are held, but I suggest that if the questions asked above point in the right direction, we may have found our *via prima salutis*. The answers will depend here as everywhere on evidence, and the evidence must be clear and certain. A further point might be reached if we were to ask whether, supposing that the extremest view of transubstantiation were conceded, there is any real evidence to show that the miracle *can not* take place through the medium of an ordinary layman; or, that God does not in fact so use laymen. The sacramental position has always been held to involve the sacerdotal. Does it? Why should it? The answer is that the Catholic church has always said so. To this it may be rejoined that a thing is not proved true because the church has so far always believed it. The Copernican astronomy had at first the whole weight of church tradition against it. If it is possible to bring sacrament and prayer into the same psychological category; if it is impossible to show that they differ, apart from such features as may be due to the mind's expecting something and supplying it; if it can

further be shown that historically emphasis on the sacramental side of the Eucharist can, as Professor Lake and others suggest, be carried not only up to the period of the Fathers, but (which is fatal) up beyond any date at which the Sacrament could have been instituted; into the much older usage and belief of the pagan world; then, without asking any abandonment of Sacrament, might it not be possible for those who set very different values in practice on sacraments to find a real unity in a recognized common religious experience?

But my last point is a more serious and a more difficult one, though here, I think, most Christian people will be agreed. Is it not the case that in common practice we are using the terms of Jesus with something less than the connotation He gave them? For example, which of us will say that for him the term *God* carries the full weight of significance and happiness that it had for Jesus? We cannot venture to say such a thing. I believe we are all of us using His language without His meaning, and that this vitiates all our thought upon the Gospel in proportion as the words decline in our speech from the value that He gave to them in His. We admit that our task is to "follow" Him, but we do not realize that this means not merely an external obedience, or even a loyal and sympathetic obedience, to such commands as He left His church initially, or as He gives to us still as individuals, but also to follow Him through His experience of God, so far as this is possible for people so different from Him, into identification with His thought and His life Godward, manward, every way. No one will call this an easy ideal, but the whole Christian community depends upon the loyalty with which every member down to the least significant cherishes it. It is not easy to write of such ideals, and I will not now write more of it beyond this—that, so far as I can see, Unity is only to be reached as we draw nearer in God-given power to this ideal, all of us.

Towards Unity

By His Eminence, Cardinal Mercier,
Archbishop of Mechlin.

[This address was delivered at the public *séance* of the Royal Academy in the presence of His Majesty Albert, King of the Belgians, by His Eminence, Cardinal Mercier, President of the Academy and Director of the Class of Letters and of Moral and Political Sciences, 1913. Cardinal Mercier tendered this lecture to The Constructive, and in transmitting the French original wrote: "Very willingly I authorize the Editor of The Constructive Quarterly to publish in his Review the lecture, entitled *Vers l'unité*, which I delivered at the Academie royale de Belgique. Perhaps the readers of the Quarterly will find that the general ideas of my article are in agreement with the purpose of The Constructive Quarterly."]

The King's presence at this gathering by a fresh manifestation of his kindness interprets his title of High Protector of this Academy as a living reality. Our Company is cordially grateful to Your Majesty. The King's actions faithfully follow his programme. Who of us but still hears resounding in his ears and in his heart the noble words uttered, on the day when he took possession of his throne, by His Majesty Albert, King of the Belgians: "Only the intellectual and moral forces of a nation fertilize its prosperity"?

I had not, ladies and gentlemen, attempted to find any special title for this philosophical discourse, but the happy circumstance, by which I am the first to benefit, brings me one which is all that I could desire. In a page of history I would wish to illustrate this general idea: that philosophy, if it would make any pretensions to stability, must, putting into operation all the resources at its disposal, submit the moral as well as the speculative order to the reflecting reason, for the purpose of unit-

ing in one integral synthesis the content of human consciousness.

Just after the French Revolution and the wars of the Empire, when the French nation regained possession of itself, the masters who first took up the arduous task of mending the broken chain of philosophical teaching—Royer-Collard, Maine de Biran, Victor Cousin, Théodore Jouffroy,—feeling their responsibility bear heavily upon them in the work of social reconstruction in which they were ambitious to collaborate, judged that it was their duty to be as much themselves at the Sorbonne as on their own hearths or in the innermost recesses of their own consciences; and through the most abstruse problems of ideology the young men saw their moral and religious personality made apparent in outbursts which they themselves would not stifle. Now, about the year 1850, Taine tells us, five or six young men, who were studying, one botany, another chemistry and medicine, the others mathematics or history, would often meet in the Latin Quarter of an evening and amuse themselves with arguing. The volume *Les philosophes classiques du XIX^e siècle en France* is the outcome of their talks.

The gravity, often affected, of the masters of the day was far from pleasing to the impatience of this little cenacle of critics of twenty. Taine would have wished them to display more ease of manner.

"As far as I am concerned," he says, "I make two parts of myself: the ordinary man, who drinks, eats, goes about his business, avoids hurting anyone and tries to be useful. I leave this man at the door. Let him have opinions, manners, a hat and gloves like other people: that is the business of the public. The other man, to whom I permit philosophy to have access, does not know that the public exists. That useful results can be obtained from the truth, he has never suspected. In fact, he is not a man; he is an instrument endowed with the faculty of seeing, analyzing and reasoning. If he has any passion, it is the desire to operate upon unknown objects much and with precision. When I enter into the study of philosophy, I am this man. Think you he cares to justify common sense, and prove the existence of the external world? Not at all. Whether

the human race be mistaken or not, whether matter be something real or an illusory appearance, makes no difference to him."

"But you are a married man," Reid says to him. "I? Not at all. That is all well enough for the external animal which I have put out of the door." "But," says Royer-Collard, "you are going to make the French revolutionaries." "I don't know anything about that. *Are* there any French?" And thereupon he goes on with his noting, decomposing, comparing, deducing the consequences that hang on the ends of his syllogisms, curious to know what he may bring to light from the bottom of the well, but indifferent as to what the take may be, careful only not to break the chain and to bring up the bucket quite full. Perhaps he will diminish certitude somewhat, perhaps a great deal perhaps reduce it to nothing, perhaps not lessen it at all. That matters little to him; he will take nothing away from truth."[2]

This separatism, which Taine was advertising, is the picturesque expression of a state of mind created by him who has been called the father of modern philosophy, Descartes. The great effort of the author of the *Méditations* and the *Discours de la méthode* is an attempt at intellectual isolation. Descartes is possessed by a passion to reconstruct everything. He will disengage himself, by dint of thought, from all the conclusions of those who have gone before him. He will put aside his religious faith and the teachings of morality. He will make himself a morality *par provision*,[3] as he expresses it, solely to avoid collision with accepted usages. He wishes to be indebted to nothing but his own personal intellectual effort. He is at the antipodes of that other geometrician, Pascal, who writes:

"The whole of humanity is like one man who is continued through the chain of the ages."

For Descartes, to philosophize is to judge, it is to know—nothing more, nothing less.

"I cannot, then," he writes, "take enough pains to rid my belief of all that I have ever believed to be true; I could not give too much rein to my distrust, since it is at present not a question of acting, but only of meditating and knowing."[4]

[2] H. Taine, *Les philosophes classiques du XIX^e siècle en France*, pp. 36, 37.

[3] Descartes, *Discours de la méthode*, Part III.

[4] Descartes, *Méditations, Méd. 1^e. Discours de la méthode*, Part II.

The philosopher knows that the passions, virtues and vices—in a word, the moral facts—cannot be ignored, and they are not. But in his eyes they have no significance except as conscious happenings. They are "thoughts," and so Descartes does in fact call them. If they find a place in the field of philosophy, it is because they are susceptible of analysis. One fundamental verity suffices, one and one only: I think—I, a conscious being, I alone;—I think, therefore I am. And the whole work of philosophy will consist of building "upon this unshakable rock," as Descartes expresses himself, all the propositions which the reasoning reason shall succeed in attaching to it.

When the meditative solitary of The Hague, "shut up by himself all day in a stove" (*tout le jour enfermé seul dans un poêle*),[5] meets with things that are good or evil, he looks at them as a disinterested observer. For him they are objects of speculative consideration: careless of the poet's confession, *Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor*, and of the noble frankness of such a hero as St. Paul, "My moral life is an enigma: the good that I would do, I do not; but the evil that my heart reproves, I do" (*Quod enim operor, non intelligo: non enim quod volo bonum, hoc ago: sed quod odi malum, illud facio*),[6] he does not hesitate to write a proposition of such mendacious audacity as this:

> "To do well, it is enough to judge well; and to judge as well as one can is enough straightway to do one's best, that is to say, to acquire all the virtues."[7]

Not thus did the wisdom of antiquity understand the matter.

No doubt the contemplation of the truth does demand a serene way of looking at things, and he is ill situated for seeing well whom emotion agitates. While the exami-

---

[5] *Discours de la méthode*, Part II.

[6] *Romans*, VII, 15.

[7] *Discours de la méthode*, Part III.

nation of a problem is going on, one must see only the reality, with its logical consequences, that alone must be regarded, without any preoccupation about the result, as Taine puts it, "curious to know what one is going to bring to light from the bottom of the well, only careful not to break the chain and to bring up the bucket quite full." But when the bucket has been emptied, and the contents are mixed with the sum total of what we already possessed, must they, can they, leave us indifferent? Can it be true that, to be impartial, to be "objective," we must have neither love nor hate? Where is this cerebral constitution, without heart, without family, without patriotism, without faith, or hope, or charity? Such an artificial being does not exist.

It is legitimate, as it is inevitable, that the thoughtful man should bring his opinions, or his convictions, face to face with the moral or social consequences with which they seem to him to be logically linked. To be sure, the true is not the good; the true and the good are, in their turn, distinct from the beautiful; but we have the feeling that, in a well established order of things, the true, the good and the beautiful, science, morality and art, cannot be in irreconcilable conflict. William James, too, observes[8] that contemporary logicians distinguish two kinds of judgments, those of *existence*, or of *evidence*, and those of *value*, or, to use the German expression, *Werturteil*. These two orders of propositions arise from diverse preoccupations. It is natural that the mind should form them separately at first, but not less so that it should afterwards bring them together, so as to see whether they are or are not capable of being combined.

This was Plato's understanding of the matter in that marvellous passage of the Symposium, where, after recommending Socrates, through Diotimus, to seek order, and that beauty which is its reflection, first in his own indi-

[8] *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 4.

vidual experiences and the consideration of things perceptible by the senses; then in the contemplation of souls and their good actions, in institutions and laws; lastly, in the sciences, the philosopher formulates these lofty conclusions:

"Yes, Socrates, he who, after passing through all the degrees of the beautiful in their proper order, has thus arrived at the term of his initiation, he shall suddenly perceive an admirable substantial beauty, that which was the objective of all his previous efforts; an eternal beauty, uncreated, imperishable; not subject to increase and diminution; which is not beautiful from one point of view and ugly from another—beautiful at one time and not at another—beautiful in one relation and ugly in another—beautiful here and ugly elsewhere—beautiful to some and not to others; — a beauty which cannot be materially imagined under the form of face, hands or corporeal members; which yet is not a discourse or a science; which resides in nothing else but itself, whether in living being or in any reality whatsoever, terrestrial or celestial, but which itself, in itself, for itself, constitutes a singular ever-subsisting nature; a beauty in which all things that are beautiful participate in a certain fashion, although neither their birth nor their disappearance make it either richer or poorer, or affect it in the least. . . . If anything, my dear Socrates, makes human life worth while, it is the contemplation of the absolute beauty. If ever you rise to this ideal, what will gold and jewels, the graces of childhood and the charms of youth, seem to you when set beside it? . . . Think you the life would be so wretched that should make you turn your attention from this side and enjoy the contemplation and the association of an object so noble? On the contrary, think you not that the man who attaches himself firmly to it will produce not simulacra of virtues—since he suffers not himself to be held by simulacra,—but the veritable virtue, since he attaches himself to the truth? . . . If anyone ought to be immortal, it is he."[9]

Christian tradition—from the Fathers of the Church, who drew their inspiration chiefly from Platonic metaphysics, down to the teachers of the Middle Ages, who for the most part followed the furrow cut by Aristotle—was unanimous in forming for itself a comprehensive conception of philosophy, in accord with the demands of the moral and religious consciousness. Scholastic is marked by these three features harmonizing in one fully complete impression of unity (*qui s'harmonisent dans l'unité plénière de sa physionomie*): the utilization of the senses

[9] *Symposium*, ed. Didot, XXIX.

and the reason, reserving the subordination of the former to the latter; submission to a single ideal constituted of truth and goodness, light and attractive power; the union, without either absorption or exclusion, of nature and supernature, that is to say, of reason and faith, of free will and grace, of the family, or the State, and the Church.

There is no doubt—as methodological documents brought to light in the last ten years have established to demonstration—that after the twelfth century philosophy and theology were, for all the teachers, two clearly distinct disciplines; no doubt that all the teachers recognized in each its own autonomous processes of demonstration; but before the Cartesian divorce, none would have imagined that the exigences of philosophy had imposed upon him the duty, or even sanctioned him in taking the liberty, of neglecting the least little portion of the treasure of human consciousness. No school before Descartes had erected separatism into a system. And even after Descartes, again and again, notably with Spinoza and, later on, some of the Pantheists of the Kantian stock, one might have thought that the law of unity was about to regain its ascendancy. Spinoza, when he conceived his *Discours de la méthode*, was thoroughly impregnated with morality and religion. He meditated for the quieting of his soul; he dreamed of eternity.

"Experience having taught me," he writes in his *Reforme de l'entendement*, "that all the events of my life are futile things . . . I have at last made a resolution to try and discover if a veritable good exists . . . a good which gives to the soul finding and possessing it eternal and supreme happiness."[10]

Sensible experience and the dialectic of reason are not sufficient for him; above them both and independently of them he has perceived *being*, that abstract entity brought to its highest degree of indeterminacy, a potentiality all the more receptive of reality the more it has been dis-

[9] *Oeuvres de Spinoza*, H. Saisset, 1, III., p. 297.

possessed of it, a capacity so much the more subject to being filled the more it has been emptied to the bottom, and this *being*, the minimum of actuality, the geometrician has confounded by a fundamental and thenceforward irreparable misunderstanding with the Being who is the plenitude of being, the supreme determination, the sum of actuality. Thus oscillating between the two poles, he becomes entangled in a string of theorems on the actualization of the substance which he identifies with the divine Being, and about the end of his *Ethique* he finds himself led to these emphatic conclusions: "The love of God ought to occupy the soul more than all else;"[11] "Our salvation, our happiness, our liberty consist in a constant and eternal love of God, or, if you will, in God's love for us."[12]

But the voice of Spinoza cried aloud in the wilderness, just as Auguste Comte's was to sound in the void, a century later, when, after reaching the second period of his career, he tried to subordinate mind to heart, philosophy to a social end—to the religion of humanity. The Cartesian current was too strong for ephemeral reactions. It has invaded the minds of men in such force that all—sensualists, positivists and materialists, on the one hand; idealists and pantheists, on the other—all with the same set determination offer incense to the same idol, speculation for its own sake, philosophic thought without morality and without religion. In truth, Spinoza himself was by no means able to escape from speculative exclusivism. His pantheism is the logical development of an *Idea*, much more than the concentration of a will upon an object judged worthy of love and worship. Kant, in his *Critik*, no doubt embraces the two domains of thought and action, but, instead of bringing them together in one integral conception, he only ends by digging a ditch to separate them, and setting up as law the dualism which

[11] *Ethique*, Part V, Prop. 16.
[12] *Ibid.*, Prop. 36, Schol.

Descartes has brought about in fact. According to him, while man in effect arrives at metaphysical conclusions only by resting them on the personal sentiment of duty, science keeps the monopoly of certitude properly so called, and after that, philosophy worthy of the name can only be theoretical.

Scientific exclusivism descended into public opinion, which reached the point of no longer respecting the necessary distinction between the particular sciences, with their own programme, their distinctive processes, their settled conclusions, and "Science," which, under a collective appellation, was supposed to condense them and reduce them to maxims. Scientific research, in the domain of archaeology and history as well as in that of the natural sciences, needs directing ideas, which are the motors and guides of effort. Professionals know that these are tools which experience will test, and will perfect or throw aside; but the public, even the well informed, fascinated by the marvellous and incessant advances realized by the positive sciences, has without reason identified the scientific hypothesis with the science itself—the hypothesis, useful in a restricted circle of phenomena, with a theory or general view of the mind,—and there was a period—has it passed for everyone?—when science, hoisted on to a throne by the prevalent craze, was called upon to represent and to be at once thought, and morality, and religion.

At the period when this senseless admiration was coming to its apogee, Brunetière's bugle-call proclaimed in France the bankruptcy of science. Henri Poincaré, Duhem and LeRoy authoritatively recalled certain crude theorists to a more modest and sane understanding of the principles and inductions of science. The reputation of Pascal—not the geometrician, but the moralist, the believer, the apologist—was re-established. In the United States and in England, in France, in Italy, pragmatist or

voluntarist reactions teemed, and today—I mean, in the philosophy of the last few decades—the issue seems to be clearly stated as between "intellectualism" and "anti-intellectualism," the latter in its turn reacting with excesses against the excesses of the former. The one, proceeding from Descartes, has kept his exclusivism, and still refuses to see in the philosopher anything but a thinking brain. The other has again laid hold, even feverishly, on the whole man, with his senses, his intelligence, all his cognitive faculties, indeed, but with his emotions too, his aspirations, his wishes; with his religious faith, if he is a believer; with all his attachments, even family and social.

And indeed is not this the concrete man, in flesh and bones, the personal *Ego*, that is, whether moral or unmoral, if you please, religious or non-religious, Christian or non-Christian, Catholic or non-Catholic—in short, the entire living, thinking, acting man who philosophizes? Then how can you expect his thought to cease, his enquiring soul to be in repose, so long as he does not find himself in the mental construction he has elaborated? There are, I know, and I do not forget it, two thoughts in us which are superposed, one spontaneous, the other reflex. But the second has for its matter and its object the content of the first, and hence it will be satisfied only when it has exhausted that content. Taine used to make fun of Royer-Collard, because he had learned in the school of Reid to confront doctrinal conclusions with common sense. Common sense, to be sure, is not the final judge. It lets itself be judged. Nevertheless it judges in the first instance. As for reflection, it derogates from its function of control in proportion as it restricts its field of vision, which is naturally coextensive with the spontaneous life.

The primordial law of the theorist in philosophy, then, is to take as the theme of his investigations not the thought and existence of the thinking *Ego*, nor a larger

or smaller portion of the real exploited by some of the particular sciences, but the totality of the being which our direct activity is capable of embracing. And it will be important to avoid distorting these first data. The philosopher will hug them as closely as he can; and because they form not a field where parterres are arranged in straight lines side by side, but a river in which the springs of the soul's activity mingle their waters, the philosopher will be bound to a double task:—

He will decompose the spontaneous data, because, being made for abstraction, and incapable of withdrawing from his own nature and the laws imposed on him by that nature, he must, willy nilly, begin with analysis.

But when this analysis has completed its work, he will recompose.

There is no philosophy without synthesis. There is no completed philosophy without an integral synthesis. Unity is not only, in the aesthetic point of view, the seal of greatness, the note revealing order, but it is the condition *sine qua non* of stability, the essential law of equilibrium and durability.

Two currents of thought are today bringing philosophy back to a unitary conception. One is traced in the pragmatism of William James, in the humanism of Schiller and in their manifold derivatives. I shall not dwell on them, because I see in them methods rather than systems. Those methods are inspired by a common preoccupation: the substitution of a utilitarian end for the objective knowledge of truth; they agree in their extreme opposition to speculative exclusivism, they mark an orientation, but have not produced a doctrinal synthesis characterized by new, appreciable results. France, on the contrary, possesses at the present time a group of powerfully original thinkers. To M. Léon Ollé-Laprune, the successor of M. Vacherot in the Ecole Normale Supérieure. fell the mission of awakening Bergson,

Le Roy, Wilbois, Maurice Blondel, to philosophic reflection, and they, often in an independent manner, are at this day coming back by partially converging paths towards a more organic, more unified conception of philosophy. M. Ollé-Laprune at the first stroke marked the Catholic boundary of a spiritual renovation towards unity.

"It is a very mean and narrow way of thinking and philosophizing," he wrote, "to reduce man to sense, or to sentiment, or to pure reason. . . . It is a very mean and narrow sort of philosophizing to suppress the religious sphere, and treat of man and human affairs as though Christianity did not exist. . . Does that mean that we must mix everything together? No, for to mix everything together is to befog everything. . . . But man, man the thinker, if he has a broad and high manner of thinking, that man binds up and dominates these various domains, and in each one he remains what he is, a complete man and, if he is a Christian, a complete Christian."[13]

Ollé-Laprune opposed the excesses of criticism with the philosopher's right to the initial affirmations.

"To think in a virile way," he said, "it is not necessary to have doubted. When there is question of accounting for things, *doubt effects nothing to the purpose*, excellently says Leibniz. Doubt destroys, dissolves, or at least disturbs the thing to be seen. Examine, if you please, in order to overcome doubt. But that, in order to examine, one must begin by doubting, this I deny."[14]

The arbitrary separatism, the rule of which still weighed heavily upon men's minds, he opposed with the obligation of not going in search of truth with a mutilated soul, and he made it his task to integrate all the inward powers, all the riches of tradition, all the resources of the religious life, in a philosophy which at the same time did not overlook the prerogatives of an intellectualism docile to objective reality.

"To think is the labor and the office of the philosopher," he said; "but I will not say that the philosopher is a thinker, if to be a thinker is to perform one special function apart, to enter one's self, as it were, in the membership of a special caste, to have a restrictive etiquette or a domain in which one hedges one's self in. The true philosopher thinks with his entire soul . . . , for he thinks as a

[13] *Le prix de la vie*, Preface, pp. x-xi.

[14] *Etude sur Jouffroy*, p. 208.

man and humanly. He thinks resting upon the soil which carries him, living in contact with the humanity of which he is a part, with the living, with the dead. . . . Lastly, he thinks attached to God, the principle, the support, the light, the rule of all thought. . . . He who will not live with a normal and entire life cannot philosophize properly. That anyone should go in search of the truth with a mutilated soul, is what I cannot understand. . . . If philosophy is the theory of the whole of life, it is not itself the whole of life, and hence one must construct it under this dominant reserve: one has to live normally before philosophizing normally about life, and before living legitimately by one's philosophy."[15]

The man who breathed the breath of this noble language into his youthful audience was an educator, even more than a master. He was the initiator who stirs up impulses, he was not the head of a school. His disciples carried away from their sympathetic contact with him a common tendency to synthesis—that, and that alone, interests us in this historical study,—but the imprint which he stamped on their minds was neither deep enough nor coherent enough to lead them into efficacious collaboration in a collective doctrinal work.

M. Henri Bergson has not expressly told us, up to the present moment, what presentiment has been aroused in him by "intuition" in the twofold domain of morality and religion.

He wishes to classify his problems by series (*sérier*), and declares that he does not yet foresee what his ethics or his theology would be. Let us endeavour to sketch the work of the psychologist and metaphysician:—

The world is that which is evolved; man is the last actual term of its evolution.

As evolution acts with utilitarian aims, the nature of the understanding must be understood by its utility, as a means, that is, of acting upon matter. In fact the understanding is nothing but this: a faculty of decomposing the flux of consciousness by making instantaneous slices, of laying in the mould of the concepts fragments which it (the understanding) has artificially

[15] *Eloge du P. Gratry*, pp. 10-11. Cf. *Ollé-Laprune* by Maurice Blondel, pp. 31-35.

immobilized, for the purpose of arranging them one after the other in the dead field of space. Hence the geometry, the geometrism, the universal mechanism of the old philosophy.

Now this philosophy is the victim of a fundamental misunderstanding. For reality is mobility. Witness my consciousness, which tells me that "to exist" is to flow, to live, to be evolved. This current, which William James calls "the stream of consciousness," this time, this duration, is something indivisibly continuous. Witness, too, nature: even "inert" matter, considered as a whole (the universe), is mobile; life is mobility itself, the lifting of the weight of materiality.

What we have to seize hold of, is this universal flux.

What is this universal flux, and how are we to put it in bonds? What is it? It is a vital impulse, without finality; an immanent activity which develops itself unforseeably, without logical or moral order (*alogiquement, amoralement*). The river flows, it tells us neither its source nor its outlet. Has it a source? Does there exist somewhere an ocean into which it empties itself?

Shall we succeed in gripping hold of this vital impulse?

We must not count upon succeeding in this by the intelligence which cuts up its concepts into discontinuous, frozen units; but we must hope better things of the "intuition" of the "spirit"—meaning thereby the totality of the cognitive power struggling with the real—which installs itself as well as it can in the flux of duration.

Then, too, the fact that evolution has followed two divergent paths, to reach intelligence here and instinct there, affords us the presentiment that around the kernel of intelligence there is a fringe of instinct.

The shock which awakens intuition is the profound law of the spirit.

The analytical effort of distinct consciousness naturally seizes *things*, but these, as soon as they become such, belong to the past; to penetrate the real, it would be nec-

essary for the interior observer to detach himself from the "already become" and seize upon the flight of the "becoming": it would be necessary that, "turning and twisting upon himself, his faculty of *seeing* should become one with the act of *willing*. A painful effort, which we can make sharply and by doing violence to nature, but cannot sustain for more than a few moments."[16] Let all thinkers make this effort; only at this price will they retain and assimilate something of the current of life.

Intellectual dialectic is that which assures the agreement of our thought with itself. But by dialectic many different agreements are possible, and yet there is but one truth. Intuition, if it could be prolonged beyond a few moments, would assure not only the philosopher's agreement with his own thought, but even the agreement of all philosophers among themselves. Such as it exists, fugitive and incomplete, it is in every system that which is worth more than the system, and which survives it. The object of philosophy would be reached if this intuition could be sustained, be generalized and, above all, be sure of external rallying points so as not to lose its way.[17]

Would it attain to the Absolute? Yes, but it is important to be precise. The absolute, with Bergson, is nothing else but the universal becoming, a vital impulse one and continuous, which at every moment keeps the weight of matter suspended, hinders it from falling into spatial dissemination.

"I admit," writes Bergson, "that in presence of the universe we speak of a centre from which the worlds spring forth like the rockets from an immense bouquet, provided, though, that we do not take this centre for a *thing*, but for a continuity of springing forth. Thus defined, God has done nothing: He is incessant life, action, liberty. Creation, thus conceived, is not a mystery; it is an action which grows larger as it advances, which creates in proportion to its progress: we experience it in ourselves from the moment that we act freely."[18]

[16] *L'évolution créatrice*, p. 258.

[17] *L'évolution créatrice*, pp. 259–260.

[18] Page 270.

No one has contributed more effectively than Bergson to rid us of Kantian idealism and mechanistic positivism; none has more successfully helped on the effort at reconstruction which looks to repairing the ruins heaped up by the excesses of the critical spirit. But to actual reconstruction has the author of the *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience* and *Evolution créatrice* contributed anything positive? Is his theory of immanentism anything else but a poem wrought out with elegance upon a fictitious web? M. Bergson rejects the intellectual interpretation of the pretended immediate data of consciousness, because they are manifested to him in space, under the aspect of materiality: will they gain in value because he wishes to see them under the physiological aspect of a vital impulse?

Whatever he may do, think reflexively or spontaneously, the philosopher cannot undo his nature: he will think humanly: now, whether we like it or not, to think humanly is to abstract from our concepts, to compose them or to dissociate them—it is that and nothing but that. At times, carried away by the impulse of his nature, and yielding to the harmonious fulness of his cognitive powers, the thinking subject will cast over the superficial totality of the real a lightning glance that is hardly conscious; at other times he will fix his attention with deliberate slowness upon each of the elements which compose the object of his spontaneous thought, so as to penetrate the more intensely their depths and intricacies: but the first operation, which you may call, if you please, "intuition," as well as the second, reflection, are but two modalities of the exercise of one and the same activity. They are, therefore, both absolutely subject to the natural, and consequently uniform and constant, law of abstraction which governs them.

"Conceptual crumbling" (*morcelage conceptuel*), that is to say, the abstractive character of the object perceived, may not be apparent, or not very apparent,

in the "intuition," because in fact, by reason of the rapidity with which it takes place and the frequency of its repeated occurrences, the spontaneous activity may, and often does, escape the distinct observation of the consciousness; the *morcelage* is, on the contrary, manifest in the reflective analysis, because it implies acts of deliberation and choice: but the greater or less clearness in the perceptibility, greater or less distinctness in the perception, of the phenomenon does not alter its nature.

To be sure, our inability to grasp the totality of the real at one effort argues a relative inferiority of the understanding, but the abstractive operation has its compensations for the consciousness: it brings us information about the origin of our concepts and gives us a reliable report in regard to that objective reality as to which immanentism leaves us perforce strangers; it enables us to stand face to face with being in itself and for itself, and affords the discursive reason the necessary and sufficient leverage for affirming the existence of a transcendent reality, an *actus purus*, a Beginning and End of this world which is being evolved.

M. Bergson has recognized in M. Edouard Le Roy a faithful interpreter of his thought, and M. Le Roy on his side attributes to Bergson's philosophy

> "an exceptional importance, an infinite range. . . . We may not understand it," he says, "but the future is there; in spite of misconceptions, in spite of incomprehensions, there is the starting-point of all speculative philosophy henceforward."[18]

Together with M. Poincaré and M. Duhem, M. Le Roy has drawn up the indictment of scientism by showing—let us say rather, forcing home—the share of utilitarian artifice which is involved in the notations and conventions belonging to the essential terminology of the positive sciences. He has thus hastened the "organic

[18] Ed. Le Roy, *Une philosophie nouvelle*, p. 208, Paris, Alean, 1912.

phase" which philosophical and social thought appears to be entering; but, after the fashion of Tyrrell, he has not refrained from arbitrarily conveying his symbolism into Catholic dogma, while, in the field of pure philosophy, he would hold us back in an amorphous *fieri* where truth never asserts itself by a definitive conquest.

"Absolute truth," he writes, "is neither a particular system nor the sum of all the systems, it should rather be their envelope, the curve of which they are tangents; or better, it is their movement, their progress, their becoming, their life, their evolution, their convergence."[20]

M. Joseph Wilbois and M. Maurice Blondel in their turn start from the criticism of idealism and "of the positivism of twenty years ago." Bergson and William James have shown the factitious quality of the common sense of mankind; Henri Poincaré, Duhem and Le Roy have laid bare the symbolic artificialities of physics; the author of the recent work, *Devoir et durée*, has undertaken the task of denouncing the perils of misconception concealed under the methods applied to the social sciences by a de Tourville and a Durkheim. This done, and after a candid tribute to the patient efforts of sociology, M. Wilbois essays to discover in his soul and in society "the stirring of a human impulse" (*la poussée d'un élan humain*),[21] just as Bergson tried to seize the "vital impulse," (*élan vital*), enquiring for the "intuition of the causative duration which renders the pretensions of our soul indefinite," on the one hand, and on the other hand, for sociological analyses, he elaborates a social morality of which we cannot but admire the noble tone and the elevation. The God of M. Wilbois and M. Blondel is no longer the pantheistic, willy-nilly becoming of Bergson, on the path of perpetual reconstruction, to which the mysterious deep of the soul would adhere,

[20] Ed. Le Roy, *Dogme et critique*, p. 355.

[21] *Devoir et durée, Essai de morale sociale*, p. 403. Paris, Alean, 1912.

subject to the impulse of an unconscious determinism; it is the transcendent, personal God. The moral and the religious life are linked together. And it is no slight consolation for a Christian and Catholic conscience to see thinkers, whose honesty and authority no one questions, pushing the penetrating logic of their deductions to the conclusions which we are glad to reproduce here:—

"All the verities which interest us are the expression of a social reality," writes M. Wilbois. "It is a social reality that envelopes all the others; it is the transcendent that we meet in the life of humanity; it is God. . . . God exacts of us three principal virtues: *faith, hope* and *charity*."

Faith: "We know," says M. Wilbois, "that God sustains, in its totality, the ascent of the human race, and, since this ascent is accomplished only by the agreement of our particular missions, I am sure that He will not abandon me in mine: is it not He who feeds the birds and clothes the lilies, O men of little faith?"

"I am as great as humanity," he continues, "and greater, since I add to it what I am at present, and as real as that duration of which I am augmenting the tension, and more real. And me, sovereign master of this swelling tide, some would wish to make me say that I am but a phenomenon as frail as a bubble that bursts. The great stumbling-block for modern reason is not immortality, but death, and thus is born a new virtue, which we call hope."

"Faith and hope are only stages on the road to charity. To live completely"—it is still M. Wilbois who speaks—"we must love all men. But our heart cannot expand in this anonymous crowd, or value it for perfections which it does not possess: the heart must take refuge in Him who has already miraculously permitted it to believe and to hope. It must give itself passionately to the lifting up into which God carries it, and must henceforward love in God those who are making the ascent side by side with it. . . . If I have not charity, I am as non-existent as the sounding brass and the tinkling cymbal, because, in our history, it is the acts of charity that create a little more of humanity: if duration is the essence of the spirit, charity is the web of duration."

"These three virtues do not bind me directly to God: between Him and me," the author concludes, "there are intermediaries: by right, those intermediaries are the whole human race; in fact, they are the Church.

"Christianity presents us a teaching and a practical morality, more specially the use of the sacraments.

"If the Christian verity had to be contained in three words, we would sum it up in the formula; *God made man.*

"Our moral life, in its turn, and our sacramental existence can be resumed in this formula, the inverse of the formula of the dogmas: *Man lifted up to God.*

"Now the double movement, descent of the Divine into our thought

and rising of our practice towards the Divine, does not establish a contact between God and the individual, but between God and society. Our fundamental dogmas are social in effect."[22]

Here the philosophy of action of M. Maurice Blondel takes its place, the most penetrating and the richest writer of the pleiad, but whose thought, by reason of its very complexity, the infinite gradation of shading of its aspects and its expressions, the fundamental problems on which it touches, has brought into existence disturbing ambiguities of meaning and stirred up disputes which are not exhausted. *Philosophy*, yes, for the author intends to put into operation only natural means of knowing, and to receive nothing but what is inwardly demanded by the soul, following the principle that

"Nothing can enter into man that does not correspond in some way to a need of expansion." Again, "that which does not correspond to an appeal from within," says M. Blondel, "that which is purely and simply from without, can neither penetrate his life nor inform his thought; it is radically inefficacious and at the same time inassimilable."

Philosophy, then, but all the same *apologetic*, or, more exactly, a *contribution to apologetic*, that is to say, a demonstration by experience of the need which the soul has of God for the accomplishment of its destiny; a subjective preparation of faithful consciences for the Christian and Catholic faith. For if conscience alone is summoned to the bar, it is called upon to lay itself open without reserve or reticence.

"I will not pretend," says M. Blondel, "to know myself and be aware of myself, to attain certitude or to appreciate man's destiny, without giving up to the crucible all the man I carry in me. It is a living laboratory, this organism of flesh, of appetities, desires, thoughts, the obscure workings of which I perpetually feel: there is where my science of life must first be constructed."[23]

Now dig to the bottom of human action, that is, "the hidden plenitude of its works and of all the exigences of its life," and you will inevitably perceive its re-

[22] *Loc. cit.*

[23] *L'Action*, Introd., p. xii.

sources; true, but you will also witness its shortcomings. Human nature, not as it is conceivable in a hypothetical world which never existed, but as it is presented in the world of historical realization, cannot shut itself up in the natural order without a painful feeling of its irremediable poverty.[24] The totality of experience, "action," constantly breaks the artificial equilibrium of a thought claimed to be sufficient unto itself and to be bounded by itself. Unity and its own definitive equilibrium, of which the conscience is in unwavering pursuit, are not obtained by a rational systematization of speculative truths; were these truths indissolubly bound up with the truths of ethics and of natural theology, they demand of the conscience the confession which is justified by a disproportion between the mysterious term of our destiny and the failing resources of a nature living at its own expense.

Of the problems offered to the philosopher by the total experience of life, philosophy succeeds neither in understanding the whole enunciation nor in finding the solution. The movement "towards unity" does not, and will not, lead to full autonomy. The supreme truth of philosophy is, that "separated" philosophy does not realize the integral synthesis of real life.

"For the consummation of nature and the fulfilment of man's aspiration," M. Blondel writes, "man and nature are not sufficient. Now it is inevitable that the complete development of voluntary action should bring us to this gaping hole which separates us from what we wish to be; it is impossible for us to fill up the abyss, im-

---

[24]Human nature is wounded, says St. Thomas Aquinas. The foundation of its being and its faculties subsist in their integrity, no doubt, but there is disorder in their inclinations and their capacities: the reason is darkened, the will hardened, the noblest powers trammelled, the selfish passions set on fire. (St. Thomas, *Summa theol.*, I-II, q. 85, a. 3.) The theologians are wont to sketch in two strokes the state of fallen human nature: original sin, they say, has robbed man of the riches of grace, and has injured him in his natural resources: *Per peccatum originis hominem spoliatum gratuitis, vulneratum in naturalibus.*

possible for us not to wish it filled up, impossible not to conceive the necessity of divine assistance."[25]

While philosophy is digging at this deplorable poverty, there arises before it a society which asserts itself to be of Divine origin, declares itself able to fill with superabundance the void of the soul and heal its wounds, and offers, besides,—and this point M. Blondel has unfortunately left too obscure—to furnish the objective proofs, necessary and rational, of the legitimacy of its mission.

"Listen and look," said Cardinal Dechamps: "there are but two facts to be verified, one in ourselves, and one outside of us; these two facts are seeking each other to embrace each other, and of these two facts we ourselves are the witness."[26]

M. Blondel and M. Wilbois have listened and looked. Both of them believers, they bear witness that they have seen the two facts embrace each other, and they proclaim that in fact the quest of their thought has no end, except on the condition that it finishes in the Christian and Catholic Faith. Without the *exterior fact* of the Church and the supernatural order objectively revealed and received with docility, we cannot account to ourselves for the *interior fact*, or explain it, or unify ourselves, any more than human society can be legitimately con-

[25] *L'Action*, p. 401.

[26] *Entretiens sur la démonstration catholique de la Révélation chrétienne*, 1er Entretien, p. 16. Cardinal Dechamps' thought may be briefly translated in these few words: It is a fact of consciousness, and of universal consciousness, that in religious matters—in all, that is, which connects the present with the future life, man with his supreme end, man with God—man trusts neither himself nor his fellows, but wishes for a certitude resting on the witness of God Himself. It is also a fact of consciousness that, in his actual condition, he asks this divine teaching of a living and traditional authority. This is the interior fact.

Now an *exterior, public* fact corresponds to this interior fact: the Catholic Church comes before humanity to teach it, and alone bears the Divine sign of a living, universal, permanent authority.

It is enough, then for good faith to seek God, to cry out on meeting Him: There He is! (Cf. Cardinal Dechamps, *Lettres théologiques*, second letter.)

stituted as an enclosed system, abstracting from the Christian order.

To seek unity is, for man—for humanity—not to stop before passing through Christ, before finding God in the Catholic way.

"Thus," Ollé-Laprune had said, "philosophy conspires against itself if it does not rid itself of the set determination to mutilate man, life, things and history. As it must try to make its views equal to the whole of the given reality, it ought to counsel, to prescribe, to endeavour, on its own account, to use all the resources, human and divine, placed at man's disposition."[27]

The illustrious Manzoni, a convert to Catholicism, liked to repeat:

"I have Catholic convictions, and I wish them to show through all that I write as through a transparency, for I seek to put force into what I write, and force proceeds only from a sincere conviction."[28]

All the philosophers who plead for the synthetic interpretation of all the data of their consciousness plead for sincerity. But what is sincerity but the orientation of the soul in reference to the truth? Now, to say *truth* is the same as saying intellectual representation adjusted to reality.

In the realm of philosophy unity is the law, but the sceptre can belong only to the understanding.

[27] *Le prix de la vie*, Preface, p. xii.

[28] *Manzoni, Lettere raccolte da F. Sforza*, Letter xii, p. 28.

The Place of Symbolism in Religion

By Charles Gore, D.D., LL.D.,
Bishop of Oxford.

One purpose of The Constructive Quarterly is to give representatives of the different religious communities of Christendom an opportunity of expressing as clearly as possible what they stand for; in part that they may learn to understand themselves and one another; in part also that those who desire to serve the cause of union may take note of the real obstacles in their path and study them carefully, so as to get upon the lines of least resistance in furthering the cause of unity, or at least be made fully aware at what points the deepest difficulties are certain to arise.

In the September number the Rev. F. J. Hall states "the Anglican position constructively." With his statement I find myself in cordial agreement. But among his "affirmations" I find the following: "The Catholic Faith is to be maintained in its purity and integrity, as contained in the Scriptures, summed up in the Creeds and affirmed by the undisputed General Councils." Now of course there are those among us Anglicans who would oppose such an affirmation, but it is not with them I am concerned. I am concerned rather with the type of mind which is called Modernist; which is conscious how the practical and devotional life of the church is bound up with its Creed, and how the different 'articles' of Catholic belief are connected together as links of a vital whole,—which accordingly desires to retain in

its integrity the Catholic tradition, but at the same time insists that it should not be pressed upon the intellect with "a crude literalism." In particular it is conscious of the intellectual opposition which exists among educated men today to belief in such physical miracles as are recorded in the Gospels and are affirmed in the Creed in connection with our Lord's person—"I believe in Jesus Christ who was conceived by the Holy Ghost born of the Virgin Mary . . . and the third day he rose again from the dead, ascended into heaven and sitteth on the right hand of God." The Modernist does not ask for an alteration in the phraseology of these clauses. He acquiesces in the plain statements of fact being taught as the church's message, but he would plead that in the sphere of the scientific or critical intellect they should not be pressed in their literal meaning. They are, in his view, symbolic statements: that is, statements which have certain spiritual values. They represent the spiritual truth that a divine providence and purpose accompanied the human birth of our Lord and that a divine assurance was given of His survival of death and His spiritual pre-eminence; but they are not to be insisted upon as literal statements of historical fact. Doubtless the mass of men will so take them. But the critical intellect finds in such statements literally understood an insuperable difficulty, and it is enough that they should be accepted as symbolical statements true in respect of their spiritual values.

This Modernist attitude of mind towards the physical miracles is sufficiently widespread to make it very well worth while to examine it especially in THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY, because no such statement as Mr. Hall's "affirmation" just quoted can pass today without the consciousness that the Modernist interpretation will be put upon it fairly widely in intellectualist circles, and Christians of all religious communions must be deeply interested to know how far the Modernist interpretation can

be taken as an accepted interpretation of the narrative in the Gospels and the clauses in the Creed.

The question of miracles can be considered from various points of view: from the point of view of philosophy or science or from the point of view of evidence. But I am proposing to consider it from another point of view—I am proposing to confine myself to this question of symbolism. I propose to ask, not whether the principle of symbolism has any application to religion—for I agree that it has—but whether the particular application of it here suggested is legitimate or tolerable.

I begin then with the general question, and I agree that symbolism must be admitted to apply to the language of religion in general and of the Christian religion in particular—meaning by symbolism the use of material images, images couched in the language of human experience, which are not to be understood literally by the trained intelligence but only as the best available expression of transcendent spiritual realities. The great classical example of these symbolic statements in non-Christian thought is to be found in Plato's beautiful 'myths'—stories which are to be taught as simple narratives, but which any one endowed with some measure of intellectual discernment will see to be valuable only because they are the vehicles of certain ideas. This method was admitted to have its place in the interpretation of the Jewish Bible by Alexandrian Jews like Philo and by many Christian theologians besides Origen. Even a Spinoza could see in such a method a bridge between what he thought to be intellectually true and what he saw to be morally edifying and spiritually necessary for the mass of men. Men like Renan and Matthew Arnold, who wanted to retain and make the best use of a religion which in the strict sense they did not believe to be true, have popularized it in modern literary circles. It has become the accepted device of the reconcilists who find themselves unable to believe in the actual

occurrence of the physical miracles but want to retain the religious tradition.

The principle of symbolism, I say, must be admitted to have legitimate application to some of the statements or doctrines of the Bible and the Christian religion. St. Paul certainly admits this when he says of our present Christian "knowledge" that it is a seeing "through a glass darkly"—that is, a blurred reflection of reality "in a mirror," or truth conveyed "in a riddle." This must be so, for to begin with, human language is inadequate to thought. As Victor Hugo says in *L'Homme gui Rit: "Il est presque impossible d'exprimer dans leur limites exactes les évolutions abstruses qui se font dans le cerveau. L'inconvénient des mots, c'est d'avoir plus de contour que les idées. Toutes les idées se mêlent par les bords; les mots, non. Un certain côté diffus de l'âme leur échappe toujours. L'expression a des frontières, la pensée n'en a pas."* I think that this is an illuminating account of the way in which our best thought about the highest and deepest subjects deteriorates in the attempt to express it with precision. This is why not merely a deep feeling but a great idea seems sometimes so much more convincingly conveyed even to ordinary people in music than in words. And in regard to things eternal it is not only human language but human thought which is at fault. Certainly in this region our 'science' is but seeing 'through a glass darkly.' Let us then try to grapple with the question at closer quarters and more in detail; and let us begin by analysing the certainly legitimate applications to our religious language of the principle of symbolism.

1. The theologians have always applied the principle of symbolism to the words and phrases used by the church in speaking about God, not only to the earlier and cruder anthropomorphisms of the Old Testament, in which God is spoken of as 'walking' and 'coming down to see' and riding upon clouds, but also to the expres-

sion of His attributes of mercy and justice, compassion and wrath, which are and must be, for human purposes, spoken of as distinct from one another and overriding one another, while in reality they cannot be so, to the idea of His 'foreknowledge,' His 'descent from heaven' in the Incarnation,' and to the mystery of His triune being. On all these and the like subjects the theologians have always been at pains to emphasize that our human language and our theological definitions are utterly inadequate to the divine realities, and that this is the chief sphere to which St. Paul's words have their application—that our present 'knowledge' of God is 'in part', that we are but seeing 'through a glass darkly' and that when we see 'face to face' in another state of being, our present knowledge will be 'done away.'

But in admitting the principle thus fully, we must guard it against misconception. We can feel and hold a quite definite idea of God practically, even if we cannot define it or express it with exactness. The Christian idea of God, the Creator and the Father, the idea of His attributes of justice and love, the idea that God is Himself love, and that Christ's character is God's character, the character of the only Creator and sustainer of the world, the idea of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, as three Persons in one Godhead, are quite *real* ideas of God, which we Christians believe to have been through prophets and the Son divinely revealed to us, though in part even the ideas themselves as we conceive them (and much more the expressions of them in words) are inadequate, and only symbolically true. However inadequate the ideas are, they are the truest ideas we can have in our present state of being, and the phrases which are best to express them are the phrases which secure the ideas. Thus it is quite inadmissible to use the symbolic principle in order to evacuate or weaken the ideas. There have been other ideas of God current—for instance the philosophic idea of the immanent Reason and Energy.

This idea of God Christianity can assimilate, but the Christian idea of the Creator or Father is far greater than it, and distinct from it. And while we are admitting that the Christian ideas or phrases are inadequate, we must insist that they are distinct and vivid ideas which tend to produce a special type of character in those who hold them and worship in accordance with them; that the truth of Christianity means the truth (within the limits of human capacity) of these revealed ideas and not of any other ideas; and that the phrases best express the truths which most securely guard and most vividly express these ideas.

2. The same principle of symbolic language must be applied to all that lies outside our present human experience. The Bible begins with an account of creation and ends with an anticipation of the end of the world—things which lie outside our possibilities of present experience. Thus it begins and ends in pictures and symbolical narratives. I do not see that any Christian either can reasonably deny this or has any interest in doing so. As regards the beginning of the world, the object of divine revelation is certainly not to satisfy human curiosity on matters which lie outside the possibilities of human observation; but to give, in terms intelligible to men at every stage of civilization, and to men of all kinds of education, such ideas of the origin of the world, of human nature, of human sin and divine providence, as suffice for practical guidance. Thus the Bible begins with what St. Gregory of Nyssa calls "ideas in the form of a story," symbolic narratives which are not to be taken for literal history. So the Bible begins and so it ends. It anticipates the 'end of the world': that is, it provides for men the sort of outlook on the ultimate future which is morally necessary for them, both to encourage them to feel that it is worth while doing their best without regard to the shortness of life and the seeming futility of human efforts after the highest ends, and also to prepare them

for desperate struggle with the forces of evil within and without. But it is no purpose of God's Spirit to write history for us beforehand. (We must on the whole discard Butler's rather unfortunate definition of prophecy). Thus the Biblical descriptions of 'the day of the Lord' both in the Old Testament and in the New are highly figurative. They project into the end of the vista of history a scene which in most graphic and arresting forms symbolizes what lies and must at present lie outside of our capacity to realize in literal form. Here again, then, in the region of what lies outside possible human experience in the past and the future we are dependent for practical spiritual knowledge on symbols. We see through a glass darkly.

But here again while we recognize the symbolic character of the phrases in which we are taught about the creation and end of the world, we must be careful not to suffer ourselves by this recognition to lose hold of the special idea which they enshrine and to substitute another. The New Testament language about the end of the world gives us a picture of a universal catastrophe, of a judgment coming on the whole world in its alienation from God or forgetfulness of God, a judgment like that which came in turn on the 'giant forms of empire' of old, it tells us of the awful figure of the Christ coming in the clouds of heaven as the judge of the world, of the gathering of all mankind before His throne, of the final overthrow of all the enemies of God, and their condign and terrible punishment, of a reconstitution of the whole material world to serve henceforth only the purpose of divine righteousness—a new heaven and a new earth 'wherein dwelleth righteousness'—and of the fulfilment of the divine destiny for man in the New Jerusalem. It is quite one thing to recognize that all this is symbolic language and is not to be taken literally. It is quite another thing to evacuate the pictures of their moral and practical meanings and substitute a really

fundamentally different idea. For instance the idea of a development of the world which shall proceed on the whole from better to better, till it finally issues in the perfection of man, and which leaves out the whole element of catastrophe, and of final judgment on a rebellious world and on individual rebel spirits, and the purging of creation and its reconstitution—such an idea of gradual development towards universal perfection is a different idea from the Biblical idea and will produce quite different moral effects upon the mind. We must recognize that the Biblical language is symbolic but we must recognize, if we would be Christian believers, that what the symbolism teaches is true. Or again with regard to the Bible language about angels and devils, it is one thing to recognize that the language about the devil 'going about as a roaring lion seeking whom he may devour', or about the 'unclean spirit going through dry places seeking rest and finding none' and then returning to the empty chamber of the human heart, or about the angels of little children beholding the face of God in heaven is symbolical language, but it is quite another thing to dismiss from our minds the whole idea of good and bad spirits and their relation to us and influence on us. Language may be symbolic and also true. And it undoubtedly makes a great practical difference whether we believe in spirits good or evil other than human spirits, and in their actual relations to us.

Again as in the case of our phraseology about God, so in the case of the language of the Bible about the creation and the end of the world, it should be noticed that to recognize its symbolical character is no merely modern device. Certainly in the first Christian centuries the symbolical view of the early chapters of Genesis was dominant and not only within the range of Alexandrian influence. It is recorded by a late writer that the somewhat literally-minded Irenaeus also argued that the narrative of Eden and the fall must be regarded not

'historical'y' or 'literally' but 'spiritually' if we are to give its language any satisfactory interpretation.[1] How far this interpretation of what is narrated as a fact is to carry us will be matter for further consideration. But the principle was in fact thoroughly familiar in the period when Christianity came out into the world both in Jewish and heathen literature and was generally applied to the opening narratives of Scripture. Then as regards the end of the world the freedom with which the Apocalyptic writers, including the seer of the New Testament apocalypse, rehandled the traditional scenery of 'the day of the Lord' shows that they were thoroughly familiar with its symbolical character.

3. Again the same principle applies to the revelation of what is 'above' and 'below' our present sphere of experience—to heaven and hell. It is easy to see that if this world is not all—if God is above and beyond—we must have both an idea and a word for this extra-mundane sphere of the divine presence. We must say and feel that 'God is in heaven.' But also Christians from the first held as a most certain conviction, on which all was staked, that the life of a man did not end with the grave, that the spirits of the dead were alive in the beyond, and in some sense were now receiving and in a further sense would receive, at the time of the end, the due rewards of their deeds. I say 'In one sense were now receiving and in another sense would receive at the end;' for at present they must be thought of as bare spirits, waiting for the time of the resurrection, when they shall receive their spiritual bodies by the resurrection from the dead. So far as they have taken in the meaning of St. Paul and later of Origen, Christians have recognized that the resurrection body would not be built up again of the materials of corruption: but in any case they believed in future life—in a sphere of waiting, an intermediate state of disembodied spirits, in the resurrection of

[1]See Stieren's *Irenaeus*, fragm. 14.

the dead, and in heaven and hell: and later, without warrant of Scripture yet under the pressure of what seems a strong demand of the practical reason, they added to the necessary scenery of the world beyond the idea of purgatory. With this exception, Scripture had already presented not only convictions and ideas but terms and phrases which provided for the imagination a sort of vague spiritual scenery of the other world. In part these terms had a very old history and were derived from days of very crude imagination, as that God sat just above the clouds—in this sense in heaven, or at a higher place more remote, the seventh heaven: and that the ghosts of the dead were in a hollow place under the earth. As I have said, it was very easy for early Christian thinkers to recognize the symbolical character of these local and special ideas, for such symbolism was everywhere in the air. I do not feel the least doubt that St. Paul and the author of the fourth gospel did not think they could get to God's house by going up high enough, as in a balloon, or that they would find hell if they could dig deep enough. In fact the way in which St. Paul speaks of us as already in 'the heavenly places' (or 'the heavenlies') shows that his idea of heaven was more than local. We need have no scruple at all then in recognizing the large element of symbolism in all that affects the life beyond our present sphere of possible experience, though here again it must be emphasized that the ideas in part symbolized in the phrases 'paradise', 'heaven,' 'hell' and in the concrete images of the resurrection of the dead from their tombs, are distinct ideas which are of the essence of the Christian religion; and that the phrases which express them presumably take us nearer the realities than any other phrases we can devise: or if we think we can invent for any particular idea a better phrase than the traditional one, we must take the greatest care that the phrase protects and expresses the distinctive idea, and is not really

in the long run calculated to substitute another and a different idea, that is to say, to alter the character of the religion.

4. Once more, we must recognize in the region of the sacraments a proper application of the symbolical principle. The sacraments are acted symbols: but symbols in the sense that the outward act or visible thing really *is* or involves its spiritual counterpart.[2] The object of the symbolic act is to present to the senses some spiritual transaction which is really effected in correspondence with the outward rite. But the symbolic act being so given, it supplies and is intended to supply the language in which we must talk about the spiritual reality. Thus we talk about 'washing away our sins' and 'eating' and 'drinking' the flesh and blood of Christ because the reality of spiritual cleansing or spiritual assimilation lies concealed behind the physical action of washing with water or eating in common. In this sense the principle of symbolism must be applied and has been universally applied to sacramental language.

Now I think I may claim that in all these four regions of Christian conception and language—that is to say the being of God, the beginning and end of the world, heaven and hell, and the sacraments,—the application of the principle of symbolism was generally recognized by the Christian Fathers and would be generally recognized today. Its assertion may shock a believer who has not thought much about the matter, at first hearing, but further reflection will convince him that the principle is sound.

And the principle, thus recognized, affects and always has affected, the sense in which Christians say certain articles of the Creed, especially "He came down from heaven," "He descended into hell," "He as-

---

[2]See Harnack *Lehrbuch der dogmeng.* I, p. 360 [Eng. trans. II, p. 144—in this case not quite accurate] on the early idea of symbolism.

cended into heaven and sitteth on the right hand of God." About the spiritual metaphor of the first phrase we need say nothing more: but what do we mean, what has the church always meant, when it has said that our Lord 'descended into hades'? We need not concern ourselves with the question when the clause got into the Creed: for I think there is overwhelming evidence going back to the first epistle of St. Peter—to a passage obscure in a certain sense but, so far as we are now concerned with it, quite distinct in meaning—that the Christians believed that when Christ died, and His body was buried, a really dead man's body in the sepulchre, He, the man Christ Jesus considered as a human spirit, was no more dead than Abraham or Moses. In His spirit He went where human spirits go, and was indeed active amongst them. I do not think it can be fairly pleaded that the phrase 'He descended into hades' did mean or was intended to mean anything more than this. It is symbolic because it uses the language of physical descent which is derived ultimately from the idea that the ghosts of the dead are under the earth in a pit. But as I have said the symbolic interpretation of such language is older than Christianity. It was an accepted principle among the Fathers of the early period. I have no doubt that there was then, as in the Middle Ages, a great deal of misplaced literalism, but no one today need hesitate to recognize symbolism in the language which confesses Christ to have 'descended into hades.' Now we come to the clause 'He ascended into heaven and sitteth on the right hand.' So far as the first part of this clause is concerned it must be understood to refer to an historical incident, *viz.* that the body of Jesus Christ, forty days after His resurrection, rose before His disciples' eyes upwards from the earth and vanished. This fact, which we accept as a fact, if we believe that St. Luke grounded his narrative on good testimony, is quite of a piece with other recorded appearances,

and must be interpreted to be like other appearances after the resurrection, as in a special sense a symbolic action. By this I mean that our Lord was not raised to the old conditions of His mortal life. The risen body is represented in the Gospel narratives probably as passing out of the grave clothes, leaving them intact, and out of the sepulchre, before the stone was rolled away to show that He was gone: certainly as becoming suddenly present within closed rooms: as appearing in different forms to different people: as no longer living here or there, or passing by walking from Jerusalem to Galilee or Galilee to Jerusalem. He is represented indeed as walking as a pilgrim to Emmaus,—even as eating with His disciples, as showing them His wounds; but we gather that all His appearances were of the nature of manifestations made out of a higher state, and simply expressive of a spiritual purpose. This I say is the impression made by the narrative when carefully examined. Its data correspond to the idea which St. Paul conveys effectively but vaguely by speaking of a spiritual body. We are led to think of a state in which matter has become simply the instrument of spiritual purpose. Thus it seems to me that when Christ 'ascended into the heavens' physically and actually, He was expressing in visible form a certain spiritual idea—namely, His exaltation to the Father's throne. We of today know that heaven is not really a locality above our heads, more clearly no doubt than the first disciples who were witnesses of the event knew it; but still for us and always, the idea of moral glory or moral failure must be expressed in local phrases, by the words 'up' or 'down,' 'higher' or 'lower.' I do not see what other action could, even for us today, express, as the 'ascension' expressed it, the majestic truth. In the act and in the phrase expressing it we acknowledge the element of symbolism which is involved whenever we talk of heaven as 'above.' When we speak of Christ 'sitting in the heavenly places' or 'at the right

hand of God' we are carrying the metaphor further. But here at least Christians have always known that they were using metaphors, and have said so very explicitly, especially about the phrase 'sitting at God's right hand.'

My point is then that in many spheres of Christian language and in certain articles of the Creed, the symbolical principle must be admitted: the language is true symbolically and not literally. And the reason for this admission is in each case the same, because the language applies to what lies outside our possible or actual human experience: it concerns the transcendent God, or regions of existence which lie in 'the beyond': and inasmuch as human language is the counterpart of human experience, and we have no other language to use, and inasmuch as even human thought or conception is limited and confined by present experience,—inasmuch as we have no celestial language—we can only speak of what lies in the beyond by symbols, which we must recognize as symbols, even while we also recognize that they are the best instruments we have for holding and speaking of realities.

5. But—and here I come to what I have specially in view in this essay—we are now urged by our Modernist friends to extend the application of this principle so as to recognize that the phrases in our Creed 'He was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary' and 'He rose again the third day from the dead' are symbolical phrases. It is conceded that the phrases were originally intended to represent literal events which actually happened, but now that we have ceased to find such physical miracles credible any longer, we can, it is contended, still use the phrases with sincerity of feeling as expressing *symbolically* realities which for us have an equivalent spiritual value. Thus 'He was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary' would be a symbol of the truth that a special divine

providence and purpose attended the birth of Christ: and 'He rose again the third day from the dead' would be a symbol of the truth that, though the body of Christ did in fact see corruption in the ordinary course of nature, yet He did really survive death and make His survival known. But such a proposed extension of the principle of symbolism really violates the principle. We must use symbolic language in the region which lies outside physical experience. But the distinguishing principle of the religion of the Incarnation is that God has also manifested Himself in the body and in physical events, and such events beyond all question we can describe in human language literally. That is exactly the purpose of human language—to describe with sufficient exactness what happens in human experience.

Thus though we do not know wholly how a natural birth of a child occurs, we can describe it in sufficiently accurate language. And though we do not wholly know how the birth of a child from a virgin mother would take place, we can describe the event with the same definiteness. So of a physical resurrection and the subsequent manifestations.

It cannot with any show of reason be denied that the point of Christianity was that these things and the like miracles had actually happened: and that provision had been most carefully made that they should be proclaimed by competent witnesses. The insistence upon actual occurrence and competent witness in the New Testament is unmistakable.

The whole pretension of Christianity centres upon the real occurrence of an event, the resurrection, and in a secondary sense upon a whole series of events, the special value of which lies in their extraordinary character, their being unaccountable except as direct acts of God calling attention to His moral purpose in the redemption of the world. Of course you may say of such supposed events either that they are, or that they are not, sup-

ported by adequate evidence: you may say that they manifest the glory of God, or that they degrade our idea of Him: you may say that they enlarge our conception of nature or that they only confuse it and throw it into disorder. What you cannot say with any show of reason is that their occurrence makes no difference to our conception of God or of nature: or that Christianity would have taken its place, all the same, whether they were believed to occur or not: or that it makes no difference to the validity of Christianity whether the belief was justified or no: or that the precise assertion of their occurrence can symbolize a course of events in which they did not occur. To introduce the idea of symbolism in this manner is to obliterate the difference between happening and not happening; and is to throw all language and thought into confusion. Symbolism is a necessary principle so far as we are dealing with beings or states or events which lie outside the region of possible human experience in this world: for inasmuch as human language is the transcript of human experience under present conditions we have no adequate language to use about such events or states or beings. We have no "otherworldly" language: we must use the best terrestrial words we can, recognizing their symbolic character. But for events in the terrestrial sphere we have a language and are bound so to use it so as to describe faithfully what occurred. And false language is not symbolic. We could express quite well in human language how Christ was born and died and came to be believed to have conquered death, whichever way these things actually happened. Or we can say that they were at the time believed to have happened one way, but did in fact happen another. But we cannot obliterate the difference or the importance of the difference. No description of an event which professes to be historical can be symbolic of a different kind of occurrence. The word symbolic is out of place in such a connection, and nothing can be

more certain than that St. Paul knew the difference between the function of human language to express the historical events 'that Christ died and was buried and that He rose again the third day' and the function of human language in speaking of the being of God 'dwelling in the light unapproachable' or the 'mystery' of the spiritual body or the 'seventh heaven'.

I do not profess to have contributed anything in this argument to the discussion of the question whether the grounds of belief in the miraculous events affirmed in the Creed are adequate or no. But I do profess to have made it evident that the Modernist claim to repeat the affirmations and to interpret them in a 'symbolical' sense, because such symbolical sense attaches to other clauses of the Creed, is a claim which completely fails to justify itself. Symbolism is in place where we are dealing with what we cannot express in terms of human experience: it is quite out of place where the affirmation concerns what passed within the limits of present human experience: and to confuse this issue is to confuse the issues between happening or not happening and between truth or falsehood.—C. Oxon:

P.S.—Since this essay was written I have been asked the question whether I do not admit that there is such a thing as symbolical history, as (to take an extreme instance) when in legends of the saints of the least valuable sort miracles are inserted, without any regard to evidence, just like the halo in art round the saint's head, simply as meaning that such and such a man or woman was a saint and must therefore be presumed to have worked the appropriate miracles: and I am further asked whether I do not admit that this sort of symbolical history is found to a greater or less extent in the Bible. To this question I should answer that I have read the Père Delehaye on *Les légendes hagiographiques*, and I admit the existence of the sort of 'history' described, and, in

a measure, its existence in the Bible, though I should prefer the term 'legend' to describe it rather than 'symbolical history.' But there is also such a thing as history properly so called, that is a record, not infallible in all details but sufficiently accurate, of events as they actually occurred, and the value of such history depends on its being a true record, and the Gospel narratives unmistakably claim to be history of this kind, of which the value depends upon its truth to fact.

On the Specific Genius and Capacities of Christianity, Studied in Connection with the Works of Professor Ernst Troeltsch

By Baron Friedrich von Hügel.

Perhaps the subtlest, yet really the greatest, of the difficulties that beset all eirenic endeavours, such as the Constructive Review so valiantly represents for our own times and peoples, lie, not without but within,— consist, not in any possible obstruction from a non-perceptive world, but from a certain flatness and unpersuasiveness which, sooner or later, always tend to pervade whatsoever is readily optimistic, studiously pacific, free from all acute stress and strain. Thus even Leibniz, that rich, all-harmonizing mind, is he as moving as Tertullian, that vehement, onesided genius, or even as some of Leibniz's own contemporaries, smaller and less balanced, but more concentrated and instinctive than that serene negotiator, of the large wig, amidst the pontiffs and princesses of his day? Probably the best antidote to any such danger is the close study, not directly of the contrasts and conflicts between the already made theologies and cults of the several Churches and Sects, but of the religious life, or at least of its philosophy, still now in the making— of the struggles and successes operative, at this very moment, within some exceptionally capacious mind and deeply spiritual soul. At least, for myself, I can be fully happy in Eirenics only in some such entirely unofficial and unfinal, slow, round-about, far-back and

far-onward looking way. And thus I come here to attempt the presentation of the fundamental strivings, and thinkings, in matters of the specific genius, claims and capacities of Christianity, of Professor Ernst Troeltsch of Heidelberg.

Such a presentation, to be effective, should be clear, yet clearness here is very difficult. Life itself is, not clear, but vivid. And even the deeper Sciences—those with most of concrete content, such as History and Psychology, —and also Philosophy, will always remain outdistanced, not in clearness, but in volume and vividness of content, by Life wheresoever it is profound. In Troeltsch's case we must add, on the side of his subject-matters, the unique depth and vividness, hence the difficulty as to clearness, of his central interest, Religion. We must add, on the side of himself, a most rarely alive sense of the special characteristics of religion and of the different, quite distinct characteristics of the other depths, ranges and complexes of human experience and of reality; and a sense largely new, in its keen self-consciousness, of the necessary part played in life generally, and particularly also in religion, by the tension thus introduced. Add again strong prejudices within this student, and still stronger prejudices amongst his environment and audience—prejudices which he very nobly, but only slowly and partially, throws off, and as to which even his fine courage has to accommodate, approximate, reconcile, hence somewhat to obscure, indeed to confuse, the full depth and range of the issues and admissions. And finally, this man is not a Frenchman, with a born sense for form, but a German with curiously little of such a sense even for a German, and who, in each of his varying moods and growths, tends always to be so emphatic as to be indeed oppressively clear for *that* point or moment, yet so as to render more difficult the integration of this his contention with other parts of his teaching even where this is contemporary. Take all this together, and

you will be prepared for the obscurities and difficulties, but not, I think—if only you will persevere as his student—for the bewilderingly rich instructiveness, indeed the grandly tonic ethical and spiritual training-power, of Troeltsch.

For now over twenty years, I have learnt quite massively from Troeltsch, as much where regretfully but firmly I still disagree, as where, so joyfully, I agreed from the first with all that I am. Probably no Englishman, possibly no American, knows his mind and works as intimately as I know them myself. Hence I believe myself to possess some special competence for attempting a description and analysis of his main positions. Nobody less than he himself would wish such an exposition to minimize differences, or not to move on, from our own two selves, to the subject-matter, indeed towards insights and analyses not yet fully either his or mine. He considers himself a strong Protestant; I think he is this in fewer respects than he used to be, or than he thinks himself now still to be. For myself I would wish to be, and I hope I am, a devoted Catholic. Yet just those convictions and habits which, within my own life, I feel to be most centrally Catholic appear to me, ever increasingly, to require the aid precisely of what is most growing, and most rich, in Troeltsch's positive convictions; and, in return, these convictions seem to me to require for their full protection, expansion and fruitfulness, much of the soil and environment they possess within my own Catholic spiritual life. And if my friend objects that I live with my head in the clouds—that I reason from a Catholicism ever less apparent in the fully official acts of the Roman Catholic Church, I could, after all, retort, *mutatis mutandis*, in much the same vein, as to Protestantism and *its* contrary, yet very real, difficulties; especially can I easily show—a point for the most part admitted by himself—how much of precisely what appears in him as his own slow conquest of most fruitful, very difficult insights

has been so far anticipated, with any real consistency or depth, in life, temper, analysis and theory, within the various religious and Christian bodies, by the Roman Catholic Church alone.

Two articles in a non-technical magazine cannot attempt to analyze the more than two thousand pages to which conjointly run the Professor's *History of Protestantism*, (in "*Kultur der Gegenwart*") 2nd Ed. 1910, his *Social Doctrines of the Christian Churches and Groups*, 1911, and the second volume of his *Collected Works*, 1913; let alone many another important article or monograph still awaiting incorporation in further volumes of this collective edition.

These many pages contain much repetition; they are at times slovenly in style, and the changes introduced into later editions are often unskilfully introduced; a curiously thin, impenetrative, because unloving spirit spoils, to my own persistent taste, much of his earlier writings, where these touch Catholicism, as he defines this complex of religious life, so much richer than, especially there, he sees it to be; and, perhaps above all, his still strongly idealistic philosophy prevents his admirably vivid apprehensions as to the specific facts, genius and needs of religion and Christianity from attaining a fully consistent and persistent, concrete and comfortable articulation. Yet he nowhere simply repeats himself; he is never rhetorical or empty, and can rise, indeed, to the noblest form wedded to the richest content; his additions are always very instructive; his love for Christianity is everywhere deeper than his antipathy to Catholicism, indeed it is that love which, with a growing knowledge of ancient and especially mediaeval Christianity, is increasingly limiting this antipathy; and his religious sense is too strong, and his analysis of it is too keen, for his philosophical idealism not to show most instructive strains and rents. Certainly no living German thinker is more sensitively alive to the present prevalence and the peren-

nial plausibility and ruinousness of Monism in all its forms; whilst few, not professedly orthodox Germans have been, upon the whole, so clear-sighted and courageous concerning the limitations of Kant, Goethe and Schleiermacher.

I propose, in this first Paper, to consider his *Fundamental Concepts of Ethics* 1902, 2nd. Ed. 1913, (*Ges. Schriften* II pp. 552–672); and, in a second Paper, to study his *What do we mean by the Essence of Christianity?* 1903, 2nd. Ed. 1913, (*Ibid*, pp. 386–451), and especially the conclusion to his *Social Doctrines* 1911, pp. 965–986. These two hundred pages, all told, contain, I think *in nuce* all the fundamental principles, strengths and weaknesses of Troeltsch's life-work, so far, especially in all that concerns the constructive interpretation of Theism, Christianity and the Church, in face of and within our modern western world.

I

Now the *Fundamental Problems of Morality*, like so much of Troeltsch's work, takes the form of a criticism of a particular author, indeed a particular work; yet it fully equals in breadth, and far exceeds in rich fulness and precision, the somewhat vague suggestions of its title. Its six-score pages constitute an astonishingly many-sided, wholly live and stimulating treatise on the special characteristics, forces, difficulties and prospects of Christianity, and on how to penetrate, utilize, meet and forecast all these things.

We shall not ourselves be directly occupied with Professor Wilhelm Hermann and his "Ethics," thus studied by Troeltsch; yet it is well to remember throughout, that Troeltsch is, here, not starting hares of his own, or beating the air, but is wrestling with a mind and conviction of rare power and tenacity, and with a soul unusually full of enthusiastic devotion to Christ, with a man, too, highly

characteristic of a very prevalent ingredient of modern thought, and possessing great influence amongst the present large class of Germans in search of a faith free from historical contingencies, metaphysical subtleties, mystical exaltations and priestly oppressions—a combination of Christ and Kant. We cannot, thus, fail to strike here, in the positions criticized by Troeltsch, upon much that is quietly assumed, or strenuously contended for, by many an English-speaking contemporary, moved and tried by the difficulties of our present times.

Let us, then, take briefly Troeltsch's short account of the starting-point of the past history of the entire enquiry; and let us thereupon pass on to a longer consideration of the four main propositions defended by Troeltsch in this monograph.

1

"Not from a metaphysic of whatsoever kind, which, by means of its own concepts, would reveal to us the essence of the world, do we now-a-days approach the religious problem. But from the general ethical problem of the final values and aims of human life and action do we reach the religious, metaphysical convictions enclosed therein; and from the development of these convictions do we then, in return, determine the more precise ethical valuations. Psychological, historical and epistemological ascertainments jointly give us a theory of values; and in this theory the metaphysical religious foundations, which underlie it, become apparent" (*l. c.* p. 553).

He then gives us a short historical retrospect. "The old Christian Theology paid no systematic attention to Ethics, and nowhere attempted a scientific presentation of them corresponding to those of Religious Metaphysics and of the Dogmas determined by these Metaphysics. From the determination of religious truth the ethical consequences flowed of themselves; and Ethics could all the

more be left to their spontaneous form—to manners and the judgments of the conscience—since Christian Ethics coalesced with the nearly related Stoic and Platonic views in the concept of the Natural Ethical Law, and could, thus, be considered as something fixed by Nature" (p. 554). "When the Catholic Church came to organize her claims and her principles for the direction of all souls, as co-extensive with the entire culture of the time, within her great systems, these systems could not, of course, dispense with an Ethic. But even here Ethics were conceived, in the identification of the Natural Ethical Law with the Aristotelian Ethics, as a complex given independently, which the Church had to accept and only to modify by means of its own higher outlook. The Christian character of Ethics consisted in the subordination of all the ends springing from the Natural Moral Law under the final end of the Church; in the Church's communication of the sacramental forces of grace for the fulfillment of these ethical demands; in priestly study of the conscience and direction of the soul, which taught the right application of the natural law, and its combination with particular Christian duties in each concrete case; and, finally, in the manifestation of certain heroic ascetical achievements effected by grace in a quite special manner and degree. Only these last achievements flowed purely and exclusively from the Christian principle and not from the natural law; indeed they completed and exceeded this law with ascetical and mystical commandments of their own. As, in Dogmatics, the immanental natural metaphysic confronts the revealed super-natural metaphysic, so also, in Ethics, the natural moral law and the special counsels and achievements of grace confront each other, separate indeed from each other within this sinful world and not harmonizable by man, but one and actually harmonious in the Divine Mind Itself. An Ethic of grace, asceticism, contemplation, Divine Love, which springs

from the conception of a Supernature and Grace transcending every creaturely measure, and from the corresponding end of the creature's participation in the Being of God, is combined with a natural-philosophical Ethic which follows from the natural end of creaturely existence, and which regulates the worldly interests of family life, Society, the State, Economics, Science and Art. The dualism of the two moralities has its foundation in the dualism within the Divine Being Itself, which, in the world of creation, manifests its nature, and, in the world of grace, reveals its supernature" (p. 555).

Here I would only refer to the truly masterly account of the social doctrines of mediaeval Catholicism, especially of St. Thomas, in the "*Soziallehren*", as the warmest and wisest appreciation so far reached by Troeltsch; and would express my opinion that, even there, Troeltsch over-simplifies, and only imperfectly understands or appreciates, the doctrine as to nature and supernature, and its quite unexhausted truth and rich applicability.

The earlier Protestantism, ever since and with Melanchton, also "always, in the first instance, attacks the problem of Ethics from the side of Dogmatics. Once we have, here, derived from the Bible (a completely sufficient, completely clear source) our fundamental view of God, World, Man, Redemption, there flow from this fixed point the consequences capital for our conception of Ethics—the doctrines of Conversion, Re-birth, the final ethical Ideal of Love. And these consequences can then be applied, by practical experience and by casuistry, to the demands of Natural Ethics, as these are developed, in connection with the tradition of the Schools, by philosophers and jurists, out of the *lex naturae*, and hence also out of the Divine Will. The contradiction present here, between the Ethics of the simple over-coming of the world and of the love that renounces all resistance and the this-world Ethics, was certainly felt; but these strictly Christian demands were now restricted to the person, that is,

to private life. The Christian, as a member of public life, as bearer of an office deriving from the political and economic system of the Natural Law, has to follow the requirements of his office, that is of the order of Natural Law permitted by God together with sin and against sin. In this way the 'personal' Ethics are nowhere perilous to the necessities of civilization. Ethics here still belong to the domain of the subjective and of the application; Religion, to the domain of the alone simply objective, to authoritative revelation. To attack the problem of Christianity from the ethical side, had, in these circumstances, no meaning; and no one here came to think of doing so except the Sectaries who, just because of this endeavour, were contemptuously expelled, as despisers of the objective revelation, of grace as independent of subjective effort, and of the Church as objectively administering these treasures" (*l. c.* pp. 559–560).

The great problems here involved were bound some day to be fully realized, and this their realization could not fail to change the relations between Ethics and Dogmatics, and hence the general conception of theology. And this realization and change Troeltsch finds to have been slowly, complicatedly, in great part unconsciously, effected in two largely contradictory stages.

The first stage "reacts against the internecine conflicts of the various Churches and Sects, and seeks a general conception of religion, which is to include Christianity and to be based upon psychology. Religion is here conceived as an essentially practical bearing of the human mind, which indeed contains certain doctrines, as presupposition and as consequence, but which finds its specific legitimation in its practical achievements. And these achievements could, now and at this stage, only be discovered, upon the whole, in certain strengthenings and foundings of Ethics. The result was the closest combination of Ethics and Religion, and the reconstruction of Dogmatics from the basis of Ethics—Ethics conceived

here in a predominantly subjective and individualistic manner. Thus Kant and the Kantians consider Ethics (as the necessary, but quite subjective, determinations of the will by the purely practical reason) to be the fundamental science; whilst Religion is, for them, the addition of the metaphysical guarantees for the victory of the moral order over the phenomenal world and its laws" (p. 564).

But in the second stage "Religion reconquers its independence of Ethics. Prepared by Hamann, Herder, Jacobi, there arose the new epoch-making definition by Schleiermacher, de Wette and Hegel, which found Religion to be distinct both from Ethics and from Metaphysics, as a central self-determination of the entire personality towards the being and nature of Reality—as the attainment of a consciousness, a living experience, of an absolute spiritual content and meaning of existence. Hence there reappeared an independent, objective determination of Religion in the conceptions of God and of an elevation of the soul into the Divine Life." Indeed "Ethics also here find an objective determination, in the great universally valid ends of action; and these ends are concentrated in the nature of reason, from which they proceed as its necessary fruits. Thus here there result distinct and specific ends and contents of the State, Society, Art, Science, the Family, Religion, which severally determine the will as so many objective values. Religion ceases to be simply a sanction and guarantee of self-discipline and philanthropy, and stands as a specific objective value alongside of the other objective values of civilization. Hence the question here is how the Christian Ethic, determined as it is by the religious end, constitutes itself under the influence of this end; and how the demands which result from this religious end stand with regard to the demands deriving from the other, the non-religious, ends" (pp. 505, 566). Troeltsch finds, however, that in Schleiermacher, so largely monistic in his trend and yet,

in his later environment and form, so strongly ecclesiastical, there is so much abstract unification and aesthetic harmony that "the tension, extant between action determined by specifically Christian religious conviction and action determined by the non-religious ends, ceases to be felt at all" (p. 567).

Yet it is along the general lines of Schleiermacher's Ethics of objective contents and ends, and not those of Kant's Ethics of a formal universal validity, that Troeltsch will now, upon the whole (rightly, I am confident) set to work.

2

Let us, then, now take with care the four chief problems as faced and met by the system of Ethics proposed to us by Troeltsch. These are: the conception of a purely formal, *a priori* necessity, is it a sufficient basis for Ethics? the Ethics of Jesus, are they identical with that fundamental moral conception? does the special, separate character of Christian Ethics reside in their proffer of a redemptive capacity for moral action? and, finally, what is the application of the specifically Christian Ethics to the concrete conditions of life? I believe Troeltsch to be in substance profoundly right in his answers to the first, second and fourth questions; but seriously inadequate in his reply to the third question. The full originality and richness of Troeltsch's position appears fully disclosed only at the end.

(1) As to the first point, Troeltsch admits that Ethics must begin with a general analysis of the Moral, and that thus we reach the conception of an end absolute, necessary, and valuable in itself; although already thus we have to admit a "pleasure", since the agent's recognition of such an *a priori* necessity undoubtedly presupposes his "pleasure" in such a necessity, that is, a sentiment (a sensitive-

ness) as to ideal values. Also, that the decision as to whether and how an act is really to proceed from such a necessity in the particular cases, is possible only to the ripe ethical conscience, in the form of a judgment offering itself to it as necessarily springing from its moral nature, hence is possible only as an entirely autonomous judgment. And, thirdly, that the essence of Morality consists precisely in the moral disposition—the personal conviction as to the necessity and universal validity of the insight offering itself as moral. Here Troeltsch would only emphasize more clearly and strongly the element of the end, already present here; and would derive the entire system of concepts from the ideally necessary end, with its great bifurcation into the individual and the social ends (p. 617).

But then Troeltsch is promptly faced by the far-reaching fact that "in the reality of the moral life we distinguish between the Subjective Rules which spring entirely from the bearing of the subject towards himself and towards other subjects (*e.g.* truthfulness, thoughtfulness, courage; benevolence, justice, loyalty); and the claims which are ever upon us to treasure, and to aspire after, the Objective Values (the Family, State, Society, Science, Art, Religion). We recognize, do we not?, also in these latter complexes something valuable, not simply for selfish or sensual reasons, but ideally and objectively; something to be striven for even with the greatest sacrifices. And in these objective ethical values,we recognize, as in the subjective, the two sides of the individual and the social value; in our devotion to these objective values we singly acquire a personal worth, which is always closely bound up with our recognition and promotion of the same personal worth in others. Thus only the subjective and the objective values, in each case individual and social, can conjointly represent the application of the idea of a moral necessity to actual life." (*l. c.* pp. 618, 619.)

"Do not object that these objective values are the

merely natural products of action. For the merely natural processes, which spring simply from physical abilities and needs, or from psychical conditions and instincts, remain a shapeless mass till they are seized by the moral idea of an ethical good to be formed upon this natural foundation. Out of the sexual instinct the moral idea thus forms the community of personalities, the Family; out of the social instinct, the personal community of the State; out of the craving for food and possessions, the orders of Production and Property; out of the aesthetic impressions, the work of Art which shows us a higher world shining through the world of sense; out of curiosity and the need of physical orientation, Science in search of truth to the neglect of every selfish interest; and out of religious moods and excitations, the conscious and deliberate Religion of an entire life's organization for God and with Him. All these ends signify an opposition to natural selfishness, sloth, sensuality and to the merely given; they all require, for their achievement, an earnest concentration upon, and devotion to, the object, for the sake of its interior necessary value. They all degenerate when taken simply as pleasures or as outlets to our need for activity. Yet against these ever threatening degenerations the principles of subjective morality would be of no avail; the only help lies in the recognition that these ends share the character of the intrinsically necessary, are means for the formation of personality, and hence constitute objective values."

"And especially let us note that also the religious element of life belongs, in the first instance, to man's given instincts, and requires, as all the others, to be raised into the sphere where it ceases to be something simply to be enjoyed and possessed, and becomes what ought to be—the objectively necessary." Yet "Religion is an independent element of life, with its own sorrows and its own joys, an experience and a temper of soul which is not artificially produced, but which is lived through and lived in

by man. It stands, in the first instance, as the experience best interpreted by Mysticism, independently by itself, bound up with Cultus and with Myth. The greater the power of the Gods becomes, the more does it draw also the legal and the moral orders under the influence, control, protection of the Divine. On the other hand, the soul's strivings after religious values (purity, resignation into God's hands, assimilation to God) become an imperative which represents the specific *oughtness* of Religion" (pp. 618–620).

"Now Ethics, if we attend only to their characteristics of universal validity and necessity, and to these quite general foundations for the formation of personality, are naturally, in principle, without any history, and, in their central features, are everywhere identical—the differences here concern only clearness, consistency and strength. The situation is different as regards the objective values; these arise within the labours of history, and here detach themselves, in 'the heterogony of ends', from merely natural forms and values. Here the great formations, from the Family to Religion, have all to be known by means of history. Each of these values indeed has its own distinct development, which reveals this value's specific character and the conditions of its life and growth. And again the interaction of these several values possesses also its own history. The end of history, then, cannot be an abstract uniform idea or reason, but only a concrete articulated system of values; and the question as to the real articulation of this system of values becomes thus the central problem of Ethics."

"And only in these objective Ethics, which are difficult and complicated, do we reach the highest and last, but also the most arduous, problem of Ethics. For in very truth there does exist an Ethic *sub specie temporis*, and an Ethic *sub specie aeternitatis*. Restrict yourself to purely formal Ethics, and you will not notice the contrast, or you will interpret it wrongly, or will explain it away. Face

the complications of the ethical problems as they battle amidst the objective values of life, and that contrast becomes the most important of all the facts. Each position here often declares fierce war against the other, as Immanental and Transcendental Ethics, as Culture and Asceticism. Yet each ever again seeks the other, since either, left to itself, withers and decays. Religion, without reference to the world, narrows and darkens the Ethical, or turns it into some Utopian dream; Immanental Ethics, without reference to a final, all-englobing, all-determining end, grow flat and aimless." (*l. c.* pp. 623–625).

Throughout this first point I can find only one imperfection—the sense, to my mind ambiguous and shifting, in which the term "nature" is used; for the rest I take Troeltsch here admirably to see and to state the complex situation as it really is.

(2) The second question, as to the identity of the Christian Ethical Ideal with the Kantian formalist Ethics, is a purely historical one, to be decided independently of our own ethical predilections. And taking it thus Troeltsch flatly denies the identity. "It is an extraordinary misconception of the real meaning and spirit of the Gospel, an impossible feat at the stage we have reached in the historical understanding of the New Testament. Not without cause has it been rejected by ecclesiastical and by radical spokesmen, by à Kempis and Gottfried Arnold, down to Renan and Nietzsche, Tolstoi and Kierkegaard."

True, what this identification emphasizes is a presupposition of the Evangelical Ethics—the spirit of interior liberty and of the need for genuine dispositions which necessarily issue, from the recognition of the end, in an action joyful and assured. This is indeed the soul of the warfare of Jesus against the doctrine of the Pharisees; the autonomy of Ethics, as the prerequisite of Morality, has probably never, in a popular form, been more vividly insisted on than in the preaching of Jesus.

"Yet this insistence in nowise exhausts the Gospel message. This message does not simply leave to each person to do, according to what appears, to his own moral insight, to be, in each case, necessary and universally valid; but Jesus points, with the keenest, an all-dominating emphasis, to a concrete and objective content, end and value in and for all action."

Already the undoubted superordination of the Kingdom of God over the individual, in Jesus's preaching, is incapable of derivation from the concept of autonomy; for the latter makes the independent individual the starting point and centre of the relations within the community. Thus "in the preponderance of the social side we get the expression of the determination of these Ethics by an objective end, and the connection of this end with a metaphysical, or religious, conviction as to the world. The littleness of the creature in face of the Infinite God, is here united with God's special care for the world as a whole and for all the individuals within it" (p. 629).

"Hence Matt. 7: 12—'Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even unto them; for this is the law and the prophets'—cannot possibly constitute the centre of the Ethics of Jesus. Propounded thus as central, "this passage would be a great triviality; and indeed, taken thus, it has ever earned the lively applause of Utilitarians and Positivists. The passage, according to the entire spirit of Jesus's preaching and to the context here, can only mean: 'be not hypocrites, demanding of others what you are not prepared to do yourselves.' The *locus classicus* for the temper of Jesus is His answer as to which is the great commandment, Matt. 22: 37: 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets'" (p. 630). Indeed simply everywhere in the

words and the spirit of Jesus's preaching appears "this pairing of the two fundamental commandments, and this their foundation in the supreme objective end of God and of a community of all the children of God. The purity of heart and the love here everywhere demanded are a sanctification of the entire person for God and to see God. Even where the second fundamental commandment is immediately concerned, all still remains under the religious point of view. We do not here find a love of our neighbour in the humanitarian sense, not, at least, in the first instance. It is the love of God who has freely given us so much, that is the motive of the love of the brethren. Even the individual who apparently stands far away, is to feel the warm breath from the true home of man—and this, also, if he do not, in consequence, turn to God. For God reigns over the just and the unjust. Indeed even towards enemies and haters this love must not expire; it must effect, by the power of God and by the soul's insight into the smallness of all human combats, what is impossible to the simply natural man, bounded by his earthly horizon and with all his little cares looking so important—the disarmament of evil by goodness, or at least, where this refuses to occur, the lofty serenity of a forgiving disposition, since most men know not what they do" (pp. 631, 632).

This specifically religious Ethic, the most consistently perfect type of religious Ethic based on the prophetic Personalism and Theism, thus finds the end and motive of action in the Kingdom of Heaven. And "this Kingdom of Heaven is, of course, not the union of men through the common recognition of the law of autonomy, as planted by God in the human breast—a modern abstraction entirely foreign to the naive ancient realism, but something thoroughly objective, a wonderful good brought about exclusively by a great grace and deed of God. And the immense concentration of all thought upon this end appears here in the immediate expectation of this divine

deed and grace, and in the Gospel being simply the call to preparation for this deed of God. All this-world considerations and ends have here become indifferent,—are left far behind and far below by an Ethic which sees only the end and the consummation—the highest and the last aim and end of life" (pp. 634, 635).

"Thus we recognize, in the unlimited sway of the eschatological idea over the evangelical preaching, simply the grandiose expression of the unique value of the religious end; and in the subjection, inspired by the proximity of the Kingdom, of every thought to the immediate rule of this last end, we have the key to the bearing of the Gospel towards the other objective values—towards this-world morality. This latter morality is, thus, not combated, but it is put into the background; only its dangers and disappointments are visible here. Art and Science in general are unknown in the circles within which the Gospel arises, even though the artistic instinct celebrates its naivest triumphs in the form of Jesus's parables, and though from His concentration upon the thought of God the scientific search after unity could not fail strongly to be aroused. State and Law are on the downward grade. Work and Property are dangerous, if they go beyond the care for the day. The Gospel loves the poor, as those most needing help, and as the more ready to be loved and to love; but it neither formulates nor solves any social problems, for the days of Society are numbered and the days of God's Kingdom are at hand. Let us all possess the world as though we possessed it not. But the heralds of this Gospel shall go further—they are to make themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven, and to give all their possessions to the poor; so that, as shining patterns of a readiness for every sacrifice, they may proclaim the great message through the cities of Israel until He comes" (*l. c.* pp. 635, 636).

"Thus, too, we understand the reality of the analogies

between the Ethic of Jesus and every other specifically religious Ethic, which, as such, determines life from the objective religious end, and consequently represses, or even renders indifferent, the this-world ends. The Platonic Ethic, with its methodic elevation of the soul into the world of the alone eternally Abiding and eternally Valid; the Stoic Ethic, which finds the standard for man's sensible, exterior life in the eternal law of nature—the rule of the spirit; the Buddhist Ethic, with its striving after the changeless and impassive Good; the Mystical Dualisms, and their sharp contrastings of certain mysterious joys of the soul with this our earthly world; above all, of course, the Prophetical Ethic, with its value of an interior life attained by the individual in union with God: all these convictions, in spite of strong differences, are nearly related to the Christian Ethic, just because they all find the standard for action in an objective religious Good. Hence they are all ascetic, rigoristic, super-worldly, transcendent, full of tension towards worldly culture. The Christian Ethic differs from these other Ethics, only as the Christian religious idea differs from *their* religious ideas. Hence, not a contemplative immersion in Being, or a quietistic denegation of the will, but an active dedication of the will to a Godhead overflowingly alive, Which bears within Itself positive ends for the world and opens up an immense movement, is the essence of the Christian Ethos" (pp. 636, 637).

And, finally, we can thus also answer the most difficult of all the problems raised by the Christian Ethic—that as to the precise character of its opposition to the world. Troeltsch himself, indeed, varies considerably on this point at different times, or even almost simultaneously. But two central convictions are here and everywhere operative within him—indeed they are still increasing.

"The historical development which succeeded in rendering the fundamental ethical convictions of Christianity fruitful for the work of the world, and which created a

civilization inspired by Christian ideals, has not misunderstood the Gospel, even though that development itself, in its great complexity, has not always been properly understood. Precisely the specifically Christian element, the personalistic conception of God, and the optimism in the estimate of the world (which, in spite of all the dualism, is here combined with that conception) perceives the divine action to have an end which comprises and fashions the world, and assigns to human labour the task of a community of personalities devoted to the sanctification of the ends of this world and to making these ends subserve the full and final end. For Jesus's teaching to yield this result it is only necessary that the religious end lose the vehemence springing from the expectation of its immediate realization, and, consequently, its power simply to evaporate all other preoccupations. That end may well have been incapable of recognition as the highest and all-dominating end except under this condition; but it can continue to be recognized, even if its realization is postponed from the immediate to a distant future. The religious end is indeed continuously renovated by men's concentration upon the image of that classical beginning when it stood, without a rival, with the power of the present, before men's hearts. But for the sake of God, the God of creation, from whom the world and all its good derive, the world, as soon as it becomes a lasting field for work, must also be accorded a positive value, and its ends must, as far as possible, be harmonized with the final end revealed to us by God" (p. 638).

And Troeltsch's second conviction is that something which, as we shall see, even he himself finds difficult to distinguish from the Catholic graduation and distribution of a domestic and an heroic type and degree of morality, constitutes the most adequate solution of the difficulty; although he most rightly insists that, in this matter, we can never, in practice and in this life, attain to more

than a relative unification, and yet that "here is a problem from which no one can escape who knows the religious life in its depth, and is prepared to take upon himself its ethical consequences" (p. 639).

"The most specific characteristics of the Ethics of Jesus reside," then, "in the content of the moral will, and not in the form; and this content, far from being something self-evident, constitutes an endless task, giving rise to ever new attempts at its adequate formulation" (p. 639).

I do not see what objection, peculiar to this second proposition of Troeltsch, can validly be raised.

(3) The third question is, whether the distinguishing, hence the decisive, character of Christian Ethics lies in their bestowal of power for moral action,—whether they can be considered exclusively as Ethics of Redemption, whilst the nature of all other Ethics would consist in their not disposing of these redemptive forces, and in thus leaving man a prey to the mere, impotent capacities of his nature.

The answer is found by Troeltsch in the foregoing analysis of Jesus's preaching, a preaching occupied, above all, with the meaning, content and demand of true justice. "Redemption lies here at the end, at the coming of the Kingdom. But over Jesus's announcement of this proximate future there is diffused such a temper of joy, of certainty of God, of the forgiveness of sins, that His preaching is apprehended as power and life, not as law. This, however, is something very different from that construction of the Christian Ethics which finds the Christian characteristic essentially in the powers here first conferred sufficiently for the execution of the moral law, and which, as against this, conceives the moral demand itself as something universally human" (p. 640).

The combination of a Redemption essentially accomplished in and by Christ and of a universally human Ethic, Troeltsch finds to appear already in the earliest formation of Christian ideas—in the Apostolic community

and St. Paul. "The Gospel becomes a faith in Christ and a cultus of Christ. The faithful venerate, in Jesus, the divine grace, wisdom, revelation made man; and they see in His death, in the sacraments which apply the fruits of that death, in the out-pouring of the spirit and in the pneumatic leaders, and, finally, in the official continuators of the dignity and authority of Christ—in the Church—the great foundation of redemptive grace. All the emphasis is thus shifted, from the ethical content, to the authority of the commands and to the healing power of the sacraments; whilst that content appears as self-evident, and coalesces from every kind of source—Christian, Jewish, Greek, popular-traditional. We thus get, at last, a transference of the holiness, from the persons, to the office, the doctrine, the authority and the sacraments of the Church." Monasticism and the ideals akin to it now represent, with considerable misconceptions, the still operative influence of the Sermon on the Mount (pp. 640, 641).

And against this Church-scheme and type, found by him to reach from St. Paul to Kant, Troeltsch places two other schemes and types of Christian Ethics. "The Sect-type rejects the Church and all the dogmas specifically connected with ecclesiasticism, and emphasizes, instead, the content of the Christian Ethics, the Sermon on the Mount, doubtless in a mostly somewhat narrow, literal-legal sense; and collects small, voluntary communities of efficiently earnest souls, which manifest themselves as such by adult Baptism. Gentle, retired saints and violent social reformers, firm, exclusive communities and radical ethical individualists have proceeded from this spirit, Kierkegaard and Tolstoi have sprung from hence." And "the Mystical type rejects every external law, and clings to a world-renouncing filial devotion to God and to a fraternal love that binds person to person and consumes the intervening selfish world in its heat. But since the world continues to exist, this spirit is, now, no more a

preparation for the coming, but a revelation of the present, Kingdom of God—a Kingdom which slumbers in man and is awakened by Christ's message. This objective Ethic of the Supreme Good often and easily moves on into an ascetic Panentheism; so, both within the Roman Church, as a supplementation to excessive cultual objectivity, and upon Protestant territory, as an independent Christian spiritualism. And where this general mystical spirit abandons the indifference to the world, and inclines to immanental Pantheism, whilst still claiming a real relation to the person and preaching of Jesus, it attains, in our times, to a great prevalence, as with Maeterlinck." "Under the influence of these two groups, strengthened by critical research (with its discrimination between the historical Jesus, the Pauline Christ, and the ecclesiastical God-man), Christian Ethics have, in recent times, been increasingly placed under the influence of Jesus, in lieu of the Church's ethical and dogmatic tradition" (pp. 643, 644).

"If then," Troeltsch concludes this his third question, "the Christian Ethos is not the universally human Ethos, with simply the addition of the forgiveness of sins and the strengthening by grace, these latter things cannot stand in the first and decisive place. The conception of Redemption has to take the second place; it must prove to be a derivative from the fundamental and first conviction—as to God and the objective religious end. And the question then is what, under these conditions, is the significance of Redemption" (*l. c.* pp. 644, 645).

Troeltsch answers here that the Redemption, thus involved in the historic Jesus's preaching, lies in faith in God and in love of God—in this and in nothing else.

Now we have already admitted Troeltsch to be right in discovering the general ethical teaching of Jesus, and its motivation, to be profoundly *sui generis*. And hence we cannot here restrict our Lord's originality to the nature and degree of the redemption taught and

offered by Him. This redemption must indeed be rooted in that revelation of the character of God and of man's relations to Him. Nevertheless it is especially over this third position that my dissatisfaction and contrary convictions grow many and definite. But since Troeltsch's fullest, maturest views on these difficult points are to be found only in his "*Sozial-lehren*," it will be better to adjourn the at all detailed consideration of these matters to my second paper. Here I can only indicate the general outlines of Troeltsch's deeply instructive admissions, and of his no less interesting inconsistencies or non-preceptions.

I note then, here simply in passing, our thinker's full realization that St. Paul insists strenuously upon the sacramental principle, and that this principle underlies the entire scheme of the Johannine writings. Similarly, his noble perception of how the sacramental and hierarchical principle and practice arose, not simply from motives of domination, or from an (however involuntary) opposition to, or limitation of, the Christian spirit, but in order to retain and to perpetuate holiness within and by Christianity. Again how Troeltsch finds even the most theocratic Papal claims, from Hildebrand to Cardinal Torquemada, to spring substantially from similar motives and needs, and how he finds here all "old Catholic" limitations both unjust as history and inadequate as to practice.

But I also perceive how strangely Troeltsch overlooks the attitude of the historic Jesus to "brother body," and to physical symbols and contacts, as occasions and vehicles of spiritual life; and how greatly he shrinks from any element of *opus operatum* in these things, whilst having to admit its unlimited sway in the gift and coming of the Kingdom as preached by that same Jesus. Also, how curiously Troeltsch, whilst stumbling at St. Paul's Christocentrism and Sacramentalism, passes over all but completely the special, acute intensification of all the Original

Sin conceptions by this same St. Paul, and the fact that Catholicism, largely from the first, then more plainly in St. Thomas, and most clearly at Trent, as against Luther and Calvin, did not here follow the great Apostle's vehemences. Hence Troeltsch too much involves *all* traditional ecclesiastical Christianity in these vehemences, whereas they are specially characteristic, not of Catholicism but of orthodox Protestantism. Again I perceive how insufficiently he recognizes the noble fulness of insight offered to us all by St. Thomas's assignation of the first place to the distinction between Nature and Supernature, in lieu of that between Fallen Nature and Redemption; and the same large mind's insistence that, though mere Nature, however clean, could not reach Supernature, yet such mere Nature is only what might have existed,—since, in fact, Nature always was, and still is, variously touched and penetrated by the prevenient supernatural God,—it has His salt in its mouth, and hence thirsts after Him. I perceive, once more, that the psychology and epistemology of such a "no sacraments" position will not work—they have sprung from extrinsic considerations. I perceive again that, if we insist, as strongly as does Troeltsch, upon the strict necessity for religion, at least amongst mankind at large, strictly requiring history, worship, cultus of Christ,—if we thus lay a strong emphasis upon the preponderance, in the Christian Ethos, of the prevenience, the givenness of God, Christ, Grace,—we accept the Church, and we cannot well reject Sacraments as such. And all this, finally, leads me to admit the dangers (human nature being what it is in both dispensers and recipients) actually connected with any sacramental system; and the need of careful discriminations, checks and complements within a large recognition of history and of facts, and of a rich, inclusive organism of life, but not of the rejection of sacraments as such. Even here, however, Troeltsch still aids us powerfully by his mind's virile penetration and

by the costly sense of reality so characteristic of his sensitively religious soul.

(4) The final question asks how the action which springs from the objective religious end of Christianity stands to the action which proceeds from the this-world ends; and especially how a unitary, harmonious Ethos can ever possibly result from all this variety and clash? Here, and here especially, do we find Troeltsch great and deep in his fundamental intuitions and advice.

He first replies then: "The problem lies in the fact that the objective ends are characterized by special contents, and hence that we have here a question of Objective Morals, and one that is simply insoluble from the standpoint of Subjective Ethics. The principle of autonomy gives us no aid whatsoever to the solution, nor does the patriarchal category of vocation bring us a single step forward. We have here to do with a relation between objective ends, which, as so many objective ends, require to be thought by us together, and to be brought to the *greatest possible* unity. And the difficulty then lies in that the this-world ends are moral ends possessing the strict character of ethical values, are ends in themselves and necessary for their own sakes, even up to the sacrifice of our natural happiness; but that they lie in the world and adhere to historical formations which, proceeding from man's physical and psychical nature, dominate his earthly horizon. Contrasted with these this-world ends, the other-world end signifies an entirely different orientation, and a jealous tension towards the competition of the worldly ends." Hence grave complications and strains, and even acute conflicts, have accompanied the attempts at some working compromise and harmonizing theory, from the first moment that Christian Ethics began to organize themselves in an enduring world. And as to the modern ethical culture, "its nature consists in maintaining, alongside of the religious end, the this-world ends, and in recognizing also these latter ends as ends in them-

selves. Indeed, just in this combination consist the richness, the breadth and the freedom, but also the painful interior tensions and the difficult problems, of this civilization. The Christian Ethic here finds Politics, Economics, Technology, Science, Art, Aesthetics, in full operative existence as so many independent ends, each possessed of its own logic and going its own way, and leaving to that Ethic at most the possibility of coming to an understanding and of a regulation, but not of a reconstruction proceeding independently from itself" (*l. c.* pp. 654, 655).

And next Troeltsch insists that this costly recognition will not arise, or at least will not persist, within us, except we possess the insight that "morality is, for us men, at the first, nothing unitary but something manifold and with many fissures; man grows up with a plurality of moral ends, the unification of which is his problem and not his starting-point. This multiplicity can be further determined as the contrast between two poles, both embedded within man's nature, from which proceed the two chief types of ends, the religious and the this-worldly. It is the polarity of religious and of humane morality, neither of which can be missed without moral damage, yet which, all the same, refuse to be brought to a common formula. Upon this polarity reposes the richness of our life, and also its difficulty; but from it also there ever arises anew the ardent endeavour to find some unification" (pp. 657, 658).

And a further point is here clear for Troeltsch: "This unification will always have to be effected from the side of the ethico-religious idea. True, there exists a morality which eliminates the religious end, and bases itself upon this-world ends alone; which, in lieu of real religion, is content with a mere general belief in a world-order that, somehow, regulates the spiritual ends of nature. But thus—as we can trace in Goethe, in Socialism, in the Spinozist Ethic—the competition between the various

ends is more than ever left open, and this, without aim or standard. And especially do such non-religious ends and strivings fail, as experience shows, to satisfy the deepest requirements of man."

"These ends indeed present themselves as ends in themselves, but they do not contain the Ultimate which alone satisfies our hunger after a last, unitary, all-embracing objective value. Hence, when taken as though ultimate, these non-religious ends either make men superficial, thus checking their moral striving; or restless, in a never ceasing search after higher ends." Nietzsche, Anatole France are here examples. (pp. 658, 659.) "The religious end, on the contrary, contains what is lacking in the this-world ends; for it springs from the soul's relation to the Eternal and Infinite, from what alone contains the final meaning of all things, from the sphere of the Unconditional, the Absolute, the Simple,—in its highest Christian form, from the soul's self-dedication to a holy living God, who, whilst containing within Himself the source and meaning of all spiritual-personal life, proposes to this life, as its highest task, the full elaboration and elevation of its personality to a communion with His will" (*l. c.* pp. 658, 659).

And Troeltsch points to history as showing a double current and influence at work between the two kinds of ends. "Only where the this-world ends had already proved their insufficiency—as in Palestine and in the ancient Graeco-Roman world generally—have the Christian Ethics exercised their fullest appeal. And, conversely, Christianity has filled the this-world ends with a far mightier, deeper life than they ever possessed before, and has, nevertheless, made any return to the old pagan self-limitation of the soul to these ends and to nature an impossibility or an affectation for us" (pp. 660–661).

Once more, Troeltsch finds that "the synthesis we are here seeking will have to be, not a doctrine with absolutely fixed lines, but a practical distribution of the predominance, here of the one, there of the other end, accord-

ing to the individual and natural capacities of the several souls, which cannot, by any ethical training, be brought to a complete equality. Thus there will be groups: some will more exclusively devote themselves to the religious end—in the clerical calling, in missionary work, in nursing the sick, in a contemplative renunciation of the world; others will, according to their several gifts, inclinations, circumstances, devote themselves more especially to the humane ends—the State, Law, Economics, Science, Art—where the service of these causes even demands the subordination of the worker's personal Christianity to the necessities of his special field of work. The influences across and back will equalize, for the whole, the one-sidedness of the parts, and will keep each group under the influence of the others." The several ages, also, of the same soul will similarly, upon the whole, constitute stages of growth moving from a preponderance of the this-world ends to a preponderance of the that-world end and value. "From first to last, indeed, the final end should be placed and be kept before the soul; yet a certain liberty and range should be left for both ends and forms, so that continually, and with as great ease as possible, there may result the deepening of the humane ends by Christian Ethics, and the humanizing of the Christian end—so that life, within the humane ends, may, simultaneously, be a service of God; and that the service of God may, simultaneously, transfigure the world" (*l. c.* pp. 664, 655).

Troeltsch fully realizes that all this "approximates to that Catholic doctrine which, at the zenith of mediaeval thinking, disposed Nature and Supernature as a succession of steps in the personality's becoming, and conceived finite man to mount from the first to the second; and which, moreover, distributed a predominance of this-world morality and a predominance of superworldly morality amongst different persons, according to their several dispositions and gifts." He even finds, precisely because of this, in Catholic Ethics "a mobility and

capacity for adaptation and for various shadings which Protestant Ethics, with their equalization of the moral demand, and their individualization of it in the civil vocation alone, have not possessed." And he shows how "where Protestantism outgrew this *bourgeois* narrowness, and coalesced with the New Humanism, its genuine ethical categories became lost, and the new ones had no room for the" profoundly necessary "tension between God and the world, as we can trace in Herder, Schleiermacher and Goethe" (pp. 667, 668).

And finally Troeltsch insists that "this entire dualism lies deeply embedded in the metaphysical constitution of man; the contrast apparent within his motives is but one of the effects of his general double position: he fronts both the finite-sensible and the Infinite-Supersensible. And this dualism can be surmounted at all only within the becoming of history and within the becoming of the individual. True, even after man's complete self-dedication, here on earth, to the final, the religious end, he will still, in his life and motives, have to experience the doubleness of his motivation. But since this doubleness has a metaphysical reason, it can only find a metaphysical resolution; and hence the final solution appears here as a life after death" (*l. c.* pp. 665, 666).

In my second Paper I hope to show Troeltsch again fuller, deeper, richer than he can here be found. And meanwhile I would conclude with a little simile that brings out, perhaps, the point to which I think both he and I would wish this short study to converge.

Is there a more nobly characteristic modern building, so ethereal-looking and yet so strong, than is the Paris Eiffel Tower? Whence its strength? Storms have come and gone, hurricanes may beat against it; it has stood and will stand. It breaks not, because it bends; it sinks not, because it sways. It yields as much as five feet in any direction, this grand steel whip, elastic in its live

resilience. So also does our frail-seeming soul-life persist, midst storms and hurricanes of temptation and of trial, by means of its range from pole to pole, of the sensible, spatial-temporal (almost to philistinism), and of the spiritual, superspatial and super-temporal, Eternal (almost to fanaticism). Thus rich and not rigid it can, in its little measure, participate in the utterly harmonious, utterly peaceful power and fruitfulness of the unmoving Energy, the Ever Living God.

The Attitude of German Protestant Theology to the Bible

By Professor D. von Schlatter, *Tübingen.*

In the movements which stimulate, convulse and in any case transform the German Protestant Church, consequently also in the sharply individualized and apparently divided efforts of its theology, the problems raised by our attitude to the Bible play an active part. Out of the questions which arise from our relations to the Bible follows the impetus, which is the cause of our unrest. These make it our duty to seek for new theological and church forms, and produce among us conflicts with their accompanying difficulties and their beneficial results. If members of other Churches wish to understand the German movement, and to have a share in its gains, it is important for them to consider the connection of the German movement with the Bible question.

Our religious position sprang from the peculiar nature of the German Reformation, and from the organization of the Church which produced it. We must regard the Church's recovery of pure doctrine, which is proved to be pure by the fact that it is drawn entirely and completely from the Scriptures, as the fruit of the Reformation. A powerfully executed legislation, which invested it with judicial power, made this pure doctrine the foundation of the Church Community. This legislation was not only upheld by the authority of the State, but its power was immeasurably increased by its claim to be the Divine Law in the invulnerability of the Divine Will. The share of the individual in the Church Community was estab-

lished by submission to the law that, with Divine Authority, strictly regulated his thoughts on Divine Rule and made them uniform with those of others.

This state of the Church made great changes affecting its whole structure inevitable, and further made it impossible but that these changes should directly affect our attitude to the Bible; for the doctrine which unites us derives from the Scriptures its substance as well as its binding power. The teaching of the Scriptures and that of dogma appeared to the layman to be completely identical. The theologian recognized it as his first task to prove this identity, and even when he had realized the discrepancy between the teaching of the Scriptures and the assertions of dogma, the question as to how the relations between the two were to be defined, continued to dominate all theological work up into the last century.

The consequence was that in the Bible question, for us all, theologians and laymen, two problems were inseparably bound up; firstly, the question of the aim of the Authority, of the significance of the Law with respect to our relation to God, as well as regarding the establishment of the religious community; secondly the question of the characteristics of the religious experience which we meet with through our knowledge of Jesus Christ, and how far the significance of the acceptation of Christian doctrine should go with respect to this knowledge. The connection between the two problems, each of which demands our closest attention, makes it evident how deep the work to be accomplished by the Church must penetrate to arrive at a settled attitude to the Scriptures, and why the accompanying discrepancies and mistakes have been so numerous on all sides.

By setting forth the Bible as the divine doctrine and book of laws, the Church fell into disagreement with the substance of the Scriptures and the experience of the Christian world when faith arises through the knowledge of Christ. This leads to a critical state within,

which, however, always by some means becomes evident. But it is not these inner conflicts which have brought about the change in the public consciousness; it came through the great movements which revived the whole intellectual life of the nation. This state of affairs hinders us, and renders it more difficult to come to an understanding on these religious questions. For the Bible question was never judged purely on religious principles, as it at once became closely connected with deep interests which reach far beyond the inner religious ones.

The one impetus against the subordination of the Church to the Bible proceeded from the resistance to the despotic degeneracy of the State. With the new organization of our national community, which summoned all to take a share in it, a strong consciousness of the imperfections of every despotic form of authority developed. The way in which tradition represented the authority of the Scriptures over the Church showed it to be despotic. It did not lead the individual himself to the attainment of personal assurance, but bound him to accept the testimony of Scripture, putting this in the place of personal experience. Therefore it became one of the objects of Liberalism to abolish the traditional acceptation of the Scriptures, with all other forms of despotism.

With the struggle against the despotic use of the Bible, however, religious motives also became involved. For our liberation is one of the gifts which Christ's coming brought to us. But this struggle produced in religion the individualistic tendency. It brought to us in Germany the wide-spread estrangement between godliness and churchliness. We suffer more from this separation of religion from the religious community than any other Church. In all the transactions in which at the present the power of German Christianity is put to the test, it is easy to show that the chief characteristic is that of non-churchliness. It is difficult to bring about a

religious relation to the Church. This, however, hampers our grasp of the Scriptures and the appreciation of their teaching. For the Bible shows us the religious community united in God coming into existence. Religious individualism, the aim of which is to bring the life of the individual into touch with God, stands, therefore, always in contradiction to the Bible. Of this, individualism becomes more or less clearly conscious when it uses the Scriptures as the foundation and guide of its religious life.

Opposition to the religious isolation of the individual did not come alone from the heads of the church governments and from the conservative clerical party, who were naturally unwilling to break with the existing church organization, but it is powerfully felt in the religiously active ranks of the people. Here the conviction is expressly emphasized that the practical proofs of our liberty must be based upon what we have received, that every effort on man's part to approach God with heart and mind must be preceded by a relation to God himself. This in its priority to our own activity should be admitted and expects to be acknowledged by us. Here submission to the Scriptures in faith and obedience is considered the mark of godliness; but this is not felt as divesting man of his rights nor as curtailing his individual life; it is the gift of liberty experienced in the only way in which it can be granted to us. The danger of connecting this line of thought with the old despotic use of the Scriptures lies very near.

This detachment from the Scriptures in the search for freedom, and the obedience to them in the attainment of divine grace, both help towards overcoming the divergences which cause friction in our theological work as well as in our church community. It is impossible for the further development of history to remain in the opposition. For the work of Jesus cannot permanently be regarded as the foundation of despotism. Jesus spoke and

acted with kingly power and made his disciples subject to him with the authority of one endued with Divine Power; but what he shows us as God's Will is Grace. Thereby the authority gains a new position, which raises it above the old conflicts. As it rests on Divine Grace, it not only demands of us, it gives to us, and reveals itself to us by giving us its life, not by taking. Now the renunciation of our own power, to which the revelation of Divine Grace calls us, leads to the reception of that which implants itself in us as its own gift in our thinking and acting. All the attempts of the dogmatic teaching of today to express the teaching of the origin of religious certainty so that its foundation becomes evident in our own experience place the conception of authority above the pre-Christian, despotic acceptation. They, therefore, try so to form it that it corresponds to the operation of God in Christ, to Grace. They hold the opinion that we experience the Divine Will both as a subjugating and as a spiritual law, because it not only sets the "*norma*" for our thinking and acting but is also the "*vis*" which fulfils it.

Closely associated with the movement which strove for freedom came the remodelling of that conception which described the Bible as the manual of divine instruction. This was brought about by the revival and enrichment of historical memories through the progress of historical research.

The doctrine, in the formation of which the Bible was used by the Church, was influenced by ancient logic, according to which, ideas rise above nature and history, irrespective of time. Ideas, it was thought, were the standards by which the productions of history must be judged. At the best, history supplied examples for the doctrine. But even then, facts produced in the course of time, and under varying conditions, ranked far below thoughts which, identical with themselves, are the fulfilment of divine reason. Then we arrived at those observa-

tions to which we now in our historical theology diligently apply ourselves, regarding them as a valuable acquisition, which showed the genetic relationship of thoughts and experiences, and proved doctrine to be the product of history.

We have not made this great step forward without troubles, because the historical study of the Bible was not the result of quiet examination, but of the struggle against the employment of the Bible as the substantiation of church legislation. Historical research, which produced the biblical documents, served the party struggling for freedom as a weapon with which it could contest the sway of those ideas which were described as divine and eternal. The polemical aim always weakens perception, for it fixes attention exclusively on the point most favourable for attack.

At first, both assailants and advocates of the authority of the Bible over the Church were perplexed by the new discoveries. For both were dominated by the hypothesis that doctrine furnishes us with religion, and both imagined doctrine to be a system of ideas, as Greek logic had demanded. When it became clear that history had produced the word of the Bible, this seemed to both parties to be a blot on the Bible, lowering its value for religion. The progress of scientific work helped both groups, for it ascertained that not only religion but also the whole of our intellectual life is founded on history. Historical examination proved the accuracy of this in language; in thought, in all it has accomplished, inclusive of logic and mathematics; in volition; in ethics; in customs; in all ranks of society. All these functions are produced and developed by history. The relation of biblical doctrine to history thus appeared singular no longer; it lost its abnormal character and became subject to the fundamental law which governs all expressions of human life.

The recognition of this fact created a reaction against religious individualism. It was seen that the individual too receives his religious possession through history, as it has provided the remaining substance of his life. Our thoughts spring from the thoughts of those who went before us. Our will is roused by contact with that of others. Our actions are the results of the work of those who laboured before us. So in our dependency on history, we discover the indispensableness of the community; history binds us to those who lived before us, and also links contemporaries together in fellowship.

Entrance into the religious community brought renewed association with the Bible. For when the question arises, by what means Divine Power draws us to itself that we know God and his Grace, there is no doubt possible. The relation to God, which constitutes our joint possession, was brought about by the coming of Christ, together with the history preceding and following. The relation to God is brought to us by this history in which the Bible gives us a share.

The Bible is no longer regarded simply as a manual of religion, by which the thoughts of Church and ecclesiastic are arranged. Its authority stands on a firmer foundation, its substance has gained in value. It now shows us the experience of humanity, on which our own religious experience is based. Now, too, the Bible provides us with our thoughts about God, but not only those thoughts,—when we get its thoughts, it gives us our own history too.

So understood, the authority of Scripture proves no check on the movement which strives for freedom. Its sway produces despotic pressure only when we are expected to repeat the doctrine of the Bible without the mediation of our own experience. But when it employs its sway to make the godly work which it has manifested to us touch and move us, then its teaching is no longer strange to us but obtains a footing in our whole being.

So the tension which had at first arisen between the critical study of the Bible and its religious use was overcome. Both methods of treatment are now carried on in harmony. For the examination of an historical fact is impossible without critical work. There can be no historical research without criticism. We need for this research an opinion not only on the relations of the statements of the sources to the real fact, but also on the relation of the event in the past to the present day. Only by clearly grasping these distinctions can we attain to historical perception. This is, however, the preliminary condition for the working of the history of the Bible on our own history; so progress in historical criticism brings us at once richly religious gain, thereby strengthening its power over us.

One more consideration must be added to those already treated; for the picture that we give of Protestant Germany would be distorted if we drew it only from the work done at the Universities. What is done in our branch of science has certainly great influence on our intellectual life, and it is of importance to this intellectual life that the sciences of thought are today brought to bear on history. But church movements do not depend entirely upon intellectual work; they received a powerful impetus from the fact that its position called the Church imperatively to action. The devout attention with which previous generations meditated on Christian doctrine, the edification afforded by the dogmatic contents of the sermon, became things of the past. The summons to work sounded urgently to man and woman. Not only do the work of gaining a livelihood and the increase of property demand greater energy; religious distress, weighing upon the greater part of the people, also rouses Christian activity and calls us to evangelization and many forms of social work. But for action we need ethics to set an aim to our work in common, and to provide us with a standard. Where can we find a system of ethics which will equip us

for the work which the present calls us to do? We could find it in the Scripture alone. So the pressure which compelled the Church to act led it back irresistibly to the Scriptures.

The ethical precepts, which the religious system of the reformers provided, were inadequate and made abundant use of the material produced by ancient ethics. Theology was almost exclusively occupied with the foundation of belief and was convinced that a well-conducted life was so assured. This thought is not wrong; for every dogma that is firmly established in the community and in its members, while guiding our thoughts, guides our wills too, and so makes itself visible in our lives. But these thoughts do not reach far enough for the present. For the totally different position in which the Church now finds itself makes it necessary for us to have new aims. It compels us to rouse in ourselves a will that earlier generations had not got; for we have work to do such as they had not. If new will power is to come to us, not only as a possession for the individual, but also as a motive power for the whole body, it is absolutely necessary for us all together, with mature consideration, to exert ourselves to produce ethics which are suited to the needs of the present day. It is the New Testament alone which can give us what we need for the renewal and purification of our ethics.

Our position, however, does not demand from us alone a system of ethics which will make clear to us the aims for which we are to strive; it demands too the strength which makes action possible. Our Church must work, not think and teach only. For this work we need more than commandments, we need love, to bring our wills into unison with the commandments and to rouse all our powers to the accomplishment of our wills.

This brings the historical study of the Bible into contact with the use of the Scriptures as the foundation of modern ethics. Apparently these two aims of Bible work

diverge widely. Historical work turns with resolute objectivity to the past alone, and uses as its indispensable medium archaeological exactitude, which leads us to an endless number of special inquiries. So it may appear as if this sort of theology gets completely out of touch with the hot struggle in which the present time finds our Church, and with the tasks which the changes in our dealings with nature, the share in national work, and the difficulties of religious unity, provide us. Nevertheless, these two, the historical interpretation of the Bible and the ethical efforts of German Christendom, strengthen each other reciprocally, and produce the identical result of closer touch with the New Testament.

We need an ethic which affords strength and produces life; then it must itself be the production of life. It must enable us to order rightly the history which we make by our actions, and must then grow out of history. Fantastic ideals can only lame, they cannot strengthen us. Therefore the need of a new system of ethics and the insight into the power of history to mould us, which historical theology provides us with, affect each other mutually. Each enriches the other. A deepened share in the history which we have to make purifies and clears the ideas of the historian, and the insight of the historian into the origin of our position produces the thoughts of the ethical scholar. But if the question is put to us how we are affected by an ethic which not only submits to us ideals and laws, but produces life and lends strength, there can be no doubt as to the answer. Through communion with Jesus the will in us is roused to surrender itself to serve the Divine Will, and so to do the work the Divine Will portions out to us in our concrete position today. We cannot be touched by the story of Jesus without being affected by the quickening law of the spirit.

An attractive subject for close inquiry is the elucidation

of the relation of our religious efforts to the Bible. To the observer in the distance it must appear as if the sway of the Bible over the German Protestant Church is seriously shaken and exposed to great fluctuation. This thought is not only found in foreign literature, but it also agitates many who are in the thick of German life. But to clearer sight it is evident that the Bible is the fixed point which calls forth, dominates and draws to itself our religious history. The Bible contributed to the abolition of the pressure of religious legislation, the purpose of which was to unite us outwardly alone. For it showed us the Divine Grace which frees us, and describes the free community of the apostles as the fruit of Jesus' work. The Bible has assisted the individual in his struggles for faith; for it offers to everyone who accepts God, communion with him. At the same time it brings the freed individual into the community again; it releases him not only from the pressure of religious tyranny, but also from the tyranny of his little personality and from the impoverishment which would result from limitation to his own experience. For it gives each his place in the history of the whole, in that history which animates, inspires and endows us all. The Bible has been the cause of the necessary disappearance of the conception of God as Head of a system of ideas. It shows him to us as the weaver of history, working for us and through us. By making us historians through reading it, it deepens its hold on us. For the history it teaches us touches the root of our being, where thought and will rise. We cannot use it to adjust our thoughts on Divine Rule only; a higher purpose is shown us; for the Bible points to our calling, and gives us not thought alone, but the good will to help in doing God's work as his servants. So it comes that its word sounds in our ear with redoubled strength, and leads us to attentive appreciation of its teaching.

Doubts and conflicts will still be experienced in the lives

of individuals and in the different bodies. But if we look at the general course of our religious history we must acknowledge that the religious power and authority of the Scriptures have stood the surprising test magnificently in modern German religious history.

Faith and Its Place in the Christian Religion

By William A. Curtis, B.D., D.Litt.,

Professor of Systematic Theology in the University of Aberdeen.

As I take up my pen to write on Faith and its place in Religion, I am tempted to begin by claiming for it outright a position of supremacy. For Christians of every denomination it has meant so much, it has seemed so vital, that exaggeration might well be deemed impossible in its praise. For the earliest age of the Church, for the age of the Fathers, for the era of the Reformation, and for us today, Faith has been the very first demand of Religion, and its claim has been counted even more sacred than that of conduct. Martin Luther speaks for all believers in the opening sentences of his memorable little treatise on *Christian Liberty*, addressed to Leo X in 1520, when he says:

> "Christian faith has appeared to many an easy thing; nay, not a few even reckon it among the social virtues, as it were; and this they do because they have not made proof of it experimentally and have never tasted of what efficacy it is. For it is not possible for any man to write well about it, or to understand well what is rightly written, who has not at some time tasted of its spirit, under the pressure of tribulation; while he who has tasted of it, even to a very small extent, can never write, speak, think, or hear about it sufficiently. For it is a living fountain, springing up unto eternal life as Christ calls it in the fourth chapter of John."

But when I look back over the long course of Christian thought, I hesitate. There is scarcely an element of religious experience or activity which has not by some

school been acclaimed as the fundamental, or the ultimate, or the supreme thing in the life of the soul. Each generation or each period is apt, by virtue of that law of changing fashion from which even the highest concerns of men are not exempt, to magnify the things which its predecessor overlooked, and to plume itself complacently on its discernment in discovering some previously neglected commonplace. After all, a school is a crowd, even in philosophy, and its behaviour is to be understood as such; it is all agape as with one mouth, it is vocal as with one voice, and its vision is as if limited to one pair of eyes. I am suspicious of the schools of opinion, learned or empirical, which say that religion consists of this, or springs from that, faculty of our spiritual nature. Little systems, broken lights, partial truths, they have their day, and slip back into the forgotten, only to return at intervals for the enjoyment of a kind of intermittent immortality. One has reason to be suspicious of graded schemes of precedence in all spiritual things, whether in ecclesiastical dignities, or in catalogues of saints, or in lists of the Christian virtues, or in faculties and energies of the soul. Must the Beatitudes enlist the offices of a theological court chamberlain to arrange them in a sequence of dignity or merit or importance? Do the Christian Virtues engage in controversy for pride of place? Does the Christian mind toss its head and scorn the heart and the will because they have not eyes and cannot think? Or the heart burn with contempt for the head and the will because they cannot feel? Or the will fling over the head and the heart because they have not hands and feet and are impotent apart from it? To play the partisan in praise of individual faculties, while religion lives a threatened life betrayed by the unwisdom of its friends and menaced by the hostility of its foes, is to imitate the contention of the first disciples who, even on the eve of the Master's arrest, disputed among themselves which of them was accounted to be

greatest. It is to reproduce the factions in ancient Corinth which attached themselves to apostolic party names—"I am of Paul," "I am of Apollos," and "I am of Cephas." Beyond a doubt there was principle below the surface of those divisions. For those early disputants the "greater" apostles and leaders were more than individuals. They were types of religion. They stood for distinctive kinds of spiritual genius, each exhibiting something which the others lacked, while all came short of the fulness of Christ. Peter is the living embodiment of simple *faith*, blunt, loyal, impulsive, somewhat narrow and by no means far-seeing or profound. James, the Lord's brother, is the embodiment of devout and homely common-sense, of practical goodness and sagacity. John is the embodiment of brooding affection and symbolic contemplation. Paul is the apostle of swift vision, fiery argument, restless energy, at once scholar, mystic, missionary and organizer—to Protestant eyes the most catholic and versatile of the apostles. To this day their temperaments divide the allegiance and the sympathies of the Christian world. They might stand as the patron saints of the parties and schools into which churchmen and theologians everywhere form themselves. The High Churchman, the Practical Churchman, the Mystic, and the Evangelical are with us still, each with his strength and each with his weakness, each with his characteristic version of the Faith in his own dialect of the catholic tongue, and with them the scholarly Broad Churchman, needed to correct their faults at the cost of his own. So, in all the Churches, we divide Christ, we who are to be one in Him. The Apostles, wise master-builders as they were, were conscious that they had but one foundation to lay and to build upon, each his own portion. Could the Church have been founded upon any one of them alone, even Peter, even Paul, or upon his solitary portion? Scripture does not conceal that they differed conscientiously upon occasion, and on grave

matters. They withstood one another to the face in argument, none claiming primacy or a casting vote. But they had learned in the Upper-room and at the Cross to reckon themselves not only *servos Domini* but *servos servorum Domini*. They were a brotherhood, with neither a throne for each nor a throne for one. From a round table of fraternal fellowship they were sent out into the world to do battle with evil and to rescue the oppressed. So also, in my judgment, is it with the religious principles and faculties which they embodied and individually exemplified. Each is needed to constitute religion: each without the others is impotent. To emphasize any one of them at the expense of the others is to reinforce the influences which provoke schism and reaction and retard the attainment of unity, efficiency, and stability in the Church. It does not mend matters if we put modern names in place of ancient, and say "I am of Kant," "I am of Schleiermacher," "I am of Hegel," "I am of Ritschl," "I am of Newman," "I am of Sabatier," "I am of William James." Nothing is more sure than that to be a partisan is to forfeit part of truth. It may be a distinguished thing to found a school by exaggerating a principle, or to found a sect by isolating a type of religious life or worship or opinion—and Church History would often be the poorer if it lacked such object lessons for the instruction of each successive age—but we are learning from history and experience that Religion calls for an unmutilated offering, for the consecration of our undivided nature, our entire spiritual energies as well as our entire bodily powers. I shall not, therefore, advance any *ex parte* claims for the principle of faith as if it were in rivalry with other principles essential to a complete religious experience. And I shall avoid, as far as may be, the purely scholastic and controversial questions in which religious faith has been entangled during its long and honourable history in the Christian centuries.

It is eloquent of the significance of Faith as an element in Religion that we speak of Religions as the *Faiths* of the World, of their adherents as *Believers*, and of Christian Churches as the *Creeds* of Christendom. Popular and scientific usage thus combine to base a comparison of religious systems and organizations upon the objects and the contents of their belief. They assume, with justice, that what a person or a people believes is fundamental, is decisive for character and conduct, is determinant of vital institutions and activities. Whatever place belongs to hope and to love, to knowledge and to obedience, to worship and to prayer, and to the other energies of the religious spirit, faith lends itself most and best, it would seem, to effective articulation. It has countless ways of expressing itself. The keeping of a law, the visit to a shrine, the homage to an idol as the symbol of a divine presence, the celebration of a mystery or sacrament or festival, the singing of a hymn, the offering of a sacrifice, the saying of a prayer, the preaching of a sermon, the framing of a doctrine, all imply a *credo* as definite as any creed or confession. When we say that the Jewish, Christian and Mohammedan religions stand out in the history of religion as missionary and creed-proclaiming systems, it is not meant that they enjoy any monopoly of faith, or that faith means more to them than to others, but simply that its contents assume in them a doctrinal or dogmatic definiteness. What faith is to one religion it is of necessity to all. Without it, indeed, there can be no religion, good, bad, or indifferent. The animist, the fetish-worshipper, and the idolater need just as much of faith for their religion as the Christian and the Jew. Credulity, indeed, believes not less but more than Faith: it is over-belief, it is faith run riot and unrestrained by reason and experience.

In the Christian Scriptures Faith has a place all its own. Already in the Old Testament it is a distinctive mark of the patriarch, the saint, the prophet, and the

psalmist, that he is a man of faith. Trust and confidence, especially in God, are there avowed or recorded almost as frequently as faith and belief are in the New. Faithfulness is commended equally in both. In the New Testament the idea gains in distinctness and in power. In the Synoptic Gospels faith is the spring of discipleship and its mature confession a disciple's supreme act; it is the condition of healing and miracle and effective prayer and salvation. Christ is constantly looking for it. The men He chose and called were singled out for their possession of it, in some cases perhaps for little else. To the centurion, concerning whom He exclaimed, "Verily I say unto you, I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel," He says, "As thou hast believed, so be it done unto thee." To an afflicted woman He says, "Thy faith hath saved thee." To a distracted father He says, "If thou canst believe, all things are possible to him that believeth," and receives the answer, "Lord, I believe; help thou mine unbelief." Again, in different mood and with other outlook, He asks: "Howbeit when the Son of Man cometh, shall he find faith on the earth?" Such is the power of faith in His judgment that a single grain of it, no bigger than a mustard seed, will enable its possessor to "move mountains." The Gospel according to John is written to inspire faith,—the same belief in the Christ which its successive episodes and allegories and conversations and monologues set forth. The spread of faith is the burden of Acts. The power of faith unto salvation is the gospel of Paul. Pilgrim faith, the trust in unseen guidance which sustained the Father of the Faithful and the heroes of his race, is glorified in the Epistle to the Hebrews. The crown and consummation of faith is the vision of the Apocalypse. And when the Christian Religion left the land and people of its nativity behind it, wherever it went it impressed observers as a thing of faith. When Clement of Alexandria says that

"the Greeks consider faith an empty and barbarous thing" he has probably in mind such mockery as that of Celsus who jeers at the stock phrases of the Christian evangelist: "Do not examine, but believe," "Science is a bad thing, take care that none of you touches science," "Only believe," "Thy faith will save thee." The same principle of faith which responded to the call, "Follow me," and believed the "Good-news," and discerned the Christ, and faced the world, clothed itself in a slowly expanding form of words and gave the Church its Creed, the pass-port to baptism and communion. Around that Creed with ever widening circumference didactic and dogmatic systems based on Scripture and tradition and scholarship and experience have grown up in all Christian lands, each of them an attempted harmony of faith and knowledge. The convulsive struggle of the Reformation controversy turned essentially on a fresh realization of the meaning and power of saving faith as it had found expression in the Apostolic age and writings, especially those of Paul. What was at stake appeared to one side to be the whole apparatus of institutional salvation, dogma, ceremonies, hierarchy, orders, sacraments, and observances appointed by God and built up by long ages of pious industry and devotion; the New Testament, it was pleaded, was in the treasury and therefore at the service of the faithful, though it was not easy to detach it and bring it out at a moment's notice, and Luther's truths were not new, in so far as they were in it. To the other side it seemed that human souls had insensibly lost touch with God through clinging to an endless round of accredited means of grace, had lost sight of God through gazing on the elaborate ritual of ecclesiastical approach, had forgotten the accents of His voice through listening to a multitude of official counsellors, and had forgotten the language of direct filial speech with Him through constant commerce with His saints. That controversy of faith is not yet

set at rest. Perhaps it never will be. Though outwardly the Churches were no longer to take sides in waging it, it would break out within each one of them by an internal necessity. Truly faith has needed means: outside the visible Church is no secure salvation: the soul must lean on authority, tradition, organization, ritual, if its progress is to be steady and assured. So urges Catholicism. But Evangelicalism is impatient of finger-posts and directions, once its feet are set in the living Way and it has caught sight of the door of grace wide ajar: it says, Why carry my crutch, or Why strap my cradle to my shoulders when I have learned to walk, Why halt upon my way to the throne of grace and plead with Mary and the Saints as though they were more merciful than the Father and the Son who saved me, Why cover the Lord's Table of Communion with an altar slab, Why turn the Gospel of Grace into a Law of Works, Why wander round Mount Sinai when the Land of Promise lies open to my feet? In every historic Church that has left Egypt behind it there is a range of spiritual territory as wide as from Horeb to Hermon and Calvary. In none is it easy for faith in its vision to sweep so vast a horizon, and give to every sacred summit its own true place and rightful dignity. The problem of faith today is not essentially different from that which confronted the sixteenth century, but, unless history is a sealed book and experience a stream run dry, its solution ought to be less difficult and less anxious. There has never been a time when the Churches of Christendom were so ready to learn from one another, to recognize their debt to one another, and to enter into Christian, if not ecclesiastical, fellowship with one another. Each reads and marks and inwardly digests the history of the others. There has hardly been a school or movement in theology and religion since the Reformation which has not contributed something to our common knowledge of the true meaning of faith in its various aspects and relations.

What is faith, that radio-agent in the soul, a grain of which, no bigger than a mustard seed, can move mountains? What is its nature? What faculty of the soul is its seat? Is it in the head, in the heart, or in the will that it resides and exerts its miraculous power? What objects does it make its own? To what does it attach itself? What is the effect and peculiar value of its function? What is its office in man's salvation?

When faith is formed, and I can say *Credo*, "I believe," it is a very complex experience that I voice, and a very comprehensive faculty that I exercise. Whatever be the object it pursues, faith moves in a high region, above the world of sense, beyond that which the eye can see, the ear hear, the hand feel. If the language of sense-experience must be used, faith is a spiritual sense, second sight, second hearing, second touch, eye, ear and hand in one to the soul, the organ of a different knowledge from that of sense. Few definitions have stood the test of time so well as the familiar terms in which faith is described in the Epistle to the Hebrews: ἔστι δὲ πίστις ἐλπιζομένων ὑπόστασις, πραγμάτων ἔλεγχος οὐ Βλεπομένων. The passage contemplates one kind of faith only, and does not exhaust even its definition, but, taken with its context, it represents faith as the spirit of confidence which urges a man to make the true fulness of life his own, it is the soul of hope, it is the secret of courage, it makes the unseen future a present reality and confronts it without flinching. The author of the Epistle means *trust in God* when he speaks of faith, not merely belief that God is, but reliance on Him, invisible though He is. But in all its forms faith is an attitude towards the unseen, the unseen past, the unseen present beyond one's ken, the unseen future, literally realizing it, facing it as an actual presence. It is, as the writer maintains, the very essence of religion: without it we could not be assured that the visible world is the work of a Creative Hand, for it is faith that discerns the evidence and effects the proof. Faith is the explana-

tion of the heroic daring and endurance of the great men of old in Israel. They had only promises and intuitions to go upon, slender and dubious securities, in the world's judgment, for possessions not acquirable by themselves in person but reserved for their posterity. Their deeds of daring demand our admiration and challenge our emulation, but greater than their works is the spirit that inspired them, the hidden life-principle that nerved them to dare and to do and to die. They found favour with God: they were His martyrs: His Word enshrines their memory. But God who accepted their works had first beheld their hearts. The life of those righteous men was their faith. As the value and the efficacy of sacrifice reside in the disposition of the offerer and not in the worth of the offering, so ultimately it is faith that constitutes the saint, not good-works open to the eye. As Luther wrote:

"A Christian, being consecrated by his faith, does good works; but he is not by these works made a more sacred person, or more a Christian. . . . True, then, are these two sayings: *Good works do not make a good man, but a good man does good works; Bad works do not make a bad man, but a bad man does bad works.* . . . As Christ says: *A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit.*"

Faith is thus the spring of religious action. It precedes conduct. It is the energy of religion. It is, in the words of the Council of Trent,

"the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and the root of all justification, without which it is impossible to please God and to come unto the fellowship of His sons."

What are we to say of the psychology of religious faith? This at least is certain, that every theory which has attempted to lodge faith in a single faculty of the soul, or in a partial combination of spiritual faculties, has broken down. Faith at its very simplest is a complex principle. It involves and includes all the primary elements of spiritual activity. It is not mere intelligence or knowledge, though it invariably contains a judgment either of

fact or of value, and is to that extent necessarily rational or intellectual. It is not mere feeling or emotion, though it floods the heart with a contentment and peace which nothing else can bestow, terminating that unrest and dissatisfaction with the seen and temporal with which it began by the expulsive power of a new and opposite affection. It is not mere volition, though trust is an exercise of will, an adventure of the soul in self-reliance or in self-surrender. Faith is an elemental instinct of the human spirit, as comprehensive as religion psychologically, indeed co-extensive with religion. Every exercise of faith is found upon analysis to include the characteristic activities of thought, of feeling, and of will, whether its object is a person or living institution, a doctrine on opinion, or a fact of observation on history. If I say, "I believe there is a God," or, "I believe in God," or, "I believe on God," or, "I believe God," or, "I trust God," these affirmations are far from identical, but as proper acts of faith they are agreed in expressing an experience or activity which is more than thinking or reflection. Belief arises only when evidence is apprehended, when evidence is adjudged adequate and moves the soul with a feeling of satisfaction, and when surrender to the evidence takes place. To believe in or to trust a person is impossible without some knowledge of him, personal or indirect. However complete my knowledge of him may be, it is partial and imperfect as regards the past, it is superficial as regards the present, and it is of necessity altogether lacking as regards the future. It is the genius of faith to make the most of slender means, to extend knowledge by imagination and by inference, to let it stimulate and affect the feelings, and to act in response to it without fear of hazard. We commonly set faith in contrast with sight or sense, and with knowledge or science, but the knowledge we draw from sense-observation rests upon faith in the testimony of our senses which are something less than infallible witnesses,

and, aside from pure mathematics, the knowledge we term science is a vast aggregate of serviceable hypotheses and laws, resting, no doubt with adequate security and comfort, upon observation, experiment and experience, but in its essence a work of faith. What faith in God is to religion, faith in Nature is to science, and faith in Man is to social enterprise. There is truth in each of those picturesque maxims of Christian antiquity, Tertullian's *Credo quia absurdum*, Anselm's *Credo ut intelligam*, and Abelard's *Intelligo ut credam*. Faith is more than the recognition of rationality in its object: it can leap where reason crawls: it can lead where reason has to follow: yet it must wait for reason, and take counsel with it before it can venture on ahead again. Augustine finely recognized the comprehensiveness of faith. He not only calls faith the seeker and knowledge the finder, just as Clement of Alexandria makes faith preceded by wonder the foundation of knowledge, but in the *Confessions* he distinguishes *notitia*, *assensus*, and *fiducia* as constituents of *fides*. Among the moderns Kant and Schleiermacher by their criticisms of rigid intellectualism did much to restore faith to its true character. Though they erred, each in his own direction, they made it impossible for their successors to ignore its essential complexity and spiritual comprehensiveness. What Kant calls "the practical reason," on which he founds our whole apprehension of religion, is a compound of intellect and will. Apart from its omission of the element of feeling, which his temperament and time and training did not qualify him to recognize with fairness, it is a creditable approximation to the full significance of faith. What Schleiermacher calls "the feeling of dependence" upon an unseen higher power, which is for him the essence of religion, is but his paraphrase of the term "faith." Thanks to his enjoyment of that early contact with pietism which was denied to Kant, he deliberately

emphasized the element of feeling throughout his system and philosophy of religion. But a *feeling* of *dependence* upon a being recognized as higher is obviously anything but a mere or pure emotion: it is a compound or resultant of a judgment of existence and value, a feeling of weakness and need and confidence, and an inward surrender or dependence. To call an activity of such essential comprehensiveness a feeling is to strain the language of psychological analysis and definition to the breaking-point, but incidentally it affords an excellent description of faith, and a confirmation of the view adopted in this article that faith is triune, is an activity of the undivided energy of the human spirit, head, heart and will at one. Except I know or think, and feel, and will to yield, I am a stranger to belief, and faith is not in me.

If, then, faith is not a distinct faculty of our spiritual nature but a confident trust exerted by the mind and heart and will in conjunction, what are the objects in religion upon which it concentrates its energies? They are, in a word, the familiar authorities which direct human life from infancy onwards. At our birth we become citizens not only of the world but of the world of religion, with an inheritance to enter into and an environment to adjust ourselves to. God speaks to us through many voices, so many and, it would seem, so various that we need time and experience to enable us to penetrate their unity, and we are often tempted, both as institutions and as individuals, to listen to one or other of the voices and shut our ears to the rest in despair of ever harmonizing them. Theistic thought has long since learned to recognize the multiplicity of the evidence on which faith is nourished before it has strength to utter itself in the sublime proem of its universal confession, *I believe in God.* The Unseen Majesty on high restricts His presence to no temple or shrine, to no sacred grove or grotto or mountain-top. It is religious convention

and propriety that must needs fence in some hallowed spot, some Zion, or Sinai, or Mecca, or Benares, or Lhasa, or Delphi, or Dodona, or Rome, and locate within it its authentic oracle at cost of counting the rest of the earth profane. So in religious life today we are divided in the Christian world over the eternal problem of the location of the seat of divine authority on earth, and of the settlement of the claims of rival authorities to receive our faith and our loyalty and our obedience. In reality we are agreed that the one ultimate object of faith is God the Eternal Unseen and the eternally self-disclosing, but, when we proceed to attach our faith to particular revelations which we believe Him to have vouchsafed or to particular agencies of revelation which we believe Him to have employed, we differ indefinitely—I was going to say hopelessly, yet it would be truer to say hopefully, since differences like these contribute to a larger catholicity than any single type of individual or ecclesiastical life has yet attained.

A comprehensive review of the proper objects of religious faith, each of which mediates to us the mind and will of the Invisible Giver and Keeper of life, must include external nature, human nature, human traditions and institutions, the Law and the Church, prophecy and Holy Writ, dogmatic formularies, Jesus Christ, and the Holy Spirit of God. Every one of these sacred agencies has inspired belief in the hearts and minds of millions of men. Every one has been abused, distorted, exaggerated, narrowed, travestied, or obscured. But each demands a place in the sum of living faith. To each of them all living faith has actually been indebted. Each is holy for the reverent soul, though each does not receive the same degree of reverence from our varying pieties. The world of nature external to man not only supplies man with the clay which his spirit animates, and with the earthly home in which he lives, but also educates his senses, disciplines his members, schools him

to know himself, and inspires in him not only his science but the rudiments of his knowledge of God the Creator, the Law-giver, the Father and Provider and Disposer of all things. Human nature, man's deep-implanted instincts, his native ideals of truth, beauty, honour, purity, uprightness, his spiritual endowment as a whole, reflect in the *camera obscura* of the soul the very image of the unseen perfection above him. To these higher intuitions faith clings with a grasp which no other revelation can persuade it to relax. It makes them indeed the ultimate criterion by which it tests the claim of every other object, however impressive, to be divine. In time this faith of natural religion which is inspired by divine self-revelation through the world and through the constitution and experience of the human soul, becomes organized, articulate, and institutional. Its experiences, its convictions, and its ritual. are systematized and take shape in a sacred literature and a sacred code, which appeal to succeeding ages not merely because they are time-honoured but essentially because the faith that framed them is imperishable and awakens a response of faith in those who receive and utilize them. The Elect People, the Divine Kingdom, and the Law, in Israel, the Holy Church, the Kingdom of God, and the Perfected Law, in Christianity, loom up before us so large against the background of the older revelation that we easily attach our faith to them and the Oracles enshrining them and the Ritual access which they have taught us and forget the dependence of faith upon the ultimates behind them. Let Tradition, Ritual, Church, Scripture, and Creeds ever lose touch with intuition and experience, the immediate realities of faith, and they lose their life and their power to inspire and to save. Above all, faith rests upon Jesus Christ, beholding in Him the realization of its every need and yearning, at once a Fact of History and a Living Presence, the Ideal of Manhood and the Image of Godhead, a Revelation and an

Inspiration to man and at the same time a Sacrificial Way to the Father. But if in Christ all faith's ideals are satisfied, in Him all faith's problems are raised. His winsomeness may attract us, His wisdom may enlighten and reassure us, His healthfulness may brace us up, His death may arrest and humble and solemnize and purify us, His spirit may take possession of our souls and dwell within us as a renewing and sanctifying power, but our faith cannot rest upon Him independently of the earlier revelation which prepared for Him and enabled His first followers, and must still enable us, to recognize Him and to divine the secret of His life and person. Not flesh and blood, He said, revealed to Simon Peter the mystery which his great confession uttered, but the Father in heaven by whose Spirit all truth is revealed. The divine in Christ, we say, is self-evidencing to spiritual discernment, but that spiritual discernment was itself the product of divine education. It was no accident that He was sent and came to Israel, the people whose recognition of the divine in nature, in the soul of man, in history, in law and prophecy and scripture was so intense and so comprehensive. He appealed expressly to all these acknowledged revelations of God in His teaching, and claimed their fulfilment in Himself, the Way, the Truth, the Life. Not even the most ecstatic of the mystics can sunder the eternal and indwelling Christ of experience from the historic Jesus of Nazareth who realized the immemorial hopes of Israel and satisfied the immemorial needs of humanity. "Back to Christ," or "Back to Jesus" has been a watchword of unspeakable value to modern faith: without that return through history to historic fact even the Pauline watchword, "In Christ Jesus," tends to become hollow and unreal. The Spirit that indwells to quicken faith takes of the things that belong to the historic Jesus and brings them home to the soul with convincing power. It is the Christ of yesterday that is the same today and

forever. Even eternity cannot afford to part with yesterday.

It is the fashion to distinguish sharply between the faith which rests on a *doctrine* or on a *fact of history* and that which rests on a *living person*, very much as controversialists contrast faith in *Scripture*, which is "dead," and faith in the *Church*, which is a "living" body. There is didactic value in the distinction, but it can be overdone, and has been. Neither Scripture nor Church is impersonal or inanimate. Each speaks with a living voice. Truth, whencesoever derived, is the proper object of faith, since God is Truth, and the "Word," written and incarnate, is its utterance by the Spirit in language and in a Life. The religious value of history, of historical fact as we say, lies in its significance as much as in its actuality, and its significance means its doctrine. Faith in a person is inconceivable apart from observation or knowledge of his actions in the region of experience. Doctrine and history cannot be separated. The Apostles' Creed, like the Confession of Peter, its prototype, makes no attempt to separate them. There is history in every fundamental doctrine of the faith, and doctrine in every fundamental fact of sacred history. But it is, I acknowledge, well to realize that *above* facts of history and doctrines based upon them, as well as *behind* them there are living persons. Actions reveal agents; doctrines reveal teachers; Scriptures reveal writers: and the faith which attaches itself to actions and doctrines and Scriptures would drop them instantly were they not revelations of a living Spirit, the supreme revealing Self. It is a fine feature of the Greek and Latin phrasing of the Apostles' Creed, though it is obscured in the English version, that it proclaims not, "I believe that there is a God the Father Almighty . . . and a Jesus Christ . . . and a Holy Ghost . . . ", but, "I believe *on* God the Father Almighty . . . and on Jesus Christ . . . and on the Holy Ghost." Belief in the mere existence

of Father, Son, and Spirit is implied rather than affirmed. It is *trust* in the known Father, Son, and Spirit that is confessed. "I rest my faith on God" is a greater thing than any acknowledgment of His existence: it is its sequel and its crown. Such faith God cannot be conceived as rebuffing; it has a right to feel assured of His acceptance; it must, in a ministerial sense, save. When Protestants profess their faith in the Bible they do not mean, and never meant, its *litera scripta*, apart from the prophetic men who speak to us through its pages, and the Spirit which inspired its composition and must illumine the soul that peruses its sacred pages, any more than Roman Catholics profess faith in the Church as a mere organization apart from the Spirit which dwells in it and inspires its life. To the former the Bible is the living Word of the Lord; to the latter the Church is the living Body of the Lord; each lives by the Spirit of the Lord. We do not, either of us, believe in Jesus Christ Himself apart from the Holy Spirit which overshadowed and enabled His earthly life and ministry, and the Heavenly Father upon whom He professed His dependence, to whose Will He filially bowed, and with whom He declared His oneness. It appears to me that faith is essentially the same vital religious energy for all Christians, and that its principal objects and experiences are also essentially the same. When these objects are seen to be so various in themselves as a group as I have suggested it is not remarkable that different races and different temperaments in the family of mankind should combine them in such varying proportions. All are agreed that faith is man's response to divine grace, that though faith is an instinct man is responsible for its cultivation and use, and that faith is determinant of all spiritual life and experience. All are agreed that faith is the human basis of all the Christian virtues, while grace is the divine influence which inspires them and transfigures them into its namesake "graces."

All are agreed that inward devotion and outward service are inseparable from faith, and that peace and assurance are normal accompaniments of its experience, though they may be sadly overcast and sorely tried. The Reformation has no doctrine of faith without good works: Roman Catholicism has no doctrine of works without faith. In the last resort neither allows that faith absolutely *merits* salvation in itself. For both salvation is God's work and free gift for the sake of Christ: the saving merit is His, not ours: we cling to His cross, since we count ourselves unworthy either to ask to share it or to erect one of our own beside it. When we have done all in our power to serve God and to follow Christ, we have learned from Him to stifle complacency. We recall that, in the same breath with which He exalted the miraculous efficacy of a single grain of faith in answer to the appeal of the Apostles, "Increase our faith," our Lord proceeded to say: "When ye shall have done all the things that are commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which it was our duty to do." Is it credible that before the throne of Christ's judgment the words of the Protestant hymn-writer would not fit the lips of Roman Catholic piety by reason of an impediment derived from a scholastic doctrine of good works and merit: "Nothing in my hand I bring: Simply to Thy cross I cling"? The Roman Catholic condemns the Reformed Church for its individualism and maintains that its liberty of conscience leads to ecclesiastical anarchy, but the Protestant retorts that fraternal anarchy among *Christians* has fewer terrors than tyranny, and moreover points to the fidelity of the Reformed Churches to their polities and pieties and fundamental doctrines. Each has a great truth to attest, a noble loyalty to foster, a sacred altar-fire to tend. Each without the other cannot be made perfect, and the first to be convinced of it deserves great honour. The Church without and the Light within; the claims of

the Household of Faith and the birthright of each member of the Family; the piety that shuns the world and renounces matrimony and the piety that consecrates common life and counts all clean that God has hallowed; the ecclesiastical discipline and obedience learned from political and military authority, and the ecclesiastical discipline and loyalty drawn from the family and the apostolic circle and the voluntary association—each of these has supplied a felt need in the Christian world. As a Protestant who has learned to sympathize with Rome not less in view of her difficulties than of her virtues I miss from her official utterances and from her representative writings and even from her representative biographies such gracious words of frank appreciation of the ideals and aims and principles and services of the Reformed communions as Protestant Churchmen freely express regarding her. But in any case it is cheering to reflect that beneath the rough surface of our persisting differences there reposes at the heart of our life and service of the same Lord a principle of vital faith that is identical. We nourish it on different fare, we clothe it in different forms of thought and speech and piety, we educate it in different schools of opinion, and we exercise and discipline it in different fields of experience, but it is essentially the same in both and means the same for both. If the Protestant is freer, less encumbered with utensils and heirlooms and spiritual possessions which he regards as unnecessary *impedimenta* of the household of pilgrim faith, let him turn his freedom to good account, and let him remember the fable of the hare and the tortoise. If the Roman Catholic prides himself on the appointments of his temple, his priestly hierarchy, his liturgy and sacrifice and law and traditions of the elders and obedience and unity, let him remember Christ's attitude towards the Jewish counterparts of these things, His attitude towards even the outcast publican and the heretic Samaritan and the Gentile

"dog," and the impressive fact that good and holy Churchmen in Israel saw in Him only a heretic and blasphemer, a misguided misleader of the people, and gave the name of "heresy" to His religion.

The world in which we live today does not contain so much of this miraculous substance which we call faith that we are justified in spending our Christian energies in proving that half of it is spurious and non-radioactive. The impatient Protestant bemoans the credulity of Rome, and the deliberate Catholic laments the unbelief of Wittenberg and Geneva. But there is no evidence that our common Lord had any desire to exclude either type of follower from His inner circle or wider following. He knew what it was to be regarded as a man deluded and "beside himself," even by His kindred and His friends as well as by His enemies. He knew also what it was to be reproached as a "destroyer" of the Law and the Prophets and the Temple and the Nation. Credulity and freethought were both laid to His charge by the divinely appointed authorities of His people. He could bear with Thomas the doubter, and with Simon Peter the denier, and with misunderstanders as many as He had disciples, because below their errors and their failures He saw their genuine faith. The time is coming when Christian faith, confronted with the allied forces of evil and unbelief and challenged by its Oriental rivals in their strength within their strongholds, will close its ranks and league its varied uniforms and standards for its Holy War. No people on earth is so faction-ridden that its contending parties will not hush their strife and clamour at the sound of an enemy's trumpet at the gate. I cannot believe that it will be otherwise in the City of God on earth, in the Commonwealth of Christ. Have Greeks and Romans a real monopoly of Catholicity? Have they undergone no reformation? Have they no internal divisions, no clashing interests and rival parties? Have Protestants no "charcoal-burners' faith" as Luther called it, unreas-

oning assent to "whatever Mother Church believes"? Have the Reformed Churches nothing left to reform? Have they no Christian fellowship in spite of their outward divisions, no unity that God can recognize? Has Rome no need of them to make her spiritually as well as geographically catholic? Some form of the Apostles' Creed, not quite the longest and the latest, it is true, could unite the whole of Christendom, and it is worth remembering that no one form of it ever yet enjoyed the undivided recognition of the whole Christian world, and that Rome though she has promulgated two new dogmas has not ventured to make room for them in her ancient ritual symbol of the faith. We stand apart because we are not yet on either side deemed worthy to enjoy reunion, because we have not yet learned charity without which, even if we have all faith so as to remove mountains we are nothing, because we do not yet know and understand each other and have not genuinely endeavoured to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace. There are signs that theological scholarship is becoming interecclesiastical, is discarding the polemic for the irenic attitude, and is at last enlisting among the forces which make for peace in the religious world. Social and missionary obligations are disarming many prejudices. The Spirit of the Living God is brooding over our confusion. The voice of the one Lord and Master of us all is rising above the babel of our dissensions and recalling us to His side. To realize that we have one Shepherd and to recognize His voice and to follow Him is to be formed insensibly into one Flock and to be assured of one Fold, if not now, at least at the close of day.

Faith: Its Nature and Work

By Peter Green,
Canon of Manchester.

I have been asked to write, from the Anglican standpoint, on "Faith," and the subject is one of such interest and importance that I cannot resist my desire to accept the invitation, although I recognize quite clearly that I am very poorly equipped for the task. I have no claims to write either as a trained theologian, who could set out clearly what ought to be held on the subject, or as an ecclesiastical historian, who could give an account of what, as a matter of fact, has been held, at various times as to the nature and work of "faith."

I would rather claim to write as an experimental psychologist, if such a title is not too grand a one for a plain parish priest to lay claim to. What I mean is that I shall write of "faith" as it seems to be in the ordinary believer, and as I believe I have seen it at work in the lives of plain men and women. And for such a treatment of the subject I would venture to claim some qualifications. In a letter of dedication to *Sordello* Robert Browning wrote "the incidents in the development of a soul: little else is worth study. I, at least, always thought so." I am in entire agreement with Browning in this: there is no study of such absorbing interest as that of the development of a soul, nor anything so fascinating to watch as "the way of a soul with its God." And to anyone who possesses this taste the life of a parish priest, visiting the sick, teaching children and young people, preparing boys and girls for con-

firmation at the most critical time of their religious development, hearing confessions, trying to help those in doubt, and dealing in a hundred other ways with souls in the closest and most intimate way, presents unrivalled opportunities. I shall therefore try in this paper to treat of "faith," in a purely practical and, so to speak, experimental manner, seeking to show what it is, how it shows itself, and in what manner it works.

It will not, however, be possible, nor would it be at all desirable, to neglect theology and the teachings of ecclesiastical history, altogether. We shall have to consider what has been said about "faith" in the past if only to be sure that when we use the word we are speaking of the same thing, and investigating the same phenomena, as our ancestors did when they spoke of "faith" and examined its workings. And "faith" has played too prominent a part in theological discussions in the past, and the Church of England is too obviously committed by her formularies to certain views as to its office and its working, for it to be possible to treat the subject as it were *de novo*.

Obviously the first thing necessary is an idea, as distinct, definite, and clear cut as possible, of the subject of our enquiry. What is "Faith?" How may it be defined? I would myself define "faith" as the response of man's nature to God. I know of course that to many people such a definition will seem very much too wide. And too wide a definition of one's subject matter is a mistake that always brings a very rapid and certain, and peculiarly unpleasant, punishment on the wrong doer. For the effect of too wide a definition of one's subject matter is always to make the first few steps of any enquiry suspiciously easy and satisfactory, and then to land one, suddenly and irretrievably, in every kind of contradiction and difficulty. But I do not think that, in this case, our definition is too wide. And in this view I am encouraged by the concluding sentences of

that portion of the article on "Faith" in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, which deals with the philological expression of "faith." The writer says "we may at least re-affirm with increased confidence that the idea of 'faith' is conceived of in the N. T. as the characteristic idea of Christianity, and that it does not import mere 'belief' in an intellectual sense, but all that enters into an entire self-commitment of the soul to Jesus as the Son of God, the Saviour of the world." Now such "entire" self-commitment of the soul must clearly involve elements in which the totality of a man's self, every element that is to say of his nature, finds active expression. Without pretending that the "self" can be divided up into distinct parts, which may be labelled "the intellect," "the will," "the affections," and so on, we may yet clearly distinguish these three activities of a spiritual being, namely knowing, choosing, and loving. Indeed when I try to form any intelligible conception of the "self" I am driven backwards from position to position till I can only define the self as something that knows, chooses, and loves. Indeed personality, whether human or divine, seems capable of no definition except as a centre of knowledge, will, and affection. Let anyone examine his consciousness carefully and he will find himself knowing, but always distinguishing what he knows (the object that is of his knowledge) from himself who knows it (the active subject). So too he will find himself choosing, and will be forced to recognize the distinction between the object chosen and himself, the subject which chooses; and again when he loves he will recognize the distinction between the object loved and himself, the subject which loves. If, however, he tries to form any mental picture of the knowing, willing, loving self (and does not make the obvious mistake of identifying his mere physical body, five foot eleven and blackhaired, or five foot nine with red hair, or whatever it may be, with his "self") he will find he can form

no such picture. Everything of which he is conscious is an "object" for consciousness; the conscious self which knows and wills and loves is not itself an object of consciousness. Yet to deny its existence, as Hume did, is to land oneself in endless difficulties. When I know something the "I" that knows is not less certain than the something which is known. The subject is as necessary, and as necessarily real, as the object.

We may then define man as a being who knows, and wills, and loves. And we may be sure that the faith which saves the whole man will be the work of the whole man, and involve elements of knowledge, will, and love.

Saving faith then is that response of man's nature to God's working in him by which man knows God as his sole Good, chooses Him as his sole Goal, and loves Him as his sole Object of desire. Faith, that is to say, is the stretching out of the whole nature of man, in his threefold activities of knowing, choosing, and loving, God-ward.

And as psychologists tell us that the intensification of any one of the elements of a "psychosis" necessarily involves a proportional increase in the other elements, so it is with "faith." It is impossible to grow in the knowledge of God without being drawn to love (or hate) Him more. It is impossible to set one's heart to do the will of God without being thereby led to "know the doctrine, whether it be of God." It is impossible to love God truly without that love resulting in a clearer intelligence and a stronger will. This last assertion will, no doubt, meet with a certain amount of dissent. "Are not many good people," some readers will ask, "both very stupid and very weak?" Doubtless such a question must be answered in the affirmative. But that does not affect my point. I still maintain that a true faith has a marvellous effect on the intellect and the will. To take the intellect first. Who has not noticed, in quite ignorant and illiterate persons, a certain sanity and wisdom

which is the result of nothing but goodness. Faith does not supply information on matters of fact not otherwise known. But it does supply "a right judgment in all things." I remember the daring paradox of a famous Cambridge don who once declared, "I know no better substitute for wide reading and travel, for producing true culture, than a religion sincerely believed in." Though I might myself have worded this remarkable pronouncement differently, I thoroughly agree with it. Love of God, and a sincere will to serve Him, clear the eyes of the understanding.

On the subject of the will there is less need to write. Clearly a true faith braces the will, as every true conversion proves. A famous surgeon, now dead, once said to me of a man we both knew well, "He wants a new backbone and that is an operation which is beyond me. But that is where your profession, Mr. Green, should come in."

So then I cannot define "faith" as anything less than the response of man's whole nature to God. And that response of the whole nature must involve each of the distinctive activities of man's nature as a centre of knowledge, will, and affection, and in a true faith God must be known as the sole Good, chosen as the sole Goal, and loved as the sole Object of desire.

We can see now why St. James condemns "faith without works" as dead. For indeed such faith, being no more than a bare intellectual acquiescence, is not really faith at all, since it involves no element of love or of choice. Equally, however, St. Paul is right in declaring that a man is "justified apart from the works of the law," for what God desires is the man, and not what the man can do or produce. Kant's doctrine that there is nothing good but the good will is but the philosophic statement of the theological doctrine of justification by faith only. Kant would not have denied that there was a sense in which a man who sincerely desired to do

right, and had an enlightened conscience, was better than a man who, equally desirous of doing his duty, was nevertheless blinded by ignorance, and the effects of evil upbringing. St. Paul would not have denied, but indeed explicitly affirms that faith worketh by love, (δι' ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη Gal. V. 6), and he prays that his converts may "abound yet more and more in knowledge."

Of the exercise of faith towards our Lord Jesus Christ as the means by which His sacrifice upon the Cross becomes effectual for our salvation only a few words need be said. The faithful believer knows Christ as what he himself ought to be, gentle, selfless, and utterly submitted to the will of the Father. He loves Christ for being all that. And finally he chooses Christ as his model and his ideal even while utterly conscious of his inability to realize that ideal. He points, as it were, to Christ on the Cross, and says, "He is what I ought to be, and He has done what I ought to do, and suffered what I ought to suffer, and gained what I need," and so pointing and thinking of Christ he, so to speak, "wills" Christ. He *means* Christ, even while he fails; as an artist means the sublime conception which he has in his mind even while he fails to reproduce it on canvas or in marble.

And when we thus recognize faith as a response of man's whole nature to God, a response in which, by knowing, willing and loving Christ, he may be said to *mean* Christ we can both understand why faith is the instrument of our justification and also understand wherein justification (the being merely considered righteous) may truly differ from sanctification (the being truly made righteous) without there being any non-moral element in the transaction.

Faith is the necessary condition of, and instrument in, our justification, because it is the one thing without which God can do nothing. God can do everything for man except outrage his free will. To destroy that

would be to destroy his very nature as a spiritual being. I cannot develop the point here, but it is quite impossible to exaggerate this inability of God's, this limitation of His Omnipotence. He could destroy man; He could re-create him; He could, if He willed, so alter his nature as to make him a mere machine. He cannot, without a total destruction of him as man, and as a free creature, outrage his free will. If man will not respond to God's gracious overtures God can do nothing. Hence man's faith, the response of his whole nature Godward in knowledge, will, and love, is an absolutely necessary prerequisite for God's action. It is not of course pretended that faith must be perfect and complete before God can work. A perfect faith would be possible for none but a perfect man. And faith grows, each element in it helping, as has been said, to the more perfect growth of the other elements. But a response there must be in man before God can work.

But given the faith God can rightly acquit man immediately and accept him as already sinless and perfect, since the only obstacle to such sinless perfection has been removed, and its actual attainment by man is God's work in and for man and not man's own work. Nothing hinders that the Holy Spirit, Who created man at the first, should enter in and entirely re-create him after the pattern of Christ, except man's refusal to allow the Spirit to work. When that refusal ceases, and man responds to God's appeal, the work may be regarded as implicitly complete, for God, the Holy Ghost, will not fail to do His part.

Yet justification, by which man is *accounted* righteous is a distinct thing from sanctification, by which man is *made* holy; the difference is all that lies between man's allowing the Holy Spirit to work (accepting Him as the Agent of a new creation of his whole nature), and the Holy Spirit completing that work. And since sanctification is a process in time, patience must have her perfect

work; and the surrender of self, which is of the very essence of faith, needs to be continued, or rather needs to be constantly repeated. We must "die daily," as St. Paul has it.

And this view of faith as a response to God's appeal which involves a "break" before God and a surrender to Him is familiar both in theory to students of the psychology of religion and in practice to all missioners. Whether instantaneous (if indeed it is ever instantaneous in any intelligible sense of the word) or a gradual process, it is of the very essence of conversion.

It would be impossible to write on the Anglican view of "faith" without saying something of the sacraments and of the place of faith in a sacramental system. And in treating, very briefly, of the sacrament it will be convenient to distinguish between the form and the matter of a sacrament. The matter of a sacrament or sacramental rite is always the perfect humanity of Jesus Christ (which *is* Grace) or some special aspect or element of that nature. Thus in Baptism the new nature of Jesus is planted in the child. In Holy Communion the entire humanity of Jesus, complete, sinless, strengthened by victorious resistance of temptation and enriched by the fruits of the Passion, is taken and received by the faithful. And these two great sacraments are said to be *generally* (*i. e.* universally) necessary to Salvation not as denying the possibility of Grace being freely given outside any and all sacramental systems but as asserting the need of that Grace (whether so given, or given apart from all sacraments) for *all* without distinction. But there are special qualities or attributes of Christ which are specially, not generally, needed. Thus, while all members of the Body of Christ are a royal priesthood, those members through whom Christ's priestly functions are specially exercised will need special grace, and this is given in Ordination. And those who are weakened and defiled by sin, and have

their love for good and their hatred of evil impaired, will need a double portion of the fruits of the Passion, namely strength, purity and hatred of sin. And this is given (though not of course exclusively given) in Penance. But in all sacraments what is given, the matter of the sacrament, is Jesus Christ in His fulness, or Jesus Christ in some special power and endowment. The sacraments, that is to say, are to be regarded as channels of Grace, and Grace is exclusively "the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ."

And so Anglicans are forced to deny that the faith of the receiver is in any sense the *source* of the benefit in a sacrament. There must be, in Baptism, a real regenerative act of the Holy Spirit, exercised in response to the faith of the sponsors ("Jesus seeing *their* faith saith unto the sick of the palsy, Thy sins be forgiven thee"). And equally, there must be a *Real Presence* of Christ in the Sacrament of the Altar. For what I want is the nature of Jesus in all its fulness and that is a thing which my faith cannot in any sense create.

But at the same time Anglicans can fully admit that faith is a necessary condition of benefit from a sacrament. The nature planted in the child at Baptism can never grow up to perfection, and take the place of the old fallen nature in it (the old man being done away and the New Man raised up) unless as it grows up there is conscious acceptance of, and co-operation with, the Holy Spirit on the child's part. The benefits of Christ cannot be secured to the soul in the Holy Communion without faith, which is a stretching out of man's nature after the gifts God is offering. Any theory of sacramental grace *ex opere operato* would attribute to forms and ceremonies a power we have already denied to God, namely the power to benefit us against, or at least apart from, our consent.

The view of "faith" which refuses to see in it anything less than the response of man's whole nature to God is equally helpful when we consider not the matter but the

form of the sacraments. From one point of view the Anglican regards the form of a sacrament as a matter of no moment at all since he recognizes that God might (a) have dispensed with forms altogether and given Grace always, as He now does in special cases, apart from any form, or (b) have appointed quite different forms. From another point of view the Anglican regards the form of a sacrament as of the very greatest possible importance and moment, because he holds that as a matter of fact God did choose just these particular forms and so they are of divine appointment and authority. And the Anglican who understands his position aright is deeply thankful that God has thus appointed forms and ceremonies as channels of His Grace. For he recognizes that the sacraments are as truly the channels through which man's faith ascends to God as they are channels by which God's Grace descends to man. And since there is, as modern psychology of education teaches, no impression without expression, he is deeply thankful to God for giving to His children these opportunities of expression, knowing how the use of sacraments strengthens faith and affords it exercise.

So then "faith" may be defined as the response of man's whole nature to God, the stretching out of his whole being in knowledge, will, and love Godward. By faith man knows God, loves Him when known, and chooses Him because He is loved. And though this faith is a response to God's appeal—the appeal being prior to, and the cause of, the response—and though the very movement of faith is a gift of the Holy Spirit, and impossible for us unaided by God, yet we can resist God and refuse to have faith. And so there is a very real sense in which faith is man's work, and, though the gift of God to man, yet such as God Himself cannot dower us with against our will. But if man has "faith" God will supply the rest.

The Nature of Divine Faith: A Catholic Account

By Michael Maher, S. J.,
Professor of Mental Science at Stonyhurst College.

As the first step towards agreement of any sort among people who are at variance is to get them to understand each other, the Editor of The Constructive Quarterly seems most well advised in soliciting, thus early in its history, from representatives of different Christian Communities an accurate account of what their Church understands by *Faith*. Obviously clearness of conception and precision of language in regard to this notion, so fundamental in all religious discussion, is of the very first importance, if any satisfactory progress whatever is to be made. Yet unfortunately just here writers of repute in religious controversy often indulge in a vagueness and indefiniteness of phraseology which suggests the thought that their own ideas are somewhat hazy and uncertain respecting the significance of a term necessarily involved in the most crucial steps of their argument. Feeling assured then that it will be a considerable gain all round to elicit thus from each of the chief religious bodies an authentic and clear account of what their Church means by religious Faith, I gladly comply with the request of the Editor, and will do my best to give a simple and intelligible, yet as accurate and complete an account as I can within the space available, of the common doctrine of the Catholic Church on the subject. It is not feasible, I fear, even in simple positive exposition of the Catholic conception of Faith, necessarily including its justification,

to escape altogether the use of some reasoning which may probably be disputed by those who dissent from us. However, I have at all events striven throughout to avoid as far as possible the employment of destructive or aggressive argument.

Belief and Knowledge: Psychologists distinguish with sundry refinements *Knowledge* from *Belief*. Roughly, the mind is said to *know* what is intrinsically evident to it, whether immediately or mediately; whilst belief signifies either assent based on the testimony of others, or conviction from cumulative reasoning, which however firm and exclusive of rational doubt, yet is characterized by some intrinsic obscurity. Thus I *know* the truth of the axioms of Euclid; and, when I have followed the reasoning from the axioms, the truth of the Fifth Proposition. I also *know* that heat melts snow; and if I have followed the proof in the laboratory, that water is composed of oxygen and hydrogen,—though in the latter case, and, what is overlooked by some scientists, in practically all scientific knowledge there is involved a multitude of assumptions resting on human testimony. On the other hand, I am said to *believe* that Alfred the Great and Queen Elisabeth have ruled in England, that Borneo is an island, that an imperceptible medium called ether pervades the material universe, and that my intimate friend would not wantonly slander me. The intellectual acquiescence may be perfect and the exclusion of all reasonable doubt may be quite complete in the latter class of experiences just as in the former, although there is felt to be a difference in the quality of the assent. There is in fact here an absence of personal *insight*. The term "belief" is indeed sometimes applied to states of mind in which the adhesion is less firm and the possibility of error clearly recognized; but such imperfect assents are more properly styled "opinions." However, this matter is merely a question of nomenclature; the important point to note is that some judgments of the

character of ordinary human belief possess perfect certainty.

Belief, because the motive for its assent is extrinsic and its object inevident, comes under the control of the will in a way that knowledge does not. In an act of knowledge, the intellect is completely determined by the intrinsic evidence of the object presented to it. In belief, volition and feeling, which influences volition, may play a decisive part. St. Thomas,[1] just as William James over six centuries later, notes that in cases where the subject-matter is in some degree obscure, the will can both select what considerations shall be attended to and then effectively impel acquiescence of the mind in the desired direction. For instance, a boy who has been under my care for some years, and whom I know intimately to be upright, generous, truthful and religious-minded, is charged with being guilty of a petty theft. An aggregate of circumstantial evidence emerges which forms a cumulative proof of a very persuasive kind against him. He reminds me that I have always found him truthful and trustworthy, and then solemnly assures me of his entire innocence. I carefully weigh the matter recalling all the circumstances and then, attending to the considerations in his favour, deliberately decide that he is innocent. I choose to judge thus. I voluntarily commit my mind to a complete assent to his declaration. I resolve to adhere perseveringly to the judgment that he is innocent, short of absolute demonstration of his guilt; and the possibility of this I cannot even imagine. Belief in the above case is eminently *free*. I might have followed an opposite course.

But whilst belief is thus determined by volition, it is not necessarily irrational or blind. The assent may have been eminently *reasonable;* the verdict fully justified by my knowledge of his veracity. I may repose in a firm certitude that my judgment was true, and I can foster and strengthen that conviction. When occasional motives

[1] *Summa Theol.* 2–2, Q.II, a.I; and Q.II, a.9. *De Veritate* XIV.

for doubt or suspicion flit across my fancy, I put them aside and recall my experience of his invariable trustworthiness in the past. Further, in proportion as I act on the belief in his innocence—apart altogether from new evidence of his honesty—the intensity of my assurance tends to increase and consolidate into a *habit*. Such a belief, assuming that it is thus reasonable, free and worthy, or in harmony with duty, is also on my part *meritorious*. I am *responsible* for it; and contrary conduct might possibly have been blameworthy and the subject of demerit. The indulgence of envious or uncharitable feelings begets rash judgments, whilst affection and benevolent emotions naturally result in kind interpretations. In brief, "the wish is father to the thought," and our habitual desires and sentiments play a decisive though often subconscious part in determining many of our most important beliefs.

So much for the elementary psychology and ethics of natural human belief. These truths were as familiar to the Scholastic Theologians of the thirteenth century as to the Philosophers of today. They are assumed in the Catholic analysis of divine Faith, and this brief *resumé* of them will, I hope, tend to make clearer my exposition of the latter.

Religious Faith, Its General Character: The term "Faith" is used in two broadly distinguished significations. Subjectively, it means an act, disposition, or habit of the mind. Objectively, it connotes an accepted truth, a belief or system of beliefs embraced by the mind. The main part of our essay will be devoted to the discussion of Faith in the first sense, but we shall complete our treatment by briefly dealing with objective Faith before we close.

Divine or Theological Faith, as it is technically called, is, according to the doctrine of the Catholic Church, belief in God's word, adhesion to revealed truth because of the authority of God, who has revealed it. Whilst

thus akin to natural human belief, rather than to knowledge, it is on a higher plane and separated from the former by a two-fold characteristic. It is based on the irrefragable authority of God, and it is elicited by the aid of a supernatural agency,—Divine grace.

Etymologically connected with the Latin "*fides*" and the Greek "πίστις," the word "Faith" is employed to render these terms in the English translation of the Bible. The meaning varies somewhat in different contexts. At times it signifies, "confidence," trust in the power and benevolence of God or of Christ. In Romans, 14: 23, it clearly means "conscience." It also connotes, adhesion. When, in the Old Testament, directed to the promises of God, this trust or confident adhesion is identical with belief. In the New Testament when applied to Christ's teaching, including His affirmation of His own Divine character and mission, "πίστις," "*fides*," Faith, according to Catholic doctrine, means assent, or adhesion of the intelligence under movement of the will, that is, *belief*.

In the view of the Catholic Church Jesus Christ came to teach, as well as to redeem, mankind. He delivered a body of doctrine which covers the whole of human life, instructing man in his relations to God and to his neighbour. He taught as one having power and authority. He demanded unconditional assent and complete submission of the mind to the truths which He revealed as the Word of His Father,—God. Again and again He appeals to the sovereign right and authority of His Father: "My doctrine is not mine, but His who sent me." "I have given them Thy word; Thy word is Truth." He reiterates that His doctrine is infallible as a revelation from God. He sends forth His apostles to promulgate it. They go forth as "Ambassadors of Christ" demanding assent to their teaching not as to the wisdom of a profound philosopher, but as to the "Word of God that worketh in you that have believed." (See John 8: 24–26; II Cor. 5: 20;

Eph. 6: 20; I Thess. 2:13; I John 5:10.) We are taught by St. Paul that "Faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ" (Rom. 10: 17); and in the great classical Chapter 11 of Hebrews, the repeated employment of the term Faith to signify firm confidence in God's promises as to the future and belief in His revelation of the past and present, all embody the same notion of a voluntary intellectual assent to truth, or of adhesion of the intellect to the divine testimony under pressure of the will. "By faith we understand the world was framed by the word of God." "By faith the Saints of the Old Testament accomplished their miracles," and "Without faith it is impossible to please God. For he that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him."

In the view of the Catholic Church, then, this Faith which is so essential, which comes of hearing, which requires a preacher who has been sent, which assures us that the world was created by God, that its Creator exists and will reward those that seek Him, and which is necessary in order that we may be well pleasing to God, is not a mere prehensive act of the will, not a blind instinct, not a religious sense or relish, not confidence in the gratuitous mercy of God, but an intellectual assent to testimony, an acceptance or embracing by the understanding of revealed truth.

Analysis of the Act of Faith. The nature of Faith will now be rendered clear by analysis of the constituent elements of an explicit act of Faith, such as, for instance, "I believe that the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity became Man, because God has revealed it."

(1) This is a judicial act of the understanding, an assent of the intellect to a truth proposed for its acceptance. The intellectual character of Faith has been sufficiently established above.

(2) The motive of assent in this act—in technical language the *formal object* of Faith—is the Authority of

God revealing this truth. The proposition is not intrinsically evident, either immediately or mediately. If I accept it, the ground for my acceptance must be extrinsic—the testimony of a witness. Here it is the word of God. God, as Creator of the Universe possessing infinite power, has sovereign right over all His creatures. He is also the Eternal Truth, Omniscient and absolutely Veracious. He cannot deceive or be deceived. The revelation comes from Him in the double character as Sovereign Creator and Infallible Witness. In accepting that revelation I am not only secure from error, I am also fulfilling my duty. When the Lord of the Universe makes a supernatural communication to man, He thereby wills and commands man to embrace and acquiesce in whatever He reveals. I believe His teaching not only because His Divine Veracity affords the highest guarantee of its truth, but because as His creature, I am morally obliged to obey Him. For Faith is the bringing of the intelligence "into captivity unto the obedience of Christ" (II Cor. 10: 6). And both elements of the motive are needed. For the Christian Revelation contains supernatural mysteries above our comprehension and moral precepts repugnant to our lower nature. We are called upon to admit the occurrence of events conflicting with our ordinary experience and the reality of things which will not fit into our concepts. But this is painful. The specific pleasure of the intellect arises from the attainment of insight into evidence. Its proper good is acquiescence in the possession of truth distinctly discerned. In this is realized its sense of power, which is its peculiar satisfaction—and its pride. Consequently the effort to assent not only to the inevident and obscure, but to what runs counter to its customary processes and most familiar conceptions is both unpleasant and in a subtle way humiliating to the human mind. Mysteries though not in contradiction with reason are above and beyond its power of comprehension, and their acceptance is an

acknowledgment of its weakness and limitations, a surrender of its claim to self-sufficiency. Precisely here lies the difficulty for the "modern mind." "Freedom of thought" "independence of judgment" are its first postulates; but these are in irreconcilable conflict with the submission of intellect to revealed doctrine, which is the very essence of Faith. It is vitally important to recognize this. Whatever methods be recommended for the healing of Christendom, we must not shut our eyes to the source and centre of the disease. The essential motive then, in Scholastic phraseology, the formal constituent cause of the adhesion of Faith, is the Authority of the Infallible word of God.

(3) Since the mystery or revealed truth proposed here for our credence is not intrinsically evident, but on the contrary opposed to ordinary experience, it is only by exercise of the will that the intellect can be brought to acquiesce. The function of the will here is to direct the attention to the sovereign and infallible Authority of God, which requires and justifies acceptance of the proposed doctrine, and then in view of this consideration to impel the understanding to a dutiful intelligent assent. We shall see later the part the will plays in the establishment of the preliminary conditions of Faith: here we speak of its operation in the exercise of Faith itself. The assent of Faith thus brought about by the will is therefore *free*, in the fullest sense. And because free, it is capable of *merit*. A necessary act, one devoid of liberty, is so far forth incapable of desert. In this sense it is, that "the devils believe and tremble" (St. James 2: 19).

(4) Finally this assent to revealed truths, this acceptance of mysteries on the authority of God, is an action not in the natural but in the supernatural order, and can only be exercised efficiently towards the attainment of man's supernatural end by the aid of *grace*—a gratuitous gift of God. This grace, it is the teaching of the Catholic Church, enlightens the intellect and strengthens the will

to embrace the mystery revealed for our belief. This again is important, though frequently overlooked outside the Catholic Church. Faith, according to her teaching, is not a natural conviction however strong, resulting from reflection on theological arguments; not rational persuasion however complete, begotten by meditation on evidences, whether intrinsic or extrinsic. These may create the needful disposition, but for the exercise of Divine Faith itself there is needed the act of the will to believe and the additional auxiliary agency of grace. This St. Paul explicitly affirms when he says, "By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves for it is the gift of God" (Ephes. 2: 8). And Our Lord Himself implies the same necessity of grace for Faith in the words: "No man can come to Me, except the Father, who hath sent Me draw Him" (John 6: 44). Moreover this grace is needed not only, or even mainly, on account of the difficulty of assent to mysteries above reason, but especially because by Faith we pass into the supernatural order which leads to Eternal Life in the possession of the Beatific Vision of God. This grace, the Catholic Church teaches cannot be merited any more than it can be evolved by intellectual labour. It is a "*donum Dei speciale*" which can however be infallibly solicited. And so Divine Faith, into which this illuminating and elevating grace enters as a constituent element, is to be prayed for perseveringly, as a gift from God. It is at once the initial stage, the dawn of the Beatific Vision, and the guarantee of its future realization and noon-day splendour. The Catholic doctrine is thus compendiously summed up in the definition of the Vatican Council Sec. III, Ch. 3:

"Seeing that man wholly dependeth upon God as his Creator and Lord and seeing that created reason is entirely subject to uncreated Truth we are bound to submit by faith our intellect and will to God the Revealer. But this Faith which is the beginning of man's salvation, the Church confesseth to be a supernatural virtue, whereby with the help of God's grace, we believe what He revealeth, not because we perceive its intrinsic truth by the natural light of our

reason, but on account of the authority of God the Revealer, Who can neither deceive nor be deceived. For Faith according to the Apostle is 'the substance of things to be hoped, the evidence of things that appear not' " (Heb. 11).

Supernatural Faith may exist either as an abiding habit or as a mental activity in conscious operation. The former is a supernatural virtue or permanent disposition in the soul disposing it to the exercise of the latter. Acts of Faith are both an outcome of the former and react upon the principle from which they proceed, perfecting it. The cessation of its exercise will lead to the atrophy of the faculty or habit of Faith. If engrossed in material or even intellectual occupations of the natural order man never adverts to or concerns himself about the reality of the supernatural, the latter speedily becomes for him a negligible quantity and then ceases to exist altogether. For this reason the Catholic Church so earnestly insists on her children frequently eliciting formal acts of Faith, the sound psychology of which is confirmed by so undogmatic a writer as William James.

"Those to whom God and Duty are now mere names can make them much more than that if they make a little sacrifice to them every day."[2]

Motiva Credibilitatis: Credentials of the Christian Religion. In the analysis of Faith given above, it has been explained that we believe the truth proposed because of the infallible authority of God Who has revealed it. But the question now arises: How do we know that God has revealed the truth in question? And what kind of assurance have we of this fact? The Catholic doctrine here is, that we must have certitude of the fact of Revelation as a preliminary condition in order to be able to believe with Divine Faith, and that this is furnished by the *Motiva Credibilitatis*. The "Motives of Credibility" are to be carefully distinguished from the Motive of Faith, which is the infallible authority of God the Revealer. The *Motiva Credibilitatis* are, in fact, the

[2] *Principles of Psychology*, vol. II, p. 322.

collection of Apologetic Arguments which establish the Divine Origin of the Christian Revelation and of the Church as its Custodian. We cannot treat of them at length here, but even though they may be familiar to many of our readers it is necessary to outline them in order to make clear the Catholic doctrine of Faith and its reasonableness both as an objective system of teaching and as held by the individual believer.

Christ Himself claimed to prove His Divine character and authority especially by two kinds of evidence—the fulfilment in Him of the Old Testament prophecies, and His miracles. The Apostles made use of the same arguments, insisting also on the subsequent realization of Christ's own predictions. The proof from prophecy appealed with special force to the Jewish communities familiar with the Old Testament and the Messianic anticipations; but as time went on a new argument of constantly increasing force began to grow up in the miraculous character of the life of the Church itself.

Viewed from the standpoint of today the Catholic defence of the Christian Faith urges two groups of *Motiva Credibilitatis*, or two stages in the development of the evidence for the divine character of the Christian Revelation:

Firstly, the account of the Jewish People, presented in the Old Testament, viewed merely as a historical and literary document. The uniqueness of the life of that Nation in so many respects when compared with contemporary peoples: its theocratic government; its religious genius; its Monotheism; its moral code; its prevarications and conversions; its marvellous preservation; the sublime teaching of its prophets; its Messianic anticipations and yearnings; their growing clearness down to the coming of Christ; its rejection of Him; its subsequent ruin, dispersion and strange preservation as a race.

Then, the New Testament story—also viewed merely

as a historical document prescinding from the assumption of inspiration or any supernatural character. The narrative there contained of the birth, life, work, teaching, death and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth: His claims to be the Messiah; the fulfilment in His Person of the prophecies; the miracles to which He appealed in confirmation of His divine origin and mission; the wondrous wisdom and moral sublimity of His teaching; the transcendent holiness and nobility of His character; His own prophecies respecting Himself and His Church and their realization; His reiterated affirmation of His own Divine Nature; the absolute impossibility of His being a deluded enthusiast and of the whole Christian Religion being the product of a disordered imagination; the remaining alternatives that Jesus Christ was either the most outrageous impostor the world has ever seen, or that He was truly *God;* and that His gospel was a Divine Revelation, that the mission of His apostles was from God, and that the Church which He came to found was a Divine Institution. Further the witness of the Apostles and their immediate disciples; their testimony guaranteed by the holiness and sincerity of their lives, their works, and the seal of their blood by a martyr's death. Such in outline was the evidence presented to the first generations of proselytes, and it furnished them with grounds for rational certitude that the Apostles and those commissioned by them were really ambassadors invested with a Divine Authority; that the gospel which they preached was from God and that the new Religion was divinely revealed.

The second stage or phase in the evidence of the divine character of the Christian Revelation consists in the group of *Motiva credibilitatis* presented by the enduring supernatural life of the Church. This argument, not available to the first generations of Christians, grew in strength, as we have already observed, with the continued existence and growth of the Church, and so has been

increasingly appealed to by the apologists from Tertullian to Newman:

Starting from the lowliest and most hopeless beginnings —its Founder crucified, its advocates ignorant peasants— yet its marvellously rapid propagation; the intrinsic difficulties of its austere and exacting morality; its injunctions of humility, poverty, chastity, forgiveness of enemies. The instruments by which it conquered the wealth, power, intelligence of the world—poor, lowly-born peasants; the intensity of the conviction and confidence of its adherents; cruel tortures and death cheerfully accepted not only by multitudes of men but by women and children, and not only in the first centuries but throughout the History of the Church; the wonderful triumph of the Christian Church; its still more wonderfully enduring existence in spite of external assaults and internal maladies; its remarkable realization of Our Lord's prophecies; its power of self-recovery from seeming mortal diseases,— the vices and corruption of numbers of its members, and even of its chief pastors and rulers; its precious fruits in the conversion of the pagan nations, in the transformation of ethical ideals, in the leavening and purification of moral life of savage races, in the raising of saints to heroic holiness in every age, in comforting and sanctifying the lives of multitudes in their toil and sufferings; its unchanging adhesion to the body of doctrine committed to it; and its astonishing unity of faith, of discipline and of government throughout every country of the world at the end of twenty centuries. Catholic teaching maintains that these considerations provide sufficient objective proof to afford true moral certitude of the Divine Character of the Christian Revelation. But they do not demonstrate it with an evidence that *necessitates* the assent of the intellect. They furnish moral certitude which suffices to exclude all reasonable doubt. But belief is essentially free, and it always remains in the power of the will to refuse credence, even after advert-

ence to these motives; still more if it chooses to ignore them.

Reflection on the two stages of the argument suggests that although recognition of the Divine Character of the Christian religion is in some respects easier to the Christian of later ages, in others it has become more difficult. Whilst its venerable history and the accumulating testimonies to its supernatural character facilitate acceptance, increasing distance in time usually tends to diminish the persuasiveness of an argument depending merely on historical evidence. Although in strict logic when certainty has been once validly established and the transmission of testimony is good, lapse of time should not weaken its value, yet, as a matter of fact, where feeling enters, imagination may suggest motives for scepticism which enfeeble conviction. If a Political Party could win a general election by proving that Julius Caesar was a myth and the Gallic Commentaries a romance of the eleventh century, the common belief in the great Roman would speedily get a severe shake!

In this lies the special value to subsequent generations of the group of the motives of credibility derived from the evidence of the supernatural life, character and work of the abiding Living Church. Apart from other inconveniences, a Religion the Divine origin and content of which is guaranteed solely by written documents of ancient date, is here placed at an ever increasingly grave disadvantage, as the sadly disastrous effects of the destructive attacks of the Higher Criticism during the nineteenth century on the Faith of so many Christians who based their belief on a purely bible Christianity have shown.

But in the Catholic doctrine of Faith the Living Church takes part in the functions of the *Motiva Credibilitatis* also in another way. The exercise of faith requires certitude not only of the Divine character of the Christian Revelation as a whole; but also that the particular truth

proposed for belief be contained in the Revelation. How is this to be secured? How is the average Christian to attain this certain knowledge? The answer of the Catholic is: The definition by the Church or the Head of the Church, of a truth as contained in the Revelation affords me that certainty. Thus the Divinity of Christ was controverted in the time of the Arians, His Humanity by the Eutychians. The General Councils of Nice and Chalcedon defined these doctrines. Similarly the Councils of Trent and the Vatican have furnished me certainty regarding points of later controversy. Moreover, as General Councils can assemble only at long intervals, it seems to me that if the Church itself is to be preserved in the infallible possession of the revealed truth, the providence of God must have provided her with the means of authoritatively and infallibly deciding disputes on points of doctrine as they arise. And the Vatican Council has itself guaranteed this for me in defining the infallibility of the Pope, whenever he authoritatively decides a doctrine of Faith for the Whole Church.

Genesis of Faith in the Individual Christian: Whilst it is necessary for the reasonableness of Faith that there should be a complete argument capable of establishing the objective certainty of the Divine character of the Christian Revelation, obviously it cannot be required that each human being should have mastered the whole proof of this fact before he can exercise the Virtue of Faith. According to Catholic teaching a subjective or relative certitude that God has spoken may be enough to elicit an act of Faith. As a matter of fact a single piece of evidence with the aid of God's illuminating grace sometimes may suffice for this now, as during the preaching of our Lord and His Apostles.

In the case of a person born and baptized into the Catholic Church the process of the development of Faith would normally be something of this sort: As a young child he receives instruction in the chief elementary

truths of Faith from his parents or teacher. For him in this stage it is natural, reasonable, and in harmony with God's Providence, to accept such religious teaching as true. This fact is the key to the action of the Catholic Church throughout the world on the question of the schools. She simply *cannot* surrender them. As the child grows older, he becomes better able to understand the religious teaching given in school, or church, and to comprehend the more simple general reasons put forward to explain and justify it. Later the boy and girl begin to observe and judge for themselves. Difficulties may now commence to appear, but they will find also increasing evidence in favour of the reasonableness of their Faith. They will note that the same religious instruction including the same religious obligations is taught to and accepted by all in their parish, old and young, rich and poor, educated and ignorant like. As their experience extends they will ascertain that precisely the same doctrine is taught by the priests in the neighbouring parishes and dioceses. Later they may travel, or they may read, new difficulties may disclose themselves; but also explanations—and the corroborating evidence of the earlier teaching steadily grows *pari passu*. The young man finds that the sacraments, the mass, the creed, the religious duties inculcated, the doctrines of belief insisted on, are ever the same,—in the mountain chapel in Donegal, in the big churches in Dublin or Liverpool, in the cathedrals of Westminster, of New York, of Vienna, of Paris or Rome. The pastors in all these churches, in different dioceses, in different nations, preach the same doctrine; they all give the same answer to his questions. The congregation includes men of all trades and professions, lawyers, university professors, shopkeepers, and dock-labourers; men of all parties, monarchists, republicans, democrats, conservatives and radicals. Yet, thus differing in every other way that men can differ, in the tenets of their Faith they are at one.

And further, this marvellous unity among different nationalties is secured and preserved by voluntary intellectual obedience to one central spiritual authority, today a feeble, old man, a prisoner in the Vatican, but one who commands, without a rifle or a gun-boat, a loyal obedience such as no other monarch in the world has ever received. And this Ruler traces his genealogical succession back to the first Vicar of Christ, and claims in matters of Faith to be infallibly protected from error. Here is the secret of the Catholic's confidence in the Christian Faith. Outsiders regard this claim of Papal Infallibility as humiliating fetters on his liberty. He, on the contrary, finds in it a most precious and irrefragable stay and support under all attacks on Religion. It is clear to him that such unity among such various and conflicting elements can only be preserved by a Supernatural Power. If worried by the sarcasms of a Huxley or an Ingersoll, or rendered anxious by the alleged astonishing achievements of some advanced school of recent Higher Criticism, he casts his eyes over the world and recognizes in this Unity of Faith a phenomenon which must have a Divine Cause. He turns to the history of the past and finds this phenomenon has endured 2,000 years. And then he renews his Act of Faith with the conviction that he has behind him a mass of intellectual testimony, a weight of moral authority and a supernatural guarantee that he is in assured possession of the Word of God Who cannot deceive, even if he cannot personally solve every difficulty.

Some Qualities of Faith: The motives of credibility, be it remembered, do not constitute the formal motive of Faith. It is very necessary to insist on this. Faith, according to Catholic teaching, is not a logical conclusion deduced from the apologetic arguments, not a persuasion the strength of which is to be proportioned to the weight of the Christian evidences establishing the Divine character of Religion. It is an assent of the in-

tellect to what God has revealed, moved by the will in virtue of the motive of the infallible authority of God revealing it. The function of the *Motiva Credibilitatis* is to afford certitude that the truth proposed has been revealed to us by God and thereby to enable and dispose the mind to elicit the act of Faith. These *Motives* create and foster "the will to belief;" they prepare the mind for the exercise of Faith, but do not enter as a constituent element into the act of Faith.[3] However, they render that act *reasonable.* And the Catholic Church insists that our Faith must fulfil the conditions of being "a *reasonable* worship." She rejects instinct and individual relish, or savour, as criteria of the divine revelation of doctrines intended for general belief. Their precarious and illusory character is obvious. She is also judiciously distrustful of private revelations, invariably submitting them to rigid scrutiny before conceding any degree of approval. At the same time it cannot be denied *a priori* that God may still make supernatural communications to private persons, for the benefit of themselves or others.

Although private inner experience of the beauty, sublimity, or consolatory character of a religious tenet does not prove it to be part of the Divine Revelation and so make it a matter of Faith; still the power, sweetness and attractiveness with which the Gospel teaching appeals to the highest elements of our moral nature, and the conscious illuminating effects of grace in connection with the assimilation of the inspired word have always been urged by Catholic Theologians as testimony to the supernatural character of the Sacred Scriptures. In the Catholic view the Christian Revelation as a whole is a

[3]In the present article I prescind from minor differences in the explanations advanced by Catholic Theologians. Such is the fine point whether the *fact* of revelation is to be deemed a partial motive of Faith, disputed between Thomists and Scotists; and the subtle question whether the Divine Veracity itself is best conceived as merely *known*, or as both known *and believed* in the process of Faith—which has given rise to a keen controversy between the disciples of Suarez and De Lugo.

public message and instruction of universal application, coming with divine authority and exacting general obedience. Reason therefore demands that in the first instance its authoritative character as a whole be established by objective, public and evident signs; and secondly, its individual doctrines must similarly have some public, easily-ascertainable objective guarantee that they possess this divine authority, if they are to claim from mankind the obedience of Faith.

The concurrent supernatural illumination of grace is necessary, as we have already explained, for the exercise of the act of faith; but it is also involved in the preparatory steps by which we are disposed and induced to elicit the act. The practical judgment that it is reasonable and morally right for me to assent implies supernatural illumination, as it moves my will to a supernatural act. This is the final complement of the preparatory dispositions to the eliciting of the act of faith. It again shows the importance of fulfilling the duties of a moral life, of corresponding with graces received and of regular prayer to win and preserve this supernatural gift; for the Catholic Church urgently insists that we must not forget that Faith is, in the words of the Apostle, a *donum Dei*, a special gift of God.

In the exercise of faith by the effort of our will, with the aid of concurrent grace, we move our intellect to give the most entire and unqualified assent to the truth proposed as coming to us with the highest authority in the infallible word of God. The completeness of this assent is, according to Catholic teaching, in virtue of the motive and the concurrent grace, *supreme*, of the highest order. Its strength is no longer measured by the mere rational force of the motives of credibility. It is now a supernatural virtue, elevating us to a new plane. It is a virtue of the will as well as of the intellect, and it is to be esteemed as including the supernatural quality of God's grace.

When it is said the completeness of assent in faith is supreme, this does not mean excelling all other assents in sensibly felt intensity. For obviously this is not the case. It means *appreciatively* supreme;—that is, apprehending the Divine Infallibility as a motive of the highest order, we incline the intellect to the most unconditional acceptance of whatever God has revealed and most unreserved adhesion to Him, rejecting all doubts.

Objective Faith: We have space for only a very brief treatment of the Catholic doctrine of *objective* Faith as distinguished from the *subjective* act or habit of the mind. *Fides Objectiva* is the entire collection of revealed truths—the Christian Faith. It is the content, the subject-matter of Christian belief. The sphere of possible Faith is limited to Revelation, but not all that is revealed is known by all to be revealed, and the obligation to obedience comes only with knowledge of the fact of Revelation. That portion of revealed truth which the Church has so far proposed for belief is termed *fides Catholica*, and is obligatory on all members of the Church. Believing in the infallibility of the Church they are bound to hold whatever she teaches.

Logic shows us that from any proposition or group of propositions, other propositions can be deduced by longer or shorter processes of inference. And so it is with the collection of revealed truths. Besides doctrines formally and explicitly contained in Revelation, there are others implicitly involved in or virtually bound up with these. Thus, the formal explicit statement that "the Second Person became Man," implicitly affirms that He became possessed of a human body and a human soul. If it be formally revealed that Christ was God-Man, it is therein virtually revealed that Christ was sinless. Logic and Psychology show that the immediacy of inference is a relative term, and while a proposition may be strictly and validly deducible from a group of revealed propositions combined perhaps with self-evident axioms, it is

sometimes not determinable by reason alone whether they are so immediately and directly contained in the revealed statements as to be justly described as revealed doctrines themselves. Consequently even distinguished Theologians are sometimes disagreed as to whether some particular conclusion is to be described as "of Faith" or as "theologically certain." Believing in the divine character of the Church as Custodian and Interpreter of Revelation all her subjects believe *implicitly* in all that she holds to be revealed. The obligation of *explicit* belief arises when she authoritatively makes known to them a doctrine as of Faith.

The public Revelation for the salvation of mankind was not given all at once. There had been continuous increase in the truths supernaturally communicated by God through the Patriarchs, Prophets and Saints of the Old Testament. It was the preparation for the Revelation which was to be delivered in its fulness by Christ and His Apostles. The *depositum fidei*, the sum total of revealed truth for general belief, according to Catholic doctrine, received its completion by the end of the Apostolic teaching. But this cessation in the objective increase of the Faith does not exclude subjective increase in the clearer understanding, fuller knowledge, and more conscious realization of the contents of the "deposit" by the members of the Church, as time goes on. Indeed, reflection shows that such "development of doctrine," as well as growth in organization, is a necessary and a most valuable function of a living Church. The grain of mustard seed and the parcel of leaven imply such evolution.

It is the essential duty, the very *raison d'être* of such a teaching Church, enduring through the ages as the infallible guardian and exponent of the body of doctrine committed to its care, as time goes on, to explain clearly doctrines about which misunderstandings have arisen, to

propose explicitly, when desirable, tenets implicitly contained in the original deposit, and, as changing circumstances may require, distinctly and expressly to emphasize and unfold truths which were communicated perhaps only in an incidental manner to a primitive society where the need for this inculcation did not yet exist. And so from the very beginning we find the Church assuming the assistance of the Holy Ghost, and expounding and defining doctrines according as error arose. Thus, the Unity of Nature and Trinity of Persons in God, the Unity of Person and Duality of Nature in Christ and the necessity of Grace for every act in the Supernatural order were raised to the position of articles of explicit belief by the early Councils. In the eyes of the Catholic the decisions of the Vatican Council were exercises of the same function and of the same authority.

Finally, a last most important question, for, in the Catholic doctrine as to the nature of Faith all these points are intimately connected, where is the *depositum fidei* in its integrity contained, and how is its preservation secured? The Catholic answer is: In the oral and written tradition of the Church. In her living teaching and in the Sacred Scriptures which she has herself guarded from the beginning. Much of the oral tradition was, like the "unwritten" law of England and other countries, embodied in written documents at an early date. Hence the great value of the testimony of the Fathers. But the term "written" here has always referred especially to the inspired Scriptures. Christ promulgated His doctrine not by writing, but by word of mouth. Unlike the founders of philosophical schools He has not left us a single line written by Himself. Before departing from this world He did not have His teaching put in written form. Instead, He instituted an Apostolate, a living, teaching Authority to whom He promised the assistance of the Holy Spirit. The Apostles, like their Master, propagated His doctrine not by writing but by speech.

For, "going forth they preached everywhere;" they founded Churches, and appointed others to carry on their work of teaching (Epistles to Timothy and Titus). Many of them, like their Master, left no writings at all; and the chief letters actually handed down from them were not written for the foundation of Churches, but as incidental communications to Churches already founded. And in acting thus they were following Christ's instructions, for His repeated command to them was to teach, to preach, to be witnesses to His doctrine. Nowhere does He, or any of them, hint that writing is to be a main, not to say exclusive, means of promulgating and transmitting that Doctrine. The Church existed for a generation and spread far and wide before any of our Canonical Gospels were written; and when in course of time they were composed, it was by the agency of the living, teaching Church that they were promulgated, guaranteed and faithfully transmitted from age to age. Being written by the Apostles, or under Apostolic sanction, the Church sacredly guarded them as a precious part of the Apostolic Deposit, but never did she identify their contents with the whole sum of Christian Revelation.

In the Catholic view then the Deposit of doctrine, which was to be accepted by the Faithful and believed whole and entire, was committed by Christ to a living indefectible Ministry, an Infallible Teaching Authority. This fact fundamentally affects the Catholic's conception of Faith. It determines his mental attitude as a Believer. The divine character of the Christian Revelation once established to the satisfaction of his reason he approaches the Apostolic Deposit as a *learner*, not as a *critic*. He conceives this was the disposition of the converts of the Apostles themselves; and he assumes that the nature of Faith should not change. It is for him still essentially an *obedience*. It is a *reasonable* obedience,—but none the less an obedience. This may be a hard saying,—for the

twentieth century. But it is not the only one in the Gospel. It does not lie with him as a member of the Church to determine what shall be the truths of Faith. He does not claim the right to select what doctrines he will accept. He cannot pick out those which seem to him more useful, helpful, comforting, beautiful, or more reasonable, and believe them. The question that matters for him is: Whether the doctrine proposed is part of the Deposit of Faith? Whether it has been revealed by Christ? If it has, then even though it seem incomprehensible or unpleasant, he deems it his duty as a Christian to submit his intellect and *believe*. This is just what he means by Faith. And as in the case of the disciples of the Apostles, so also in his own, he imagines that it was precisely to teach clearly what is to be believed, that Christ founded a teaching Church. He holds that this teaching Church was instituted to preserve, propagate and transmit the Faith not merely for the first generation, not for the first century, for the first four centuries, nor for the first fifteen centuries, but to the end of time. He holds that this Living Teaching Authority was entrusted with the charge of the entire system of Christ's doctrine; that it was commissioned to teach all of it to all the peoples of the Earth; and that it was guaranteed to live and continue its work till the end of the world; and that the Charter of its Authority and Indefectibility was formulated in the last will and testament, the final solemn utterance with which Our Saviour closed His earthly career: "All power is given to Me in heaven and on earth. Going therefore teach ye all nations: baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and behold I am with you *all days, even to the consummation of the world.*" (St. Matt., 28: 18–20.)

Faith[1] as it is Understood by an Orthodox Divine[2]

By Archbishop Platon.

Faith is the first foundation stone on which Christianity itself is built, and on which it builds all the faithful into one body, which is the Church of Christ. Before all, "he that cometh to God must believe that He is," for "without faith not only is it impossible to please Him," but also to live a Christian life. (Heb. 11: 6, and 10: 38.) Making clear for us the given signification of faith, Christ the Saviour points out the contrast between heaven and

[1]In the New Testament we find various definitions of faith. Sometimes it is spoken of as knowledge (John 2: 24); at others, it is represented as an active power (Gal. 5: 6); sometimes it is described as a firm belief (Matt. 9: 22); at other times as the miraculous power of God in man (I Cor. 13: 2); the power which justifies and saves him. It may be said that the idea of justification through faith, of salvation by faith, penetrates the New Testament throughout (Matt. 16: 16; John 1: 12, and 20: 31; Rom. 1: 16–17; Gal. 2: 16; Eph. 2: 18, etc.). But in the same Holy Scripture of the New Covenant we also read of the insufficiency of faith alone for salvation; we read that not by faith alone is man saved, that faith without love is nothing, that the most important matter is, that we should live as those "worthy of the Gospel of Christ" (James 2: 24; I Cor. 13: 2; Phil. 1: 27; I John 3: 23, etc.) since good works are necessary for salvation as well as faith, good works which, in the future life, will be the hostage of salvation, or of condemnation (Matt. 16: 27, and 22: 34–36; John 14: 21; Eph. 6: 8; James 2: 17–18).

[2]Living here in America, far from my Orthodox fatherland, where all such questions have been worked out in a scientific way, I have no scientific apparatus which I might use in order to present the subject of this essay in a more exhaustive way and in a clearer light. My chief and almost only source is the Word of God, my scientific apparatus is such knowledge as I have personally acquired and which I now use from memory. Therefore to the word "Faith" in the title, I have added "as it is understood by an Orthodox Divine."

earth, between which He, the Saviour, is the only Mediator. Being "not of this world," He can be understood only through faith (John 8: 23–24). But in order to know God, be it even through faith, we must be endowed with this faculty; therefore faith is a special faculty in man, which is evidently his in virtue of his likeness to God; therefore, in its subject, knowledge through faith is incomparably superior to knowledge through reasoning. And this faith is not merely faith in God, but faith in the God-man. St. Athanasius the Great says: As the thought of man fell into the sensual, the Word of grace deigned to make itself visible through means of a body, in order that, having become man, He might attract the attention of other men, drawing their senses to Himself; and, when they behold Him as man, to convince them ultimately by His works that He is not only man, but also God.[3]

Through the medium of man's nature in the Saviour, men become convinced that for them too it is possible and necessary to live the life, which is knowable by faith only. In this way faith presents the aspect of man's personal relation to Christ the Saviour. It is not merely an agreement of our intellects to the truths of salvation contained in divine revelation, but an assimilation of these truths by our hearts, and, so to speak, their transmutation into our very life and activity. As the activity of believers in Christ, our activity is the natural result of our free, vital and hearty trust in Christ as the Son of God, as our Saviour and Redeemer, through Whom all the means of salvation and all the blessings of our spiritual life are granted to us, in Whom is hidden our very life. Thus in faith a Christian is united to God, because faith is not a mere conviction that God is (Heb. 11: 6), nor a mere trust in the grace of God, but it is also in its nature obedience, a free subjection of man to God, a bowing of man's will before the will of God. In this sense St.

[3] *Works of the Holy Fathers*, Vol. 17; First Part of the *Works of St. Athanasius the Great*, pp. 101–102, 1, 2.

Augustine says that "*cetera potest homo nolens, credere non nisi volens.*"

This is the kind of subjection of our wills which makes possible the revelation of the unconditioned divine principle within conditioned human limits, in the finite human being, the human personality, which thus becomes capable not only of understanding eternal life, but also of living it. And so faith is the subject of every personal Christian life, the attainment of which brings about a complete revolution within the man; abnegation of self, and the rendering up of one's whole being to Christ the Saviour. The holy apostle thus speaks of himself: "For I through the law am dead to the law, that I might live unto God. I am crucified with Christ: nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me; and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, Who loved me and gave Himself for me" (Gal. 2: 19–20). These words of the apostle indicate the two elements of the Christian life: faith in Christ the Son of God, Who gave Himself for us, because of His love for us, and love, by which faith works: "faith which works by love" (Gal. 5: 6). From the union of the elements of faith and love results the Christian life, which, for the Christian, is the way to the blissful eternal life, a way which is necessarily narrow and difficult, for the Christian's life in the flesh, the being crucified together with Christ, is in reality the gradual but constant killing of the external man, with his lusts and passions, and the realization of the life of our inner man, or the life of Christ in us.

Let us express this more clearly. "I am crucified with Christ," says the apostle; that is to say: I, the external man, have died to the life of the flesh, as Christ died, Who said of Himself, that He is the "life" (John 14: 6) and that in the knowledge of Him as the "life," life eternal awaits those who believe in Him (John 17: 3); consequently, not I, the external man, live, but "Christ liveth in me," inasmuch as He is the life. Therefore, even if I

appear to be living in the flesh, I do not consider this living, for I know that this is but the covering, the sheath of life, beneath which lives my true life, Christ, because I do not live in the flesh or by the flesh, but by faith, or because of my faith in the Son of God: "yet not I but Christ liveth in me." The apostle says, as it were: I do not deny that I live in the flesh, because I perform all the functions of the external man—I use food and clothes, I speak with the tongue of flesh, and act as a man acts, who lives in the flesh, but through all my acts there breathes a different life, not the life of the flesh, but the life of faith. Before my conversion to Christ, I, Paul, spoke with the same tongue, used the same voice as after my conversion, but before my conversion my tongue blasphemed against Christ and His Church, and after my conversion that same tongue became the instrument of heavenly blessings, of thanksgiving and praise of God. And so, though I live in the flesh, I do not live the life of the flesh, I live, not by the promptings of the flesh and blood of the external man, but by faith in Christ, which communicates to me a wholly different life, the spiritual life, the life of Christ; and the life of the flesh is dead and crucified with Christ.

Whence does faith in Christ receive such a miraculous power? On what does it feed and live?

The holy apostle says that faith lives and feeds on the love of God (Gal. 5: 6), of our Lord Jesus Christ. The same love of God is born within us sympathetically from the love of Christ for us. John, the apostle of love, says: "We love Him, because He first loved us" (I John 4: 19).

Though St. Paul does not say directly, in the above-mentioned quotation, that he, having been crucified with Christ, lives by faith, which acts by means of love, this is the reason why the same idea is contained in the words: "I live by faith in the Son of God, Who loved me." These words speak as much of faith in the Son of God as of love for Him, because feeling the love of the Son of

God upon us already means feeling love for Him. St. John says: "Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that He loved us" (I John 4: 10).

And so, from the union of the elements of faith in Christ and love for Him arises the true life of the Christian, which St. Paul lived, and concerning which he says that he was crucified with Christ (according to the external man) so that he does not live any more, but Christ lives in him. In this sense, St. Paul says of Noah, that "he condemned the world and became heir of the righteousness which is by faith" (Heb. 11: 7), as in his faith he justified the decree of God destining man for a life of absolute trust and the closest union with God.

From this most obviously comes the importance of faith and its salutary power.

The words of the apostle which I have quoted (Gal 2: 19–20) express the chiefest and most fundamental dogma of the Christian teaching; that is, that the true Son of God incarnating, suffered passion for the sins of men because of His love for them. But the same words of the holy apostle express also that which is the very essence of the active Christian life, that is, renunciation of self, spiritual crucifixion with Christ, the killing of the life of the flesh, and our spiritual coming to life by the life of Christ being communicated to us because of our faith in Christ. Towards this crucifixion with Christ and the coming to life in Him and through Him are directed all the commandments of the Gospels, all the counsels, all the ways of the Christian life, all the Christian life itself. All this is assimilated by faith, and the believer's crucifixion with Christ is accomplished on the altar of the love of Christ, Who loved us and gave Himself for us. Consequently self-renunciation is the chief element and sign of Christian love. To love Christ means to desire Him instead of one's self; it means placing Him where one's "I" was; it means delivering one's self up to His will; it means

giving one's self to Him, wholly and completely, with one's whole being and soul.

And so the principles of our life are faith and love. In a practical form, this principle may be expressed as follows: "Live by faith in Christ the Son of God, Who loved you, and love Him yourself, so as to be crucified with Him all your life, as He was crucified for you."

We believe that, except by faith, there is no way to come to Christ, no means of becoming a Christian and coming into closer communion with Christ and His body, the Church. But, in order to be a vital principle, faith must be joined with love; otherwise it will not be active nor life-giving. Love examined in itself is the fundamental feeling of the human soul created in the image of God, who Himself is Love. Love is proper to our nature. But the degree of Christian love, active, disinterested and life-giving, can be attained only through faith in Christ, in conjunction with which alone it can acquire the exalted qualities of Christian love.

Therefore we, Orthodox Christians, consider that neither faith without love nor love without faith can be the true principle of Christian life and activity, but the two together and inseparable, exactly as the two act together and inseparably in forming and accomplishing the spiritual life. The relation between them is analogous to the relation between light and heat. Light without heat cannot warm, and heat finds its first cause in light, in fire. This is why, from our point of view, we cannot accept even such a learned statement as that of Josiah Royce, according to which the salutary power of Christian love alone is the origin of the idea of the Church in Christian history.[4] Christian love without faith is cold heat; that is, something inadmissible and unthinkable in the life of a Christian. Our Russian professor M. M. Tareyeff[5] says:

---

[4] *The Problem of Christianity* (New York, 1913); Vol. 1, p. 50.

[5] *The Evangel, Foundations of Christianity* (Sergieff Possad, 1908); pp. 249–252.

"Evangelical love is a love that believes, and therefore faith, the faith of God, enters into the content of the divinely spiritual life: eternal life belongs to the faithful (John 3: 15; 5: 24; 6: 40, 47). The love that has faith becomes the principle of the whole breadth of human activity, being revealed in the New Testament law of absolute action and in independence of everything exterior, like that of the Son of God. . . . Love and faith give man the knowledge of truth, which is the most important sign of everlasting life (John 17: 3). Of course this does not refer to the theoretical knowledge of the intellect, but to the living of divine life in experience, the 'fellowship' with God (I John 4: 7–8; 1: 2–3; 2: 20, 24, 25, 27). . . . Faith gives to the Christian a victorious power over the world (Luke 12: 32). . . . The self-abnegation of love is lit up by the belief that for the sons of the Heavenly Father, everything is possible (Matt. 17: 20; Mark 9: 23). . . . By the power of the divine faith, the chosen of the Heavenly Father are freed from the divided purpose and inconsistency of serving both God and Mammon (Matt. 6: 24; Luke 16: 13), from the torturing unbeliefs of the heart (Mark 9: 24) and from cowardly uncertainty: the peace of unlimited measure, the peace of intrepid faith, comes to dwell in their hearts (John 14: 27; Matt. 6: 24; Luke 7: 50). . . . The freedom which comes from faith in the fatherly love of God raises the fallen, exalts the persecuted, gives strength to the lowly and alertness to the impotent. This is the knowledge which is hidden from the wise and prudent and revealed unto babes, it is comfort for all those that labour and are heavy laden, it is rest for all the meek and lowly of heart; it is the yoke which is easy and the burden which is light (Matt. 11, 25–30)."

Without faith a Christian is incapable of any truly good work, because all truly good and really Christian work is accomplished only by the help of the grace of God, and grace is given to each individual according to the strength of his faith in the merit of the Redeemer. As to the good works which a man can accomplish naturally, they are only psychically good, and not spiritually good. Such is the teaching on this subject of our Orthodox Church, taking into consideration also that St. Paul, speaking of human activities not founded on faith, says that all that is not of faith is sin. In the same way we view the relation of love to good works: all good works have their life and force in love. According to the word of the Lord, all the Law and the Prophets are contained in the one word, Love (Rom. 13: 9). "Charity (love) is the bond of perfectness" (Col. 3: 14). But this love is inseparable from faith because all grades of moral perfection, every accom-

plishment in the life of the spirit, is gauged by the measure of progress in faith and love. Every spiritual gift is dealt out to a Christian according to the measure of his faith, and in the same way every fruit of the Spirit grows ripe in the measure of the ripeness of charity (love). More than this: a Christian must never for a moment lay down the torch of faith, in all the walks of his earthly life; with it he must pass through the gates of death and into eternity, when faith will assume a different character, becoming vision, but even then love will remain unchanged, because it "never faileth"; but it will flow in a stronger stream in our hearts, as we shall then draw nearer to the very Source of eternal love, to Love itself.

From this characteristic quality of the principles of the Christian life, it becomes clear of itself how necessary faith is for this life. Without faith in Christ, it is impossible to lay the foundation and make a beginning of our salvation and our spiritual life; without faith and love, it is impossible either to continue or to complete the salutary journey of life, even if this journey has been begun. The cause of this lies in the necessary influence of faith and love on all the works of the Christian, on all the degrees of his moral perfection, on his whole life. The necessity that the principle of life and activity shall be established on faith and love is particularly and especially revealed in our relation to the Son of God, Jesus Christ, to Whom we are united as our Life-giver, Who imparts to us His divine life, a union similar to that which exists between the head and the other members of the body, or between the vine and its branches, or between a spring and the stream which flows from it. But as without reciprocity no bond can exist between two people, what must we bring to Christ, in order to come into communion with Him? Nothing but faith and love. What degree must be reached by our faith in Christ and our love for Him to enable these powers to draw life from Him and to distribute through our whole being? To

accomplish this, our faith and love must grow deep enough to become the enduring interior driving power of our whole life; to accomplish this, they must transfigure the whole of our inner man into the image of Christ Himself, clothing the inner man in Christ; and each one of us must, as it were, identify himself so completely with Christ, as to have no mind or will of his own, as such, no feeling or thought of his own; this, in the language of St. Paul, is to be crucified with Christ, living no longer for ourselves but only for Christ.

Here, then, is the need of faith in Christ and love for Him, as the principles of the life of the Christian crucified with Christ. Because faith and love are so necessary for the life of the spirit, the rule and mode of activity of the Christian life are generally called the law of faith and the law of love, in contra-distinction to the law of works, as the external rule of morality and right conduct.

As the principle of the Christian life, faith completely corresponds to man's present condition. It is in keeping both with the lofty possibilities of human life and with its infirmities. All the highest conceptions of man's intellect and all the demands of the moral law present themselves to our consciousness in the form of faith, which needs no reasoning for its proof. To live by faith in God is proper to the children of God, who, trusting their Father, do not desire and do not demand that the Father should reveal all His works, counsels and intentions to them in a clear light. A promise and assurance on the side of the Father, and faith on the side of the children, are enough. Faith is so omnipotent that there is nothing impossible for it (Matt. 17: 20). This is the exalted side of faith, which corresponds to man's dignity as the son of God. But the same faith which defines our relation to God of necessity also points out our infirmities and defects. The obscurity which enwraps the highest truths of religion capable of being known to faith, shows that we have not as yet reached the day of the kingdom of Christ, which has no

twilight. That the eye of faith beholds all the blessings of the heavenly life at a great distance, is a sign that we are strangers and newcomers to that life, as yet incapable of enjoying these blessings, and therefore faith gives us, together with the knowledge of these blessings, a lesson in humility, which is necessary in our present condition. Faith discloses not only the nearness of man to God but also the kinship between God and man, so that it is easy to understand why without faith it is impossible to please God (Heb. 11: 6). If I have learned to know God by faith, and this knowledge has penetrated my feeling, my soul and being, this faith saves me, because it makes my life no longer carnal but spiritual, and actively directed towards the most concrete ideal of life, the Lord Jesus Himself. Having in view faith *of this sort*, we may say that to be a believer and to be saved are exactly the same thing. It is this faith and this power of faith that St. Peter has in view, when he speaks of Christians who are "kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation" (I Peter 1: 5). The life of a Christian who believes thus is the life of Christ in him, but it is as impossible to enter "a pillar of salt" as to give it a soul.

Throughout all that I have written, I have not had the shadow of an intention to dispute with Protestantism or to enter on a polemic, to refute or to prove. No, realizing clearly that, in this work of mine, a positive development of the theme will lead sooner to positive results, and founding my work exclusively on the data of the teaching of the Holy Scriptures, I have endeavoured, in as far as I can see, to develop and establish the first half of my definition of faith with sufficient clearness and completeness: Faith is the first foundation stone on which Christianity is built.

Going straight forward, I have come directly to the Protestant view of faith, and I cannot pass this view by without touching on it slightly, be it only because of the object which THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY pursues.

FAITH AS UNDERSTOOD BY AN ORTHODOX

If faith be a fact and a real phenomenon, having its essential nature and its visible form, it would seem that there could be no disagreement concerning it, nor different ways of understanding and viewing it. Yet we witness the existence of completely different ways of viewing, understanding and confessing faith. Evidently the Kantian cognition of the *Ding an Sich* meets us here with full force.

Faith is subject to our cognition only in so far as it is evident to us; but there are various kinds of evidence; hence, we have different kinds of knowledge of faith, depending on the differing character of our evidence. For instance, Tertullian's "*Certum est quia impossibile*" is a periphrasis of the words of St. Paul (I. Cor. 1:25), because his eyes were fixed by the apostle precisely on this side of faith. As you look at a thing, so you will see it: you may fail to take a full view of the whole of it; or you may look at it from the wrong side, but in both cases the result is contradiction and disagreement. For instance, Divine Grace is certainly one; yet let anyone try to find a more striking example of difference than that which exists concerning it in the dogmatic teachings of the Protestants, the Roman Catholics and the Orthodox. We have the same thing in the views of faith, in the teachings and confessions of faith, understood as the manifestation of faith in life. And in this matter it is natural for every confession to think itself the more correct, alone salutary and binding on all Christians. Yet certainly not on the basis, or for the reasons, which the learned E. A. Cook brings forward in the work over which he toiled for six years, with the object of showing how superior Protestantism is to Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy. If the learned writer has proved the truth of the Protestant doctrine concerning justification by faith, and the necessity for its acceptance by all, he would have the right to speak of the superiority of Protestantism; but it is without question hazardous to deduce this superiority from the absence of

priesthood from Protestantism[6] or from the external prosperity of Protestant nations. There was a time when the Christian East was completely under the sway of the heresy of Arius, St. Athanasius of Alexandria being almost the only man who represented Orthodoxy, and therefore being forced into hiding and imprisoned. Yet who now thinks that Arianism was superior to Orthodoxy? According to this kind of logic, he who is better dressed is also morally superior. It was as strange an experience to read such an opinion in Mr. Cook's book as it would be to hear it expressed by any citizen of a democratic country like this.

No; in Christianity there exist radical questions of universal significance, in the solution of which Christians most unfortunately disagree. And the assumption of the superiority of one or another on the ground of exterior appearances is entirely out of place. It is not important which of us has the better exterior appearance. But it is important to learn where is the Church of Christ; to discover which Christian confession is to be accepted as truly pure and salutary. Here lies the immeasurably important essence of the question.

I should not mention the opinion of Mr. Cook, which is so confident, yet founded on such an external and insecure basis, did we not find an echo of it among other denominations. For instance, a venerable, gray-haired Episcopalian said to me, in conversation, the other day: "Many, many Americans think that you Russians are no better than heathens, because of your fondness for ritual and the externals of religion." I replied: "Many, many in Russia think that you are a cultivated nation." Having thus exchanged compliments, my American friend uttered a long-drawn "Ye-es!" and grew pensive. I do not know what his thoughts were, but mine were: "How far apart

[6] *Christian Faith for Men of To-day*, E. A. Cook (Chicago, 1913), pp. 86–88. Mr. Cook uses such an expression as "less confused by priestcraft," yet Melanchthon and even Calvin accepted the divine establishment of priesthood.

we still are, even what strangers we are, and, if we have anything in common, it is the faith of Christ; this pure and lofty feeling alone seems able to bring us together and to unite us; and yet even on this ground, which we seem to hold in common, we have gone so far from each other."

Will Christians, then, never come to any agreement? Will they never, though conscious of the need of union, persuade each other that it is possible and attempt its realization? Is it possible for Christians further to disregard, or to fight separately against, the anti-Christian spirit which is at present assuming a dominant and really threatening attitude?

For example, here is a cutting for the *New York Evening Journal*, of November 22, 1913:

"Berlin, November 22. The agitation of non-sectarian Socialists, free thinkers and atheists against the State Church is reaching serious proportions to-day. More than 5,500 persons resigned from the Church in Berlin to-day, as a result of mass-meetings. It is estimated that 35,000 Church members have left the Church in Berlin alone since the movement began."

What is it that makes us not only keep aloof from each other, but even show irreconcilable animosity toward each other? And this animosity exists not only between different confessions, but even between members of the same confession. Take the example of the Modernists in their relation to the Roman Church and its officials. The other day, I came across studies of Modernism by C. A. Briggs[7] and by an Italian professor, Giovanni Luzzi.[8] They both disapprove the attitude of Pius X towards the Modernists, but, whereas the former endeavours to be objective and to keep to the purely scientific grounds of history, the latter writes with passion, and, when speaking of Pius X, assumes a tone which positively leads me to

[7] *Church Unity* (New York, 1909, XIII): *The Encyclical Against Modernism.*

[8] *Review and Expositor* (July, 1913), pp. 371–372.

refuse to believe his statements. Or take the other example of the innumerable fractions of Protestantism perpetually disputing with each other, and trying to prove the necessity or superfluity of this or that element in religion. Or take the almost inimical attitude of the non-Orthodox towards Eastern Orthodoxy, although properly speaking, Orthodoxy is absolutely a *terra incognita* for them.

And yet resting on the oneness of faith in our common Saviour, on the oneness of confession and calling, which can be realized only by the fulfilment of the Master's will, St. Peter the apostle demands from all complete unanimity, and even oneness of thought: "Be ye all of one mind," he says (I Peter 3: 8) to all his brethren in Christ. Who can deny that the principle of Christian brotherhood banishes from the life of Christians, not only all animosity but even all sense of separateness in general? St. Paul, in the name of our common faith, demands peace and harmony among men (Eph. 4: 31–32) and the drawing of them all into a single body—the Church of Christ, in order that they may fight the only battle permitted to them in Christ—the battle against sin, which destroys unity among men. This fight is not merely allowed by Christianity, it is even commended: "Put on the whole armour of God that ye may be able to stand against the wiles of the devil . . . stand, therefore, having your loins girt about with truth and having on the breastplate of righteousness; and your feet shod with the preparation of the gospel of peace; above all, taking the shield of faith . . . " (Eph. 6: 11–16). As may be seen from these words of the apostle, the fight permitted by Christianity is conducted against the reign of lies, animosity and wickedness, and for the salvation of all people; it should, therefore, facilitate the greater development of internal unity among them, just as when several nations are leagued together to fight a common foe, there is developed in them a certain sense of national unity. The

struggle demanded by Christianity is one of the chief conditions of that very consciousness of universal Christian unity to which Christian writers of the early centuries referred in their days. In their view, all people, once they are bound by the ties of Christian brotherhood, make up one nation, to whatever nationality they belong by blood, and however great the distances that separate them (St. Basil the Great, St. Augustine and others). Oneness of faith unites Christians separated by distance just as if they were the closest neighbours (Basil the Great). Is it not a matter for profound grief that difference of confession is deeper than the sharpest political separation, that Christian confessions cannot come near to the idea (I dare not say of union) but even of a *rapprochement*, whereas inimical nations are able, for purely egotistical purposes, to be reconciled and to enter into coalitions, and whereas "solidarity" is the watchword and motive of the common life of our day? Let us also cast a glance at this common life, at all the care men take of themselves and their lives, for the preservation and amelioration of transitory earthly existence. How much of it is earthly, how much of it is trivial! Yet men give themselves up wholly to this labour—spending on it, sometimes squandering on it, all their power, intellect, energy, often their very life. In pursuit of his object, one man is joined by others, who can and do help him, and thus are formed large bodies of men often united by no lofty ideas, very commonly united by the meanest interests.

And we, Christians, though belonging to different confessions, surely know that the question of eternity is solved for us all in the same way, as we all believe in the one Lord Jesus Christ, as we feed our souls on the same spiritual bread offered to us in the Holy Scripture, are nurtured and live here on earth within the sphere of the same lofty ideas, holy and eternal ideas, and are borne hence into the region of eternal light without twilight by the breath of the same wind which blows from above: we, brethren

in spirit, we, kindred by faith, are in reality strangers and aliens to each other. For example, how clamorous grew the Presbyterians when President Wilson visited the Roman Catholic Thanksgiving service, and how careful were certain Episcopalian choirs, who altered our Orthodox hymn to the *Holy Virgin*, using its music to sing the praises of the *Lamb!*

Is it not clear that Protestants are as intolerant of Roman Catholics as the latter are of all who are not Roman Catholics? And it will take much labour and much time so to alter matters that such a relation between various confessions shall disappear from their life. They have gone too far from each other, so far that at present one cannot see how a *rapprochement* is possible.

How dreadfully tragic it is; what an unbearable state of things! But my Church has never failed to pray for the "peace of all the world, the prosperity of the holy Churches of God, and the union of all." I believe in the possibility of this union. I could not disbelieve it, because I both trust my Church and obey her. Exactly as, in his own time, St. Augustine believed the Gospel in obedience to his Church: "*ego*" he said, "*vero Evangelio non crederem, nisi me Ecclesiae commoveret auctoritas.*"

The great Father of our own Church, St. John Chrysostom, also says to us: "Christians, you will be responsible not alone for your own salvation, but for the salvation of the whole world." He desired that the prayer of a Christian should be truly all-inclusive, that a Christian at prayer should stand before the Lord accepting the care and concern of all human beings, whatever their nationality or religion. It is evident that the holy Father remembered that Christ bade all people take up His yoke that is easy and His burden that is light. This call is equally addressed to the "lost sheep of the house of Israel" and to all other nations. "And other sheep I have," says the Lord, "which are not of this fold: them also I must bring, and they shall hear my voice;

and there shall be one fold and one shepherd" (John 10: 16).

Surely every Christian knows this: while remaining Christian, people cannot possibly be out of sympathy with the idea of Christian brotherhood and union. But in practice they are not only indifferent but simply intolerant towards each other. For instance, on looking through the *New York Tribune* of November 15th, I chanced to learn that the Protestants in Spain had addressed a petition to the Government to be allowed to open their own churches "as in other countries." "But," the paper continues, "this will hardly pass, because the present Cabinet is Conservative, and will most probably oppose it." Is this, then, Christian brotherliness and Christian tolerance? Is there anything of "the spirit of Christ" in it, the spirit which found it necessary to rebuke the Boanerges, sons of Zebedee (Luke 9: 54–56; Matt. 20: 21-24; Mark 10: 35–41). And while maintaining such an attitude towards each other, we know so little about each other, or even nothing at all. Of late, we have a great many American visitors in our Orthodox Cathedral in New York, "to hear the singing of the beautiful choir." They hear and go into raptures; they also feel greatly moved by the pomp of our Orthodox service; but, most unfortunately, they know nothing at all of the inner meaning hidden in this singing, this "majestic exterior", this ritual "which makes one go deep within one's self and feel that one is near to Christ"; they do not know the inner side of our holy Orthodoxy and what it contains. If they became acquainted with it, they would see with their own eyes that, in the Orthodox religion, the idea of one Christian community and brotherhood in Christ reigns supreme; that not only do those who come to worship here pray to Heaven for this union, but that our Church realizes the idea of united Christianity in fact, as in it, each one, fulfilling his purpose, lives the common life of the whole organism (Eph. 4: 3; 4: 16), which harmonizes the activity

of individual members, without restraining their freedom. The unity within our Church is inner, spiritual and organic, and the Orthodox represent their Church to themselves as one great community of those who live in Heaven, and those who are still on earth, but all believing in the same Orthodox way, a community which is a perfect incarnation of divine life, the true body of Christ. In allowing a believer to participate in its life, in helping him with its holy Sacraments and its prayers, our Church realizes the idea of the organic life of those who believe in Christ, through a more intimate union among them and by inspiring them with the Holy Spirit, the one true principle of life. Containing the very living spirit of God, our Church is ecumenical or catholic; being a universal union of heaven and earth, our Church is a community whose object is the eternal salvation of its members, united into a single whole by their faith in Christ and their love for Him and for each other (John 13: 35; 15: 12). Therefore we can say that in spirit our Orthodox Church represents the whole Catholic Church, which knows no national boundaries (Matt. 8: 11–12). Aiming at supreme spiritual interests, it rises above everything temporal and finite. Being universal in essence, its spirit embraces all humanity, uniting it into a single whole and bringing it into communion with the heavenly (Heb. 12: 21–23) as well as with the very objects of the Church's calling and existence on earth, that is, the salvation of the faithful, of all its members.

Salvation is attained by faith and good works together; in other words, it is attained by faith and love inseparably united, because "faith without works is dead." With us, the antithesis does not exist; we have no justification by faith in contradistinction to justification by works. And can it be said that there is a real foundation for this distinction? Of course, following the tradition which he has absorbed with his mother's milk, a Protestant will answer, Yes. But if he takes time to think it over dispassionately

and in all seriousness, he will of necessity be obliged to answer, No. When a Protestant speaks of justification by faith alone, does he not understand this justification only as the action of God working in man an instantaneous upheaval, absolutely disregarding the very process through which he has come to this upheaval? It is clear that in such a definition more room has been given to faith and less room to works—that is all. Therefore what is meant is the degree of the importance of faith in our justification. This is why we now find in Protestants the idea of faith as the way, and also as the means, of justification, as well as the way and the means taken together. The latter idea is propounded by two Anglican bishops, the Right Rev. Dr. Moule and the Right Rev. Dr. Hopkins.[9] It is evident that these hierarchs are no longer completely satisfied with the purely Protestant doctrine of faith as the only principle of justification. They consider faith practically, and deal with it, amongst other things, as a marriage bond between Christ and the faithful, giving rights and imposing certain duties on both. In this treatment Christianity goes very far from that teaching according to which it is enough to believe, in order to be saved: From it, it follows that one must fulfil the conditions of the "bond," that is, perform deeds worthy of this alliance of faith.

The same thing may be observed among Roman Catholics. When the Roman Church speaks of justification by works, it means the process at the beginning of which, as is acknowledged by the Council of Trent, is placed "faith," the foundation and root of justification. Consequently, in the eyes of a Roman Catholic, in the good deeds which express a Christian's love, justification is revealed in its completeness.

Therefore the difference lies in the views taken of the subject, in its definitions and opinions. To my Orthodox

[9] *Justification by Faith*, see *Fundamentals* Vol. II (Chicago, 1913), p. 119.

eye, the one-sidedness and incompleteness, and therefore the inconsistency, of these two definitions is clearly apparent, for I cannot help seeing that one confession undertakes to define the beginning of the phenomenon, and the other, its end; in the one, faith dominates, though love is also implied; and in the other, love dominates, though faith is also implied. As result, we have the difference of doctrine; though, in reality, these doctrines seem to contain merely an exaggeration of the basis of disagreement, and the neglect of the basis of agreement.

So we see a profoundly deplorable phenomenon. And still more deplorable is the fact that, though the possibility of agreement is obvious, we are prevented from realizing it because the doctrines of faith and works are founded on the doctrine of original sin, which is differently considered by Protestants and Roman Catholics, and the doctrines are put forward as the logical deduction from the dogmatic teaching concerning original sin. But who can fail to see the instability of the doctrines of faith and works thus derived,—and would it not be natural to conclude that a revision of the value of the doctrine of original sin is very necessary?

I have now approached the main point of our mutual religious disagreement in word and thought. And here I must stop, as the discussion of this subject would not only lead me away from our present theme, but would compel me to face the question of Christian teaching in general. This grand dogmatic dispute brings into relief the real contrast between two different world-concepts, which show their influence on the doctrines of the importance of faith and works respectively in the salvation of mankind.

We leave it to our readers to judge where the true view of faith, as the force which saves, is to be found; with the Protestants, with the Roman Catholics, or with us, the Orthodox. Is it to be found where an action, which does not belong to it, is ascribed to faith, or where something

that belongs to it is taken away from it, or where faith is acknowledged to be the necessary principle of salvation, but of necessity in inseparable union with love? I do not doubt that the importance of the subject will meet with the proper attitude on the part of the readers of THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY of many faiths, and I trust that their love of truth will help them to be strictly objective in their consideration of the arguments which I offer to them. It has been said for the sake of us all, that "love creates all." But, dealing with American readers, I permit myself to add to this a quotation from William Jennings Bryan:[10]

"Were a block of ice to be broken by a hammer into a thousand pieces, each piece would continue to be ice; but love in its action is like a ray of sunshine striking the ice; its action is slow but sure, and after a little while nothing will be left of the ice."

And so, if we have love for questions of such limitless importance, if, in trying to solve them, we are guided by the love of truth, why should we not believe that a day will come, when, under the action of this love, the ice which at present freezes within us Christians kindly feelings towards each other, will disappear; when the mutual relations of Christians of different confessions which are sometimes so cold as to make them enemies, will disappear, and the warmth of brotherliness will be spread over the whole Christian world; everything unnecessary, everything alien, which separates us, will also disappear; and only one feeling will remain with us, a feeling which, according to our faith in Christ the Saviour, is alone worthy of us, Christians, and whose name is Love.

[10]Quoted by Dr. Parkhurst, in his second lecture on Missions.

Education and Religion Among Working-Men

By W. Temple, M.A.
Headmaster of Repton,
President of the Workers' Educational Association.

It has often been suggested that Christian unity may best be sought by indirect methods; as we all work and think and pray in fuller devotion to the one Lord, we shall find ourselves united. Probably this is only one side of a question which needs to be approached from many sides; but it is one side, and its partial truth must not be forgotten.

There is another and yet more fundamental region where indirect methods may produce undesigned and momentous results, the region where faith and unbelief wage their unceasing war. This article is intended to give a single illustration; but to make that illustration intelligible some historical introduction is necessary. We are to trace a great change in mental outlook which is a by-product of the purely educational work of the Workers' Educational Association, and a brief sketch of that organization's work and history is needed for a proper understanding of it.

The Workers' Educational Assocation is just ten years old. It is impossible to give its membership, because it is a federation of other organizations, and many individuals belong to it through the affiliation of their Trade Union, Friendly Society, and the like. Over 2,000 labour and educational societies are affiliated. It is a wholly working-class body alike in origin and government.

It was founded because a group of working-men, realizing their own debt to University Extension and similar movements, were moved to stir up their fellow workers to a consciousness of what might be theirs and, having stimulated the demand for education, to bring it before the sources of supply.

The Labour origin of the movement has kept it free from the individualism which governed the educational reforms of Liberals in the middle of the nineteenth century. For Labour in England has never lost the spirit of fellowship and the sense of corporate life, which pervaded all classes in the Middle Ages, but was destroyed in the upper and middle classes later on by the spirit of commercialism. Labour has never, as a whole, regarded with anything but extreme disfavour the "educational ladder," up which the clever child may climb, leaving his own people and his father's house and winning instead material comfort and a sense of superiority. And in this, it may be well to point out in passing, Labour is entirely right. No doubt from the point of view of the community there is a good deal to be said for the "ladder"; if a child, born to poor parents, has the capacity to be a great artist, or a great statesman, it is good for the community that this capacity should receive both development and scope; and if individualism were pushed to its logical extreme by the abolition of the family and of inheritance, a certain justice would result; all would start level, all would have the same chances, and all would find their relatively appropriate positions. But human nature is not so simple a thing as this suggests: it is made up of elements for which the family, and perhaps even the right of bequest, is needed, if they are to develop in proper balance and harmony, and the only consistent form of individualism would be ruinous. If however there are to be different strata of society, all imposing upon their component individuals distinct tastes and conventions,—and this

state of affairs will last for some centuries yet, with whatever modifications—then it is clear that to lift an individual from one stratum to another is to expose him to a very serious temptation; he is tempted to look down on the people among whom he was born, and when a man has once broken up his native sympathies, he is not likely to grow new ones, and so remains a self-seeker all his days.

The whole temper of Labour has therefore made it a vital point in the policy of the W.E.A. that it does not seek to lift people out of their class by education, but to educate them in their class so that they may use their trained faculties for the benefit of their own fellows. But it has not made the outlook narrow. Provided that the fundamental principle is accepted, people of all types and of all social and educational antecedents are welcomed as co-operators in the one cause. And I do not hesitate to say that the spirit of real Brotherhood, which the New Testament teaches one to expect in the Church but which the Church on the whole keeps studiously away, is to be found more abundantly in the W.E.A. than anywhere else in my experience. This—itself a great spiritual and entirely Christian result—has a bearing on the more specifically religious effect of which this article is to speak.

The cream of the work done by the W.E.A. is to be found in its Tutorial Classes. These are classes established and supervised by "Joint-Committees" at the various Universities—a "Joint-Committee" being one where Labour and the University are each directly represented in equal numbers. Such a class is limited to 30 students; they pledge themselves to attend with the utmost possible regularity for a three years' course and to write essays equivalent to one a fortnight. The class meets once a week through 24 weeks during the winter months, and each meeting lasts two hours—one for the lecture, one for discussion. The latter is vital—partly because work-

ing-men are not going to be talked to unless they are allowed to talk back (which is one reason why they don't go to Church), and partly because it is then that various members of the class begin to get their own teeth into the subject and the best part of the education begins.

Every year since 1907 it has been the practice of the W.E.A. to bring to Oxford or Cambridge—whichever is holding an Extension Summer Meeting in that year—a party of working-folk for a week or, if possible, a fortnight. At the first of these gatherings there was some doubt how Sunday evening could be most profitably spent. The party was assembled in a Junior Common Room at New College; conversation was desultory and time was hanging heavily. Then Mr. Hudson Shaw, who had been preaching in the University Church at the service just concluded, said that he had seen in the congregation many of these working-people, whom he believed to be opposed to all that he had said; why should they not have things out together? A discussion started and almost every one who spoke exhibited the bitterest hostility to the whole religious view of the world; religion was denounced as the chief obstacle to progress and hardly a voice was raised in its defence.

That was only a few days after this party—the first of its kind—arrived in Oxford. The week that followed was eventful in many ways. Many of the men had come up rather suspicious and rather defiant in temper. The welcome and general treatment which they received put an end to that. On the Saturday, with Bishop Gore as chairman, the Conference assembled which asked for and obtained the appointment of the first Joint Committee; the Bishop preached on the Sunday morning and presided at a Christian Social Union meeting in the afternoon, leaving Oxford immediately afterwards. That evening we met again at New College. To secure more order in discussion a resolution was formally moved:—"that this house regrets the threatened antag-

onism between Labour and Christianity." After a long and earnest discussion the resolution was carried with three dissentients.

That party consisted of about 40 members. In successive years the numbers have increased to about 150; and from Mr. Shaw's suggestion in August, 1907, has grown a regular custom of spending the latter part of the Sunday evenings at these Summer Meetings by discussing in the presence of the preacher the sermon which he has just delivered in the University Church. Very many agnostics or even dogmatic materialists are ready and eager to come to the service when they know that a discussion is to follow.

In August, 1909, and again in August, 1913, I have been the homiletic victim. And it is my experience on those occasions which must be my sole excuse, however inadequate, for this article. In 1909 it was impossible to keep the discussion to any one point; it rambled over every conceivable subject. The whole problem of evil and the income of the Archbishop of Canterbury (which is at the most only a minor factor in that problem) were produced by consecutive speakers as hopeless obstacles to faith. But more important for our purpose is the fact that on that occasion almost every speaker was hostile, and some of them bitterly so. A few believers rose and gave their testimony, notably one Roman Catholic, a woman worker from a Northern town, who stood in silence for a moment, and then said, "I am so sorry for all you men."

It was not difficult to disentangle the various causes of this hostility; it will be clearest to give them as brief headings, passing from the trifling to the serious.

(A) The first are plainly irrelevant to the main issue:

(1) The large endowments of City livings where there is no population, and similar minute details.

(2) The conflict of Old Testament history with modern historical and natural science.

(3) The defectiveness of Old Testament morality.

(B) Then came a group resting on a real misunderstanding of Christian doctrine:

(4) The immorality and incredibility of a crude substitutional theory of the Atonement, which was for many of them the whole of Christian belief;

(5) The belief that science has established Determinism (of a very mechanical type) contrasted with the belief that Christianity postulates Free Will (of an impossibly Libertarian type). [In short they seemed to think that Christianity consists of Pelagianism and Substitutionism and nothing else.]

(C) Two, and only two, real perplexities:

(6) The average Church-goer is opposed to most good causes and his religious frame of mind enables him to keep a quiet conscience while he opposes.

(7) The evil in the world. . One man told a true story of terrible suffering and injustice, and then added: "If Jesus were God, that could not happen."

Such were the problems. And the Christian was expected to defend the historical accuracy of the whole Old Testament, to say nothing of various specific heresies, such as Pelagianism. If he wavered he was told that he was not a thorough Christian, though of course he might be all the more sensible on that account. But not only was Christianity thus tied up in fetters of the enemies' forging. Most of the disputants—and this is the most important point of all—believed themselves to have an alternative doctrine of life and of the Universe; some called it materialism and some agnosticism, but there it was, definite, coherent, dogmatic.

That was four years ago. The Tutorial Class Movement was young then, and very few of those present had submitted to its discipline even for a short time.

In August, 1913, nearly all who took part in the discussion had belonged to Tutorial Classes for two or three years, and some for longer. The change was astounding. The most obvious effect of the class-training was in the relevance of the points raised. There was no rambling. Every one discussed the points dealt with in the sermon. No others were introduced until the preacher himself deliberately opened up the whole problem of determinism, owing to his knowledge that many present were eager to talk about it. But the supreme difference was here: there was no trace of hostility or antagonism. There is no reason to believe that in the interval any one had become a convinced Christian. But the whole temper of mind was different. No one appeared to think that he had a satisfactory alternative. And the general tone of the speeches was—"I wish I could believe that; but my reason will not let me." There was on all hands a readiness to follow distinctions; no one raised the cry of "hedging" when it was pointed out that mechanical determinism and Jack-in-the-box libertarianism do not cover the ground. The Christian was allowed to state something like Catholic theology without being told that he was deserting his colours.

I think it is difficult to overestimate the importance of this experience. It suggests one bit of practical method, and one large principle of progress.

It suggests that a great deal could be done by preachers who would from time to time meet questioners and opponents in some room where opinions could be expressed with freedom. I am sure that the number of working-men in Church would enormously increase if the parson announced that on the first Sunday in every month he would go to the Parish Room directly after evening service, to discuss his own sermons with any one who liked to come. To begin with, he would soon be preaching much better sermons. And he would have the opportunity of finding out what the real diffi-

culties are. Usually they turn out to be due to a totally false conception of what Christianity is. A man is brought up under a rather ignorant exponent of theology; for a time he believes what he is told; then he discovers that what he thus believes is intrinsically absurd, and he supposes that he has weighed and found wanting the theology of the Christian Church, when he has only rejected something explicitly condemned as heretical—(like Pelagianism)—or something too foolish to have been dignified to that extent. I should add that I know many places where this method has been followed for many years with excellent result.

And the general principle of progress is this. The great change which I have described was worked by an educational discipline which had no theological or religious intention. The men and women who go to Tutorial Classes are not students of theology. The subjects they work at are Economics, Industrial History, General History, Natural Science, Political Science, English Literature and the like. But because they begin to criticize phrases and to think accurately they become impatient of wide generalizations, such as materialism or determinism. They learn the complexity of things. They are less self-confident.

But the matter goes deeper. These classes have no religious aim, in the accepted sense of the term; and if they had, they could not produce the particular religious effect which I have described. But inasmuch as education is the development of everything about a man which distinguishes him from an animal or a machine, inasmuch as it disciplines his intelligence, quickens his imagination and widens his sympathy—in so far it is breaking down barriers between the man and God.

As we labour for the coming of the Kingdom, we must expect to see it come largely as a by-product of processes not consciously concerned with it; or rather, we must be ready to work in the ways adapted to the circumstances

and claim all methods for Christ, even if they are employed at present mainly by agnostics or atheists, if only they tend to produce a fuller manhood. For he who liberates or develops any man's manhood, has been an agent in the creation of a child of God.

The Labour Movement in Religion

By F. Herbert Stead, M.A.,
Warden of Robert Browning Settlement, Walworth.

The Labour Movement in general is widely misunderstood. The mere mention of the phrase strikes a note of alarm in the breasts of the middle and upper classes. To them it means strikes, lock-outs, intense inconvenience, dislocation of industry, disturbance of public order and not infrequently riots, looting of shops, and widespread consternation. But these things are mere incidents in the progress of the Labour Movement. They are to it as collisions are to railway enterprise, wrecks to shipping, panics to commerce, wars to national development.

I.

The Labour Movement is a normal and necessary phase of social evolution. It is a part of the general humanization of the race. It is a factor in the integration of man, a moment in the coming of the Kingdom of God. It is an endeavour to raise what are called the lower and lowest strata of human society to the level of the possibility of a normal human life, to secure for those who have least of it their proper share in the true human heritage, whether that heritage be material, mental, or spiritual. It begins with the most rudimentary needs, though happily it does not end there. For example, the upper and middle classes have enough food, clothes, houseroom. The working classes have not. The investigations of Mr. Charles Booth in London and of Mr. Seebohm Rowntree in York, supplied the data for

an entirely legitimate inference that well nigh one-third of the population was living in a state of poverty: that is to say, one out of every three or four human beings, in the wealthiest nation in the eastern hemisphere, had not enough food to eat, or clothes to wear, or room to live in.

Nor is the share of the national wealth which falls to the working classes increasing with the general prosperity. A recent return of the British Board of Trade shows that the cost of living for the working classes has risen on the average during the last eight years (1905-12) by 10 per cent., in some places as much as 12 per cent., while the rise in wages has ranged from 1.9 to (rarely) 5.5 per cent. If humanity is to be normal, all its members must have enough food, clothing and shelter. This sufficiency of supply for the most rudimentary human needs, the Labour Movement seeks, however unsuccessfully, to secure.

Leisure is another indispensable requisite to human development. It is enjoyed in large measure by the middle and upper classes. The ancient custom of one day's rest in seven is for them being now extended by the popular institution of the "week-end" into three-days-a-week of recreation. For the working classes legislation has secured somewhat shorter hours of work, but it is sad to reflect on the large numbers who have not yet attained to the Mosaic requirement of one day's rest in seven, and whose day knows scarcely any interval between work and sleep. The Labour Movement is out to secure and extend the Sabbatic charter of a six-days' working week, and—in Wordsworth's phrase—to see

> "That every day should leave some part
> Free for a sabbath of the heart."

Similarly, effective social influence is part of the heritage of man. As expressed by power in the State it is very unevenly divided. It is possessed by the upper

grades of society to an extent altogether disproportionate to their numbers, their abilities, or their deserts. The vast reservoir of civic genius and energy banked up within the working classes has as yet been scarcely tapped, with corresponding detriment to the whole of society. The Labour Movement seeks to rectify this unfortunate anomaly.

So one might pass in review the many good things which enhance the value and enlarge the opportunity of human life, and show how seriously deficient in these respects is the lot of the workers; how necessary, therefore, the action of the Labour Movement in endeavouring to secure for the majority of men their human birthright. It is evident that if humanity as a whole is to be integrated, humanized, raised to normal level, those parts or grades of humanity which are at present below the normal level must be lifted up. The Labour Movement is there to lift them. And it is to the interest of the whole of humanity that this process be carried out. Not one grade of society, but all, will benefit by its completion. The whole of humanity therefore should view the Labour Movement with interest and with sympathy. The Christian cannot overlook it, for, rightly viewed, it is but one part of the great process by which the Lord Christ is animating, inspiring and unifying the whole of the body of humanity.

The Labour Movement has always been at work. It has been present in every effort of the worker to better his position. But as an outstanding modern development it dates from the middle or end of the eighteenth century. It begins with that transformation of the conditions of production consequent on the introduction of machinery and steam which is shortly and conveniently known as the Industrial Revolution. Some of its chief phases must be noticed, if one would understand aright the main theme of the present study. The writer may be pardoned for mostly limiting his survey to Eng-

lish life. The limitation will be the less open to objection when it is remembered that, as Karl Marx stated, England is the classic land of modern industrialism and capitalism.

The story of the Labour Movement is one of the most inspiring and fascinating records to be found in the whole history of human progress. Each phase has had its martyrs and apostles, and each has supplied a fresh illustration of the working of the Power which uses the weak things of the world to confound the mighty, and base things of the world, and things that are not, to bring to nought the things that are.

1. At the outset we come upon the *Emancipation of Labour*. To free the worker from the fetters of chattel slavery is the most elementary demand of the Labour Movement. First the white labourer was freed. It is now scarcely credible that until the end of the eighteenth century slavery existed in Scotland. The Russian serfs were only liberated in 1861. Black labour has barely found its freedom during the last hundred years. The slave trade was abolished in 1807; negro slavery in the British Empire in 1834; in the United States in 1865; and in Brazil some decades later. The real slavery which for brown and yellow men lurks under the guise of the indentured system has still more recently come to an end in Australia and in South Africa. So has been secured the first great essential of the Labour Movement. Slavery, which has existed right down from prehistoric ages, has been legally abolished in our time.

2. Next comes the *Organization of Labour* for economic ends in the Trade Unions, the Co-operative Societies and the Friendly Societies. Each chapter in this story is a romance of fraternity and heroism.

3. A further stage is the legal *Protection of Labour;* within the nat on by means of Factory Acts, among the nations by means of International Conferences and

agreements. The narrative of these reforms is far more thrilling than the wonder-tales of chivalry. It tells of whole populations of women and children delivered from the dungeons of oppression and shame and death, by the doughty deeds of knights of the Holy Ghost.

4. The *Enfranchisement of Labour* has been partially effected in most civilized lands. In Great Britain the Borough Franchise was given to the working classes in 1867, the County Franchise in 1884. Only in a few favoured lands have working women as well as working men attained equal voting power with every other elector.

5. The *Education of Labour* is a much more gradual process. The Scottish people had nearly three centuries start of southern Britons. In England and Wales public elementary education was begun in the Sunday Schools and extended by voluntary societies, Anglican and undenominational, but did not attain really national dimensions until 1871. Even after that date the process of getting all the children of the nation into school has been slow, but happily sure. Adult working men and women have been helped by Mechanics' Institutes, Working Men's Colleges, University Extension lectures, the Workers' Educational Association, and other agencies.

6. *Socialism* has made very slow advance in the ranks of British Labour. (1) Robert Owen and his movement did not, beyond resolutions at congresses, grip the working classes to any great extent. (2) The Christian Socialism of F. D. Maurice and Charles Kingsley was, and has remained, principally a middle class movement. So far was it from actual touch with the life of labour that in the dying number of the *Christian Socialist* pleasure is expressed that the movement has in the end brought some of its chief promoters into touch with some individual members of the working classes. (3) Fabian Socialism has also, despite its services in supplying

intellectual guidance to many working men, been largely confined to the *bourgeoisie*. (4) The Social Democracy has never taken root in British soil. It has been a more or less sickly exotic. It was satirized by Herr Bebel himself as "a Social Democracy *pour rire*." Only on the Continent, and pre-eminently in Germany, has the Social Democracy captured the great majority of the working classes.

7. This brings us to the *Labour Movement in Politics*. The first Labour Member of the British House of Commons is now the Father of the House. He and his later colleagues formed the Labour wing of the Liberal Party. Then came the Independent Labour Party, and subsequently the Labour Representation Committee. Out of their efforts has sprung the Labour Party, now thirty-nine strong, in the British House of Commons. Labour Members have effected much, with Liberal aid, in the New Zealand Legislature. The island-continent of Australia has been twice under a Labour Government. A Labour Party is making its way in the South African Union. European Parliaments have an ever-increasing number of Social Democratic members. In Holland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden the Social Democrats can at any moment decide the fate of the Ministry in power. In the Reichstag there are 110 Social Democrats, the largest body of members in any one German Party.

There are other developments which might be noticed. There is a Labour Movement in Journalism. There is a nascent Labour Movement in Art. Enough has been said, however, to show the importance which attaches to our central theme.

II.

The Labour Movement in Religion is a phrase by no means universally accepted. It strikes on many ears with an unfamiliar sound. It has often been challenged. A Social Democratic newspaper in Copenhagen recently

took exception to the phrase as mixing up politics and religion, two things which in the judgment of the journalist should be kept carefully apart and aloof from each other. This criticism clearly revealed the writer's own view of these two factors in modern life, but that view is certainly not shared by foremost representatives of British Labour. The present leader of the Labour Party in the House of Commons, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, said only last May:

"You cannot say that one thing deals with economics only, that Socialism is an economic proposition and religion is a spiritual proposition, and that the two can be kept apart. That is not the Divine plan of creation at all. The Divine plan of creation is that there are no watertight compartments in life. The man who talks about economics on the one hand and religion on the other as two separate modes of thought, two mental habits alien from each other, is just talking as much nonsense as the man who talks about a leaf being separate from the root and the root separate from the branch. When you see great spiritual movements going on alongside of great economic movements, movements in politics, in the Church, in our social life, it is One Thing, One Entity, One Unity which is developing, which is pushing out, which is expressing itself in a variety of ways, in a variety of phases, in a variety of forms, the great Divine Idea struggling with the imperfect to become its master and recreate it, and transform it into the perfect, which it is itself."[1]

But the Labour Movement in Religion is not to be classed along with the Labour Movement in politics, in art, or in journalism, as one among many parallel movements, or as one among many branches of the same tree. Rather the Labour Movement in Religion is the Labour Movement become self-conscious, aware of its meaning, cognizant of its whence and its whither, and of its place in the general process of life. All the other phases of which mention has been made are sectional and partial. This is central. This gives cohesion and compactness to the whole movement. This unifies it. This consciously relates it to the great Unseen Forces of Evolution which have been at work "from life's minute beginnings up at last to man," which have wrought

[1] *To the Workers of the World: An Appeal for Personal Religion, by Eight Labour Members.* Page 83.

their way through pre-historic, barbaric, semi-civilized mankind up to the present stage of human culture, and which are now throbbing and pulsing and thrusting life onward throughout the whole range of the Labour Movement. In one word, it is the soul of the Labour Movement.

1. In England the soul began to be even as the body was coming into being. Preceding by a few years the Industrial Revolution, came that great wave of religious life which in this and in all English-speaking lands has done so much at once to democratize religion and to Christianize democracy. Methodism reached the new industrial masses with a power which none of the older religious bodies could rival. The tears which streaked with white the coal-black faces of the Cornish miners, under the moving appeals of Whitefield, are a picturesque reminder of the new religious life that swept among the toiling millions. It supplied, notably through its lay preachers, leadership and inspiration to the infant Trade Unions.

2. Then, as the religious societies founded by John Wesley tended to grow conservative and respectable, there broke out a new religious force in the form of Primitive Methodism. Out of all proportion to its numbers, Primitive Methodism has influenced and led the English Labour Movement. It has been of all the denominations the most distinctive organ of the Labour Movement in Religion. What the Independents were to the middle class movement in religion and politics which dominated the Puritan period, that the Primitive Methodists became to the corresponding working class movement in the 19th century. Many, if not most, of the leaders of organized labour, especially among the miners, have been cradled and trained in the Primitive chapel.

3. The offshoot of Methodism known as the Salvation Army has done splendid service in evangelizing and reclaiming the lowest grades of labour. But its

autocratic constitution can scarcely be held to embody the religious ideals of enfranchised Labour.

4. A much fuller expression of the spirit of the Labour Movement in Religion appears in the Adult Schools, which were initiated by a Methodist, but which have been chiefly, but by no means entirely, developed under the fostering influence of the Society of Friends. In these Schools wellnigh a quarter of a million men and women meet every Sunday morning to read the Bible and to study in its light popular phases of science and history, as well as the ever recurrent claim of present-day social duty. The leaders and organizers are mostly drawn from the middle classes. But the rank and file, the plastic and propelling force of the movement, as well as its atmosphere of frank fellowship, are contributed almost entirely by the working classes.

5. From the Adult Schools in turn sprang the Pleasant Sunday Afternoon, now known as the Brotherhood Movement. In these Brotherhoods, which meet on Sunday afternoon to sing virile songs, to hear solos, and to be inspired by rousing speakers who treat, in vigorous newspaper English, of some phase or other of duty and religion, there are gathered considerably over half a million men. A not unimportant feature of these meetings is the system of half-yearly prizes. As a result there are being built up in the homes of the British working classes little libraries of instruction in social and civic duties. The platform is catholic in the best sense of the term. The speakers are mostly laymen, occasionally women; Town Councillors, Members of Parliament, labour leaders, social workers, men who have proved themselves experts in the discharge of duty on some side or other of every-day life. The Brotherhood may be said to be the organ of the lay conscience of the community. Prayer and Bible reading are invariable elements in the programme of the afternoon. At a national gathering of these Brotherhoods in the Crystal Palace a

few months ago, the then Lord Mayor of London described them as meetings for the study of social science and the promotion of Christian brotherhood. The movement is spreading to the Colonies. It is striking its first roots on the Continent. I have had the pleasure of addressing the first Danish Brotherhood, which, significantly enough, assembled at the headquarters of the Social Democracy in Copenhagen. Strange to say, the Brotherhood seems to appeal to the French working man, who of all others is supposed to be the least open to religious impression. Deputations of English Brotherhoods have been very warmly welcomed by the French proletariat, and on one occasion, after an address by Mr. Keir Hardie, the enthusiastic Frenchmen wound up with ringing cheers for the Sermon on the Mount!

The Adult School and the Brotherhood together supply a very real education in the method of applying Christian ethics to the problem of modern life. Though both rightly disavow all Party or class bias, they are a—very largely spontaneous—expression of the religious life of the working classes. They are to the newly enfranchised democracy veritable schools of Christian citizenship. From both have sprung Labour leaders.

6. The Labour Church, name and thing, is a small phenomenon illustrative of a similar, though less positive, tendency.

7. The United States have supplied a singular method of recognizing the affinities between Trade Union and Church. Thanks to the influence of Mr. Stelzle, the American Presbyterian Church formed a Church and Labour Department, which has made this interesting arrangement: in cities where there is a Trades Council and a Presbytery, the members of the Presbytery are summoned to meetings of the Trades Council, and the members of the Trades Council are summoned to meetings of the Presbytery. The persons so invited are at liberty to speak and advise, but not to vote. In this

way Church and Labour are kept in intelligent and friendly communication.

III.

The relation thus signalized is true to the history of English-speaking Labour. In each of the phases of the Labour Movement that have been previously mentioned, the influence of the Christian religion has been not merely most potent, but also most explicit. The Emancipation of Labour was begun and completed by men who derived the inspiration for their great crusade on behalf of human freedom from the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Clarkson and Wilberforce and the Churches effected the change. The Organization of Labour was similarly inspired. The initiatory rite of the early Trade Unions was often a religious ceremony. Many of the meetings of Trade Unions were opened with singing and prayer. The pioneers of Trade Unionism among the agricultural labourers were the Dorsetshire Lovelaces, who were most unjustly sentenced to penal servitude for this heinous offence against the dominant squirearchy. The local clergy, alas! had had no small share in compassing their doom. Their leader, George Lovelace, was a Wesleyan local preacher, and when the monstrous sentence of seven years' transportation was passed, Lovelace tells us he got a pencil and a scrap of paper and wrote the following lines, which deserve to be quoted, as the quintessence of the spirit of the English Labour Movement:—

"God is our guide! from field, from wave,
From plough, from anvil and from loom:
We come, our country's rights to save
And speak a tyrant faction's doom:
We raise the watchword Liberty:
We will, we will, we will be free!

"God is our guide! no swords we draw;
We kindle not war's battle fires.
By reason, union, justice, law,
We claim the birthright of our sires:
We raise the watchword, Liberty!
We will, we will, we will be free!"

Scottish Trade Unions used to have an evangelistic branch. I remember my own father was regularly invited to preach a sermon at the annual dinner of the local Union of Shipwrights. Most of the Trade Union leaders and Labour Members of Parliament have been drawn from the Primitive, Wesleyan and Baptist Churches. The dockers' strike in 1889 owed a very great deal to the influence of Cardinal Manning, who made the worst-paid riverside labourer feel that Catholic sympathy was with him in his struggles. The Factory Acts are for ever associated with the profound religious faith of Lord Shaftesbury. The sturdy Quaker piety of John Bright led the movement for the extension of franchise. Popular education began, as we have seen, in the Sunday School. It still remains true to its origin. A very striking illustration of the attitude of British Labour to religion has been recently afforded on the vexed question of Religious Education. For many years the organized labour of England had pronounced for what it described as "secular education." Secular education on the lips of British Trade Unionists and Labour Members was something very different from what is meant by the phrase in Australia or on the Continent of Europe. It did not mean the exclusion from the schools of the Bible, nor even of explanations of the Bible. It was directed against sectarian and dogmatic teaching. But even so understood, secular education was found to be inacceptable to British Labour. The Labour Party was forced officially to drop that plank from their platform, and the Trade Union Congress by a substantial majority decided to shelve its annual resolution in favour of the "secular" solution. Doubtless the reasons for both decisions were political and politic. But none the less they are significant of the temper of organized labour in England.

IV.

The Labour Movement in Religion has found its latest, clearest and most far-sounding expression in and through an institution which it is necessary now to describe. In 1895 there was founded in Walworth, the central division of the County of London, amid a dense population composed almost entirely of working people, the ROBERT BROWNING SETTLEMENT. The first residents went into the work under an overpowering sense of Mandate, the urgency and persistency of which they could not at the time understand but felt they must obey. The Settlement is centred in the old Congregational Chapel where the poet Robert Browning was baptized in 1812 and where his parents used to worship during his boyhood and youth, now therefore called Browning Hall. At its first meeting the Settlement declared that it stood for the Labour Movement in Religion. From the opening address then delivered I may be pardoned quoting a passage which strikes the keynote of what in the last four years has been recognized by the world as the distinctive message of Browning Hall:—

"The Labour movement in general is, as I said, the effort of Labour to gain more of the good things of life. The Labour movement in religion is the effort to gain more of the best thing in life.

"Men are finding out the truth about the Christian religion. They are going back past priest and Church—back to Jesus Himself. They see Him more nearly as He was than any age before them has seen Him. They find Him to be the Nazarene carpenter, the homeless wanderer, the despised agitator, the friend and champion of the poor and exploited and disinherited, the supreme social reformer. His Gospel was first and foremost good tidings to the poor. The social ideal He announced was a kingdom of God which belonged to the poor. On founding His Church He promised blessings to the poor, to the hungry, to them that wept. His most gracious invitation was: 'Come unto Me, all ye that labour.' Men are learning anew the Gospel of the Kingdom and are feeling as never before its meaning. They are finding that His Kingdom means the abolition of want, the diffusion of universal plenty, honesty in production, justice in distribution, fulness of physical as well as spiritual life. They are learning to lay stress where He laid it, on the Kingdom as the intertwined Fatherhood of God and Brotherhood of Man and Lordship of the Christ. They are learning that the Kingdom of

God is no spiritual fire-escape, but is the sum of all the good things of life with the best uppermost.

"The Real Jesus and the Real Gospel are being discovered to-day. And the workers who are ever face to face with the sternest realities are rising with great joy to greet the real Jesus and to receive the real Gospel. He is *their* Jesus. His Gospel is good news for *them*. He has been kept from them too long by the selfishness of priest and plutocrat. Now they are finding Him as He was and is.

"They are finding in Him their Leader; the pioneer of the true Social Revolution, the guide of their life, the goal of their collective effort; the Saviour of their souls and the Reconstructor of Society. From Him they receive the forgiveness of sins; the law of conduct; the power to obey; the heart to trust; the spirit to forgive; the motive to strive and suffer for the good of all; the hope of conquest over death.

"Labour can read now. Labour can vote. Labour can think and write and rule. And once Labour has seen the real Jesus and drunk in His social ideal of the kingdom of God, then we shall behold the most glorious revolution this land has ever witnessed. Then we shall see clearly that the Labour movement in religion is but the answer of the workers to the command of the Christ."

Round the Settlement inspired by these principles slowly gathered a number of earnest working men in Adult School and in Brotherhood, and a group of speakers who were leaders in the Labour world. Besides its manifold and constant service of its impoverished neighbours, the Settlement was led in the most unexpected ways to initiate movements of national and international significance. It encouraged its neighbours to plant gardens, with such success as to have led to similar developments elsewhere. Thus it has been used to sow the central districts of several cities with flower and shrub and tree. The Browning Hall Conference on Housing and Locomotion pointed out the first steps of relief to the overcrowded populations of central London. It led the way to the appointment of the Royal Commission on London Traffic, and of the Traffic Branch of the Board of Trade. First in recent times it raised the demand for a London Traffic Board. Beginning by finding work for its neighbours out of work, the Settlement was led on until it was privileged to suggest to Her Majesty Queen Alexandra the initiation of the Queen's Fund for the Un-

employed, which first provided on a national scale the means of work for the workless. Browning Hall, was, by a mysterious convergence of Influence and event, made the cradle and headquarters of the National Committee of Organized Labour, whose ten years' agitation secured the passing of the Old Age Pensions Act of 1908, a fact which has been generously recognized by leaders of all Parties in the State. The endeavour to give its neighbours the stimulus and delight of foreign travel has led, in ways undreamed of, to the Settlement organizing peace pilgrimages of Labour Members of Parliament to the principal cities of Germany, at moments of acute tension between the two great countries; and its international vocation has been warmly welcomed by leading authorities, both at home and abroad.[2]

V.

In each of these movements, which were initiated and surrounded with prayer, the Settlement came into ever closer touch with the leaders of British Labour. It got to know the inner life which prompted their public activity. At last the time came for focusing their witness to the authority of the Christ. The event itself was precipitated by the first General Election in 1910. Then as never before, the great "condition-of-the-people-question" of which Carlyle had prophesied more than sixty years ago, took its place right in the centre of the political arena. It was everywhere. It attested the presence not merely of a great popular demand, but of a great popular hope. As was said at the time:

"All men's hearts are in expectation, brooding more or less consciously over the great promises of the social evangel, 'Blessed are ye poor, for yours is the Kingdom of God! Blessed are ye that hunger now, for ye shall be filled! Blessed are ye that weep now, for ye shall laugh!' Slowly smouldering in the consciousness of the multitudes, ready to burst into flame, is the conviction, 'The Kingdom of God is at hand!'"

[2]For fuller record, see *Eighteen Years in the Central City Swarm.* (Hammond.)

This social expectancy seemed to demand as its immediate corollary the old personal demand, "Repent ye, and believe. Come ye after Me."

1. So the Settlement resolved to issue an appeal for personal religion to the workers of South London. The 1st of May, as is well known, has been increasingly celebrated by the working classes of Europe as Labour Day. The Settlement decided to begin May 1910 not with a Labour Day, but with a Labour Week—an octave of evangelistic meetings for working people. And to voice this appeal the Settlement chose its comrades in the foremost ranks of the Labour world, the men who had themselves been chosen by the working classes of England to represent them in Parliament and in other bodies, and who had gathered round the Settlement in its struggles on behalf of the unemployed and the aged, and for peace abroad. Enveloped in an atmosphere of prayerful expectancy, the First Labour Week began.

The speakers included the foremost men in the British Labour Movement: Will Steadman, Secretary to the Trade Union Congress; Frederick Rogers, Secretary to the Old Age Pensions Committee; Arthur Peters, National Agent of the Labour Party; George Lansbury and Will Crooks, the two men who, Mr. Charles Booth attests, saved the East End from revolutionary horrors; Walter Hudson, leader of the railwaymen and M. P. for Newcastle; Philip Snowden, M. P. for Blackburn; John-Hodge, M. P. for Gorton; Arthur Henderson, M. P., Ex Chairman of the Labour Party; and Mr. Keir Hardie, M. P., founder of the Party. Every one of these speakers, in tones of burning earnestness and transparent sincerity, drove home the central message of personal devotion to Jesus Christ. In each man spoke a career of eminent service to the working classes, an individuality clear-cut and rugged, and a conviction of molten intensity. Mr. Arthur Henderson prefaced his addresses with words of

devout and reverent prayer. All the speeches were full of moving and convincing power.

2. The tremendous impression and the converting power of the first Labour Week fixed it as an annual festival in the Labour world. Labour Week, 1911, had as its speakers no fewer than eleven Labour Members of Parliament. Besides voices from the Home Country came speakers from beyond the sea. Mr. David Bowman, leader of the Labour Opposition in the Queensland Parliament, declared that the Labour Movement aimed at establishing the brotherhood of man and the Fatherhood of God. The Hon. J. S. T. McGowen, Labour Premier of New South Wales, spoke on the ideals of regnant labour, and declared that the Australian Labour Movement placed its reliance on God's holy word, and strove to realize the principles inculcated there. It was felt at the time that while both Weeks laid heavy stress on personal duty and personal responsibility, individual confession was the note of the first Week, collective confession the note of the second. As was said at the time:

"Here is a body of legislators, declaring that their one aim in the legislature is to carry out the Will of the Christ: to create in Parliament a religious atmosphere: to translate as far as possible the principles of Jesus into the laws of the realm: to give statutory effect to His concern for the crippled, the sick, the widow, the fatherless, and the poor in general: to take hindrances out of the way of men practising love of God and love to Man: to make real to men the Divine Fatherhood and the human Brotherhood."

3. At the third Labour Week, 1912, seven Labour Members of Parliament spoke. A Danish visitor found, as the two dominant notes of this Week, the stress laid on the Kingdom of God on earth, and the duty of personally following the Christ.

4. The fourth Labour Week was if anything more saturated with the spirit of prayer, the note of power, and the atmosphere of joy than any of its predecessors. There were not wanting glances over the wide fields of

philosophy and history, but most of the speeches concentrated on the actual teachings of Jesus.

But of all, perhaps the greatest public attention was paid to the speeches of the leader and of the founder of the Labour Party. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, M. P., maintained that the Labour Movement and religion were mutually necessary, the movement demanding the inspiration of faith and the Church requiring the application found in the movement. From his political experience he bore witness that the men whom we cannot trust are the men who are living materialist lives.

"The men and the women who are the sturdy warriors, great soldiers, and magnificently reliable commissioned officers in our army, are the men who go to church and chapel, the men who have got faith. The force behind our movement is not material; it is spiritual."

Mr. Keir Hardie, M. P., in enforcing the need of a new crusade, declared in memorable words:

"My friends and comrades, I often feel very sick at heart with politics and all that pertains thereto. If I were a thirty years younger man, with the experience I have gained during the past thirty-five years, I would methinks abandon house and home and wife and child if need be, to go forth amongst the people to proclaim afresh and anew the full message of the Gospel of Jesus of Nazareth. The need of the hour is for a fresh crusade. . . . In the working class movement of today, especially in the Socialist section of it, there is to be found more of the true spirit and teaching of Jesus than in most of the Churches of the land. This Labour Week, by bringing Labour men and Christian men and women together may easily prove the nucleus out of which the real reformation of Christianity may come. With Christianity as a ruling force, there would be neither armies nor navies, neither poverty nor riches, neither slums nor palaces, there would be no competitive system of production for profit whereby the rich are able to grind the poor; there should be Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, with Love for the binding law."

A new feature in the platform of Labour Week was the presence of Bishop Welldon, the Dean of Manchester, who as "a Christian Democrat" declared that what the Church wants is to get back to the original teaching and example of Jesus Christ. "There is your Leader! Let us follow Him." Father Hopkins, an Anglican monk

representing the National Seamen's and Firemen's Union, proclaimed Jesus the Prince of Labour Leaders.[4]

5. Along with these speeches went a great avowal:

"The Browning Settlement consists of members of several denominations, who share in the work without any prejudice to their particular denominational loyalty. But in order to express their common religious aim, and to enjoy religious friendship, there was formed in 1897 in connection with the Settlement the *Fellowship of Followers*, which includes members of almost all denominations and of none. This Fellowship has no pretension to being a Church, still less a new sect. Its members are enrolled on signing the declaration—

"Jesus said:—'If any man would come after Me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow Me.'

"Meaning so to follow Him, I wish to be enrolled in the Fellowship of Followers."

In the four Labour Weeks, 1910 to 1913, this declaration was signed by no fewer than twenty Labour Members. These and the speakers together make up by far the vast preponderance of personal influence and official status in the British Labour Party. They include all who have occupied the position of leader of the Labour Party, the Vice-Chairman, the Secretaries, and the most propulsive personalities. The example thus set was widely followed. At the first Labour Week alone no fewer than 160 attached their names to this declaration of purpose.

VI.

The witness of Labour Week produced a profound impression, not merely in the immediate neighbourhood but in far wider circles. The summary report of the first Labour Week contained in *Fellowship* was widely welcomed. At the request among others of the Archbishop of York who said he had "rarely been impressed with greater hopefulness for the future of religion among our working people than he had been by reading the summary of these speeches," the report of the proceedings was published. The book was brought out under the

[4]See *Workers of the World* (Hammond.)

title of *Labour and Religion, by Ten Labour Members* (Hammond). This edition widened the welcome given to the Week.

1. In religious circles the book came with a shock of a glad surprise. The present Bishop of Winchester noted in the speeches "not only respect for the example and teaching of Christ, but also a genuine grasp of what is, whether they would call it so or no, doctrinal truth." To a later Week he wrote that while he had a strong faith in the Church's duty to witness and teach, he recognized at least equally strongly her duty to learn. "God's great truth in Christ finds its own, and again makes its own, in all that surrounds it." To the fourth Week he wrote that so far as men of Labour and men of Christ are, or think themselves, opposed, it is all fault and mistake, for which Christians, he believed, were most to blame. "The Name of Christ is the one Name of real inspiration for all true ideals of labour, the Name of keenest rebuke for all which denies labour its dignity, reward or freedom." Canon Scott Holland pronounced the first "a week of wonder. The appeal was to Jesus Christ Himself, behind and in spite of those who profess His faith. And we could not but bow our heads to the rebuke and pray that we may be forgotten if only He may be remembered." The report of the second Labour Week was published under the title of *Christ and Labour* (Hammond), and formed the theme of the sermon which the Bishop of London preached before the Church Congress in Stoke Parish Church in October, 1912. He quoted at length from the speeches of Labour leaders, and declared with thankfulness: "In this country the Labour Movement is avowedly and definitely religious"; and he based on these utterances the demand that "the whole tone, the whole texture, of the Church must be altered." The Archbishop of Canterbury, in his Second Visitation of his diocese during January and February, 1912, dwelt on the sig-

nificance of the first Labour Week, and quoted the utterances of Mr. Hardie and Mr. Lansbury, adding, "The teaching may not be profound, or the doctrinal basis very clear, but to call it anything less than definitely Christian is impossible." He also recorded their membership in the Fellowship of Followers. To the fourth Labour Week His Grace also wrote that he was convinced of the real value of the annual effort, adding, "May every highest blessing attend a gathering so distinctive of what is possible in England, and may soon be possible in other lands."

2. The United Free Church of Scotland showed from the first deep interest in the movement. Its *Missionary Record* announced that now organized labour had declared itself a religious movement, Christian alike in inspiration and in aim. It organized in November, 1911, a Labour Week in Glasgow avowedly on the lines adopted at Browning Hall, when five Labour Members spoke, and report came that the general effect was to drive home to Labour men and Churchmen alike that the Will of Christ must be made supreme in every department of life.

3. The Calvinistic Methodist Forward Movement in Cardiff arranged a Labour Week for Holy Week, 1912, at a time of gravest industrial disturbance. A letter from Dr. R. F. Horton was read, in which he declared that the first question of the modern world was how to bring religion and labour together. The chief speaker was Mr. Keir Hardie, who on Good Friday sketched afresh the life of Christ and declared "We are out to make the Kingdom of God upon earth a reality."

4. A Labour Week was also arranged at the Oakley Place Centre of the South London Wesleyan Mission, at which some three Labour M. P.'s spoke, Mr. Keir Hardie again being the chief speaker. It was described as a real revival of religion.

It will be noted that the four Labour Weeks were held

in a period marked by seismic convulsions in the industrial world. It was the time of the Seamen's Strike, the great Railway Strike, and the still greater Coal Strike, the very greatest industrial conflict on record. And the men who rode the whirlwind and directed the storm of the great crises had in successive Labour Weeks avowed themselves to the world as followers of Jesus Christ and evangelists of His Grace. To this public confession of theirs can be traced without doubt much of the remarkable absence of bitterness which attended these disputes. Men in all stations of life recognized in the leaders of insurgent labour no longer godless anarchists, but comrades in Christ.

VII.

News of Labour Week soon aroused responsive echoes from the continent of Europe. A German friend in close touch with the Labour Movement in England and Germany wrote of *Labour and Religion:* "It is the most wonderful book—from a German point of view—which has ever made its appearance in the Labour Movement. A translation would simply work marvels." His resolve to translate the book into German has not yet been carried out. But a pastor from Darmstadt present at the first Labour Week reported in *Die Christliche Welt:* "Anyone attending the meetings came to feel as if a piece of the old primitive Christian enthusiasm had been again awakened." This notice caught the eye of Dr. Valdemar Ammundsen, Professor of Church History in the University of Copenhagen, and led him to procure a published report of the proceedings. He at once asked and obtained permission to translate it into Danish.

Accordingly in August 1911 appeared, with a preface by the Professor, a translation bearing the title in Danish, *English Labour Leaders on Christianity.* The first and second thousand were speedily exhausted, and a third

edition is now published. This little book has been widely read amongst the working classes of Norway as well as Denmark, and has helped, the Social Democrats themselves being witness, to effect a remarkable change in the attitude of Norwegian working men to the Christian faith. The report of the second Labour Week, *Christ and Labour*, has also been translated into Danish by a young Social Democrat, commending the practical Christianity of English Labour leaders to his Danish colleagues, since the Labour Movement could not accomplish its historical mission without the help of Christianity. Professor Ammundsen's translation was in its turn translated bodily, preface and all, into Finnish.

The interest aroused in Scandinavian circles led to my being invited to address the Lillehammer Conference of Christian Student Unions in Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland. The mere narrative of the third Labour Week created a manifestly deep impression. A nobleman from Finland said that it had come to him with something like the shock of a revelation that from the ranks of Labour itself were to spring the men destined to save the working classes of Europe from infidelity and atheism. He urged that the message of Labour Week should be repeated in every capital of Europe. A few months later a very remarkable event occurred in the annals of European Social Democracy. An invitation to English Labour Members to conduct a Labour Week tour through Norway, Denmark and Sweden was initiated by the Social Democratic members of the Norwegian Parliament, and was the subject of consultation for several months between them and their colleagues in the Danish and Swedish Parliaments. For purely technical Party reasons, the invitation from the three kingdoms was not sent.

A resident at the Browning Settlement, on returning home to Finland, arranged an invitation in pursuance of which I undertook a Scandinavian tour last autumn. I spent two days in Copenhagen, and had the pleasure

of addressing the first Danish Brotherhood, at the chief hall of the Danish Social Democracy, on "Jesus and Poverty." The Social Democratic organ in the press was naturally critical, but grew less and less unfriendly. In Norway I had the pleasure of meeting the leaders of the Social Democracy, and was deeply impressed with their ardent desire to introduce Labour Week into Scandinavia. In Stockholm, too, I found at the headquarters of the Social Democracy a readiness to welcome the English Labour Members on any quest. In Finland the mere statement of the Gospel as set forth in the successive Labour Weeks seemed to create a very deep impression. It was received by four audiences, numbering from one to two thousand, in three successive days, in Helsingfors. The witness of British Labour leaders to Christ wakened great enthusiasm in a thousand Finnish working men assembled at Tammerfors. The attitude of the Social Democratic Press became distinctly friendly, and the work so begun is being continued by Professors of the University and others. High hopes are entertained of the Church recognizing her duty to Labour, and of Labour recognizing in Christ its true leader. The working classes of Scandinavia seem ripe and expectant for the proclamation by British Labour Evangelists of the Nazarene Carpenter's message.

VIII.

Things seem to be moving in the same direction in Germany. Mr. Keir Hardie himself has declared,

"On the Continent of Europe, where the Socialist movement is most developed, it is true that for a time Socialism and atheism were practically synonymous. Remembering how the Church posed as the defender of privilege and oppression, this was scarcely to be wondered at. But of late years a most remarkable, and to me a most gratifying, change has been coming over the movement. Great leaders like Jean Jaures in France and Vandervelde in Belgium and others less known in Germany have been discovering that behind nature there is a Power unseen but felt, that beyond death there must be a Something, else were life on earth a mere wastage. And that idea is permeating the entire movement."

One hears that Social Democratic journalists have been gravely discussing whether the Social Democracy stands in need of religion. Some have stoutly affirmed that it already possesses a religion in its enthusiasm for human brotherhood and its faith in human progress. Other Social Democrats again have argued that these are not enough, their movement requires that "unconditioned obligation" which religion alone can supply. Still more significant is the fact that a Social Democrat, Maurenbrecher, has published from the office of *Vorwärts*, the official organ of the Social Democracy, a series of pamphlets purporting to tell the story of Bible history as he understands it. His delineation of the prophets, and his Life of Jesus, may be very inadequate and unconvincing to the ordinary believer. But they do bring the teachings of Christ and His predecessors, though in very restricted form, before the eyes of the Social Democratic working men. In Switzerland Pfarrer Kutter, "the prophet of Zurich," has long maintained that the Social Democracy is the organ of the living God, Who is to him the everlasting "Forward!" of human history. The so-called godless Social Democracy has, he says, changed places with the so-called Church of God, which is the agent and organ of modern Mammonism. He asserts with passionate earnestness of the Social Democrats that "They Must" arrive at the ultimate source of inspiration of all their highest principles in Jesus Christ. His fellow townsman, Professor Ragaz, has advocated similar views in his *Neue Wege*, and watches with lively sympathy the progress of the English Labour Movement in Religion. During this very winter he and other Social Democratic pastors are speaking on Sunday evenings at the Social Democratic headquarters in Zurich on Religious Socialism developed from the parables of Jesus. From Halle-an-der-Saale have come pressing invitations for a Labour Week tour in Germany. Even to Spain the message of Labour Week seems destined to find its way. Pastor Fliedner, grandson of the founder

of the Deaconesses' Home at Kaiserswerth, himself now engaged in evangelical work in Spain, is translating *Labour and Religion* into Spanish. He declares that it is just the thing needed to disarm the hostility of the Spanish Social Democracy towards the Christian religion, which they have hitherto identified with a reactionary Church. He also presses for a Labour Week tour by English Labour Members in Spain.

The passing of Bebel, with his famous watchword, "In economics, Socialism; in politics, Republicanism; in religion, Atheism," seems to mark the advent of a new spirit in the Social Democracy of Central Europe. Already the old intransigence has been repudiated by the Party, which now co-operates not merely with other Parties in the Reichstag, but actually with the Government itself. Similar tactics are being followed in Scandinavian kingdoms, though as yet declined by the tenacious Dutch.

So one may hope that other water tight compartments are breaking down, and that the great Social Democracy will find its soul. Its essentially Christian principle of human brotherhood among all nations, its unflinching witness to the cause of peace, its faith in the triumph of unselfishness over egoism, its undying war with Mammon, may be expected to reveal their organic unity with other and more transcendent elements of the Christian religion. Just as the prophet Isaiah hailed Cyrus, the Persian fire-worshipper, as the Anointed of God, called to liberate the people of God, so may we, with Kutter, hail the Social Democracy of Europe, despite all its pagan pollutions, as anointed of God for the liberation of His peoples from the Babylonian yoke of Mammon and Moloch. And we may cherish the hope that Cyrus will yet acknowledge Jahveh,—that the Social Democracy will consciously and reverently accept its vocation as organ of the Living God. Then it may be expected to take its proper place in the great Labour Movement now marching round the world. Consciously

affiliated with the Driving Force of the universe, it will in all lands be infinitely more powerful for good. The spiritual evolution of the Social Democracy will be to the modern world what the conversion of Constantine was to the Roman world. It will mark a new era of tremendous significance in the history of the human race.

IX.

This survey of developments in the modern Labour world, however imperfect and hurried it may be, ought to suggest to the devout soul more than merely human causality. The Browning Settlement, which has been so strangely called to be a centre for the diffusion of the Labour Movement in Religion through so many lands, can only watch with wonder the unfolding of the Directing Purpose. It has found itself, with its record of social reform, carrying out the plans of a Divine strategy far vaster than it has yet realized. It recognizes in the unrest that trembles through the Labour world as with the shuddering of coming earthquake, in the increasing repudiation of the materialism of the last century, in the aspirations and enthusiasms of the federated workers everywhere, as well as in the more explicitly religious outreachings which have been here recorded, the presence of a Higher Power, the movement of the Divine Spirit.

Earnest watchers scanning the social horizon feel their breasts stir with a great hope. The night of feudalism and mammonism is passing. The new day is at hand. And the astonished eyes of the dim multitudes are beginning to discern in One Who, unseen and often unknown, has led them through the long darkness, the Divine Figure of the Carpenter of Nazareth. Now they begin to know that it was He who emancipated, organized, protected, enfranchised, educated them and placed in their hands the sceptre of His power. The Labour Movement in Religion is none other than the response of the toiling masses of mankind to the call of the Christ.

John Woolman

By T. Edmund Harvey, M. P.

As the dust of time settles more and more thickly over the record of men great in their day, and names once famous fade into forgetfulness, there are here and there found, by a strange contrast, certain humble and obscure figures who made little noise in the great world about them, whose beauty and attractiveness the passing years bring out more and more clearly, until their personalities are felt as radiant influences, illuminating the life not only of their own, but of succeeding ages.

Few who have read the Journal of John Woolman, the humble hearted New Jersey tailor, will hesitate to acknowledge the extraordinary spiritual charm which penetrates the work, and those who are familiar also with his other writings will feel that he has a message for men of another age, who have perhaps even greater need of it than had his contemporaries.

He had no advantage of learning or eloquence by which to win attention, but through the pure simplicity of his words there shines a spirit singularly tender, revealing itself continually in Christ-like thought and action. Little more than a column is devoted in the *Dictionary of National Biography* to the slender details of his life and writings; he belongs to those uncanonized saints to whose memory no Bollandists devote their pious labours, and he would have been the last to wish for such a record of research to be made in his honour. But we may still try to recall what he did in order to understand what he wrote, and to feel something of what he was and is.

JOHN WOOLMAN

John Woolman was born in 1720 at Northampton in West New Jersey, the fourth child and eldest son in a family of thirteen. His parents were Quaker planters in the more recently settled Western side of the colony, and after his village school days were over he helped them on their farm, studying as best he could in his leisure in the evenings. His library was necessarily limited: the Scriptures, a number of seventeenth century Quaker writings and Fox's *Book of Martyrs* forming doubtless the chief part of it, while possibly at a later date he made the acquaintance of à Kempis and through Cave's *Primitive Christianity* got to know something of the teaching of the earlier Church Fathers.

Brought up in a country home in which religion was an ever present reality, he tells us "before I was seven years old I began to be acquainted with the operations of divine love." But the peaceful life and the devout influences of his home did not prevent him from going through much conflict of soul before he set forth on what he felt to be the true way of life. As a boy of sixteen his sociable nature drew him into the company of the gay youth of his own age, and for several years he threw in his lot with them: a severe illness turned his thoughts again towards a better life, but with returning health he began to resume his old company. Soon after he was eighteen years old the struggle within him grew more acute: he wrestled for months with his stubborn will, till finally he "felt the power of Christ prevail over selfish desires." He found some help in steadily attending the Quaker Meetings for Worship, and "in reading the Scriptures and other good books," but these he already felt were only a means to an end. He was convinced, he says, that

"true religion consisted in an inward life, wherein the heart doth love and reverence God the Creator, and learns to exercise true justice and goodness, not only towards all men, but also towards the brute creatures. That as the mind was moved, by an inward principle, to love God as an invincible incomprehensible Being,

by the same principle it was moved to love him in all his manifestations in the visible world. That as by his breath, the flame of life was kindled in all animal sensible creatures, to say we love God as unseen, and, at the same time, exercise cruelty towards the least creatures moving by his life, or by life derived from him; was a contradiction in itself.

"I found no narrowness respecting sects and opinions, but believed that sincere upright-hearted people in every society, who truly love God, were accepted of him."

These words may indeed be said to give the keynote which runs through the whole story of his life.

From very childhood he seems to have felt with peculiar power the sense of the links that bind us to our lower fellow creatures which made him careful in after life to avoid causing needless suffering and attentive to the hardships which mankind so often inflicts without thinking upon wild and domestic animals. The incident in his boyhood which first aroused his thought on this subject is thus related in his Journal:

"Going to a neighbour's house, I saw, on the way, a robin sitting on her nest, and as I came near she went off, but having young ones, flew about, and with many cries expressed her concern for them; I stood and threw stones at her, till one striking her she fell down dead: at first I was pleased with the exploit, but after a few minutes was seized with horror, as having, in a sportive way, killed an innocent creature while she was careful for her young: I beheld her lying dead, and thought those young ones, for which she was so careful, might now perish for want of their dam to nourish them; and after some painful considerations on the subject, I climbed up the tree, took all the young birds and killed them; supposing that better than to leave them to pine away miserably; and believed in this case that scripture proverb was fulfilled, 'The tender mercies of the wicked are cruel.' I then went on my errand, but for some hours could think of little else but the cruelties I had committed, and was much troubled."

In his twenty-first year he was asked by "a man in much business at shop-keeping and baking" to tend his shop and keep his books for him, and was placed in charge of a shop at Mount Holly, five miles from his parents' farm.

This change, while it made it easier for him to give up the company of some of his old acquaintances, brought him out of his quiet country life into constant intercourse

with a very different world, confronting social problems which he had not hitherto been required to face. A few months after he went to Mount Holly he was brought into contact with the evil of slavery, to combat which afterwards became one of the great objects of his life. His master had brought several Scotchmen to sell at Mount Holly, possibly men who had been convicted in connection with some Jacobite rising, one of whom Woolman nursed on his deathbed. Some time after this his master sold a negro slave girl, and asked Woolman to write a bill of sale: he did it reluctantly, but could not forbear from telling his master and the elderly Quaker who was purchasing the girl that he believed slave-keeping was inconsistent with Christianity; but he was still uneasy that even as a hired servant he should have had any part in such a transaction, and from this time onward when he was asked by neighbours to write out the conveyance of a slave, or to make provision for bequeathing slaves in drawing up a will he declined to undertake the task and explained his reasons.

In his twenty-third year Woolman began the first of a long series of religious journeys which Quaker Ministers in his day frequently undertook, holding public meetings for worship amongst their fellow Quakers and the general public. He had begun to speak as a minister almost a year previous to this but on this occasion he went, not on his own initiative, but at the request of an older Quaker minister, Abraham Farrington, whom Woolman accompanied, occasionally speaking briefly himself. They went from place to place for a fortnight holding meetings largely in districts not inhabited by Quakers. The experience of sharing in this service with one of riper years was doubtless very helpful to Woolman as to many another Quaker minister. The Society of Friends with its unpaid voluntary ministers had never any organized method for training and assisting inexperienced ministers, but during the first three

generations of its existence such ministerial journeys were very frequent, and older men or women were able in this way to be of great assistance and encouragement to the young companion whom they often took with them.

Woolman began now to look out for some form of employment which he could undertake with greater freedom of heart than that of a general retail trader. He declined several offers of profitable business engagements because he felt they would be attended by "more outward care and cumber than was required" of him.

"I saw," he writes, "that a humble man, with the blessing of the Lord, might live on a little, and that where the heart was set on greatness, success in business did not satisfy the craving; but that commonly with an increase of wealth, the desire of wealth increased."

His employer kept a journeyman tailor and Woolman therefore arranged to learn from him this trade and was thus able to provide himself with a useful business, which he supplemented by a retail shop. This he would leave from time to time to undertake his ministerial journeys, but although he was careful to limit his trading to articles which were of real use, his business kept increasing until, after some ten years, he decided to give up all but such as was necessary to maintain his small household. This involved a real struggle, for he tells us that his "natural inclination was towards merchandise." He told his customers of his intention and induced them gradually to transfer their custom elsewhere, until finally he gave up all but his tailor's work, which he carried on without the aid of an apprentice, supplementing it by congenial labour in the apple orchard of his little farm.

In the meantime he had married a true helpmeet: the brief record of his Journal only faintly indicates the loving home life which from other sources we know was his.

"About this time believing it good for me to settle, and thinking seriously about a companion, my heart was turned to the Lord

with desires that He would give me wisdom to proceed therein agreeable to His will, and He was pleased to give me a well-inclined damsel, Sarah Ellis, to whom I was married the 18th day of the 8th month, in the year 1749."

In the following year he lost his father who had lived long enough to be able to see and approve the work which his son was now engaged in, in trying to convince his fellow Christians of the iniquity of slavery and of the duty of each man to set his slaves free. In 1754 was published at the expense of the Society of Friends his first pamphlet, written several years previously: *Some considerations on the keeping of negroes. Recommended to the Professors of Christianity of every Denomination.*

In a previous journey through Maryland, Virginia and South Carolina, Woolman had felt unhappy at the contrast between the hard lot of the slaves and the comfortable lives of their masters and henceforth found that when travelling as a minister he could not avail himself of the free hospitality which his Quaker hosts would provide him in the different places through which he passed, without paying for the work which slaves did for him.

During the last eighteen years of his life he undertook a number of these journeys, extending from New England on the North to South Carolina Southwards, covering thus many thousands of miles, chiefly on horseback. This unpaid service was largely made possible for Quaker ministers by means of the customary hospitality of their hosts, as the Society of Friends while permitting the payment of travelling expenses, or even the upkeep of a travelling minister's home, by contributions from its members, had no other provision to support its ministers than this spirit of mutual fellowship. In Woolman's case, with his own small home, his wife and child to care for, his travels as a minister must now have involved an added burden of sacrifice. He made it his plan, he tells us, to provide himself at the outset of such a journey with a quantity of small silver for distribution amongst the slaves of whose masters' hospitality he partook.

He gives no hint of the effort that it must have required to provide this money out of his slender means, although he does tell us how painful it often was to him to have to shock the sensibilities of some prosperous and kindly host by offering this pay to his slaves and explaining the reason. Woolman did not stand alone in his earnest effort to arouse men to the evils of slave owning: several Quaker preachers of his day, chief amongst them Antony Benezet of Philadelphia, the son of a Huguenot refugee, gave themselves cordially to the same cause, and little by little they roused their Quaker co-religionists to share their feelings. In this they were indeed carrying out the ideal which George Fox had foreshadowed when he urged the planters of Barbados to set free their negroes after a certain period of apprenticeship in labour, and not to send them away empty-handed. The little colony of German Quakers who settled in Pennsylvania had already before the close of the seventeenth century recorded their solemn view that slavery was incompatible with Christianity, but too many of their fellow believers while deprecating the slave trade from abroad had little by little accepted slavery as an existing institution, contenting themselves with insisting upon the humane treatment of negroes by their masters. Woolman and those who felt with him had to arouse the conscience of their co-religionists to see further than the conventional Christian standard in this respect, and both the result of their labours and the way in which they were carried out are worthy of note. In private no opportunity was lost of appealing to the best instincts of slave owners, by quiet arguments and still more by the deeper influence of the prayerful spirit of unselfish love which John Woolman carried with him wherever he went.

He tells us in his Journal but little of his own work, and we only get from time to time hints of the agony of spiritual conflict through which he went. It is altogether characteristic of him that as time went on he increasingly

felt a personal responsibility for the suffering which others were causing by the social system which they upheld by their practice. He did not denounce wrong doing in the stern prophetic spirit of some pillar saint, standing aloof from the sins of an evil world. He felt that he was a companion and fellow not only of the sufferers but of the doers of wrong; in his own heart and conscience he bore the burden, feeling that their guilt was in a real sense his. Doubtless this way in which he put himself alongside and in the place of the men with whom he pleaded aided greatly the strength of his appeal to them. He had no desire simply to impose a reform upon them from without; he wished to see the reform brought about, but wrought from within as the act of their own will.

The turning point of his work came at the Yearly Meeting of the Society of Friends in Philadelphia in 1758, when a subordinate meeting reported the case of certain members who had purchased slaves. John Woolman knew that this matter would be brought forward; it was only dealt with towards the close of several days of conference, and he continued throughout this period in attendance, taking no part in any discussion but inwardly engaged in sorrowful prayer. At length the question was raised and seemed to be dealt with in a right spirit. Woolman followed briefly several other speakers. No one openly justified slave keeping but some pleaded for caution, urging

"that if Friends continued under the exercise the Lord in time to come might open a way of deliverance for these people."

It was the old plea which in one form or another has so often been used to safeguard the position of men who are not prepared to rise above the conventional moral standard of the day.[1] Woolman then rose again and

[1]It must not be forgotten that such a great religious leader as George Whitefield was at this very time maintaining that slavery in the Southern States was a necessity.

recalled to the thought of the meeting the purity and justice of the Divine Being in whose presence they were gathered, who heard the cry of the oppressed slaves, and opened men's understanding to perceive the way of duty. He appealed to them not to let private interests or personal friendships keep them from their duty. The tide turned, and though certain slave owners endeavoured merely to secure the condemnation of any purchasing of slaves in the future, this would not content the meeting, and it was finally decided without opposition to strike at the root of the matter by condemning slavery itself, and a committee of four was appointed to visit any members who kept slaves and induce them to free them.

From this time onward the subject continued year after year to claim the deep interests of the Society of Friends. By means of repeated visiting Committees, in whose labours Woolman took an important share, it was eventually found possible to persuade almost all Quaker slave owners in Pennsylvania and New Jersey to liberate their slaves, and finally (a few years after Woolman's death) the few who still refused were disowned from membership.

It was felt that bare liberation did not meet the claims of justice and accordingly, in the minute adopted at the yearly meeting of 1758, when slave-owners were asked to free their slaves they were at the same time asked "to make a Christian provision for them according to their ages" and length of service.

The effect of this change amongst the Quaker colonists of Pennsylvania was not confined to their own number, the public opinion of the whole province was leavened by it and as a practical outcome the legislature of Pennsylvania led the van of the newly formed United States by passing in 1780 a law providing for the gradual extinction of slavery in its borders. In a less degree the attitude of Quaker citizens helped in the other

Northern States the growth of the movement against slavery, and wherever Woolman travelled he could not fail to rouse the conscience of men to realize this evil as they had not done hitherto. His work was thus a preparation for the later Abolitionist movement, but had more reformers shared his spirit, and that tender patience by which he showed his sympathy with those against whose way of life he pleaded, one cannot help wondering whether any War of Secession would have been possible.

It was natural that Woolman's thoughts should turn sometimes from the wrongs of the negroes to another race which had also suffered at the hands of the Colonists. Since the days of William Penn, the Pennsylvania Quakers had preserved a friendly relationship with the early inhabitants of the land, but the unjust spirit in which Penn's degenerate son had taken advantage of the letter of his father's treaty and the numerous bloody feuds which had taken place between other colonists and various tribes of Indians had created a barrier of mistrust which was not in existence in the earlier days of the colony.

In 1761 Woolman met in Philadelphia some Indians from a native settlement some 200 miles to the Westward, and felt drawn to visit them, having, as he says,

"many years felt love in my heart towards the natives of this land, who dwell far back in the wilderness, whose ancestors were the owners and possessors of the land where we dwell; and who, for a very small consideration, assigned their inheritance to us."

He told no one but his wife of this until the winter of 1762, when, in accordance with the custom of Quaker ministers, he brought the matter before his fellow members and was encouraged to carry out his desire. In the early summer of the following year he found some native guides and prepared to set out on his journey into what was then almost an unknown wilderness. On his last night at home Woolman was roused from bed by

a knocking at his door, and summoned to the inn, where he found a party of friends from Philadelphia, who had just arrived with the news that the Indians were on the war-path and had taken a fort near Pittsburgh, killing and scalping a number of English people both there and in other places. He did not inform his wife until morning of the alarming tidings; she was naturally deeply distressed when she heard the news, but after some hours of prayerful meditation Woolman felt clear that it was his duty to go on, though the effort cost him much. On his way he was met by a friend who proposed to accompany him, in spite of the risks which Woolman explained to him.

On his journey he was impressed by the evils of the rum trade in which many white people were engaged with the Indians. Very characteristically he notes too that the frontier settlers who frequently engaged in this trade were poor, and had moved out to gain an independence which the high rents fixed by the wealthy made difficult in the more populated country. He felt that love of luxury and wealth in civilized districts were thus responsible for driving settlers Westward and leading them to this harmful trade, or to settle on lands not rightfully acquired from their native owners. The journey lasted some days; they went on horseback for a while along an Indian war-path, passing trees stripped and painted by their warriors, and coming across the traces of the newly rekindled war. On their way they met a Moravian who was paying a second visit to the same Indian settlement, and when they reached their destination Woolman, after counselling with him, attended and sometimes spoke at his meetings, instead of having separate gatherings of his own with the Indians, some of whom were already beginning to meet together regularly for Christian worship. He had to make what use he could of the very imperfect native interpreters, and their limited knowledge of English must have been a real difficulty. But, as he

quaintly put it, "We laboured along, divine love attending." On one such occasion, he tells us,

"Feeling my mind covered with the spirit of prayer, I told the interpreters that I found it in my heart to pray to God, and believed, if I prayed aright, he would hear me, and expressed my willingness for them to omit interpreting; so our meeting ended with a degree of divine love."

At the close of the meeting one of the Indians pithily said, in his own tongue, to one of the interpreters: "I love to feel where words come from."

After five days Woolman felt that he had discharged his message, and said farewell to the Indians of Wehaloosing, a number of whom accompanied him on part of his return journey. He seems to have had no feeling that prolonged intercourse was necessary to convey the message he had to deliver; he looked forward to other visits like his own being undertaken, and in the apostolic spirit of the first Christian missionaries he left his hearers in confidence that they, like himself, might receive the guidance and help of the Divine Spirit in every difficulty and in the opportunities of growth and service which each day would bring.

The direct results of his visit we cannot judge, but Woolman's influence and example helped to stir up the Society of Friends in Pennsylvania to more systematic efforts to aid the Indians both in educational training and religious fellowship. As Woolman continued from time to time his religious journeys he seems to have grown more and more sensitive to the guiding Hand which he sought to follow, even though his scruples in avoiding every practice involving needless luxury and therefore undue toil to the producer caused him to seem peculiar even to his friends. Early in 1770 he was prostrated by an attack of pleurisy, and at one time had no thought of recovery. It was during this illness that there came to him the supreme spiritual experience of his life, which some two and a half years later, only a week or

two before his death, he recorded in his Journal in the belief that it might some day be of assistance to others.

"I was brought so near the gates of death, that I forgot my name: being then desirous to know who I was, I saw a man of matter of a dull, gloomy colour, between the south and the east; and was informed that this man was human beings in as great misery as they could be, and live; and that I was mixed in with them, and that henceforth I might not consider myself as a distinct or separate being. In this state I remained several hours. I then heard a soft, melodious voice, more pure and harmonious than any I had heard with my ears before; I believed it was the voice of an angel, who spake to the other angels: the words were—*John Woolman is dead.* I soon remembered that I once was John Woolman; and being assured that I was alive in the body, I greatly wondered what that heavenly voice could mean . . . I was then carried in spirit to the mines, where poor, oppressed people were digging rich treasures for those called christians; and heard them blaspheme the name of Christ, at which I was grieved; for his name to me was precious. Then I was informed that these heathen were told that those who oppressed them were the followers of Christ; and they said amongst themselves, If Christ directed them to use us in this sort, then Christ is a cruel tyrant. All this time the song of the angel remained a mystery. . . At length I felt divine power prepare my mouth that I could speak; and then I said, 'I am crucified with Christ, nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ that liveth in me: and the life I now live in the flesh is by faith in the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me.' Then the mystery was opened; and I perceived there was joy in heaven over a sinner who had repented; and that that language (*John Woolman is dead*) meant no more than the death of my own will."

This was the La Verna of John Woolman; for him there came no vision of the winged seraph or of the form of the Crucified Saviour, but he too was to carry about with him the marks of the passion, not on his hands and side but in his heart and life.

The close of Woolman's labours was now drawing near. He had for some time felt that he must visit the meetings of the Society of Friends in the North of England, more especially in Yorkshire, and after obtaining, in the spring of 1772, the assent of his fellow members, he made inquiries for a vessel. A friend of his had, he found, taken a passage for London in the cabin of a Philadelphia ship. Woolman believed that he ought to travel in the steerage, which distressed his friend, who endeavoured with others to dissuade him from his purpose, pointing

out the difficulties which it would involve. But Woolman, although depressed by the prospect, felt that he could not yield to his friend's entreaties, the more so as he had noticed various superfluous decorations and fittings in the comfortable cabin which the fares of the passengers must pay for, making them responsible for the needless toil of the workers who had built it. The voyage lasted thirty-nine days, and the weather was often rough: Woolman in the steerage shared the cramped quarters with the sailors, and his tender heart was troubled by realizing the hardships of their life, and more particularly that of the five cabin boys, especially in the night watches, and in stormy weather, when there was no room in their crowded quarters for them to change their wet clothes. Woolman kept calm throughout the stormy voyage, though he felt oppressed by the foul air of the steerage, and his heart went out in prayer for his wife and family whom he had left behind. The language and life of the sailors troubled him, too, and he felt again the responsibility of the traders and buyers for whose real needs or unnecessary wants these sailors worked. He noticed, too, the sufferings of the poor fowls on shipboard:

"In observing their dull appearance at sea and the pining sickness of some of them, I often remembered the fountain of goodness, who gave being to all creatures and whose love extends to that of caring for the sparrows; and believe, where the love of God is verily perfected, and the true spirit of government watchfully attended to, a tenderness towards all creatures made subject to us will be experienced; and a care felt in us that we do not lessen that sweetness of life in the animal creation, which the great Creator intends for them under our government."

When the storm was severe he felt more strongly the desire

"to embrace every opportunity of being inwardly acquainted with the hardships and difficulties of my fellow creatures,"

and later, when he felt weak and ill, he recorded his thankfulness for his lot, regarding it

"as a kindness from the great Father of mankind who in this, my floating pilgrimage, is in some degree bringing me to feel that which

many thousands of my fellow creatures often suffer in a greater degree."

He landed in London in time to be present at the Yearly Meeting of the Society of Friends which was then sitting, and he went straight to attend it. Whittier has recorded the tradition which tells how at first his rough undyed garments and unusual manner startled the gathering of Ministers and Elders, so that it was even suggested by one of them that he need go no further, but might return to his own land. Woolman sat still and wept; at length he rose and said that he could not thus abandon his duty, but would gladly support himself by such labours as he was capable of, without being in any way a cause of expense to Friends. Then after a pause of silence he spoke the message which he felt in his heart. The very man who had advised his return rose again and expressed his regret for his former mistake; and Woolman was able to go forward with the full approval of the whole meeting. All that he himself records in his Journal are the brief words: "In this meeting my mind was humbly contrite."

The four months of his ministry in England were passed in going on foot from meeting to meeting, chiefly in the North. He felt unable to go by coach, because he felt so keenly the cruelty which the stage-coach system often caused to the over-driven horses and overworked post-boys, and on this account he asked his friends not to send him his ordinary letters by post, although this meant that he could not hear so often from his family. As he travelled he noted the rates of wages, and the cost of the various necessaries of life to the poor, feeling acutely their hardships, and endeavouring to arouse in prosperous homes a sense of responsibility for this poverty from which their own comforts were often indirectly drawn.

After travelling Northward into Westmoreland, Woolman returned into Yorkshire, and arrived in York in time to attend the large Quarterly Meeting held there

at the close of September. The hospitable William Tuke sent his young son Henry out to guide him on the last stage of his journey from Wensleydale, and through all his after life the lad retained the memory of the sweetness of his presence. Woolman declined the kindly hospitality of William Tuke, preferring a home outside the walls, where he might be "in the clean country." It was here that he was attacked by small-pox, and in spite of tender nursing, lacked the strength to overcome the disease. His one anxiety was to avoid giving needless trouble to any, and he was touchingly grateful for the loving care which surrounded him: to one young nurse who gave him drink in the night he said: "My child, thou seemest very kind to me, a poor creature; the Lord will reward thee for it." The illness was a difficult one, but he bore it with quiet resignation, telling those about him that when he spoke to his friends in New Jersey of his concern to visit England he had told them of his desire to visit the Quarterly Meeting at York, and that "being there looked like home to me." And so, with peace in his heart he passed away.

It is not easy to indicate the effects of John Woolman's work in raising the standard of life of those with whom he came into contact, or in inspiring others to devote themselves to remedy oppression. Most of the leaders in the struggle against slavery both in England and America came directly or indirectly under his influence, and his social teaching is likely to have an even wider and more enduring effect than his work on behalf of the slaves, which was indeed only part of a wider message which his whole life work reflects. Woolman's views on property and its responsibilities are explained even better than in his Journal by his posthumous work, *A Word of Remembrance and Caution to the Rich.* In simplest language he unfolds the social responsibilities of wealth in the light of the Golden Rule, showing that those who live in luxury impose on men a twofold burden, making some work

at occupations not really needful, while paying them by money obtained from the labour of others whose work is thus rendered unduly hard. Absolute ownership of property is impossible, he holds, for a Christian, who can never be more than a tenant in God's world. No legal right can outweigh the unwritten rights of our fellow creatures to a just share in the means of life, and no title to property can justify selfish misuse of it in ministering to our own luxurious wants. But if we use our possessions for the good of the whole community, we become, he tells us, interested in the Divine workmanship,

"and feel a desire to make use of every opportunity to lessen the distresses of the afflicted and to increase the happiness of the creation. Here we have a prospect of one common interest from which our own is inseparable, so that to turn all we possess into the channel of universal love becomes the business of our lives."

As one reads the pages of this little tract, it is as though the vision of a new heaven and a new earth unfolds before one's gaze; yet, after all, it is no new world, but just the plain course of simple human duties, transfused by the glow of a wonderful love of a man for his fellow men. As we close the book we see how petty and narrowing is the selfishness which binds together so much of our social customs, or under the specious appearance of legal right oppresses the toiler and encourages the property owner to build for himself a pleasure house of luxurious habits, which is, in reality, both for himself and others, a prison to the spirit. Yet into the midst of this sordid and selfish world there penetrates the transforming and cleansing Light which is reflected in John Woolman's writings, making its intent appeal to all that is of good hidden beneath the surface of this world's failure, a light working within the cramped and marred lives of men, which yet may be changed by contact with it, till in due time a new and Divine fellowship replaces our half heathen civilization, so that the spirit of the teaching of Christ breathes through every act of our social being.

THE
CONSTRUCTIVE
QUARTERLY

A JOURNAL OF THE FAITH, WORK
AND THOUGHT OF CHRISTENDOM

JUNE, 1914

The Religion of a Moving, Changing World

By Henry Scott Holland, M.A., D.D.,
Regius Professor of Divinity and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford.

The whole round earth is on the move. That is the cardinal significance of the hour. There has been no parallel in history to the range and scale of this movement. Even that wonderful impulse which shook together all the peoples of the Mediterranean Littoral from Gaul to Babylon, under the sway of the Roman Empire, vast and sweeping as was its action, only covered a limited area of the earth's surface. It was in itself, for those who came within it, a moment singularly like our own. We can still feel the glow of its cosmopolitan excitement, as it rehearsed the long roll of varied and scattered nations who had all been drawn out of the unbroken seclusion of agelong homes under the momentum of a common inspiration towards a single spot—Parthians, and Medes, and Elamites, and the dwellers in Mesopotamia, and in Judea, and Cappadocia, Pontius

and Asia, Phrygia and Pamphylia, in Egypt, and in the parts of Libya about Cyrene, strangers of Rome, Jews and Proselytes, Cretes and Arabians. No contemptible list! And yet, behind and beyond them all, lay dim Continents of stagnant life, wholly untouched by any movement whatever, slumbering in the monotonous reiteration of a changeless order. Far Asia was already held captive under the thrall of its own unbroken memories. China had arrived at a fixed and completed social ideal. The unknown depths of back Africa held uncounted tribes in the grip of that aimless unalterable routine which is what we mean by savagery. And, since that amazing hour of Rome passed, movement has been a rare phenomenon on the world's surface, only felt in this or that corner of our Western Continent, breaking ground now and again in spasmodic effort, only to die back again under the pressure of the prevailing disinclination to stir.

We are all instinctively sluggards. "A little sleep, a little folding of the hands in sleep." There is no one to whom that does not appeal. And the appeal itself never sleeps. It never loses its opportunity or lowers its importunate claim. So the deadweight of what has always been is bound to win at last. Things which our frantic but ephemeral efforts had just succeeded in faintly moving, settle back into their places. All things continue as they were at the beginning. This is our normal state of stagnation. We form an enormous lump within which, at a few scattered spots, a tiny leaven stirs.

But, by some sudden impulse, during the last few years, everywhere at once, there has been a shaking and a noise: and lo! there was no dim or hidden corner of the world where a change was not proceeding. A wind blew: the tide rose. Down went all that barred and obstructed and isolated. Bolts withdrew of themselves: doors flung themselves wide. Frontiers seemed of no

account. Roads lay open. Ancient civilizations, that had on them, we thought, the very stamp of eternity, crumbled away before our eyes. Blind and dark places, which savagery had entombed in its night, yielded to the light, and admitted us to secure and familiar intimacy. Conditions which had endured, since man began to be, broke up and vanished. There was no continent which did not pass under the spell. Change became the universal order of the day.

Change! Some change. We cannot say yet what the change will be. We may hope: we may fear: we may despise: we may dislike. It is equally easy to prophesy evil or good. There are ominous signs: there are mutterings of storm: and there are, also, deep and ineradicable convictions which pledge us to believe that change makes, on the whole, for good. But it is enough, for the moment, to arrest attention on the mere fact that everything, everywhere, is suffering some change. There is nothing that can be again as it was. Something has happened which compels a re-adjustment in every department of human existence. India will never again be what India has immemorially been. We shall never see again the Japan or the China which once offered their unbroken front to the powerless centuries. Never again will Africa secrete its old savage heart under the cloud of a darkness that can be felt. Never again will the vast spaces of South America hide from our eyes the fate of unknown populations. Everywhere, the light has come: the change has begun to work: there is a shifting of values, a movement felt in the mass, an impulse astir, a breath that blows. What will come about, no one can yet say: but the old is gone: and something new has got to come. That is quite certain.

And the change that has come upon these far unchanging scenes is bound to tell back on us, of the restless West. We had played our part till now, as if we could leave these immense motionless bodies out of account: as if we

had the game to ourselves. Now, that old immunity is gone for ever. The whole earth will be alive with the very forces which we had monopolized. All nations will enter into competition with us. Their activities will tell upon our possibilities. We shall feel their pressure: we shall have to make allowance for their purposes: we shall be limited by their demands. By a thousand avenues, their life will pass into ours: and we shall be pervaded by new influences, and tinged and coloured by alien desires. Horizons will be altered: affairs will take on a strange scope and scale and range. There will be new balances, and new measures, and new considerations, and new standards. Existence will be a changed thing for one and all. The West will never again be the compact, coherent, separable fact that we could once sum up in a typical phrase. Its old identity is broken up. The East will never again be that massive block of immemorial tradition which stood over against the busy bustling West, in such dramatic antithesis. There will now be fusions and comminglings, reactions and correspondencies, which will invade, and pervade, and permeate, and interlace, until a whole novel social world will have integrated, to which all nations and peoples contribute, and from out of which no race falls unused or unwanted.

Change, then, is on us all. We are moving. To what goal, we cannot say. At what loss or gain we cannot yet pronounce. Only there will be nothing that is as it was before.

Now, the mere fact of change, of movement, has its most crucial effect in the department of Religion. It is there that its occurrence is most ominous, most critical, most destructive. For nearly all the forces of the world's Religions have been set on the prohibition of change. Change is taken to be the violation of Eternity. And the pressure of the Eternal on human life, wherever it is felt, tends to show itself in the desire to give to the passing

hours something of the fixity of that which changes not: nor has any shadow of turning.

We can trace this instinct at the lowest stage, as well as at the highest. At the bottom of the scale, the dominant motive in the spiritual heart in the savage expresses itself through fixed taboos, and immemorial custom. Here nothing changes with the changing generation. Ritual acts repeat themselves for ever. Religion lends all its authority to the transmission of unalterable tradition. And this is intelligible enough. Life, in its savage form, is shifty, precarious, accidental. It has but frail uncertain worth: it is open to every casual peril, and swift disaster. It can only win a touch of dignity by identifying itself with something that lasts, that cannot vanish away, that holds in it the pledge of stability. Religion, therefore, lends worth to human existence by finding for it imperishable forms, so that it may not be the prey of the drifting moment. By clinging fast to these acts of arrest, man finds his feet, among the moving sands. He belongs to an order which can survive chance. He becomes aware of that in him which has enduring value. This is his first necessity, if he is to secure for himself a lodgment on which to stand and make sure of his own identity. It is a great achievement of Religion, if it can so fix the settled fashion of his ordered existence, through social Rites and Initiations, and tribal Taboos, that the man can pull himself together, and face the whirl of circumstance unashamed and undisturbed.

And if we pass up to the highest expression of the human spirit in its endeavour to come into touch with God, we find the same prevailing note. The civilization of China acquired its weight of grave distinction, in that it had rid life of all restlessness. There was no fretful perturbation, no wilful aggression. Everyone's place was set and ordered. The lines of rational limitation prescribed the proper task, the normal function.

The father knew what it was to be a father, and the son to be a son. Immemorial sanctions governed every act. Nothing was omitted from the code of conduct: everything had been foreseen; and Confucius, it was proudly recalled, had a fixed length for his nightdress, and a standard proportion in which his vegetables stood to meat on his plate. So the dignified etiquette covered the entire ground, and allowed for no crumb of uncertainty that was not swept up in cleanly submission. And the whole weight of ancestral Religion backed this ideal of a motionless perfection. Confucius had dreamed the dream which Plato immortalized in the Republic—the dream of a Society caught in statuesque arrest at the moment of consummation, with everything exactly in its place, each member fulfilling his charge towards the whole Body by doing that for which his nature most precisely fitted him, doing it in joy of a dedicated self-expression.

If only the laws of such a State could be fixed beyond criticism and beyond recall, then this earthly human life of ours, with its emotional phenomenalism, might still unconsciously reflect the absolute truth of the Eternal Ideas. So it might be in that Ideal Community, in which the kings were able to philosophize, and the philosophers would consent to rule as kings. The sanction of the High Gods would seal the changeless authority of the fixed laws, which the philosophers had ordained in sight of the Everlasting Reality. The one thing totally prohibited, utterly cancelled and eliminated, would be Change.

And once more the profound spirituality of the Hindoo has taken the same direction as the practical judgment of the Chinaman. Motion, process, growth, change—these are the illusions of phenomenal existence. Religion, in its highest sense, can make no terms with them. It discredits them, as "Maya." It holds itself aloof from passing under the wheel of changeful Time. It would

escape from Past, and from Future. It would abide in the motionless centre of the eternal Now. In all motion lies temptation, degradation, vanity. Back on itself life returns: to be absorbed in the pure Vacancy of Being. So man approaches to the likeness of God just so far as he can eliminate the passage of time and transcend the fret of change. He loses his true self, by submitting to the endless and meaningless succession of the cosmic process.

Yet again in the intensely practical instinct of Mohammedanism there is the same motive at work as in the mystical passion of the Hindoo. Here, too, the whole force of the Religion sets towards arrest. It gives fixity to the ethical custom of the Arab, who is, himself, the very monument of a changeless type. The Arab is what the Arab has ever been. That is his secret: that is his strength. He has looked out at a world that ever shifts and turns and alters: and he ha despised it: and has remained what he was at the first. Once he took over all this changing show, and, by his supreme sagacity, made it all his own: and then, tired of his mastery, threw it away behind him, and went back on himself. His Faith is the expression of the type. It stands for the Unchanging. It abhors process. It has embodied its ideal moment in the Koran. It wants nothing further. Every rite wins its spiritual power out of its sameness. The cry from the Muezzin is the symbol of its invincible and timeless monotony.

These world-religions, then, are protests against Change. They rely on its elimination. They have no place for it. Yet the whole world has committed itself to Change. It has accepted motion as its law of life. The Gospel of Western civilization has taken possession: it has come into its own everywhere. Man is in movement. And, by that act, he moves away from all the religions of arrest. They have no message for him: for motion is, to them, meaningless. Change is futility: is evil: is death. Once let man accept the vitality of pro-

cess and he has stripped his ancient faiths of their inner significance, of their fundamental purpose. He goes out on his new adventure, unaccompanied by them, unaided, unsanctioned. They can do him no service on this track. They have lost their hold. He can but leave them behind.

But there is just one religion in the world which has seen in motion the law of human life, the key to man's being. It was the Jew who first declared that man is essentially prophetic. He can only be understood under terms of becoming. He is in process, in growth, in the act of becoming something more than he is. Herein is the secret, by which alone he makes himself intelligible. The worth of his existence lies, not in the present, but in the future. He would not be precious now if he were not on his way onwards. In what he will be lies the standard of his value. He can never pause, except in death. Arrest is his fatal sin. It is the betrayal of his cause, the surrender of all that interprets and rationalizes his purpose, his conduct, his acts. He exists by suggestion, by omen, by anticipation, by expectancy. Far ahead is the goal which he is created in order to discover and attain. Only when the goal is reached, will it be seen what and why he counted for at each separate moment of his story. The end holds in it the revelation of what he is doing now. And the end will justify the process: it will show itself to be an end which could only be arrived at in that way and no other. Every step of the process will find itself ratified in the consummation. For the beginning holds in it already the end, even as the end receives all its richness of meaning from out of that in which the beginning was made. The process is not lost in the consummation: but is retained in the act of fulfilment. Prophecy embraces the first in the last, and the last in the first. In and through change, nothing is lost. Change only serves to emphasize the identity of that which changes.

This is how history becomes the medium of the Divine Revelation of God to man, as well as of man's revelation of himself to God. History is continuous. It leaves no past behind. It carries the past along with it into the future. The end is what it is, because the past has been what it has been. The final act retains in it all the process through which it has been arrived at. So the Vision of the last Fulfilment of the entry of God into the human process is a Lamb in glory, still holding in it the secret of the death wherewith it had been slain.

Prophecy! There lies the key. Man prophesies. That is his life. He is moving. He is being changed. He never ceases to pass under new conditions. He lives according to the measure by which he grows: "first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear." That is the secret of the Jew, on which Jesus Christ set His seal, and which the Incarnation embodies.

True, there is an act in that Incarnation, which has an unchanging value. Christ, the Lord, was only for once seen walking the earth in our flesh, and dying on the Cross for our salvation. That is an event which cannot but be unique and unalterable. It has happened: and, in happening, it has reversed the story of man. No hungry generation can tread down that incomparable fact. Whatever changing experience the years bring into them, that one Redemption will cover it. It will prove itself inexhaustible in efficacy. It will last until the end. Man will never arrive (so we believe) at any situation which will not require the same Atonement to make it good. No advance will carry him beyond the scope of saving Grace. Here there is something of finality reached. We are in "the last Period." The Name of Christ will prove its power to bring all things under it. But this efficacy of the Name will be verified by the unceasing rhythm and order of changes through which humanity will pass. The entry of God into flesh, far from arresting its movement, adds to it new force.

Man grows faster than ever: and in growth still finds his life. Arrest is, now, forbidden him by a yet more absolute decree. Under Christ's law, it becomes the sin of sins, the sin of the fixed contented Pharisee, the sin against the Holy Ghost. For man is now endowed with the Spirit whose very existence is motion. It "proceeds." That is its essential character. It goes whithersoever it listeth, free as the wind. We cannot tell whence or whither: only we hear it pass: and this passage forward constitutes its ceaseless evidence of itself. This spirit of divine motion no longer merely strikes upon man, sporadically and brokenly, from without, lifting him by its impact, dropping him again by its withdrawal. So men of the old Covenant were inspired. But, now, it resides deep within the secret heart-recesses of the Body which Christ has made His own: and impels it onwards by a pressure that never languishes or fails. This Spirit of Christ is the Spirit of Prophecy: and man, therefore, since the Incarnation, is more than ever prophetic. More than ever is it true that he is understood and judged not by what he is, but by what he is becoming. He is to be read in the light of that to which he tends. Only through movement can he manifest his true character. He holds in himself the germ of what shall be hereafter: and by virtue of that alone can be forgiven for being what he is. His vocation is to move on endlessly from glory to glory, in the face of Jesus Christ.

Here, then, is the one and only Religion for which the present situation has any meaning. Humanity, at large, has committed itself to the necessity of movement: has surrendered itself to Change. That has become simply inevitable. And no Religion that has adopted arrest as its note, can do anything for man in movement. It has for him no gospel to deliver. Only a Religion which can justify and hallow motion can be of any use to him. And, if so, then there is but one

competitor in the field. There is only one spiritual offer before him. It is the Religion which finds in the historical process itself the material and the zest of the divine Revelation. God's Eternal Righteousness realizes itself for man, not in a fixed moment of arrested perfection, but in an ever-growing, ever-developing, ever-expanding purpose. His Eternity is verified by man's inexhaustible fertility of changes, by his limitless capacities for advance. Man's life is a perpetual pilgrimage toward the City which hath the foundation. For ever, he draws nearer: and for ever follows the gleam. His greatness lies in that he knows not yet what he will be: only he knows that he may become ever more like Him whom one day he will know as He is. There is a far-off goal: and he is already pledged to arrive there by that Spirit which is in him, and which cries, from within him, for the Christ that shall come at last. For such a Creed, movement is the sacred thing, which it understands. In an earth given over to movement, it is bound to come into its own.

If only it be given a chance! If only it is allowed to bring up its own opportunity! It must be quick. For the movement of the world is going ahead at a terrible speed. It has shaken itself free of ancient obstructions, with a sudden impetus which has staggered our imagination. It is off. It must go somewhere. Nothing can hold it back. It must take its direction: it must determine its dominant onset. The next ten or twenty years must settle which this will be. If, in making this determination, it receives no inspiration from the Faith of Jesus Christ, then it will do it without any religious help at all. It will have no spiritual element inside its decision. For no other religion has a message or an interpretation to deliver to a changing world. If it may not possess itself of the mind of Christ, then, its mind will be necessarily formed outside the frontiers of religion. It will be robbed of its natural success. It will be thrown

back on its own limited resources. It will find itself to be godless, without perhaps intending it. In Japan, in India, we already see what the outcome will be, if it is left for materialism to develop. That is why the moment is so hazardous. That is why we are under tremendous challenge. The Hour has come, when, for the secular earth at large, there can be but one religion which meets the needs of the situation. There can be but one Religion which will not find itself bankrupt, powerless in the face of a situation which it cannot sanction, or explain. If we, at such an hour, fail to bring home to men the one offer, which can be of any avail, then, we shall have made the great Refusal. We shall have blasphemed the Holy Ghost.

The Confession of Christ

By Henry Churchill King, D.D., LL.D.,
President of Oberlin College.

In our efforts for the union of all Christians, is there already a unity that we are trying more adequately to express, or are we seeking to create, out of hand, a unity that is now quite non-existent? If we did not believe there was already a real and vital unity of spirit should we be seeking a closer union? What, then, is the unity of spirit which alone keeps all our efforts for closer union from being utterly vain and futile?

Doubtless it is true, as a recent theological treatise says, that union cannot come "by alleging 'unity of spirit' as an excuse for acquiescence in actual disunion"; but it is even more to be feared that such under-estimation of the significance of unity of spirit as seems here implied, will make actual union impossible. It is simply and solely that unity of spirit that makes it worth while to talk about union at all. What, then, is that unity of spirit? We are plainly seeking, are we not, the more manifest union of Christendom; that all the Christian forces of every name may present a united front to the world. We are seeking the union of all believers in Christianity, of all Christian people, of all who think Christianity the highest and final religion, of all who believe Christ to be the supreme revealer of God, of all those who find the great source of their spiritual life in God's revelation of himself in Christ, of all who count themselves, first and foremost, learners of Christ. The one uniting word is "Christian." We are seeking the union of all confessors of Christ.

This is our real unity: that we all, with loyal devotion, confess Christ. This is what touches our hearts and makes us long for mutual understanding and for union. This other's loyalty to Christ is like my own;—that is the great moving consideration. And this is a far deeper and more significant thing, we may not forget, than any union of effort, or plan, or creed, or organization that might grow out of that unity of spirit, highly desirable as that closer union is. But we shall not make headway toward a valuable union by putting the secondary and derivative in place of the primary and original—by making external union more than unity of spirit.

Let us glory, then, in the unity that is already ours, nor fail to appreciate its significance. For nothing conceivable can give such actual and genuine unity as common loyalty to a person. The greater that personality, the more significant the resulting unity. Where that person is the supreme personality of history, and believed by his confessors to be the supreme revelation of God himself—the personality that has redeemed their life—the unity of spirit is the greatest attainable. No uniformity of creed, of ritual, of institution, of concerted plan, of government, could possibly bring so meaningful a unity.

Doubtless the very oneness of human nature, body and mind, insures that the spirit requires embodiment; that every idea must have some mechanical presentment, some answering means, some organization, some institution. But the body is not thereby made of equal importance with the spirit. The significance lies nevertheless in the spirit back of all. We need to recall both sides of Lotze's fundamental philosophical thesis and see "how absolutely universal is the extent and at the same time how completely subordinate the significance of the mission which mechanism has to fulfil in the structure of the world." Doubtless Christianity must have some external embodiment of creed, of ritual, of worship, of

organization; but no single particular embodiment is essential, and all are completely subordinate in significance.

In every form of expression of our unity of spirit in loyal devotion to Christ, individual temperamental differences will manifest themselves. and ought to manifest themselves. To insist on uniformity in any of these expressions is to make real union impossible. As unity is more and other than union, so is union more and other than uniformity. Even the "Lambeth Quadrilateral," supposing that all could agree on all four of its points, is still an altogether unsatisfactory basis of union, for one reason, just because it looks to too great uniformity, and tends to conceive the union as thereby accomplished. As surely as it is not compromise but comprehension which is needed, and as surely as we are all more likely to be right in the affirmations that mean most to us, rather than in our negations of things that do not appeal to us; so surely the road to any union worth while must not be a prescription of some upon others of favorite expressions of any kind. If others find a certain means really helpful in the expression of their devotion to Christ that we do not find helpful, they must have liberty to use that means, or lack of means, but not to prescribe it upon any others. Liberty to use but not to prescribe is essential. However certain it is that differences in psychological temperament must be taken into account in religion, and that these differences are often wide—like the so-called "Catholic" and "Protestant" temperaments—we still must see with absolute clearness that the truly essential thing is not this or the other of the different ways of approach to God in Christ, but the desire and purpose so to approach God, and the evidence in life that the soul has found God and been accepted of him. We have to get back of all these differences of temperamental expression to that unity of spirit that makes it possible to call both types of people Christian; that

makes them able to recognize in each other unmistakable loyalty to Christ.

The truth is that we have been very slow in coming to recognize in religion—what has been long recognized in philosophy and social theory—what a true unity is; that unity should be indeed organic, though in a different sense from that often meant; and that true organic unity presupposes differences, not uniformity. Uniformity gives only a sand-heap of identical atoms, but no true unity. Paul's epoch-making figure of the body of Christ with many different members and many different offices must not be allowed to slip from our minds. We cannot get this higher unity of an organic body without different members and different functions. These very differences are necessary, if the parts of the body are to be members one of another, and are to be bound together into the more significant unity of the whole organic body. Paul's idea of the organism, thus, that became so influential later in philosophic, ethical and social thinking, looks to a true unity, but nowhere to uniformity.

Can we make it plain to ourselves that uniformity is in no sense the true aim of our efforts for a union of all Christians? No doubt, back of all the essential unity of spirit there must be certain implications of creed, of worship, of government, of organization. But our age ought certainly to be able to come to this problem of Christian union in all these respects, with a different vision than that of preceding centuries.

Even with reference to the underlying creedal statements it should be remembered we are, in the first place, not seeking for all Christians the kind of compromise statement that would be involved, for example, in a modern Westminster Confession. Readers of history may not shut their eyes to the fact that there were considerable divergences of view in the gathering out of which came that creedal statement; and that the statement finally reached did not mean that all these divergences had disappeared

(though something of that may well have happened), so much as that ingenious men had found, upon the disputed points, language sufficiently vague and ambiguous to allow all parties to read their own views into it. Now, such a compromise creed is not destitute of value; —it means some real gain in agreement, and it may give a new sense of unity to those accepting it. But its value is often mistakenly conceived, and may turn into a positive damage, if the creed be used as a universal prescription, or if it be thought to mean real uniformity of detailed belief. Most creeds have wrought untold damage in this direction.

It should be equally clear to the modern man, in seeking some basal statement of belief, that it is no mere average of ideas which is sought. Such an average is like the abstract average of the statistician which corresponds to no real concrete fact. It is like the statue of an abstract virtue: it lacks the convincing reality of the concrete living thing. One may reach in that way a creed that is not the living creed for any one of all who subscribed to it—a creed that is not for any of them a natural expression of their own vital faith.

Still less should the basic confession of faith be the barest minimum of belief in which all might conceivably agree. The religious experience of the Christian ought rather to express itself with increasing richness, and reach out in many directions. The psychological law is, that that which is not expressed dies. And religious experience needs clear and thoughtful expression in significant statements as well as in life. It is no underestimate of the value of creedal statements that is here involved; rather, it is so alone that its true place is given to the creedal statement. We ought to see that just because of different temperaments, different environments, and different modes of education there will be different reflections of the Christ that we confess, different expressions of what the life he has called out in us means.

And the organic unity which is to be positively sought is that which recognizes and preserves these differences; that contends for the value of every such honest reflection of the life of Jesus, rather than seeks a deadening identity of expression. The New Testament itself consists of a series of such reflections of Christ.

It is true that Christianity looks to life, and that Christian doctrine must bear on life, and that the differences between one Christian statement of belief and another are likely to lie more in the realm of the philosophies than in the realm of life. It is true that we may well put our emphasis on the strictly religious and practical purpose of the Bible as intending to reveal to us God and to give inspiration to some real sharing in his life. And it is true that the one thing in which we may all agree is that Christ is the ultimate appeal. We can all agree in the confession, that we wish to make our thinking, in this sense, truly Christian. But life has inevitably some corresponding convictions that call for thoughtful expression. Yet we cannot do justice to a true conception of the organic unity of Christians, without seeing clearly that complete uniformity of belief and statement is both impossible and undesirable.

Complete uniformity of belief and statement is impossible, in the first place, because it is difficult indeed for any of us to tell our real inner creed. That creed is the creed that finds expression in life. It is the statement of those assumptions that are implied in deeds and spirit. The will, thus, has its creed as well as the intellect, and the truths of religion must be wrought out rather than merely thought out. And the intellect can formulate only very imperfectly the truth that the will has wrought out. How comparatively empty and flat the greatest truths sound from one who does not seem to have lived them into existence. On the other hand, how significant the simplest truths become when they are backed by a great life. Now the truth which so

lives for a man is his real creed, and that real creed he can better state at the end of his complete experience than at the beginning. It is still more impossible for another's formulation completely to shadow forth this whole life-experience. This is not at all to join the company of those who wish to "rule the doctrinal element out of their religion." It is quite a different thing from that, to insist that only the *whole* mind can reach the essential meaning of things; that all Christian doctrine looks directly to life, means something for life and grows directly out of life; that no series of propositions can possibly set forth the whole meaning of the Christian life; and that the acceptance of any set of propositions is not the acceptance of Christianity. Thinking there must be, earnest and hard, and every possible attempt to express the fullest results of this thinking in ordered statement of doctrine—to reach a comprehensive intellectual unity that shall bring our religious beliefs into relation to all the rest of our thinking. All this is highly important and helpful. But even so, doctrine is means, not end; an expression of life rather than life itself. The intellect serves life but may not dominate it.

Complete uniformity of belief and statement therefore is impossible, first of all, because we are none of us really able to make an accurate statement even of our own creed. It is impossible also because if two persons should agree in adopting the same formula of words, even these same words must be interpreted out of different inheritances, training, environment and experiences, and the emphasis and meaning will change accordingly; and they will change even in the same individual from time to time. Unalterable doctrine is thus impossible. Any true acceptance of a creed involves every time a kind of creative activity on the part of the individual affirming the confession. This means that the different temperament, the different point of view and the different emphasis cannot help affecting every man's creed. It is

true of a man's creed as of his environment that the only effective portions are those to which he attends; and the points of attention vary from time to time.

But it is not only true that complete uniformity of belief and statement is impossible, it is equally true that were it attainable, it would be undesirable. We are dealing with those truths that have to do with the infinite God himself, and with human relations to that infinite God. We can only approximate to the infinite truth so sought by seeking from every soul the most honest expression of his experience and so sharing our experiences with each other. The situation is like that illustrated by Leibnitz's figure of the mirrors surrounding the marketplace. Each mirror gives its reflection from one point of view, and it is only by combining all these reflections that the complete view of all the aspects of the marketplace could result. We need indispensably the supplementing help that comes from sharing in the best visions of other souls.

And when one thinks how it is that the truth makes progress in the world, he finds another reason for not desiring uniformity of statement in religious belief. For the truth comes, in any case, not by all the others giving way to some single authoritative statement, but by each bringing honestly and carefully his own matured conviction, in order that out of all these presentations there may come a larger result than any one brought to the conference. Any one of us can hope to make progress in the truth only so far as he can increasingly supplement his own view by some participation in those of others. From this point of view, the union of Christians, so far as creedal statements are concerned, should be much like that of a group of scientific workers; they are united in the pursuit of the truth. The one essential is loyalty to the truth—utterly honest observation and report, with no careless echoing of another. Such agreement as then results has genuine significance. But it in turn is re-

garded as no final goal. These scientific workers seek a series of progressively successful attempts to formulate the world they study. Their union is in this one aim. Should not the union of Christians, so far as their creedal statements are concerned, be similarly conceived?

And in the realm of morals and religion it is peculiarly important that uniformity should not be sought, because in this realm, above all, we cannot and we must not simply repeat one another. My confession of my faith must be honestly and vitally my own. Religious doctrines are an expression of life already present, and they are of value only so. If my creedal statement is not an honest expression of conviction growing out of life, it is a hindrance rather than a help, even to my own life; for, as a great German theologian has said, "conscious untruth tends to drive from Christ." And every untrue testimony of such a kind tends also to mislead others.

For every one of these reasons, it is not desirable to check the expression of religious faith in constantly revised statements of belief, nor to forbid theories. If the fellowship of the united church is to be highly significant and capable of growing enrichment, it must be honestly representative of the full sweep of the growing experience of all Christians. It can be this only if it refuses to prescribe uniformity, and admits to its fellowship the differing members and differing functions, and so realizes Paul's ideal of us all as members one of another.

It becomes, thus, increasingly clear where our real unity lies, namely, in the common life we share, in the common experience we have, in the common revelation of God in Christ and in the common surrender to it. The best analogy of our religious faith is to be found in what the same great personality may mean to different people. Our entire emphasis, therefore, is to be laid on the word "Christian." Our solution of Christian fellowship even in the realm of creedal statement is thus not by abstrac-

tion but by concreteness; not by false simplicity, but by living fulness; not by relation to propositions, but by relation to facts. All our confessions of faith must come back to an experience like that that Paul had in mind when he wrote: "When it was the good pleasure of God to reveal his Son in me." The revelation is of God, it is through Christ, and it is in me. This, in some form, is reflected in every Christian experience and in every Christian confession of faith. It is the primal confession, that comes out in the primitive baptismal formula and benediction of the New Testament. We shall come together, as we more and more truly confess Christ, as our creedal statements conform more and more perfectly to his spirit and to his emphases. One of the greatest reasons, thus, for a persistent unwillingness to give decisive weight in the union of Christians to any historical creed, however important historically it may be, is because, as Fairbairn puts it, "the Church, so long as it believes in the divinity of its Founder, is bound to have a history which shall consist of successive and progressively successful attempts to return to him. He can never be transcended; all it can ever be is contained in him; but its ability to interpret him and realize his religion ought to be a developing ability."

Our basis, thus, as Christians is everywhere in the common life in Christ, in that personal relation to God in Christ that includes the whole man. But loyalty in such a concrete personal relation is a far higher test even of belief than any series of propositions can be. The simple question—"How would Christ be likely to think and to speak upon this point?"—may do more to clarify and steady a man's expression of his faith than anything else. No question is so deep-going, so revealing. Even in the realm of the conception and statement of our faith, the most stimulating and truly conserving of all influences is the love of Christ. "No man can say, Jesus is Lord, but in the Holy Spirit." We confess Christ.

"Other foundation can no man lay than that which is laid, which is Jesus Christ."

And just as in our statements of belief we are to seek not uniformity but liberty and comprehension, for the very sake of a larger faith and a larger life, that shall lead in turn to statements still more adequate, and more truly reflecting Christ; so in worship, in organization, in forms of government, in life, and in active service we must give the largest liberty, and bring all back continuously and increasingly to the test of the spirit of Christ, in the hope once again of a series of successive and progressively successful attempts to express Christ in these ways too. It is hopeless to expect the Christian world to be satisfied with any union of Christian people, that definitely excludes from its fellowship those whose desire to be loyal disciples of Christ cannot be doubted. Where Christ has already received, the church cannot reject. We are to bear honest and faithful testimony ourselves to what seems to us most Christian in these realms of worship and organization and life, and we are to be willing to heed with open mind the similar witness of other Christians; that out of all something more truly Christian than any of us have conceived may come. In other words, our Christian union must be as wide as our Christian unity of spirit. In life, in statement of belief, in worship, in institutions, in form of government—in all alike—the one essential is that we should confess Christ. This is the one great primal confession. Less than this is not Christian; more than this is exclusive.

A Programme of Christian Conference

By W. H. Frere, D.D.,
Community of the Resurrection, Mirfield.

There is a large and increasing opportunity at the present time for conference between Christians of divided allegiance with a view to a better mutual understanding. In view of the deep yearnings after Unity that are moving in the hearts of many sundered Christians, such preliminary discussions are eminently desirable and even necessary. But the value of conference depends largely upon its programme—what is to be included, what is not; and what is to be the order of proceedings?

This article is intended to suggest a mode of procedure and to justify the suggestion made. It starts from the conviction that very often in such discussions the beginning is made at the wrong point. It may be necessary in any diagnosis to begin with the obvious symptoms: but not much good is done until disease is traced back to its causes. These lie deeper and are less obvious. It is not the business of the patient to know more than the symptoms; but the men who consult with a view to healing must get, as soon as they can, to the causes.

Now the symptoms of ecclesiastical disunion are well known to us all. There is no gain in beginning a conference with them. Those who discuss must produce reasoned estimates of the causes of disease in order to form the material of profitable discussion.

The programme here suggested begins with two fundamental topics which, in the view of the writer, are

deep-lying causes of the disease; and they must be first settled—at least provisionally or in part—before it is profitable to come to details. Both of them are concerned with the methods of God's working in relation to man.

(1) First we enquire, what is the beginning of religious experience? Does it depend upon man's consciousness, or solely on God's action? We reply that God comes first. His action is antecedent to man's action, and independent of it. This is a proposition which all would accept in theory; but, when we come to practice, such acceptance is found to be very imperfect. And in fact people do tend to regard man's action Godward as an initiative. The result of such a view is disastrous, as one or two familiar instances will show.

(a) Thus in regard to conversion:—the turning of man to God is always a response to the eternal, antecedent and independent call of the Father, and the drawing of the love of the Saviour. But this is often misconceived. In some religious spheres, where religion is thought to begin with a conscious, or even dramatic, act of man's turning to God, there is apt to be a serious wastage. There are souls waiting, longing to make the move, but not finding in themselves the initiative, which they suppose to be needful. So they remain—in the view of their friends, at least, and perhaps in their own view, unlaunched Christians—disappointed and disappointing. This is a real disaster: but it is inevitable if the initiative lies with man.

(b) In regard to the knowledge of God, many are groping, and cannot produce or procure a living knowledge of God. They wait, expecting it to come, as their own discovery, rather than as a revelation from God. They wait, sad and dull: as time goes on they begin to despair. This is a disastrous situation; but it cannot be helped if the reality of religion only begins with man's conscious move.

(c) Still more do men despair of being able to love God. They cannot find it in themselves to attempt so great a task: and they have never been taught, with all its implications, the great truth that *We can only love Him because He first loved us*,—in other words, that our love of God is not an advance but a response.

Thus schemes of religion that make over much of man's action, man's faith, man's turning, man's love,—leave much spiritual wreckage by the side of their track as they work themselves out.

(d) If such things happen in religious circles, much more do the like disasters occur outside such areas. Many a man, well disposed, but not naturally religiously minded, finds little spiritual capacity in himself, such as he sees moving in others. He concludes that the capacity for religion is a peculiarity, perhaps even a fad or an eccentricity. He lapses into an indifference which perhaps he greatly regrets. But he feels that he cannot help it. He has no religion in him: at any rate then he will make no religious professions. And he consoles himself with that cold comfort. If he is specially sensitive he may become more violent. He may come to abuse religion as a delusion, self-created; as a mischievous piece of hypocrisy, obscurantism, or self-deception. Such cases are the sad, but natural, outcome, if God does not come first.

(e) The disaster of this inversion of the true order of things is perhaps seen more clearly still in the world of the child. If religion begins with man's action Godward, then the religion of the child is potential only, not actual. By many persons today the child is regarded as a future convert, rather than as an actual child of God, capable of receiving God's grace, and in baptism especially receiving the Holy Spirit, with the baptismal gift of membership and sonship. This divergence of thought is the cause of much theological difference, not only on the subject of the doctrine of baptism, but also about membership, worship, missionary method, etc., and, ultimate-

ly, church polity. This underlies also much of the English and colonial controversy about religious education. The view of the child as a future potential convert causes the cry, "Let the child wait till he is old enough to act for himself." And the disasters that are ready to follow in England and Wales from this mistaken cry, the next decades will reveal.

No! God comes first. Our turning to Him, our learning to know Him, our daring to love Him, are not audacities of our own initiative, though they involve our venture of faith. They are acts of response. Even apart from them, the sons of the covenant are the happy recipients of grace and privilege,—the unconscious child, and the unawakened adult, among the rest.

Here then we have reached the answer to the first question propounded; and discussion cannot get far unless there is some agreement on such a point. If our divergences of religious thought today are to be brought into a harmony, we must expel the Pelagian tendency, so natural to our self-importance; we must build up our concordat on the foundation principle of our absolute dependence upon God. It is through lack of practical and actual agreement on this fundamental point that our differences go down so deep,—far deeper than we readily acknowledge,—and our many well-intentioned but superficial efforts to reconcile them fail, and perhaps disappoint and embitter us. An agreement on this subject is therefore the chief and deepest foundation to be laid.

(2) Assuming then henceforward as a common basis, that, in the fullest sense, God's manward work is antecedent to man's Godward action, and independent of it, we turn next to consider in what way God works.

Is it by purely spiritual action? or does God use common material means for the highest religious ends?

Again we may expect a large agreement in theory, and a somewhat wide divergence in point of fact. A deep-seated mistrust of the material has haunted Chris-

tian thought from the earliest days, and haunts it still, making men suspicious, if not intolerant, of ordinances.

This is fundamentally contrary to the Gospel of the Incarnation: yet it survives and recrudesces. Moreover such a mistrust puts religion at the mercy of the emotions. For if religious fervour may not be represented and mediated by the external, then it must all be fermented from within. Thus the very people, who think they are fighting emotionalism, are often those who are chiefly its prey. For it is not in the externalities, let us say, of High Mass—of ceremonial, of incense, of colour, of music, and the rest,—that the worst form of that danger lies. The externals occasion, in any case, only a superficial form of the danger of emotionalism. Far more dangerous is the emotionalism that misdirects and mishandles man's deepest feelings. And this worse form of the danger is bound up with the policy that bans external helps to devotion, and plays upon inner feelings, under the delusion that the former being material are necessarily unspiritual, while the latter being intangible are necessarily spiritual.

If we are to understand one another we must come to a better agreement in this matter. We must unite, first as to the principle, that God freely uses material means for spiritual ends; and then in respect of the details that derive from that general principle.

(a) We are already doing so in the case of one of the important derivatives, *viz.*, the Doctrine of the Church. Less and less does the view prevail that the Body of Christ is no more than an invisible church. If we at all conceive of God condescending for our salvation to material means, then the idea of His using or even founding a human organization, as one of the means of the world's salvation, need no longer be suspect. And if in principle it is found to be not inadmissible, then it is soon found acceptable in practice, as an actual, historical and effective fact.

(b) The like consideration holds good about documents safeguarding the Revelation of the Faith. If the enshrining of spiritual truth in words—human words—and in alphabets—human alphabets—on material parchment and paper, is a process capable of spiritual import. and not to be held unworthy of God's purposes and methods, then Scriptures and Creeds can be accepted as having their place in God's methods: and with them also Catechisms, Canons, Articles, Confessions of Faith, and all the rest. It is arbitrary to accept Scriptures and reject Creeds. The documents differ in value, but in principle they are all the same. The Scriptures were written in the earliest days, and were canonized, by the same processes which made the two catholic creeds. These creeds became valuable above others, because they best sum up a history in accordance with the primitive records. Other formularies have ranged wider, and become more dogmatic and less historical; and therefore they count for less. As a rule the smaller and more peculiar the body that they represent, the more dogmatic and exclusive they have become. But still the principle holds good: the catholic creeds are supreme in formulation of Christian verity; and even the most controversial and sectional of confessions have some part to play in the safeguarding of the divine truth of God's Revelation.

(c) Again, and still more obviously, material media as Means of Grace are seen to have their place in the divine economy. In spite of their being material, perhaps because of it, they can be recognized as efficient with spiritual power. There is no need to discredit the word of prayer, or of blessing, or of consecration, because it is human, and expressed by material means. There is no need to regard the Ministry of Grace as man's convenience. There is no reason to deny that man can act, bless, absolve, ordain, and the rest, on behalf of God. There is no justification in principle for denying the objective efficiency of sacramental rites in their varying

measure, ranging from the high power of the two great sacraments of our Saviour's institution, down through many stages of lesser but real efficiency to such things as Ikons, Relics or Holy Water.

(3) If these two great principles with their derivatives can be accepted, and especially in so far as Christians can be agreed about the "sacramental principle"—using that phrase as a general term which may sum up the whole of the preceding section—then and so far can we profitably go on to discuss outstanding differences of detail,—such as the Polity of the Church and its Government, the Ministry of Grace, the Belief to be required of Members, the right use of the ordinances:—in fact the burning questions of the day.

Under each of these heads many points arise which it will be best to put in the form of questions.

(a) Is there any one and exclusively necessary system of Church Polity and Government? We are face to face with many divergences, papal, episcopal and non-episcopal. None of these three terms describes a single unvarying scheme. Even the papal theory of government is divided among rival schools of thought, and is actually carried out in very varying degrees in different places. Still more varying a thing is episcopal government, both in history and in present practice. It has been autocratic, it has been constitutional; within the rampart of Celtic monasticism in old days it was reduced —so far as government goes—to a non-entity; and in later days, and to some extent still, within the areas of religious orders, its administrative power has been and is almost *nil.*

Non-episcopal polities are yet more divergent. Some emphasize the side expressed by the term presbyterian, others that expressed by the term congregational: some aim at much regulation, others at little.

Is any of them the one necessary? Is it not more likely that they all have some value and suitability? In their

moderate forms they are not mutually exclusive. May it be truly said that there is no one ideal polity, except only the government of Christ the Head: and that the Church polity, which will be best adapted to act in subordination to our Lord for the regulation of His Body, will be that which combines most of these excellencies?

(b) Turn next to the question of the Ministry of Grace; for this is a wholely different sphere from the last, though the same officers normally operate in both spheres, since they act both as rulers of the flock and also as dispensers of Word and Sacrament.

If the Ministry of Grace is not a human convenience, but a living agency acting efficiently on behalf of God, what are the guarantees that certify it as such? The idea of a ministerial succession is strongly asserted both as a fact and as a principle: it is also denied in theory and severely criticized as a historical claim. It would carry things too far to discuss here the historical question. So we will confine ourselves to one single remark on the subject. Even if it be conceded that the claim is assailable when started in a crudely mechanical form, it must be admitted to be far less so when regarded as a spiritual claim: and we are now dealing not with mere mechanism, but with spiritual treasures as contained in earthen vessels.

Supposing then for the sake of the argument that the claim in this sense is true—as the writer himself believes it to be—what is its significance?

We have three things to distinguish—(1) a spiritual charisma, (2) an ecclesiastical authority conferred by the body in the name of the Lord; and (3) a public reliability. The Ministry, to be not only efficient, but also "valid" (that is "reliable") needs all three. St. Matthias had all three in a different way from the Twelve. In his case the ecclesiastical authority was in special evidence; and the public reliability much depended on it. St.

Paul's Ministry is different again in position. It was questioned: and he was not as the Twelve, nor yet as St. Matthias. He claimed to have received the spiritual charisma independently; and he demanded subsequently of the Church ecclesiastical recognition rather than authority. He never wholly won this; and perhaps to the end of his life his position was not universally recognized as valid—*i.e.* reliable. He is the chief representative of the ministry sometimes called—by a somewhat unfortunate misuse of the term—charismatic. All ministry is properly speaking charismatic: but this special form, which has usurped the title, differs from the normal ministry, in that, while the normal receives simultaneously the divine charisma and the ecclesiastical authority, the abnormal makes its claim independently of ecclesiastical authority, and wins public recognition of its reliability (if at all), not through ecclesiastical attestation, but from practical evidence of efficient working of spiritual gifts.

(i) Now in considering the position thus defined, all will be agreed that it is the spiritual charisma that is of supreme importance: and no man may presume to say how God shall give it and how not: that would be to make the very mistake that St. Paul's opponents made.

(ii) But on the other hand God is known in His workings towards us as a God of law and order. He has worked in this particular respect along well defined lines, and, as we cannot but see, concurrently with ecclesiastical action, since the days of Matthias. He has given the gift concurrently with the laying on of the hands of the Apostle and of the presbytery. The inner and the outward call of the individual candidate, on his side, are thus matched, on the side of the Body, by the spiritual charisma and the ecclesiastical authority conferred upon him. No one can presume to say that the man who has the ordination of any part of the Body of Christ is not capable of acting with its authority: and where he is so commis-

sioned the presumption is that he receives also a ministerial charisma of God.

(iii) But more is needed, for his ministry to be fully accepted. It must be accepted not only as complete, but also as reliable. If it is to be reliable, the Church as a whole must be satisfied that the particular Church and ministry, which gave him its authority, was qualified to do so, from the point of view of the Church as a whole. May it now be said that it is at this point that the question of succession comes in? (a) Succession clearly is not the *sine qua non* of spiritual charisma, for God is not tied to His ordinances: He can and evidently does give a spiritual charisma of ministry where there is no unbroken ecclesiastical succession. (b) Are we to say then that Succession is the guarantee of ecclesiastical authority? In practice it may be; equally it may not be; for not all ordinations are regular, even if valid. (c) Are we not then led to conclude that the real value of Succession lies in the fact that essentially it is the guarantee required for the third requirement, *viz.*, public reliability? It is in this capacity that the doctrine of Succession makes its first controversial appearance upon the stage of ecclesiastical history. The Succession, though, as we believe, a fact, did not become an argument, to be used in favour of some, and against others, until the fight with Gnosticism in the last quarter of the second century made men examine the credentials of ministries and bodies[1]: and then the Great Church required evidence of the Succession as a guarantee of public reliability. The argument, it is true, was more used to establish a reliable doctrine than a reliable ministry; but the two ideas are not separable. May it not then be the case that the true value of the Succession lies in the guarantee that it gives to the Church as a whole of the reliability of the ministry of a particular part?

[1]The appearance of the idea in the Clementine Epistle is, of course, earlier; but not, in the present sense, controversial.

If this is so, the consequences must be thought out, as they affect the Nonconformist views of their own ministry and of the Catholic ministries: as they affect the Catholic view of Nonconformist ministries; and as they affect the Orthodox and Roman Catholic views of the Anglican ministry. All the divisions of Christendom are concerned to secure that their several ministries should be, not only adequate from their own point of view, but also accepted as reliable by the Church as a whole. The attainment of such an end will necessitate many reconsiderations, and demand of all much humility and charity. But the prospect seems hopeful, if the lines suggested prove to be sound. No Christian body can rightly be asked to surrender its own ultimate convictions as to its own ministry; but if it can come to an agreement with others on the great principles that lie behind the Faith, the Church and the Sacraments, then it may rightly be asked to make any sacrifices short of such surrender, in order to satisfy the scruples of the rest.

(c) Turning next to consider the degree of belief to be required by the Church of its members, we may state the question thus. Some parts of the faith are necessarily *de fide*, and must be maintained as *sine qua non;* others may rightly be left to be matters of individual opinion. What is the relation of these two divisions? Some desire to make the *de fide* requirement as large as possible, while others desire to keep it as small as may be. Is it wise to encourage theologians in screwing up the *de fide* standard as high as possible, on the ground that the more definition and requirement there is, the better for simple souls? Is the rival tendency better, which claims, that the less definition and requirement there is, the better for truth, growth and liberty? The former practice issues in a great uniformity, which may harden into paralysis: the free variety may degenerate into anarchy: and in either case life suffers.

At present each party is too much tied to what it has, to appreciate what the other party has: while there are some that belong to neither party and are suspected by both. To those who value uniformity they seem half-hearted or hesitating because they do not regulate belief more strictly: while to those who love freedom and variety they seem illiberal, because they stipulate for so much as they do. They are too negative for some, and too positive for others: and meanwhile they are apt themselves to misunderstand both the others. Here again may we not look for a blending of ideals to come about, as the parties learn to understand one another: and for the consequent development of a richer catholicism?

(d) Lastly, What bearing has all this on the practical use of the Means of Grace?

Is it right to think that the more sacramental an Ordinance is, the less popular, and the more restricted, should be its use? Or is the reverse the case?

Certainly there are many who would say of themselves: —"I have little spiritual gift, little religious imagination, little devotional power. If I am encouraged to go to Mass, to make my Communion, then,—because I have so little in myself,—I can do that much, and I gladly will. For however poor I myself am, I am then in touch with the external worship and the objective Grace of God. But I have no gift for meditative services, such as *e.g.* Morning and Evening Prayer, and no taste for sermons." Others like them are saying:—"I have little power of penitence, small sense of contrition, and a dull sense of divine mercy. If I am left to myself in such efforts, I shall never get far: but if I am encouraged to make my confession before the priest and to receive God's Absolution at his lips, the external and sacramental will carry me beyond myself, and make up for my own spiritual inertia."

Such people as these must be fully considered besides those of an opposite spiritual nature, who find a good

deal of spiritual capacity in their own nature, and are impatient of the external. The two opposite temperaments find it difficult to understand one another. So the mystic and the institutionalist find themselves to a sad extent intrenched in opposite camps. Yet they are brothers, and they need one another. And they themselves, and the Church as a whole, will receive new strength, when they are able to find some common ground, and advance out of their respective camps to co-operate upon it.

Here then is an attempt to outline a programme of Christian Conference. The burning questions of the controversy of the day come at the end of the programme. When they are undertaken at the beginning without the preceding discussion of principles, they are apt to remain where they were,—questions still, and unsolved, and burning questions withal, that result in more pain than profit. But if preliminary principles can be first discussed, and some agreement can be reached about them between some parties (even though the agreement be at first only partial and provisional), then new possibilities will arise of the settlement of practical differences and the extinguishing of the bonfires of controversy.

Neither in "this mountain" nor yet "in Jerusalem" is the ultimate Worship of God: but in a heavenly Zion, common to them both, and not yet attained. May it not be that, in the mercy of God, even our mean divisions may be used and overruled to lead us on a good stage thitherward?

Unity in Scholarship

By Francis Brown, D.D., LL.D.,
President of Union Theological Seminary.

In 1906 a book was published in England which had a quite unique significance. This was not due to its size, for it had less than seventy pages, and not to its comprehensive scope, for it dealt with a single question, and was, in effect, an occasional pamphlet, put in boards for convenience;—nor yet to its attitude and opinions, for these, though clear and vigorous, were shared by many. Its unique significance lay in its joint authorship by two men of learning and high repute, of whom one was a devoted Roman Catholic, and the other a convinced Protestant, both of whom heartily agreed on the question at issue, maintaining it, each from his own point of view, by such arguments as appeal to students. They found no inconsistency in uniting their voices to advocate a common conviction, while in loyalty to their respective communions they remained of different minds. In the Preface, after explaining the occasion, they say: "We therefore now publish herewith these much-tested reflections and requirements of two working scholars and life-long lovers of organized Christianity, sure that truth sincerely sought and simply spoken can never completely miscarry among men." This is the speech of authors who know the meaning of "Unity in Scholarship."

As I name the title of the book, its tenor, and the names of its writers, prejudice may begin to lift its head. The book is *The Papal Commission and the Penta-*

teuch, it opposed the conclusions which the Pontifical Biblical Commission set forth, and the authors were Charles A. Briggs and Friedrich von Hügel. Prejudice, however, is entreated to lie down again. I may have my view of the matter at issue, and any readers of this article may have theirs. But I cite the book not to make propaganda for or against its particular views. If Baron von Hügel and Dr. Briggs had agreed with the Papal Commission instead of criticizing it, their union in publicly avowing this opinion would still have been significant. It is true, such a union would then have been less likely, as may perhaps presently appear. But as far as the fact of unity is concerned it is of less consequence whether two who are touching shoulders are marching North or marching South. We are occupied, just now, with the fact of unity in scholarship.

The motive of such a partnership as this is of course not the partnership itself. The partnership is a means to an end. This is the precise point to be emphasized. There are ends, dear to scholarship, devotion to which has power to unite men whose religious views are in a certain measure contrary to each other, whose allegiance is to authorities which themselves decline to recognize each other, whose positions in ecclesiastical matters represent historical antinomies now centuries old, whose spiritual ancestors persecuted and anathematized each other, the inclusion of whose children, ultimately, in a single church fold, once more, seems a hopeless dream to many, and perhaps the approach to it a menace. About such *ultimata*, the present article asserts nothing. It is concerned merely with certain phenomena, which all may observe and test, and with their implicit presuppositions and consequences.

There is evidently a large degree of mutual confidence between men who thus unite in scholarship. Each must have the assurance of the other's absolute honesty with himself and his fellow. Each is certain that the other

will not allow his churchly pre-suppositions to warp his rigid method of observation and inference. No ecclesiastical postulate can effect the induction in the regions of scientific inquiry where that process is sovereign. Each knows this of his associate. Each is certain, too, that the other will express what, as a scientific student, he has reached by this method. There will be no juggling with facts, no cowardice, no silence treasonable to the truth.

Another implicit assurance is the conviction of each that the truth does not disturb the religion of his fellow or himself. There is a range of inquiry on which men of different religious minds may enter, and on which they expect to reach positive results to be inevitably held by them in common, without abandoning their fundamental convictions in the matter of religion. These are not discussions in which one expects to persuade the other to give up his original ground. Discussions of that kind presume diversity, involve argument and counter-argument, perhaps struggle, contention, the drawing of lines sharper than before. But polemic is not unity, and polemic is excluded, between those who are united by scholarship, in as far as the scholarship is earnest, and the union serviceable. This must be quite consistent therefore, with a sense of security in fundamental positions, even while these disagree. Whoever is unwilling, in advance, to pursue a scholarly aim with one whose religious platform he does not stand on, is to this extent deprived of the experience of unity in scholarship. Such unity requires—to insist on the point excessively, perhaps—a perception of definite areas where the faculties of trained men may exercise themselves together, where the determining factors are such as appeal to all trained men alike, where, however difficult it may be to ascertain the exact facts, and however delicate the process of combination and however great the skill needed in that process, nothing, after all, is called for outside of scientific

competence; where the microscope tells the same story to equally instructed eyes, and the generalization from observed phenomena brings the same conviction to equally unperverted minds.

It was said, or implied, a few pages back, that minds accustomed to progress, and undisturbed when they are conscious of growth, are more likely to enter into scholarly fellowship than minds timid or reactionary, or even dwelling by preference on the conservation of what has long been held. This really needs no argument. Such minds are practically familiar with the methods of ascertaining truth used by those who set the world forward,—used because they are the only methods at the disposal of men—the available, necessary, effective methods. They have seen these methods at work, and they have come to trust them because their own minds have been satisfied by the use of them. They have applied these methods, sincerely, to the historical foundations of their own faith, and to the experiences which make that faith vivid. They can give intelligible reasons for the faith that is in them. They use sound methods of attaining truth in estimating the most precious mental treasures they have. Naturally, they do not hesitate to use them in departments of thought, which, however important, are to the religious mind secondary, and not primary.

They may not all agree in conclusions within any one of these departments. Mathematical certainty is not attainable in non-mathematical regions. The opinions of some must be nearer the truth than those of others. It is not, may I repeat, a question of precise results. Baron von Hügel and Professor Briggs might conceivably have disagreed in the outcome of their respective letters, bound up together in 1906. The best tools of the best workmen will show, in one way or another, the individuality of the man who wields them. But those who believe in their tools, and have some

mastery of them, can still carve cheerfully, side by side.

Those, however, who are clinging to the past, and are disturbed by the fact of change, who do not expect new truth, and never care to test the old, are naturally less able to unite with others in scholarly inquiry, because the ends of scientific scholarship do not call out their reverence. They distrust the faculties of the human mind. Knowledge, for them, is something imparted more than acquired, something fixed, solid, established,—inorganic rather than vital, a rock and not a growing tree. Rocks are dead, and do not grow together, while in the Syrian Lebanon you may see great living cedars, with independent roots, organically joined, one to another, in their branches.

Unity in scholarship, then, implies a vital scholarship—scholarship in action. Union in any kind of work tends to break down barriers between men, and those who think of unity must always take this fact into the account. It is so, especially, when the association does not aim at unity as its prime end, but is absorbed in some purpose to which unity is a preliminary, or an incident. "Go to, now, let us be united!" arouses the latent antagonisms, thrusts the conditions of unity into the foreground, from this side and that. "Is not this thing great and worthy? Let us do it side by side!" fixes our common thought on the achievement, we measure each other by our desire for that, and our contribution to that, and before we know it we are going forward with arms closely linked.

This is true often, when the common work is physical. Only it must not be mechanical, not even the mechanically skilful, merely,—not digging, nor tending machines, unless this work is, consciously, for a common good, and each isolated worker is concerned in the achievement of all,—soldiers keeping step in the rhythmical march, or throwing up earthworks in patriotic defence; boys in a

game, each adroitly contributing to team-work; musicians fiddling together to achieve a symphony; a ship's crew straining together to hold out in a storm;—especially, perhaps, all endurance of hardship together. Comrades in battle are not absorbed in devising new ways of being comrades, but in winning the victory. The new comradeship comes of itself. You warm towards the man by whose side you have fought.

Obviously, work which calls only the physical into play will not bring this about. It must be work with purpose in it. The purpose is the essential thing, the only essential thing. The physical may wholly drop away. The common effort may lie wholly in the sphere of mind and will, where the purpose is born and lives. The unifying effect is here, also, proportioned to the compelling force of the purpose.

This is illustrated for us, every day, on mission fields —as yet chiefly among branches of Protestants—where the strength of resolve to meet the superhuman task makes its own alliances, to which, in the absorbing enthusiasm of the service, the veto of a divisive prejudice appears as an impertinence—an impossibility. The difficulty is, of course, that enthusiasm in its narrower forms, may sometimes make friction and kindle the very prejudice that thwarts it. We must instruct our enthusiasms and give them perspective, to make the common end the dominant factor in Christian missionary action.

Meanwhile a part is played by less demonstrative, more purely intellectual faculties. We have come a long way on the path of intellectual recognition and real union, even where union in religion seems impossible as yet. Its value as approach to such union lies in better knowledge, fellowship, the breaking down of aversions, the building up of appreciation and mutual respect, a confidence by each in the other's rational competence and integrity. I am to speak of this in

some slight detail. If I show my Protestant and non-liturgical training, unawares, in doing so, I hope it may be pardoned; I shall not intentionally thrust these forward.

The intellectual bond and personal fellowship between persons of different religious beliefs has not always been admitted, or, indeed, been possible. We are concerned, for the present, chiefly with Christendom. The earlier ages of the Church have been marked either by prevailing religious uniformity, or by the clash of religious conflict. Now, neither in times of general religious uniformity, nor in times of general religious conflict, has the association of different religious types in achievements of the mind been a notable phenomenon. When there was one religious standard to which practically all conformed, the question of intellectual fellowship between men who were religious opposites could not often arise. When it did arise, it served only to mark the distinction between powerful orthodoxy and feeble heresy, in which the blaze of orthodoxy sought out and consumed the heretical upstart. And when types of religion were fighting each other, and the issue was doubtful, party-lines were drawn sharply, of necessity fellowship seemed compromise, and compromise was hateful; Christ and Belial had nothing in common—even when groups differed *in toto* as to which was Belial and which was Christ. No doubt areas still persist in the Church at large where the same sharp lines are maintained, but they are diminishing in extent. No doubt, also, there are still emergencies, where principles seem at stake, and strong feeling is enlisted—where singlemindedness is the watchword, and both mind and spirit stand with drawn swords—and where any kind of commerce, even calmly intellectual commerce, between religious opponents is not in human power. But these emergencies, also, are growing fewer, by degrees.

Religious persecution has not been so very long dead,

and even now it rises out of its grave from time to time. Of course persecution and the spirit of persecution cannot live with mutual recognition and respect. These are contradictions. The power to tolerate must precede the power to understand, and understanding, in turn, begets tolerance. Then comes the discerning of a common heritage in fields of science and of reflection, not riven by divergence in religion.

The mention of the Church in the same breath with scholarship is irritating to some who are scholars. And indeed no one can be ignorant of the spokes put in learning's wheel by the Church, and churches, time and again. But we must try to remember all the facts. Even when, at one time, it has applied the most primitive of brakes, the Church, at another—occasionally even at the same time—has been handling the reins and perhaps whipping up the horses. And on the whole the coach has gone forward. Certainly no church of our common acquaintance, even when it brands a doctrine as false, would now admit opposition to learning as such. And obscurantism is pining and shrivelling in many quarters. But this matter is aside from the present purpose. We are assuming that men love knowledge, churchmen like the rest. If any do not, this article is not for them. But for those who do, their love of knowledge may introduce them to each other, and hold them in contact, till they, more or less firmly, grow together.

On the scientific side, Haeckel and Tyndall and Huxley arrayed many religious people against them—unwisely, no doubt—because they left the realm of science, where they had mastery, to philosophize and theologize in regions where special training did not qualify them to pronounce; but this has as little to do with our present thesis as the obstructive tactics have which religious authority has so often employed against scientific results, among which that authority has not made itself at home.

The one absolute condition of unity in scholarship is love of truth above all things else. This is opposed to blind confidence in one's own set of opinions, which prevents one from applying to those opinions the common tests of truth—which regards such opinions as enthroned above all tests; and it is opposed also to the identification of one's own opinions with the truth in such a way as to cause distrust of the integrity of those who differ. The habit of consciously setting truth first, of desiring to be corrected where one is wrong, of cherishing no views which cannot survive discussion, of humility in the presence of truth, and of the vast ranges of human ignorance, grows strong from candid experience of men. We actually find men whose character we trust, whose honesty we know, whose word we believe, and who yet reach conclusions different from ours, when their premises appear to be the same. We learn to hold our own views firmly, convinced that, approaching it from one side we have touched truth, and yet ready to acknowledge and avow that this may not be the whole of truth. We have some conception of the existence of higher verities not yet fully grasped, which take up into themselves all the partial truths, our own opinions among them, even convictions which seem to us opposites and inconsistencies, and combine them in a loftier harmony.

This firm humility, or humble firmness, before truth is really a humble faith in God. We need to believe in God profoundly, if we are to have genuine unity in scholarly endeavour with those whose sincere views are importantly at variance with our own. God is greater than our knowledge of Him. His mastery of truth transcends ours. All His faithful ones with their many little minds are needed to represent the fulness of His great mind.

Even in childhood and boyhood, common study has unifying value, as real as common play. Common

schools, uniting many confessions, have a profound value for that very reason. I speak as an American. If we believe in religion, schools without direct religious teaching do not satisfy the abstract ideal, but if, at present, no other common and public schools are possible, without working a sense of injustice and intensifying religious bitterness, we may be content to lay the responsibility for religion upon organized religion itself, and recognize the value to social unity of the combination of different religious elements in the same schools. Those who have sat together on the same benches will not be inclined to a crusade against each other in future years.

The development of the educational system of the United States on this basis, the growth of State Universities, built up on a system of tax-supported schools, —no questions being asked at a single door as to religious affiliations—and parallel growth in institutions of private endowment, demonstrate with tremendous power the conquest of great mental ranges for religious freedom and equality, whatever may be their other weaknesses or defects. I can remember when in some New England Colleges a Catholic or a Jew would have been a marked man. Now even a host of Catholics and Jews surprises no one. To stigmatize Harvard as Unitarian now sounds as much out of date as to exalt Columbia for being Episcopalian. In other lands these phenomena are equally at home, sometimes in extreme and radical forms. A religion established by law of course introduces complications. It was only in 1854 that the ancient English Universities were opened to Dissenters, only in 1871 that non-Anglicans could become Fellows or teachers there, and the problem of elementary schools is yet unsettled in England. The German educational system frankly recognizes great branches of the Christian Church, and some Universities have distinct faculties of theology for Catholics and Protestants. France, on

the other hand, having disestablished its religion has swung far away. On the remote Mediterranean Coast there is a great college, founded by American Protestant Christians of the New England type, in whose teaching body are representatives of Christian communions which have by no means always stood together, and in whose class-rooms Presbyterian and Congregational students sit side by side with Latins and Maronites, Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics, Mohammedans, Druzes and Jews. They are all taught to be religious and to respect each other's religion.

One more illustration I must touch on lightly, although it lies within the religious field itself. I am familiar with an institution which exists for teaching purposes in a department where divisions have been sharp, and still are so, in many sections of it. The field is that of scholarly and practical education for the Christian ministry. Its governing board and its teaching force include members of six ecclesiastical bodies, and its students are from twenty-six. With few exceptions these students remain in their original connection during their three or four years of professional training, receiving, as far as their numbers warrant it, particular instruction in the specific things they need to know as members of their several churches. Most of their class-room hours, however, find them thoroughly intermingled, and in these, denominational earmarks would be hard to detect on teacher or on pupil. Fellowship within this Faculty of Theology and within the student-body, and between these two, is close and harmonious, with the differences that always appear among earnest men of vigorous minds, but not most emphatic in sectarian lines. All owe allegiance to the truth, seek it, strive to be governed by it. It is not yet a complete Church Unity, although, amid the independent opinions which are held within it, there are those affirming that no closer Church Unity is possible. It represents at least a distinct unity in the churches,

and perhaps has its part in spreading beyond itself that oneness in the Spirit, without which external unity will always be shadow rather than substance.

It is a slight digression, perhaps not impertinent, to say that in a country like the United States, where no form of religion is established by law, the door is opened to liberty of religious organization so wide as to be confusing to an observer, and make petty contentions easy. But the very multiplication of religious bodies, on the same civic plane, whose members touch each other at a hundred points in political, social and moral activities, practically forces them to close association on many fields of common life, which of itself is worth a large price. It is in this sense that it may be said with some truth that the multiplicity of sects under these conditions tends to work its own cure, in as far as acquaintance and association favour ultimate unity in religion. But to return.

Even when there is nothing supremely religious in the pursuit of common studies side by side by members of different religious bodies,—except so far as there is always a religious element in the pursuit of truth—it is not therefore inefficacious. In any case an opportunity is offered for religion to recognize itself under differing forms. It works for cohesion and mental interpretation. It makes personal contacts. It dispels blind prejudice. Religious indifference may be sometimes a fruit of it, but that is simply a fresh challenge to religion. It does not so much make proselytes as remove incentives to proselyting. It even promotes assimilation. And let those dread this process who have little faith in the power of their own religion to hold its own in a fair field!

But mature scholarship has its unities also. I must illustrate chiefly from regions which I know best—sciences akin to theology.

Interchange of results, in scholarship, begets a sense of fellowship. Real masters in any skilled trade, value each

other's handicraft. Honest, artistic products breed confidence in the honesty and artistry and competence of fellow-craftsmen. So real scholars recognize each other's integrity and live in mutual appreciation and self-respect. Take textual criticism, which is judgment based on detailed critical evidence, having no proper connection with theological bias. Hort's textual skill, and that of Weiss and von Soden are honoured everywhere. Abbé Gasquet, revising the text of Jerome's Latin Version of the Bible, shows Protestants and Catholics alike how to photograph manuscripts. What student really cares, except for the honour of it, to what body the newer editors of the LXX belong? Learning will judge them not by their theology, but by their accuracy, their keenness, their sobriety, their fair-mindedness.

Take the publication of diplomatic treasures: no one will grudge to Protestants the editorship of the Freer manuscripts, nor to Catholics the publication of the Coptic parchments which Mr. Morgan left in the hands of Professor Hyvernat. The only question in either case will be: is it well done?

Take archaeology: We are not prejudiced or predisposed by the religious name of Rawlinson, Layard or Loftus, of Oppert, Schrader or Delitzsch, of Peters or Koldewey, of Osiander and Glaser and Müller. We do not always remember their religion, we ask only whether they saw and knew. We do not distinguish on theological grounds between the travellers who have eyes in their heads, the Bordeaux Pilgrim and Mukaddasi, Marino Sanuto and Parchi, and Fabri, Pietro della Valle and Cotovicus and Pococke, Seetzen and Burckhurdt, Robinson, Tobler, Guérin and Renan, Wilson and Warren and Kitchener and George Adam Smith. We judge them by their quickness and comprehensiveness of observation and their precision of remark. The German and the American Schools at Jerusalem learn gladly from Dominicans and Assumptionists and Bene-

dictines. Excavators like Petrie, Bliss, Macalister and Mackenzie are for all religions.

The admirable modern library at the *École Biblique de Saint Étienne in Jerusalem*, is stocked with the works of Protestant scholars, and with the best periodicals of all lands and faiths, which contribute to scholarly discussion, and it is opened to scholars of whatever creed. One debates with the Dominicans who have made it famous on points of exegesis, and epigraphy, on textual criticism and literary history, on philology and archaeology, and the feet of the whole group stand on the common ground of exact phenomena, and scientific evidence. No Protestant library for scholars is complete without their *Revue Biblique*. Père Lagrange is indispensable for the study of Semitic Religions, and Père Jaussen for Arabian customs. Père Dhorme is an authority on Babylonian origins, language and religion, and the author of an important commentary on Samuel. Pères Biever and Abel and Savignac are specialists of high rank in Palestine topography, usage, epigraphy and history. To Père Vincent, a genius,—in a frail physique, alas!—we must all go as learners whether for ancient Canaan, or for Jerusalem and Bethlehem, ancient and modern, illuminated by exhaustive inquiry and discussion; and Père Vincent in turn pays tribute to the British Palestine Exploration Fund, and its foundation-laying map.

Such illustrations could be multiplied indefinitely and at random. Bryennios was a Metropolitan of the Greek Orthodox Church, and his edition of the *Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* busied scholars of many varieties of faith for a long series of years. Smend and Socin were German Protestants, but there was nothing confessional about their edition of the Mesha-Inscription. Grenfell and Hunt are English Protestants, but their Egyptian discoveries are studied by the world. Lepsius, Maspero, de Morgan, Naville, Breasted, Reisner and other ex-

plorers in Egypt have no sectarian stamp upon them. So it goes the world over, and in many other regions of knowledge and thought.

Of course we cannot confine our view to Christianity alone. As scientific training has spread, it has shown itself to be tied to no creed. Hindus and Japanese are capable scholars. Moslems are beginning to appropriate modern learning and its methods. Jews have long done so. Graetz, Goldziher, Bacher, Neubauer, Schechter, Montefiore, Gottheil, Jastrow, Friedländer, Ehrlich, Ben Jehuda are a very few of the names which Christian and Jewish scholars alike pronounce with respect. Here also, acquaintance brings confidence and personal regard. This is not less important in the interest of scholarly advance, than the interdependence of different types of Christian students. It is important also for human progress. We cannot look forward to quite the same religious fellowship, in this case, in proportion as Christianity contradicts modern Judaism, and Judaism Christianity, but mutual understanding always works toward appreciation in the religious sphere as well as elsewhere. Christians may admit that a truth-loving Jew among scholars, is nearer the Kingdom of God in his studies, than a Christian who twists his evidence to make out a case; and Jews may admit that a Christian scholar who seeks real things with humility is a worthier servant of the Highest than a Jew who blinds himself to facts. Who can tell what religious fellowship, in such conditions, the God whom Jew and Christian both adore, may some day bring to pass? Who can estimate the needless alienation which polemic and persecution have had to answer for in these relationships, hitherto?

Association in a common work is a still closer exhibition and promoter of unity. The less pronounced forms of it bring together contributors to some large publication, in a kind of theoretical or ideal connection, each doing his own portion, without necessarily seeing or knowing

his fellow-contributors, at most being familiar with their names and having a personal judgment of the qualifications of some of them. Each is conscious of association with the rest, more or less vaguely, according to his temperament, and each is satisfied or dissatisfied, honoured or compromised, by his associates, according to the sharpness of his opinion respecting their ability and integrity. Most modern encyclopedias are constructed on this basis. This comprehensiveness of plan as to subjects and authors, both, gives them large value. The skilful editor seeks the competent man, in whatever religious group he finds him.

The direct effect on Unity in all such cases consists partly of the freedom with which every thorough-going scholar takes knowledge where he finds it, and is to this extent not different from the interchange of learning already considered. There must be, besides, some correspondence and contact with the editorial force, and this tends to real combination. But, beyond this, the demonstration to the world of an association in diversity has its unifying value. The silent evidence to the power of kindred purposes in bringing together those who otherwise differ, has an effect which gradually takes on force. It awakens, or strengthens, doubt as to the fundamental worth of division, and suggests co-operation on a wider scale.

Learned periodicals, sometimes with comprehensive editorship, add new testimony of the same kind.

Not radically distinct for the cause of Unity are our comprehensive Biblical Commentaries, in series, with eclectic authorship. Fifty years ago a useful example of this was the English translation of *Lange's Commentary on the Bible*, under the editorship of Dr. Philip Schaff. This was made by American (and a few British) scholars of various churches. The *International Theological Library* and the *International Critical Commentary* are also in point. Both of these owe their origin to the

imagination and energy of a younger colleague of Dr. Schaff. They are really two parts of one project. Both began to issue volumes in the nineties, and both are now well advanced. They are inter-ecclesiastical as well as international. Among authors who have already written in them or have agreed to write are represented the Anglican, Baptist and Congregational (American and English) bodies, the Friends, Irish Episcopalians, Lutherans, Methodist Episcopalians, Presbyterians (American, English and Scottish, and in Scotland, both Established and United Free), Primitive Methodists, Protestant Episcopalians, Roman Catholics and Unitarians. Such a list no longer excites remark. Subtract all you please from its significance in view of the desire of editors and publishers to appeal for circulation to all these bodies, a still deeper significance lies in the reality of this appeal. No doubt each body is glad to see that its own scholars are recognized as fit for learned company, but the appeal to various communions has multiplied strength when it comes in the name of the leading specialists of all the communions.

Learned societies in which members, of different religious views, discuss questions of scholarship with mutual consideration, give an almost more significant evidence still of what may be done in uniting elements of marked religious diversity. In these men come eye to eye, and hear each other's voices, learn to recognize the personal equation and allow for it. It is far less easy afterward to be bitter with one another. Jew and Christian, and many kinds of Christian, come together once a year or oftener, in the Society of Biblical Archaeology, for example, the Oxford Society of Historical Theology, the American Oriental Society, and the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis. These all make their contribution to Unity.

A kind of learned society, carefully composed, and permanent till its work was done, must have especial

notice. Within English-speaking Christianity it is strikingly appropriate to name the Revised Version of the Bible. A comprehensive association was formed to make it. It, too, was not undertaken for the sake of Unity, but for the sake of a better understanding of the Scriptures. The uniting of men from different ecclesiastical bodies in the Companies of Revisers was proposed and accomplished in the service of an end which commanded all parties. It was a mutual recognition of gifts monopolized by no one communion. It seems wholly natural and rational to us. Familiarity with this procedure for forty years and more, almost makes us forget that it was a landmark of progress. In the seventeenth century it would not have been possible, nor yet in the eighteenth. Dr. Philip Schaff wrote of it: "There is a commonwealth—we may say, an apostolic succession—of Christian life and Christian scholarship which transcends all sectarian boundaries."[1]

The Commission of sixteen prelates and scholars appointed in May, 1870, by the Convocation of Canterbury, invited forty others, in the first instance, to join them. Teaching in the Universities was not yet allowed to Dissenters. But in their selection they took advantage of the Convocation's fifth resolution dealing with the matter, which gave power to this Commission by saying: ". . . . who shall be at liberty to invite the co-operation of any eminent for scholarship, to whatever nation or religious body they may belong." Subsequently nine more were invited, not only to fill vacancies, but also to secure the services of scholars attaining prominence as the revision went on. Some sixty-five persons in all took part, and five more were invited to take part, in the labours of the British Company of Revisers. Of these seventy men, forty-eight were of the Anglican Church and its daughters (forty-five Anglicans proper,

[1] *Companion to the Greek Testament and the English Version*, 1883, p. 386.

two of the Irish and one of the Scottish Episcopal Church); eleven were Presbyterians of various branches, four were Baptists, three Congregationalists, two Wesleyans, one a Roman Catholic and one a Unitarian—a varied Christian fellowship! The choice of a Roman Catholic by Anglicans was, of course, not so significant as the choice of an Anglican by Roman Catholics would have been, had the case been reversed, and, unfortunately, the Roman Catholic—John Henry Newman, not yet a Cardinal,—was among those who declined. The choice of a Unitarian was perhaps more noteworthy, and Dr. G. Vance Smith remained a member of the British New Testament Company to the end.

The American Company of Revisers numbered thirty-four in all. Besides these at least seven others were invited but declined. Among the thirty-four who accepted there were nine Congregationalists, six Presbyterians, five Protestant Episcopalians, four Baptists, four Methodist Episcopalians, three Reformed (Dutch), one Lutheran, one Friend, and one Unitarian. Those who declined included four Protestant Episcopalians, one Reformed (German), and one Methodist Episcopalian. The actual combination was a notable one and most harmonious.

The success of this great experiment of keeping bodies of men from Christian communities, whose separate existence is due to an intense feeling of incompatible differences, in close association for a common end, with appreciative recognition of each other and a mutual trust that was stronger the longer it lasted, will grow in significance as ultimate unity draws nearer.

No doubt the most striking fact of all, within our present range, is *joint-authorship* between men of different religious tradition and belonging. This heading may not always be easy to distinguish from the joint-work of Bible Revisers. But the number of co-operators is smaller, the association closer, and the resulting responsibility greater for the individual. A few titles

will illustrate the rubric without attempting to exhaust it.

In the field of Biblical Criticism, the most complete and authoritative book on the documentary theory of the "Books of Moses" is *The Hexateuch*, by Principal J. Estlin Carpenter, a leading Unitarian, and the Rev. G. Harford-Battersby, an Anglican clergyman. Three or four decades ago, the Rev. Samuel Rolles Driver, Anglican (it was an early piece of that scholarship which has meant so much to this generation; one cannot remember without grief that we shall have no more!), was associated with Adolf Neubauer, a Jew, in publishing an elaborate book on Jewish interpretations of Isaiah 53. Dr. Pusey had suggested the plan, and wrote a Preface. In 1897 Mr. A. E. Cowley, Anglican, and the same Dr. Neubauer published *The Original Hebrew of a Portion of Ecclesiasticus* from manuscript fragments brought to England through Mrs. Agnes Lewis, a Presbyterian, and Professor Sayce, an Anglican; and shortly after, Dr. Taylor, an Anglican, and Dr. Schechter, a Jew, joined in issuing *The Fragments of Ben Sira*. A Hebrew Lexicon has been published in Oxford whose three editors were, respectively an Anglican Canon, a Protestant Episcopalian, and a Presbyterian. The little book that has served as text for this article is a notable instance. A long list could be made up of books in which, while earnestly promoting sound learning, the authors have established real unity among themselves, and contributed, by the way, to a still larger unity.

How far from anything like corporate church unity the utmost closeness of fellowship on the lines of scholarly union must remain, I am fully conscious. But it is still true that prejudice and distrust between religious bodies demand a solvent, and that no great union is possible without the individual touch. And it is plain that association in thinking and acting with a common end in view leads man to touch man, and provides one of the

solvents in which distrust and prejudice may be softened and absorbed, so that mutually repellant individuals may become an amalgamated group. Such is the guild of scholars, and within that guild, it may be hoped, will be developed at least some of the leaders who shall show us the way, at length, out of our labyrinth of sectarianism, into the broad and picturesque and fertile country of religious fellowship, in which diversity shall be for enrichment and not for separation, and the great ends of religion shall be pursued by all religious people, side by side. In such a unity, so led, religion will at length establish its universal dominion.

We shall have to acknowledge, with some sadness, that scholarship has not yet moved religion very far along the road toward Unity. We are yet quite on the fringe of this great matter. The revision of the English Bible, and the *International Theological Library*, and all the rest, have not, hitherto, brought any two churches into one. But in truth it would be absurd to think they could. Only a handful of men are directly affected, and the circles under their direct influence are not very wide, compared with all the millions. Even the handful are not, for the most part, conscious of radical approaches by reason of work at the same enterprise. Indeed, if each thinks of himself as representing a body, a party, a first result may sometimes be to stiffen him in his separation. But, all the same, those particular men, once they have lost themselves in the common work, will not be readily moved to fight each other. Let us have more of them. Let us multiply occasions, great and small for taking advantage of each other's knowledge. It all works the right way. It works slowly, no doubt. We must be patient. It is only one limited factor in the many that are co-operating. But it really works. And if each of us who has felt its working will pass on his increasing knowledge, his appreciation of newly discovered personalities, and his fresh pictures of

truth, to his own company and group, it will work in geometrical ratio, and by and by it will tell, visibly, on the result.

For my own part the phenomena are cited as an evidence not of results attained but of tendencies at work. The results will be grander than any of these things. Drift from one religious body to another, growth of one at the expense of another, indifference to one as the price of recognizing many, are not very significant—are hardly steps toward a noble goal. It is actual relation between the religious bodies themselves that must be promoted. Better acquaintance, recognition, esteem, confidence, sympathy—these things grow by the association of students, and on such things, with the simplification of religious thinking, and the deepening of faith, the comprehensive Church of the future will by and by arise.

Unity is a social matter, but it can be made effective only by individual ties. There must be many contacts of mind with mind, and heart with heart—invisible cords across the fences.

This paper began with a reference to one of the most sincere and powerful Protestant scholars and advocates of Church Unity, who entered into the heavenly fellowship a year ago. I cannot think of the closer union of Christians without thinking of him—his belief in it was so simple, and his longing for it so strong. They bridged many chasms and crossed many boundaries. Official pronouncements of Roman Catholic against Protestant, and of Protestant against Catholic have often been uncompromising, divisive and hostile. But Professor Briggs dedicated his *Theological Symbolics*, just finished in manuscript when he died, "To the Reverend Father Giovanni Genocchi . . . Beloved Friend and Fellow Servant in Christ Jesus."

The Eastern Orthodox and the Anglican Communions

By F. W. Puller, S.S.J.E.

In the September number of The Constructive Quarterly a remarkable article by the Russian Archbishop of North America and the Aleutian Islands[1] occupied deservedly the place of honour. In one part of that article Archbishop Platon pointed out that the great aim of helping forward a better understanding between the isolated Communions of Christendom would be very effectively promoted, if a part of each issue of The Constructive were devoted to "The discussion of this or that particular point of our faith[2] by representatives of various Confessions."[3] There may of course be difficulties in carrying out this suggestion; but if, supposing that they exist, they can be overcome, I feel sure that the noble object, which the founders of this journal have had mainly in view, will be very considerably furthered.

In another part of his article the Archbishop carried out his own suggestion in a very interesting way. He dealt with a particular problem or question which is being studied at the present time by a certain number of the hierarchs and theologians of the Russian Church

[1]The title of Archbishop Platon's article runs thus:—*Admitting all Impossibilities, Nevertheless Unity is Possible* (Constructive Quarterly, vol. i, pp. 425-444).

[2]On p. 439 the Archbishop somewhat enlarges the scope of his suggested discussions. He says that the "theme" of those discussions "is, first of all, the theoretical side, our faith; and then the practical side, our Church."

[3]*Op. cit.* p. 438.

and of other Eastern Orthodox Churches. This problem is primarily a practical problem; but its solution depends partly on doctrinal points connected with the sacred Apostolic Ministry which our Lord instituted when He founded His Church, and partly on certain matters which pertain to the domain of History. The question which is being investigated is the view which the Orthodox Eastern Church ought on her own principles to take concerning the validity of the Holy Orders of the Anglican Church.[4] The Archbishop sees very clearly that the Russian Church can never proceed in this matter by the method of "concession." If any Christian Church, which was considering whether or no she ought to recognize the orders of another Christian Church, was to come to the conclusion that she would recognize their validity as a "concession", she would be acting as an unfaithful steward of a sacred trust committed to her guardianship, and she would also be offering under the guise of politeness an insult to the Christian body on whose behalf she proposed to make such a "concession". The Anglican Church from her foundation in the sixth century to the twentieth century has never doubted that her Episcopate is derived by continuous succession from the Apostles; and, especially during the last three and a half centuries, that is to say, since her reformation, she has hedged round the transmission of that succession by extreme care in the fulfilment of her very strict rules. It is quite natural that the Eastern Orthodox Church, which has been separated from the communion of the Anglican Church for more than eight centuries and a half, should wish, before taking any steps towards a mutual *rapprochement* between herself and the Anglican Church, to feel quite sure that the Anglican Church has preserved that succession on the possession of which she herself rightly lays such stress. And it is the more necessary that she should make such an investigation,

[4]Cf. *Op. cit.*, pp. 432-436.

because, until lately, she has derived her information about the Anglican Communion mainly from Roman Catholic books; and in those books there is to found a series of mis-statements about the history of the transmission of our orders, of which the more learned Roman Catholic theologians are now ashamed.

Certainly we of the Anglican Communion have nothing whatever to say against the Eastern Orthodox Church investigating this matter with the most scrupulous care. We should be astonished and pained if she took any other course; and we feel morally sure that, when her investigations are concluded, she will, to use the Archbishop's words, "acknowledge Anglican holy orders not as a concession, but from a profound conviction that by doing so," she "would think and act rightly." (*Op. cit.*, p. 435)

Already Eastern theologians of good standing and high reputation have taken many steps towards the attainment of this wished-for goal.

Professor Bulgakoff of Kieff, after a long discussion of what he calls "the question of Anglican Hierarchy" arrives at the two following conclusions in regard to the historical, canonical, and liturgical questions involved:—

(a) "Its uninterrupted succession from and connection with the Roman Catholic hierarchy, thanks to the latest historical investigations, must be acknowledged to be undoubted."

(b) "The Anglican Ordinal, in respect to its contents, may be placed amongst that series of forms of Ordination, which are used by those Christian bodies whose hierarchy, notwithstanding their heresy, is admitted by the Roman Catholics to be valid."[5]

In regard to the doctrinal point involved in the Eastern discussion of the validity of Anglican ordinations, Professor Bulgakoff defines his position thus:—

(c) "If the teaching of the present Anglican Episcopate upon the Sacrament of Orders turns out to agree with the teaching of the ancient universal Church, this will be a clear proof that Anglicanism has not merely preserved the Apostolical succession in an outward manner, but that it has not changed the essential nature of that

[5] A. Bulgakoff, *The Question of Anglican Orders* translated by W. J. Birkbeck, p. 44 (S.P.C.K., London, 1899).

ministry which is indispensable for the Church according to the mind of Her Divine Founder and Head."[6]

With reference to this doctrinal aspect of the question, it will be well to draw attention at this point to an admirable treatise by Professor Basil Sokoloff of Moscow, which sets forth very clearly the impression produced on an Eastern mind by the teaching expressed and implied by the formularies of the Anglican Church in regard to the Sacrament of Order. In the course of his treatise Professor Sokoloff has analysed with rare acumen the doctrine about ordination, expressed in the prayers and other formulas, which together constitute our Anglican Ordinal. He then sums up the result of his analysis in the following words:—

"Thus, according to the present teaching of the Anglican Church, the hierarchy is acknowledged to be a Divine institution, into the body of which are admitted only such persons as have received a special calling. These persons receive a consecration through the imposition, accompanied by prayer, of the hands of the Bishop, by means of which there is sent down upon them the grace-bestowing gifts of the Holy Ghost, and it is only this Divine assistance which gives them strength and ability for the fulfilling of their high office. This doctrine concerning the Divine ordinance and grace-giving significance of the hierarchy the Anglican Church has preserved unchanged from the earliest times of the religious Reformation and of her separation from her connection with Rome."[7]

Further on in this same chapter of his treatise, Professor Sokoloff gives a catena of quotations from some of the greatest and most authoritative of Anglican theologians. He cites passages from Bilson, Hooker, Jeremy Taylor, Cosin, Pearson, Beveridge, Christopher Wordsworth, Archbishop Benson, and finally from the *Answer of the Archbishops of England* [Abp. Temple of Canterbury and Abp. Maclagan of York] *to the Apostolic Letter of Pope Leo XIII on English Ordinations, addressed to the*

[6] *Op. cit.* p. 45.

[7] I quote this English translation of the passage from Mr. W. J. Birkbeck's translation (pp. 7, 8) of *One Chapter from An Enquiry into the Hierarchy of the Anglican Episcopal Church* by B. Sokoloff, Professor of History in the Moscow Ecclesiastical Academy, printed by the Church Printing Company, London.

whole body of Bishops of the Catholic Church; and having brought his catena to an end, he writes as follows:—

"The extracts we have now given will, we think, suffice; they prove sufficiently convincingly that the Anglican divines of the seventeenth,[8] eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, down to the present time [*i.e.* 1897], have clearly proclaimed, and are still proclaiming, the same doctrine of the Divine institution and grace-giving significance of the hierarchy, that their Church has also always expressed in her religious formularies. And this being so, must we not come to the conclusion that in the Anglican Church the Laying-on-of-Hands differs in no essential respect from that of the Orthodox Church, and therefore may be acknowledged to be a Sacrament? Indeed apparently we have here, on the face of it, all the marks of a Sacrament."[9]

This final remark of Professor Sokoloff is very noteworthy and is undoubtedly true. Ordination, as it is set forth in the services comprised in the Anglican Ordinal, and in the writings of the great Anglican divines, and in official documents such as the *Responsio* of the two Archbishops of England to Pope Leo XIII's Bull, *Apostolicae Curae*, does bear all the marks of a Sacrament in the sense which Orthodox Eastern divines have attributed to that word during the last six or seven centuries, a sense which at some later date or dates has been officially accepted by all or most of the several Orthodox Eastern Churches.

But the learned divines of the Orthodox Eastern Church are no doubt fully aware that, during the ten and a half centuries which preceded the sad breach of communion between the East and West, neither the definition of the word, Sacrament, nor the numbering of the Sacraments agreed with the definition and numbering which are now usually accepted by them. Their definition of the word and their numbering of the Sacraments have never been imposed on the whole Catholic

[8]Hooker wrote all his works in the *sixteenth* century and died in that same century, so that Professor Sokoloff might well have headed his list of centuries with the sixteenth, and that the more since it was in that century that the English Ordinal was compiled.

[9]*Op. cit.* (Birkbeck's translation, p. 30).

Church by any Ecumenical Council; nor does their definition of the word rest on any clear warrant of Holy Scripture or on any tradition handed on by the Holy Fathers. In saying this I have no sort of wish to complain because in later times the Eastern divines have adopted a new definition which has resulted in a new numbering; nor has the English Church ever condemned the Eastern Orthodox Churches for using the word Sacrament in the way they now use it, or for asserting that in that sense of the word there are seven of them. Theologians of this or that school of thought, or belonging to this or that group of local Churches, do from time to time define and use theological terms in new ways; and they are free to do so, if a particular meaning of the term has not been, so to speak, canonized by a real *consensus patrum* or by an Ecumenical Council; but such Theologians have, it seems to me, no right to force their new definitions on other groups of local Churches, who may prefer to maintain or to revert to some older use of the term. The great S. Athanasius at the Council of Alexandria, held in 362, would not allow those who used the expression "one *hypostasis* in the Godhead" to force those who used the expression "three *hypostaseis*" to adopt their terminology; and he similarly required those who used the expression "three *hypostaseis*" to refrain from forcing their formula on those who spoke of "one *hypostasis*". By catechising both sides he made it clear that the two parties interpreted the word "*hypostasis*" differently, and that in the real substance of the doctrine of the Trinity they were agreed; so each party was left free to use its own formula, and all united in the confession of the one great revealed truth.[10]

Now there can be no doubt that, before the division of East and West, the word Sacrament or Mystery was used of a great many things which are not now

[10]See Hefele, *Histoire des Conciles*, Leclercq's French translation, vol. i. part. ii. pp. 966, 967.

called Sacraments by the Orthodox Eastern Church. For example, S. Hilary of Poitiers speaks of the Sacrament of Fasting and of the Sacrament of Holy Scripture. S. Jerome speaks of the Sacrament of Martyrdom. S. Augustine speaks of the Sacrament of the Creed, and the Sacrament of the Lord's Prayer, and the Sacrament of the exorcised salt given to the catechumens. Similarly in the East S. Theodore of the Studium, who died in 826, asserts that Christ "instituted *six* sacraments," which he enumerates thus:—(1) Baptism, (2) the Holy Communion, (3) the Consecration of the Chrism, (4) Ordination, (5) the Monastic habit, (6) the Rites which have to do with those who have died holily.[11] It will be noticed that in this list no mention is made of Penance, or of Marriage, or of the Prayer-Oil for the sick, or of the administration of the Chrism in Confirmation. None of the Holy Fathers ever once grouped together the seven rites which are now regarded by the Orthodox Eastern divines as being the only rites which ought to be called Sacraments; nor did any of the Fathers ever connect the number seven with the Sacraments.[12] It is absolutely certain that the Apostles did not explicitly commit to the Church any doctrine about the septenary number of the Sacraments as a revealed regulative principle, which could be used for dogmatic purposes or for any purposes whatsoever. For very nearly a hundred years after the breach of communion between the East and the West, no one either in the East or the West said a word about seven Sacraments. S. Peter Damiani, Cardinal Bishop of Ostia and principal friend and adviser of Pope Gregory VII, was, I think, the first Latin to attempt to number

[11]See S. Theodor. Studit. *Epistt.* lib. ii. ep. 165.

[12]A very authoritative Roman Catholic theologian, the late Cardinal Franzelin, elaborately discussed the question,—"How it came to pass that the Fathers never once grouped those seven rites together" (Franzelin. *Tractat. de Sacramentis in genere*, edit. 1878, Thes. xix., p. 273).

the Sacraments; and he asserts that they are twelve in number. Strange to say, the Holy Eucharist finds no place on his list; but he includes the Anointing of a King, the Dedication of a Church, the Canons of a Cathedral, Monks, Hermits, and Nuns.[13] S. Peter Damiani died in 1072, eighteen years after the breach between the East and the West. Hugh of S. Victor, who died in 1141, sixty-nine years after the death of S. Peter Damiani, mentions nearly thirty Sacraments in his great work, *De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei;* and it is to be noted that he mentions Baptism and the Holy Eucharist first, separating them off from the rest, and putting them into a group by themselves.[14]

At last, about the year 1150, Peter Lombard brought out his celebrated four books of the *Sentences*, and in the fourth of these books we find the seven rites, which are now regarded by the Eastern Orthodox Church as the only rites which ought to be called Sacraments, grouped together for the first time, and set forth as being the seven Sacraments of the New Law. Peter Lombard had a perfect right to limit the number of Sacraments to seven; just as S. Peter Damiani had a right to declare that there are twelve; and S. Theodore of the Studium had a right to say that there are six; and the great Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries had a right to give the name of Sacrament to a very much larger number of holy things and practices. The number of the Sacraments depends on the way in which the word, Sacrament, is defined, and there is no divinely revealed definition of that word transmitted to us by the tradition of the Church. The term, "Sacrament", is, as Bishop Jeremy Taylor rightly said, "a word of art";[15] that is to say—it is a word which has no precise meaning based on the

[13]Cf. S. Petr. Dam. *Serm.* lxix., *P.L.* cxliv. 898.

[14]Cf. Hug. de S. Victor., *De Sacramentis Christian. Fid.*, lib. i. part ix. cap. vii., *P.L.* clxxvi. 327.

[15]Taylor's *Dissuasive*, ed. Cardwell, p. 240.

nature of things or on some universally accepted definition, but is artificially employed by different authors to designate groups of sacred practices, sometimes larger groups and sometimes smaller groups. Our post-Reformation Anglican formularies and divines use the word, as the great Fathers used it, in an extended sense[16] while at the same time, following also in this the great Fathers, they have been accustomed to separate off from the rest into a class by themselves the two principal Sacraments, that is to say Baptism and the Holy Eucharist. These are described as the two Sacraments "generally necessary to salvation", or the two Sacraments "ordained of Christ in the Gospel," or in an abbreviated form the two "Sacraments of the Gospel."

One quite understands that the Eastern Orthodox theologians, who have for some centuries past used the word, Sacrament, in Peter Lombard's new sense, should be puzzled and even shocked when they find Anglicans using the word in the old patristic way. But they will soon get accustomed to this, and will candidly recognize that our difference of phraseology does not necessarily indicate a difference in faith. We certainly have no wish to force our phraseology on them, and we feel well assured that they will not wish to force their phraseology on us. This is a situation which may well be governed by the pacific example of the great S. Athanasius.

Now Archbishop Platon in the article, to which allusion has been made, tells us that Professor Bulgakoff has "categorically announced that the only real obstacle in the way of a satisfactory solution of the question is

[16]Bishop Jeremy Taylor (*u.s.*) says:—"It is none of the doctrine of the Church of England that there are two Sacraments only; but that of those rituals which the ecclesiastical use calls Sacraments (by a word of art) two only are generally necessary to salvation." See also Palmer's *Treatise on the Church of Christ*, 2nd edit., 1839, vol. ii. pp. 441-443; and Bishop E. C. S. Gibson, *The Thirty-nine Articles*, 6th edit., 1908, pp. 593-602.

to be found in the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England;"[17] and the Archbishop adds:—"an insurmountable obstacle, indeed, as the Thirty-nine Articles deny that holy orders are a sacrament." I really hope that what I have said and am going to say may do something towards preventing this statement being repeated. There is no such denial to be found in our Articles. The idea that there is such a denial is based on a misunderstanding of our technical language. We distinguish between Sacraments ordained directly by Christ or by God and Sacraments ordained directly by the Apostles, and these again from Sacraments ordained by the Church in post-Apostolic times.[18] We say that to the first class belong only two Sacraments, namely, Baptism and the Holy Eucharist, and that all other Sacraments belong either to the second class or to the third. S. Bonizo, Bishop first of Sutri and afterwards of Placentia, who died in 1090 and was a friend and supporter of Pope Gregory VII, speaking of the first two classes, makes exactly the same distinction. He says in his *Libellus de sacramentis:* "There are two Sacraments which were delivered to us by the Lord Himself, but there are some other Sacraments which were instituted by the Apostles."[19] No doubt the Sacraments instituted directly by the Apostles were indirectly instituted by Christ our Lord, who by the operation of His Holy Spirit guided and moved the Apostles to institute them. But there was, assuredly, a deep reason which led our Lord to reserve to Himself the direct institution of the two great Sacraments which were typified by the Blood and Water flowing from His pierced side, and are necessary for all who would live the Christian life.

[17] *Constructive Quarterly,* vol. i. p. 434.

[18] As examples of the third class might be mentioned the sacrament of the anointing of Kings and Emperors, and the sacrament of the salt for the catechumens, and the sacrament of the feet-washing, and many more.

[19] "*Duo ab ipso Domino tradita, quaedam vero ab apostolis instituta.*" (*P. L.*, cl. 857).

Similarly, in the *Great Catechism* of the Orthodox Church, of which an edition was published in 1857 at Athens with the approbation of the Holy Synod of Greece and the subsequent approval of the Patriarch of Antioch, it is stated that "Our Church has seven Sacraments: Baptism, Chrism, etc. Two of these—namely Baptism and the Eucharist or Communion—are the chief and distinguishing Sacraments of the New Testament;"[20] and Cardinal Bellarmine describes the same two Mysteries as "the principal, the chief, the choicest Sacraments of our salvation."

It is quite in accordance with these views that the Church of England separates Baptism and the Holy Eucharist from all other Sacraments, and puts them in a class by themselves, and declares in her Catechism that Christ has ordained in His Church, as generally necessary to salvation, only two Sacraments; that is to say, Baptism and the Supper of the Lord; and in the 25th Article she asserts that "there are two Sacraments ordained of Christ our Lord *in the Gospel*," and she adds that "those five commonly called Sacraments, that is to say, Confirmation, Penance, Orders, Matrimony and Extreme Unction, are not to be counted for Sacraments *of the Gospel*," and that they "have not like nature of Sacraments with Baptism and the Lord's Supper, for that they have not any visible sign or ceremony ordained of God."[21] Some of these lesser Sacraments have "a visible sign or ceremony" ordained by the Apostles, and some, like Penance and Matrimony, have not; but none of them have "a visible sign or ceremony" ordained by Christ, our God, in the Gospel, a distinction which is quite peculiar to Baptism and the Holy Eucharist. In the 35th Article both Books of the Homilies are

[20] I quote from Dr. J. T. Seccombe's English translation of the *Great Catechism*, p. 26.

[21] For the positive teaching of the Church of England on these five sacramental rites, I may perhaps be allowed to refer to my *Continuity of the Church of England*, pp. 68-77, edit. 1913.

approved as containing "a godly and wholesome doctrine"; and in the Homily concerning Swearing the English Church says that "*the Sacrament of Matrimony* knitteth man and wife to perpetual love"; while in the Homily on Common Prayer and Sacraments (part i) the Church declares that "though the Ordering of Ministers hath this visible sign or promise, yet it lacks the promise of remission of sin, as *all other sacraments* besides the two above named do. Therefore neither it, nor *any Sacrament else*, be such Sacraments as Baptism and the Communion are." Here the Church in perfectly distinct terms implies that there are other Sacraments besides those two which Christ Himself ordained in the Gospel.

I hope that I have now made it quite clear that the Thirty-nine Articles do not deny that Ordination is a Sacrament, and that consequently "the only real obstacle in the way of a satisfactory solution of the question", raised by Eastern Orthodox theologians as to the validity of our Orders, is in fact a non-existent obstacle.

Archbishop Platon in his article seemed inclined to get rid of this obstacle, the existence of which he assumed, by minimizing the dogmatic importance of the Thirty-nine Articles; and I owe a debt of thanks to his Grace for the kind and appreciative way in which he referred to my own discussion of that subject in my book entitled *The Continuity of the Church of England*. I adhere to every word bearing on the matter, that I wrote in the above-mentioned book. I thought then and I think still that Eastern Orthodox Theologians have often in the past exaggerated the dogmatic importance attributed by the Church of England to the Thirty-nine Articles; and I am glad to see that so influential a Russian Prelate as the present Archbishop of North America and the Aleutian Islands is inclined to take a truer view. But, while I hold in common with the generality of Anglican divines that the dogmatic importance of the Articles is

very inferior to that of the Creeds and of the definitions of the accepted Ecumenical Councils and of the Catechism and of the Prayer-book, yet for all that I personally, having given my assent to the Articles and having subscribed them on several important occasions during the course of my life, am anxious to make it clear that, though I have subscribed them, I am in no way bound on account of that subscription to deny that Holy Order is a Sacrament. Rather, I am bound by that subscription as well as by other still more authoritative teachings of the Church of England, such as that contained in the Ordinal, to declare that Holy Order is a Sacrament, though not a Sacrament to be put on the same level as Baptism and the Holy Eucharist.

I have now said what it occurs to me to say at the present time about the particular problem which the Archbishop selected for discussion in a certain part of his article. That problem has a theoretical side and a practical side. It touches on questions connected with the faith and also on questions connected with the Church; and it is one of those problems which must be solved satisfactorily, if the Church of England and the Eastern Orthodox Church are to come together and establish relations of mutual inter-communion.

Perhaps I may be permitted to suggest another problem which needs also to be discussed, and of course to be discussed in an irenic spirit.

The Church of England, whether in her pre-Reformation or in her post-Reformation stage, has always regarded herself as forming part of the Catholic Church. Any number of quotations from her formularies, and from her great theologians, and from the pronouncements of her synods and hierarchs could be produced, if it were necessary, in proof of this statement. But at the same time the Church of England has never regarded herself as constituting the whole of the Catholic Church. Before the Reformation but after the split between the

East and the West she formed part of the Latin Communion; and, chiefly under the influence of the forged decretals and other forgeries, she regarded the several national Churches of Western Europe, which were in communion with the Roman Pope, as together constituting the whole of the Catholic Church. She was one of those national Churches, and therefore in her own view she was not the whole but only a part of the Catholic Church. In those days the Eastern Orthodox Churches (to our shame be it spoken) were normally regarded by the Church of England and by other Western Churches as schismatic bodies. Since the Reformation the English Church has been out of communion with the Roman Pope and with the Churches belonging to his obedience; but her theologians, while never ceasing to believe in the Catholicity of their own branch of the Church, have normally regarded both the Papal Communion and the Eastern Orthodox Communion as bodies which were not outside but inside the Catholic Society founded by our Lord.

It is true that, since the promulgation of the definitions concerning Papal autocracy and infallibility at the Vatican Council in 1870 and their subsequent reception by the whole hierarchy of the Roman Communion, some Anglican theologians may have doubted whether the constitution of the Roman Communion had not been so fundamentally altered as to make it uncertain whether Anglicans ought to continue to regard the Roman Communion as still retaining a place within the Catholic enclosure; but the Anglican Communion has not as yet made any authoritative pronouncement on that question; and for our present purpose we may set it on one side.

It remains the fact that the Anglican view of the whole situation presupposes that there may be a cessation of visible inter-communion between different groups of local Churches, while each group retains its right to be

regarded as forming a part of the one Catholic and Apostolic Church of Christ. In other words the essential unity of the whole Church, produced by the union of all its parts with Christ, the Head of the body, may continue unimpaired; whilst the visible unity of the Church Militant here on earth may be in abeyance, owing to the suspensions of inter-communion between different parts, which have resulted from the mistakes and unregulated passions of men.

It is of course pre-supposed in this view that throughout the Catholic Church there is an identity of faith in the fundamentals of Christianity, and that every part of the Church has preserved or at any rate possesses a valid ministry transmitted from the Apostles, and that at least the more important Sacraments are everywhere duly administered.

But the problem which I venture to propose for discussion, quite apart from the present application of its solution, is the question whether the visible unity of the Church Militant here on earth can ever be in abeyance; and any discussion of that problem ought, if it is to be conducted on Catholic lines, to be based on the witness of Scripture and Tradition and the History of the Church. At least, that is my conviction.

I feel sure that, if agreement could be arrived at in regard to the solution of that problem, a great step forward would be thereby taken towards the *rapprochement* of the Anglican and Eastern Orthodox Communions, and so towards the ultimate re-establishment of inter-communion between those great and venerable bodies, which may God hasten in His own time.

Jerusalem, the Holy City[1]

By Adolf Deissmann, D. Theol., D.D.,
Professor in the University of Berlin.

On the 14th February, 1914, in the Great Hall of the Prussian House of Lords at Berlin, there took place, in the presence of Prince Frederick William of Prussia, representing the Emperor, the first annual meeting of a Society which, in conjunction with other organizations, is working on such very broad foundations, both international and interdenominational, that it may be expected to be of great interest to the readers of this periodical. It was the "German Society for the Prevention of Malaria at Jerusalem." At the instance of Baron von Mirbach, Lord Chamberlain to the Empress, who has done much for Jerusalem, and to whom the sanitary condition of the Holy City had long been a grave anxiety, a "provisional committee" was formed at Berlin in the summer of 1912. Its deliberations were attended by men of science and representatives of the various religious bodies interested in Jerusalem. It was resolved to study scientifically the problem of how to improve the sanitation of Jerusalem, and the requisite funds were raised by voluntary subscriptions.

Professor Kirchner, the head of the Prussian Board of Health, suggested that Professor Mühlens, of the Institute for Tropical Hygiene at Hamburg, should be sent out to Jerusalem to investigate the febrile diseases. He accordingly went in August 1912, and was followed

[1]Translated from the author's MS. by Lionel R. M. Strachan, M.A., English Lecturer in the University of Heidelberg.

in November by Professor Pannwitz, the General Secretary of the "International Tuberculosis Association", whose object was to discover how the different national and religious interests at Jerusalem might be united in turning the results of scientific research to practical account.

The results were as follows:—

There are no limits to the unhygienic condition of Jerusalem. It arises from the ignorance and superstition of the population. An immediate improvement of the present state of affairs is certainly attainable by systematic and united efforts. The hygienic laboratory established by Professor Mühlens, first in the Empress Augusta Victoria Institute on the Mount of Olives and afterwards at St. Paul's Institute, has won universal confidence. A large portion of the inhabitants of Jerusalem have been examined for malaria, and it has been ascertained:

(1) that a large portion of the inhabitants have malaria parasites in their blood;

(2) that the malaria flies (*Anopheles*) are very common, and that their chief breeding-places are in the cisterns;

(3) that therefore the risk of malarial infection is very great;

(4) that a number of other febrile diseases occur (typhoid, relapsing fever, dengue, papataci, trachoma);

(5) that tuberculosis is alarmingly on the increase, and is spreading very rapidly among certain races.

It was also placed beyond doubt that effective hygienic measures in Jerusalem, which is a veritable mosaic of separate territories belonging to all sorts of nations and religions, could only be carried out by international work on a large scale.

All the consuls resident at Jerusalem (Germany, England, France, Italy, Austria, Russia, Sweden, Denmark,

United States of America) signified their approval of the plan for improving the sanitation of Jerusalem by an international union of all the interested parties. The Mayor was favourably inclined to the idea. The medical men occupying official positions of any kind formed a "volunteer health committee". The Governor accepted a memorial and promised to report to the Government at Constantinople about it. The consuls of the different nations have received copies of the memorial and have promised to inform their Governments and their diplomatic representatives at Constantinople.

The concluding sentences of the memorial are as follows:

(1) An improvement in the sanitation of Jerusalem is only attainable by unanimous co-operation of all the nations and religions represented at Jerusalem, especially of the doctors, with the native Government.

(2) To secure a unity of all the interests an international hygienic centre is necessary.

(3) The bacteriological laboratory founded by Professor Mühlens will co-operate with the laboratory established by Dr. Brünn at the expense of Mr. Nathan Straus, of New York.

(4) The laboratory will if possible be established in a house rented for the purpose in the neighbourhood of most of the hospitals, and will be enlarged to the extent of the existing funds raised by voluntary contributions so as to be able to supply scientific information on all hygienic questions to all authorities and medical men of the Turkish and other Governments.

(5) The purely scientific work of detection is to be combined with a practical campaign against endemic diseases, especially malaria. Most of the doctors in Jerusalem have expressed their willingness to co-operate in this practical work.

(6) One of the first objects in contemplation is the establishment of a hydrophobia department.

(7) Departments for the examination of samples of

food and water, and for the preparation of curative serums, are to be established later.

(8) The laboratory is to be constantly at the disposal of the Turkish government in all hygienic questions, *e.g.* in the event of an epidemic outbreak at Jerusalem or elsewhere in Palest ne

(9) The means for its support will be raised by voluntary contribut ons of the nations and religions represented at Jerusalem

Meanwh le negotiations had already taken place for the immed ate establishment of a hygienic centre at Jerusalem The "German Society for the Prevention of Malaria at Jerusalem", the Nathan Straus Institute, and the Jewish Medical and Scientific Society came to an agreement by which in June, 1913, an "International Health Bureau" was set up at Jerusalem, at first with four independent departments for malaria-research, general hygiene, bacteriology, and hydrophobia. Professor Mühlens, the head of the German malaria department, undertook also to be Superintendent of the Bureau. Dr. Brünn, of the Nathan Straus Institute, was appointed Vice-Superintendent. For the summer of 1913 a tuberculosis department was added provisionally under the direction of Dr. Much, the expenses being borne by the Hamburg Tuberculosis Research Institute. The Societies concerned appointed special trustees to watch over the joint interests of the Health Bureau.

Thus the work of improving the hygienic condition of Jerusalem has been systematically and energetically begun, attention being paid first of all to the now prevalent malaria, without neglecting the other infectious diseases. Since June, 1913, the Bureau, with the constant support of the authorities and of the doctors resident in Jerusalem, has been hard at work discovering and treating the patients, and improving the hygiene of their environment. It seems as though success is already observable with regard to the spread of malaria, and

the same remark applies to the other spheres of the work. It is expected that further departments of the hygienic central institute will be established by the various nations, or by the committees formed in the various countries. The scientific and practical requirements are numerous enough to admit of considerable division of labour, in accordance with preferences and means.

This great work of civilization, in which all the nations and faiths represented at Jerusalem have united together, is inspired by a common love of the Holy City. It was the wish of the German Committee that the unique importance of Jerusalem as the Holy City should be set forth at the first annual meeting, and to this wish Professor Deissmann responded in the following address, which he delivered on that occasion.

Jerusalem, the Holy City! At Smyrna, a few weeks before the Greek festival of Easter, as you row out towards evening to board the Russian steamer from Odessa to Palestine, a strangely moving sound comes thrilling to you from the ship across the darkening waters of the harbour. Artless in their simplicity, but fraught with a solemn grandeur, the notes are borne to you—sounds of a foreign language, but you need no interpreter: by force of direct appeal the pilgrims' song has gone straight to the heart. During the next few days on board the steamship "Korniloff," as you glide past the naked rocks of Samos and the coast of Ephesus, you soon become acquainted with the singers. They are pilgrims to Jerusalem from the heart of Russia and from Siberia, some hundreds of peasants, men and women, mostly old people, of fine stature, in coarse home-made garments and clumsy great boots,—unwieldy folk with hard hands deformed by labour. Led by their popes they had embarked in crowds at Odessa, full of blissful expectation of the crowning moment of their lives, bound for the Holy Land, the Holy City.

Your West European who has passed examinations and taken his degree is apt to prove his culture by recoiling with a shudder of superiority from the coarseness of these Russian pilgrims. He flees from the pilgrim ship to the great Levant liner, where for whole days under the sun of Homer, in company with other good Europeans and Americans in dress-clothes and patent-leather, with the aid of enormous menus he can devote himself generously to the complicated problem of satisfying his generous appetite. But he who travels in the East to study the East and the soul of the East and is really capable of the self-resignation such a purpose entails on the West European, will prefer to remain on the anything but up-to-date "Korniloff." Day after day, as Rhodes comes in sight and the Cilician coast rises up, he will sit on deck with the Russians, camped in their village groups, sunning themselves, or seated round their tea, crumbling into it the stony pilgrim bread they have brought with them, and spooning it out of one common dish. Then you hear from them many a little thing that brings these people nearer to us, and you learn to read their faces, weathered and bronzed, where from beneath a tangle of rough hair eyes often gleam out with frank sincerity and quiet peacefulness or with enthusiastic zeal or in subdued joyful anticipation of wondrous visions. Then the monk from Mount Athos, who is also along with them, comes up to you, laying aside his mistrust at last, and presents the stranger with gaudy pictures of saints, the Knight St. George on his proud white charger, and the Martyr-Bishop Ignatius with his lions. He has thousands of these pictures in his luggage and will consecrate them at the sacred shrines, so that the pilgrims when they return may carry fresh sanctity with them into the unending stretches of their native steppes.

At evening we venture a descent into the nether world between decks. Most of the passengers, Russians,

East-European Jews, Armenians, and other Anatolians of the lowest classes, if they do not spend the night on deck, have already stowed themselves away to sleep by hundreds in unspeakably close quarters — men and women, the sick and the healthy, are crowded together in densest confusion, side by side and in rough wooden compartments one above the other, all rolled up in their blankets and rugs. An overpowering atmosphere assails the nostrils, but we push our way through these catacombs of the living, the rays of our electric lamp quickly flashing over them, to a dimly lighted open space in the forepart of the ship, from which comes the sound we heard at Smyrna. There we take our places quietly, with no profane curiosity, at a steerage service of the pilgrims.

A wax candle flickers before two pictures of saints fastened to a post. In front of it a devout congregation of a few men is at vespers, with bowings, ejaculatory prayers, crossings, and hymns. It is all very crude, with none of the grace with which the Southerner makes the sign of the cross. These Russian peasants cross themselves as if they were felling a hundred-year-old fir-tree, and they bow as if they were standing over a saw-pit. But who can smile at their unwieldiness when he has observed the genuine emotion of these devotees? Even the dirty planks of this pilgrim ship are holy ground to them, because every hour spent thereon brings them nearer to the Holy City. Behind the band of pilgrims praying in the ghostly light of the consecrated candle one can imagine the shade of the great Leo Tolstoi, to whom the soul of these people was as an open book, and whose own soul was nurtured by the forces alive in the Russian peasantry. And he who cannot see it himself in these pilgrims to Jerusalem, may learn from Tolstoi what native energies there are in the popular religion of the pilgrims—forces not least among the abiding foundations of the Russian national character.

But there are other travellers to Jerusalem whom we meet on board the pilgrim ship. Jewish emigrants from Russia are present in large numbers, proletarians in extreme poverty and destitution, with the scantiest belongings. Among them, however, are some better dressed, a tall Palestinian Jew in the prime of life returning with money he has collected in Europe and universally respected as a person of eminence, and another bright young fellow who speaks Yiddish and willingly does us good service as interpreter with the Russians. Often, too, we observe the quiet devotion of an old man, who bends over a Hebrew book, yearning for the land of his fathers, in whose sacred earth he himself hopes one day to be buried.

These are modern travellers to Palestine, but two thousand years ago in like manner Jewish pilgrims of the Dispersion went up at festival time to Jerusalem from all the lands of the Mediterranean. Certain well-known passages of the New Testament picture those ancient pilgrimages to us. We hear of the eunuch of the Ethiopian queen Candace, we read the list of pilgrims of all nations at the first Christian Whitsuntide. The two great names in the earliest history of Christianity, Jesus and Paul, are also the most prominent in the immeasurable list of Jewish pilgrims to Jerusalem.

After Jerusalem had been trodden underfoot by the pagan conqueror; and when, following a pagan interregnum, a Christian Jerusalem gradually grew up on the site of the Jewish Holy City, Christian pilgrims from the whole of the East and West once more crowded the old Jewish routes. The itineraries and reports of pilgrimages that have come down to us from Christian antiquity and the early Middle Ages tell with open-hearted simplicity of the pilgrims' experiences at the holy places, where great shrines had arisen since the days of Constantine. Then Islam swept into the Holy Land and occupied the Holy City, and still at the present

day, in spite of the Crusades, retains possession of it as a holy city for itself. *El Kuds*, "the sanctuary", is today the Arabic name for Jerusalem, and the sacred rock on the site of the old Jewish Temple, over which rises the marvellous cupola of the Dome of the Rock, is dear to every Mohammedan as the greatest shrine after Mecca.

Our pilgrim ship therefore on her way to Syrian waters carries Moslem travellers to Jerusalem from Anatolia. Most of them camp on deck, hiding their women in primitive tents made of carpets and woven material. All these groups, however, Turks and Arabs, Russian Jews and Christians, Greeks and Armenians, camping by day in motley confusion on the deck, are as a whole an extremely interesting microcosm of the modern religious East,[2] which in its general structure has most faithfully preserved some important features of the religion of the pilgrims of antiquity. And however different they look and however different they are, the watchword on the lips of all of them, as upon our own, and equally dear to all, is "To the Holy City!" just as in our churches at home we sing:[3]

> Let all then in their places
> Stedfastly set their faces
> Toward Jerusalem!

At the Cilician port of Mersina we leave the pilgrim ship, and then all start on a pilgrimage of some weeks through Cilicia, Syria, Galilee, and Southern Palestine, so as gradually to approach Jerusalem from the north.

---

[2]Sir W. M. Ramsay has recently doubted whether one sees the natural East on the Russian steamers; he thinks it is "the East mean and denaturalized". I feel obliged, however, to uphold my view and I hope in another place to deal more in detail with the question.

[3][The lines are part of Tersteegen's hymn (published in 1738) "*Kommt, Kinder, lasst uns gehen*":

> *Ein jeder sein Gesichte*
> *Mit ganzer Wendung richte*
> *Fest nach Jerusalem.*

None of the English translations (of which Catherine Winkworth's in *Lyra Germanica*, 1855, is said to be the best) was accessible to me.—Tr.]

That is the right way to the Holy City, the way by land from the north. It is a mistake for the traveller, flung suddenly from the comfortable European steamer on the coast of a strange and poverty-stricken land, to approach by way of Jaffa from the west and behold the Holy City for the first time on its most unfavourable side, without any preparation whatever. The laments of "disappointed" travellers to Jerusalem which re-echo through the nineteenth century books about Palestine are due to no fault in Jerusalem but to the wrong route chosen for approach, which is doubly wrong when Egypt with its fascinating wealth of antiquities and its luxury, both Oriental and European, has been visited before Palestine, the poorer country.

Jerusalem the Holy City prefers to surrender herself to him who has made long pilgrimage through Eastern lands. In those weeks of pilgrimage the eye must grow accustomed to the East; then at last we see more than the merely unpleasant side of the East, and Jerusalem becomes a great experience to us. The experience is all the greater if the city we aspire to reach is to us, as to the people on the pilgrim ship, the Holy City, not an interesting city merely, but the Holy City, which after all, because it is the Holy City, is also the most interesting city in the world.

Arriving then from the north, we gain our first sight of Jerusalem on the Thursday afternoon in Holy Week at El Bireh, the last halting-place a few hours before the goal is reached. A miserable khan supplies us with the last refreshment we shall get, and while the horses are being fed once more, we walk a few yards up the gently sloping road: there to the south the first glimpse of the Holy City can be obtained. An icy-cold wind finds its way through our overcoats and blows a few heavy raindrops into our faces as we stand here on the heights of the Judean mountains. Some eight miles away, in all the brilliance of a brief ray of sunshine, the high-

built city lies before us like a distant shimmering town of faery: a wide extent of white walls, proud cupolas, soaring towers and minarets. We can pick out no details yet, we cannot give names to the domes and towers, but the whole is familiar to us from a secret province of the soul. And we see naught that is ugly or wretched; all is bright and shining, in calm and distant grandeur. There is no disappointment, therefore, but only added experience, rich and deep: the Holy City is ours.

Having successfully found his lodgings in the city the pilgrim cannot do better than start out as soon as possible for his first walk to the Mount of Olives. The impression derived from the distant shining view from El Bireh is deepened and widened; soon one takes in the whole city at a glance and realizes why it was, and is, and ever will be the Holy City. When you have drunk your fill of the light that glows upon the desert of Juda as far as the Dead Sea and the blue mountains of Moab, you look down on Jerusalem, lying at your feet in the marvellous brightness of a Palestinian spring morning. Rising above the wall and majestically dominating the whole panorama of the town you have the spacious Holy Place, containing the Dome of the Rock and the other sanctuaries of Islam. It is the site of ancient Christian churches, of Jewish and Israelite temples still more ancient; and doubtless, as we may conjecture from analogous instances, in the fifteenth century, B.C., when "Urusalim" is mentioned in the Tell-Amarna tablets, it was even at that remote period a sacred precinct of the aboriginal inhabitants.

From the clay-tablets of Tell-Amarna down to the Old and New Testaments, and thence onward to the writings of the crusaders and the mass of books dealing with Palestine in the last few centuries, an enormous literature in many languages reflects the prodigious history of this sacred precinct during four thousand

years. It is without comparison, tragic and heroic, sublime and inspiring, but also revolting, often a wild struggle of unholy men with unholy men to possess holy things; it includes four-and-twenty conquests with fire and sword, destruction and rebuilding, cruel fanaticism, but then again tranquil ecstasy and cloistral devotion. From this soil, which drank the blood of the Galilean pilgrims whom Pilate slaughtered at their sacrifices, this soil ever lusting for the blood of prophets and saints, there rose also to heaven the smoke of the altar of burnt offering and the jubilant chorus of the psalm-singers. This precinct, the whole city indeed, lies under the unalterable sway of the mysterious forces of living religion.

Behind the greatest sanctuary of all come others in overwhelming plenty. There is the most august place of worship in Eastern Christendom, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, built over the site of Golgotha: in the semi-darkness of its interior our Russian shipmates, whom we see wandering about everywhere in entire blissfulness during these days at Jerusalem, will experience the fulfilment of their highest wishes when witnessing the miracle of the sacred fire on the Great Sabbath (Easter Eve). The huge proportions of the Russian buildings stand out solidly in the background of the town; to these are added the monasteries and churches of the Greeks, Latins, Armenians, Copts and Abyssinians, the Jewish synagogues, and the churches of the English-speaking Christians. The German buildings make a good figure among the venerable chaos: the Protestant Church of the Redeemer, dedicated by the Emperor; the Catholic Dormition, thrown open to his Catholic subjects by the Emperor; the numerous charitable institutions, both Christian and Jewish, founded and maintained by Germany; and on the Mount of Olives itself, like a mighty stronghold, the Empress Augusta Victoria Institute.

The suggestion in miniature on board the Russian pilgrims' ship becomes a great experience, stamping itself indelibly on the memory, as we view the Holy City from the Mount of Olives: Jerusalem the metropolis and abiding-place of the three great monotheistic religions of the world, with their infinite variety of manifestation in nationality, social order, and civilization — Jerusalem the Holy City!

Really? Really the Holy City? A European gentleman—one of those who have passed examinations and earned a right to a pension—having landed in Palestine after the sensations of the season at Kairo, has meanwhile come up to us unobserved on the Mount of Olives. One instinct at least is strongly developed in him, the instinct for discovering the unholy. He fled from the pilgrim ship and now he will flee from Jerusalem. Hundreds of people, however, who desired in no *blasé* spirit to see the Holy City, have fled from it deeply grieved, disgusted at its unholiness. One stock ingredient of the books of travel consists of satire about Jerusalem the Unholy—the strife of the different religious bodies, the fanaticism of religious hatred, the business instinct beneath the mask of piety, the crudities of a materialistic belief in miracles. Nor is justification entirely lacking; and yet to flee in precipitate haste from the unholiness and cast ridicule upon it is really unjust.

Of course at Jerusalem, as everywhere else in the world, things unholy will be found dwelling in close proximity to the holy. Just as the history of the city for four thousand years is the history of the struggle between holy and unholy, just as the water-cisterns of underground Jerusalem are both a fountain of life for a hundred thousand human beings in a district where springs are unknown, and at the same time the breeding-place of dangerous epidemics, so the Holy City even today is in fact full of unholy elements. In all possible gradations the unholy presses itself impudently forward

into the light of day: from the brutal fanaticism of the Mohammedan pilgrim from Afghanistan who fires a revolver at American ladies visiting the Dome of the Rock, to the venomous smile of scorn displayed by the controversial theologian from Europe armed with all the sarcasms of sectarian polemics, who will tolerate nothing that does not find a place in his own narrow western soul, or from the appeals of pious street-beggars to the organized plunder of the pilgrims, all this and much more that is unholy is indeed present. But *the holy is also present;* and those eyes of ours, so ready to discover unholy things—should we not rather train them to discover the unalterable living holiness that persists in spite of all the unholiness?

There is a marked gradation of structure also about the holy element at Jerusalem. It ranges from the rude to the refined, from the immemorial tabu belief of the common people which invests the Holy Place as such with magical powers, to the veneration of sacred things because they are historically venerable; from the blundering fervour of the Siberian devotee to the shy realization of present Divinity by a European mystic; from the religion that craves after happiness, asks only for a friend in need and seeks only to be cured of bodily ills, to the moral enthusiasm that sets free such powerful inward forces as self-devotion, willingness to make sacrifices, patience and tolerance, manly optimism, the confidence inspired by Eternity amid all the impermanence of Time. And yet the refined is not always the strongest, and the rude is not always the coarsest: it all depends on the persons to whom holiness has been vouchsafed. Many a man, who in his complex and burdened soul can still feel only the last dying vibrations of holiness trembling would perhaps be glad to exchange with the simple souls that are able to open out fully and feel the full chords of revelation flooding them.

If there is anyone who says he can discover nothing

of all these gradations of holiness in different souls, let him be taken by the hand and led to the many places in Jerusalem where charity and philanthropy have found a home, where on behalf of cripples, lepers, the blind, orphans and the destitute, in hospitals and asylums, in Jewish and Christian schools, teachers and nurses, clergy and doctors, lay brethren and deaconesses are doing their holy *work*. Supported by donations from the whole civilized world, especially from Germany, England, Scandinavia, America, France, and Russia, the charitable enterprise so magnificently developed in Jerusalem acts as a message of holiness which even the more remote bystander finds sufficiently intelligible. If the dust-whirl were to raise still more alarming clouds of unholiness than hitherto, even then for the sake of its charitable enterprises, if for no other reason, Jerusalem would be and Jerusalem would remain the Holy City.

A new link in the chain of charitable organization, uncommonly interesting by reason of its international and interdenominational character, has been added by the recently founded "International Health Bureau" at Jerusalem. To a trembling sick woman the Saviour once spoke the words, "Be whole of thy scourge". The latest form of charitable endeavour, the organized attempt to combat the ravages of disease in Jerusalem, has had the courage to adopt these words, divine alike in their gentleness and their boldness, and to say to the Holy City, "Be whole of thy scourge". When I realize what benefits these well-directed labours are likely to bring to the Holy City, which has suffered for thousands of years under the scourge of insidious febrile diseases, what benefits to the Holy Land at large, it seems to me as though the barriers between the various faculties had fallen. It is scientific work by medical specialists, and it is the work of civilization done by European pioneers, but it is also, considered *e specie aeternitatis*, a holy work that is being done in the Holy City.

Wesley's Place in Catholic Thought

By Augustin Leger,
Professor of the Ecole Navale, Brest.

That John Wesley was at bottom a genuine Roman Catholic, is not going to be the contention of this paper, however frequently he may have been, in his own days, described as a Papist or a Jesuit in disguise by unfriendly critics.

To a charge of this kind, in August 1739, he quietly opposes his "having the same assurance that Jesus is the Christ, and that no Romanist can expect to be saved, according to the terms of his covenant." Then follows, as early as December, 1747, while reading the deaths of some of the Order de la Trappe, amazement "at the allowance which God makes for invincible ignorance. Notwithstanding the mixture of superstition which appears in every one of these, yet what a strong vein of piety runs through all! What a deep experience of the inward work of God; of righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost!" His May, 1775, Sermon on the Trinity dwells on the fact that persons may be truly religious who hold many wrong opinions: "Can any one possibly doubt of this, while there are Romanists in the world? For who can deny, not only that many of them formerly have been truly religious, as Thomas à Kempis, Gregory Lopez, and the Marquis de Renty; but that many of them, even at this day, are real inward Christians?" Still more outspoken, the Sermon on Faith, in April, 1788: "If most of these are volunteers in faith, believing more than God has revealed, it cannot be denied that they believe all which God has revealed as necessary

to salvation. In this we rejoice on their behalf: We are glad that none of those new Articles, which they added at the Council of Trent to the faith once delivered to the Saints, does so materially contradict any of the ancient Articles, as to render them of no effect."

Thus far had he travelled in the span of fifty years, increasing knowledge and spiritual experience bringing along with it more and more eloquent tribute to the saintliness of individual members of the Church of Rome. Indeed, to the teaching and influence of several of them, from Kempis to Pascal and Fénelon, it would be no hard task to mark his indebtedness.

Still, no amount of suchlike obligation and praise can fairly be construed into an approval of the ecclesiastical system itself. To merely human traditions, to "the number of sacraments, transubstantiation, communion in one kind only, purgatory and praying for the dead therein, praying to saints, veneration of relics, worship of images, indulgences, the priority and universality of the Roman Church, the supremacy of the Bishop of Rome," he pointedly took exception. And throughout his life he remained almost morbidly suspicious of the persecuting spirit which struck him as inseparable from Church absolutism overriding private conscience and what he considered the right of private judgment. "The generality of them are of the same principles, and the same spirit with their forefathers"; no doubt, "they would be of the same practice, too, if opportunity should serve." So, they may prove a danger to English liberty. And he concluded, in 1780, that "no government not Roman Catholic ought to tolerate men of the Roman Catholic persuasion."

The admiration he extends to truly religious Romanists is, therefore, exactly on a level with his commendation of truly religious Calvinists, or, for that matter, of pious Christians of every denomination; just a little warmer and closer than what, in his later days, he would say

of any really God-fearing, right-living Jew, Mohammedan, or pagan. Rather than any partiality to the Church of Rome, the broadening of his mind has thus widened his outlook. Charity, which he preferred to call Love, has made him more comprehensive. His soul has expanded in the fire of Catholic Spirit.

That Spirit he was careful to define, as early as 1750, and to contradistinguish from "this spawn of hell," speculative or practical latitudinarianism, an indifference to all opinions or modes of public worship. "A man of a truly catholic spirit, has not now his religion to seek. He is fixed as the sun in his judgment, concerning the main branches of Christian doctrine." That all cannot think alike, that all cannot walk alike, are surely the two grand hindrances in the way. Yet, "though we cannot think alike, may we not love alike? May we not be of one heart, though we are not of one opinion?" May not "all the children of God forward one another in love and in good works"? "The heart of each is enlarged towards all mankind, those he knows, and those he does not; he embraces, with strong and cordial affection, neighbours and strangers, friends and enemies. This is catholic or universal love. And he that has this, is of a catholic spirit. . . . . Catholic love is a catholic spirit." While differences in opinions or modes of worship "may prevent an entire external union," yet need they "prevent our union in affection"? And, again, one would like to add, may not this union in affection, to some extent, ultimately pave the way for an entire external union?

Is there now less reason to preach, and, however remotely, to reach after the ideal set forth in those pregnant words, fully one and a half centuries ago? With all the changes that have taken place in thought, social structure, and world intercourse for those one hundred and sixty years, is there less reason for all friends of Christianity, nay, of truly human civilization, to keep

before their eyes that vision of a brotherly, if not actually of a patriarchially reunited Christendom, a vision fit to counterbalance the scandal of sectarian strife, the competition of non-Christian religions, the practical materialism and the new barbarity of ever more bitter class antagonism which threaten joint ruin to Christianity, morality and society.

Possibly, the best chance of making this dream come true, is, not to try and rush it through, but patiently to work it out by slow degrees. Bring together representatives of every creed in the world; and, the wider the chasms to be bridged over, the more risk there is for the very heart of a belief to be irreparably injured in the very straining for agreement. Where differences only bear on minor points of divinity or ritual, it is easier to concur without suicidal over-exertion. The recent reuniting of various Methodist bodies; the negotiations that have been going on in Scotland between the Established and the United Free Church; practical co-operation between non-Episcopalians in various parts of the world, all tread on some firm ground of close original affinities.

Now, we hear a great deal about the momentous steps lately taken by Anglican bishops in East Africa. But, if Kikuyu is to prove the hopeful watchword of a reunited Christendom which it sounds to many English ears, two points must be duly borne in mind. First, that, in Wesley's own words, "a man of a truly catholic spirit does not halt between two opinions, nor vainly endeavor to bind them into one." People have no right to call themselves "men of a catholic spirit, only because they are of a muddy understanding; because their mind is all in a mist; because they have no settled consistent principles, but are for jumbling all opinions together." Principles cannot be compromised, trifled with, or explained away; sooner or later, they would be sure to reappear; and the last misunderstanding to be worse

than the first. Long jumps on the surface of things will not avail here. But each must follow his principle right through, down to the inmost centre where diverging lines are seen to meet and mix in one point. No miracles of practical co-operation will ever supersede the necessity of agreement on fundamentals; even such co-operation can only conduce to a similar consummation by gradually removing misunderstandings and prejudices, as between individual Christians.

Let us remember, secondly, that any talk of Christian unity will be idle, as long as that universal communion, the Church of Rome, is left out of reckoning. Any concentration of the Protestant Churches that has for its only object to fight it more irresistibly, would only mean a fiercer duel between two compact forces under the common standard of Christian love: a magnified stumbling-block in the way both of heathen and unbeliever.

If unity is for Christianity the only chance to win over the non-christianized races, and to win back the dechristianized Western world, this unity must be total as it must be sincere, grounded in dogmatic assent as well as in charity, the unanimous perception of the same truths being simply mediated by more friendly feelings and a juster appreciation of each other.

Now, John Wesley, both in the actual facts of his life-work and in the philosophical assumptions those facts imply, is, if not always a conscious exponent, at least a most typical illustration of some of the deeper principles that underlie the action of the Church of Rome. If many features that are held, in the following pages, to be characteristic of the Protestant, as opposed to the Catholic scheme of religion, are nowadays disowned by almost everyone, this will be only further evidence of the vast thorough-going change that has been worked in the temper and outlook of Protestantism, largely by the agency of Methodism itself, as well as of the provi-

dential potentialities of Methodism in the task, so long and slow, of Christian reunion.

First to be noticed, in this connection, is the social character of Wesley's aims and methods. Religion, holiness, salvation he does not consider or present as merely individual concerns, a simple relationship between God on the one side and, on the other, each particular soul quite apart from the rest of mankind, as if souls were truly isolated spiritual monads, without any direct contact with and influence upon one another; no otherwise bound together than in so far as they are each and all related to the same common principle; getting separately at truth, through the medium of the Bible, by the personal enlightenment of the Holy Ghost; getting hold of salvation through direct personal intercourse with Christ, independently of their fellow creatures: so that every one of them might conceivably just as well be saved if it were alone in the world. Religion thus becomes strictly a mystical duet.

Now, Wesley's scheme, from first to last, has been, on the contrary, distinctly polyphonic and symphonic. Fellowship has been, throughout, the key to his original message. The *Short History of the People called Methodists*, as published in November 1781, clearly strikes this note and emphasizes its continuity: "On Monday May 1 (1738) our little society began in London. But it may be observed, the first rise of Methodism, so called, was in November 1729, when four of us met at Oxford; the second was at Savannah, in April 1736, when twenty or thirty persons met at my house; the last was at London, on this day, when forty of fifty of us agreed to meet together every Wednesday evening, in order to a free conversation, begun and ended with singing and prayer." The Methodist society, the United Societies of the People called Methodists: this, their only official name, and the most accurate description of what they were first in-

tended to be, at once takes us back to their generating motive.

"Where there are two or three gathered together in my name, there I am in the midst of them," to the end, "that they all may be one." Mere mechanical or chance gathering seems to come short of such virtue; in vain are bodies juxtaposed, unless there is some intercommunion of souls, organic structure in Christ, superadded breath of corporate life. Lack of organic corporate life must have struck Wesley as the chief fault of the Established Church of England, first in his youthful days, next as an Oxford undergraduate and fellow, then as his father's curate in a Lincolnshire country parish.

In spite of all the political and religious strife of the seventeenth century, which had finally sapped and broken up every pretence of ecclesiastical unity within the Kingdom, and stultified the elaborate discipline of Rubrics and Canons once devised on the strength of a policy of conformity that could no longer be enforced by any means, the fundamental unit of Christian organization still wholly coincided with the civic one; and, because they had ceased to be really co-extensive, the former was getting more and more of a sham. People were reckoned church-members, simply because they had been born there, and, largely as a matter of course, been baptized there some time or other; just as they were expected to pay their rates and fill up various local offices, each in his turn; and just as vagrant paupers were to be sent back for help to the place of their birth. It was a triumph of the territorial church system, where faith was very much taken for granted on the part of the native, if for no other reason, because he belonged there. Between the parish church worshippers, there was hardly any bond but that of chance neighbourhood in space, and of more or less formal attendance in the church building on Sundays and a few other appointed days.

Conversely, where you happened to live outside the

boundaries of a recognized parish, you were practically non-existent: no uncommon case in many parts of eighteenth century England. For now, growing wealth was seeking abroad for the wider markets afforded by the colonial development; and the larger demand requiring an increased supply, the ever busier production that eventually culminated in what is known as the industrial revolution, led to the denser grouping of operatives, to the rise of bigger and bigger industrial centres, and sometimes to wholesale shiftings of population from one district to another.

But, in churchless areas, in towns and cities that had almost suddenly outgrown their old parochial limits, there was no erecting a new church, no subsidizing the old local unit, without first setting in motion the cumbrous machinery of Parliament, as often as not in the face of powerful vested interests, private or collective, of difficulties about rates, tithes, and right of presentation, and of conflicting claims and protracted opposition. The *Journals* of the House, for this period, are full of such long disputed cases. In most places, the gap had to be filled provisionally by some voluntary chance ministrations.

Thus, the territorial frame-work, from which the Church, in former days, may have derived strength and support, was now, as it were, turning into a rack. Her fabric, no longer suited to actual needs, rather loose in some places, and with large rents in others where the economic map of the country had unexpectedly expanded, was wearing thin almost everywhere.

Close union between Church and State may easily prove damaging to spiritual forces, unless the spiritual power is strong and independent of the temporal. Here, the heads of the Church are nothing but the creatures of Government, at a time when the Hanoverian King and his Whig Ministers distrust nothing more than the Tory, Jacobite Church of England clergy, and find their chief

political support among the Dissenters with no love to spare for the Establishment. Bishops' appointments became a party affair; the two orders in the Church are out of sympathy. Since Convocation was silenced in 1717, no organ of corporate life is left to the Church, through which to make up her mind and express her will. Her zeal is banned as *enthusiasm* pregnant with possible trouble. Mazeppa-like, she has been ridden by the State into lifelessness.

Much as Wesley and his friends may have contributed to the popular view of eighteenth century clergymen as dissolute infidels, his experiences and success, as recorded in the *Journal*, rather tell the other way. Heroes and saints, indeed, were in a minority, as they generally are. Bad men could be met with, as they can at all times. As for the great mass, they did not quite know where they stood. There had been so many changes, ever since the Reformation, every one of them attended by a fresh exodus of the more earnest spirits. Controversy between the sects had been raging on all manner of points of doctrine and discipline; critics had shaken the authority of Scripture; free thinkers were calling everything in question. Never had objections loomed so big in press and pulpit; never had theology been more undecided, preaching more self-diffident, positive Christianity kept so far in the background, or so carefully toned down. Never had faith, meanwhile, been more urgently needed for the very sake of morality, amid rapidly changing ways of life and standards of right and duty, accumulating wealth with its many temptations, and budding seeds of social and political discontent. The flock was feeling no less bewildered, no less forsaken and lonely than the shepherds.

"Parishioners are a rope of sand," Wesley exclaimed in his appeal to men of reason and religion, in 1745. The Church of England has none of that true Christian discipline by which "all the living members of Christ

are knit together in one, and all that are putrid and dead immediately cut off from the body"; none of that Christian fellowship, which is as absolute a requisite for personal growth and perseverance as for mutual edification. "Christianity is essentially a social religion; and to turn it into a solitary one is to destroy it. . . . . I mean, not only that it cannot subsist so well, but that it cannot subsist at all, without society, without living and conversing with other men."

Therefore, to supplement indeed the service of the Church in this all-important particular, not to supersede her in her ritual and sacramental ministrations, will be Wesley's constant object from his University days to the end. Beside the regular Establishment, a free Brotherhood, under his generalship, will enroll all such as are anxious voluntarily to connect themselves with a pastor who watches over their souls.

A man's Christianity cannot be taken for granted, because he happens to be born of nominally Christian parents in a nominally Christian country. Unless family religion stands at a singularly high level, every generation in its turn has to be christianized again, just as the world was by the apostles in the beginning. Every soul must personally answer a particular personal call. Birth parochialism thus gets spiritualized into new-birth kinship all over the country.

The conviction that wakens the sense of sin together with a longing for inward liberation, of course, appeals to the individual conscience. Yet even this derives much of its efficacy from the preacher's multiplied magnetic power over emotional multitudes. Then the collective work of society meetings, classes, and bands begins immediately. Where no societies are formed, it appears that almost all the seed falls by the wayside. Hence Wesley's insistence on the duty and benefit of joining the society.

This idea of good men of the Church, in the several parts of the Kingdom, uniting into friendly societies, to

be helpful to each other in all good Christian ways, Wesley says was suggested to him and his Oxford friends by *The Country Parson's Advice to his Parishioners*, a book written in King William's time. Ever since the Restoration, two main currents had been working together in that direction, the one from Germany, the other from France. They seem to combine in Dr. Woodward, who, about 1700, gives an account of the societies or conferences in London. John Wesley's father, writing in 1724 about their many good effects, which may even make up for the total destruction of monasteries that few good men do not lament, shows how much the Church of Rome owes to such societies, and pays a special tribute to the noble and pious M. de Renty, a friend of Vincent de Paul, a prominent member of the Confrérie du St. Sacrement, a leader of the great French religious revival that goes under the name of counter-reformation.

Counter-reformation also might be styled the whole of German Pietism, from Arndt and Spener to Francke and Zinzendorf, in so far as it reacts against the excessive isolation of the individual in Lutheranism, and reasserts the expansiveness of genuine faith. For the co-operation of souls in the work of spiritual progress and salvation ever naturally blossoms in every shape of charitable assistance and social help. On Methodist bands and classes are grafted sick-visiting, relief of the poor, organizations for loans, medical dispensaries, and so on. From the same root will spring the social work of the Salvation Army, and every kind of philanthropic endeavour, spreading from one denomination to another.

The idea of practical Christian brotherhood, largely reappropriated by Wesley from Catholic ground, is distinctly a Catholic idea.

As a simply auxiliary means of spiritual fellowship and guidance for all, whether Churchmen or Non-

conformists, who sincerely desired "to flee from the wrath to come, to be saved from their sins," there was no call upon Methodism to evolve a complete theology of its own. Yet, let us not be misled by the very current statement that undogmatic morality was its all in all. The main-spring of Wesley's success as a preacher, if carefully analyzed, is seen to lie in the intense earnestness, the unflinching, uncompromising fearlessness and boldness with which he everywhere asserted the great transcendental facts of the Christian revelation, however unpopular or scoffed at, instead of minimizing them, explaining them away, or cautiously clouding them in a far-away background, as was so commonly done around him out of a mistaken fear of deistic or sceptical ridicule.

On April 5, 1768, we read in the *Journal*, "I preached at Warrington", a great centre of Unitarian influence, "I am afraid not to the taste of some of my hearers, as my subject led me to speak strongly and explicitly on the Godhead of Christ. But that I cannot help: for on this I *must* insist as the foundation of all our hope." An unqualified assent to the truth of the Bible, belief in God as self-revealed in Scripture; chief of all, absolute trust in Christ and advocacy of personal intercourse with Christ as the living, abiding, all-redeeming source of grace: would Hume or Horace Walpole have readily subscribed to such undogmatic morality?

What is true, is that, in a singularly unconstructive age (its most constructive thinker, Kant, is principally remembered for his criticism of reason), Wesley was little addicted to speculative construction. Small was his faith in the power of the human understanding beyond certain very definite limits; and he did not care for philosophy. His problems were mostly suggested by practical needs, and solved with a view to practice. As in style and oratory, so in divinity, "plain truth for plain people" was his only aim. And just as he laboured "to avoid all words which are not easy to be under-

stood", of set purpose he abstained "from all nice and philosophical speculations; from all perplexed and intricate reasonings; and, as far as possible, from the very show of learning." Untheological he may have been; but by no means undogmatic.

Indulging in clever elaborate intellectual systems and demonstrations was not his business in life, but making immortal souls conscious of those truths "which are necessary to present and future happiness." These are of all times; and they are most elementary. Comparative theology, which distinguishes the essentials from the circumstantials of religion as they are more or less necessary and infallible means for the supreme end, the recovering of Charity, was one of his favourite topics. And the 1775 Sermon on the Trinity shows us that, even as regards the truths most closely connected with vital religion, the *explication* of the words was of no importance in his eyes. We need not believe any mysteries, he argued; for the mystery never lies in the fact, but altogether in the manner; we have to believe the plain revealed facts, not to comprehend the manner of them.

Nothing, indeed, is more striking, in Wesley's mental progress, than this increasingly marked pre-eminence of the practical over the theoretical, while he grows more and more indulgent to those that have, sometimes rashly, been charged with heresy, because entangled in those metaphysical cobwebs of which he is shy. At the same time, his responsibilities as a leader of souls drive him into successive controversies where it is seen that words have the most direct bearing upon conduct, and that spiritual life or death may hang upon correct definitions. Highly instructive, in this respect, is the evolution of the tenet which is, not infrequently, held to account for the evangelizing power of Methodism, and is almost identified with it: justification by Faith.

As everybody knows, the far-reaching change in Wesley's mental attitude, which is somewhat too ex-

clusively referred to as his conversion, took place on May 24, 1738, at a meeting in Aldersgate Street where Luther's Preface to the Epistle to the Romans was being read. "I felt I did trust in Christ, Christ alone for salvation. And an assurance was given me that he had taken away *my* sins, even *mine*, and saved *me* from the law of sin and death." For weeks, the Lutheran Peter Boehler had been besetting him with glowing pictures of that experience; and for years afterwards, justification by Faith alone, as understood and taught by Luther, was the chief element in Wesley's preaching, what he looked upon as the corner-stone of the temple.

"O ye fools, when will ye understand that the preaching of justification by faith alone; the allowing no meritorious cause of justification, but the death and righteousness of Christ; and no conditional or instrumental cause but faith, is overturning Popery from the foundations? When will ye understand, that the most destructive of all those errors which Rome, the mother of abominations, has brought forth (compared to which transubstantiation and a hundred more, are 'trifles light as air'), is, 'That we are justified by works'; or, (to express the same thing a little more decently) 'by faith and works'?" This entry for August 27, 1739, breathes the very same flame as the Sermon on Salvation by Faith, on June 11, 1738.

Now, would any Christian theologian speak slightingly of faith, deny that man is always unworthy of God's grace, or discountenance gratefulness to the Redeemer? But the question is, what does Luther's formula really convey? Is it simply a statement of mystical experience? Then it means that all Christian life naturally flows from a strong sense of Christ's love for us, cannot flow from anything else, and cannot but flow from it. But, why, then, is it worded in that scholastic, abstract, artificial way, which anatomizes the activity of God and man, as if grace and will, faith and works did not indissolubly combine in the concrete reality of the soul? Or is it

supposed to express a clear relation between definite logical terms? Then it is technically worthless, because it stealthily includes, in the word "faith," the "works" that seem to be excluded by the word "alone."

Wesley almost angrily denies somewhere that, by embracing justification by faith, he gave up his former pursuit of holiness. As a matter of fact, he appears to have expected the fulness of holiness at once, and, once for all, the moment he was justified by faith; so oddly was a keenly emotional, imaginative temper always wedded in him to a steady dialectical mind and a severely trained will. His will went on patiently striving; his mind gradually acknowledged that, just as an assurance that we are forgiven cannot be the antecedent condition of our forgiveness, so justification is but a momentous step among a great many others, starting from the first dim rays of prevenient grace that never fail any one, and leading on to further vistas of indefinite growth in holiness, if only man uses every instant all the strength that is freely given him by God.

But what about the less clear-sighted, less scrupulously conscientious millions? It is all very well for a carefully-behaved scholar in his study to declare, as we read for instance in the *Journal*, Aug. 27, 1739, that "no good works can be done before justification; none which have not in them the nature of sin"; or even, when charged with holding that works are a condition of justification, subtly to distinguish, "if you mean good works, I do not." For plain people, bad works are the only alternative to good ones. Moravian stillness, comfortably waiting for the blessing, almost canonizing the "poor sinner" (for the more sins, the more glory to God), only too well agrees with the human line of least resistance not to have been the irresistible conclusion. Nor are works after justification at all more necessary or less mischievous: they incline us to fancy that we can add something to God's omnipotence. So inseparable, as a matter

of fact, is the connection between Justification by faith alone and absolute Predestination. If nothing is to be done, on man's part, but wait for God's pleasure and passively be prompted by grace, then obviously God alone is responsible for the damnation of the damned and the salvation of the elect; all we can do, avails nothing.

Hence, Wesley's long bitter struggle against Moravian Quietists and Calvinistic Antinomians, whose contempt of the Law ended, according to him, in downright blasphemy and wreck of Christianity. His doctrine of Christian Perfection grew up in opposition to both. Justification by works, is this Popery? Not justification by works, but the universality of the Romish Church, and the supremacy of the Bishop of Rome, is the fundamental doctrine of Popery, he protested to a Bristol gentleman, in January 1758. And, after all, "should we, for fear of this or of any other reproach, refrain from speaking the truth as it is in Jesus?" (VII, 129; 1777).[1] Spoken he had in the Minutes of Conference 1770, which dwell on man's faithfulness, working from faith as well as for faith, nothing being more false than that a man is to do nothing in order to secure justification; this, no doubt, is salvation by works,—if not by the merit of works, at least by works as a condition; "we are rewarded according to our works, yea, because of our works: how does this differ from 'for the sake of our works'? and how differs this from *secundum merita operum*, which is no more than 'as our works deserve'?" (VIII, 337-8.)

"We are every moment pleasing or displeasing to God according to our works; according to the whole of our

[1]The references throughout are to the Methodist Book-Room reprint from Jackson's edition of Wesley's Works. XIV vols. 8°

For a fuller illustration of various points, see: *La jeunesse de Wesley* (Paris, Hachette); *Wesley's Last Love* (London, Dent; New York, Dutton, 1910); *La Doctrine de Wesley* (Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne, aout-novembre, 1911).

present inward tempers and outward behaviour." Christian Perfection, therefore, means so devoted a love of God, so full a use of all the grace available, that there follows constant increase in grace, an ever more complete power over sin, horror of sin and freedom from sin, an ever greater approximation to the moral likeness of God, to the full life of God in the soul of man. Full sanctification, he proclaimed in September, 1790, "is the grand depositum which God has lodged with the people called Methodists; and for the sake of propagating this chiefly he appears to have raised us up" (XIII, 9).

Preaching in 1763 on *The Lord our Righteousness*, Wesley definitely outsteps the sectarian narrowness of the technical phrase he had in 1738 so warmly adopted, and, so soon after, found reason to doubt. "Although Mr. Law denied justification by faith, he might trust in the merits of Christ. It is this, and this only, that I affirm (whatever Luther does) to be *articulus stantis vel cadentis Ecclesiae*, the pillar and ground of that faith of which alone cometh salvation. But Mr. Hill thinks justification by faith, and by trusting in the merits of Christ are all one. Be they or not, I still think, some may doubt of justification by faith, and yet not perish everlastingly" (X, 432-3). Still stronger and more explicit the Sermon on *Living without God*, July 6, 1790: "Perhaps there may be some well-meaning persons who aver, whatever change is wrought in men, whether in their hearts or lives, yet if they have not clear views of those capital doctrines, the fall of man, justification by faith, and of the atonement made by the death of Christ, and of his righteousness transferred to them, they can have no benefit from his death. I dare in nowise affirm this. Indeed, I do not believe it. . . . Without holiness, I own, no man shall see the Lord, but I dare not add, 'or clear ideas' " (VII, 354).

To guard against soul-destroying errors, the language of controversy cannot be too exactly accurate. But it

is far better not to have controversy at all. Where the enemy does not come and disturb them, people stand in no need of technicalities, always so liable to puzzle them. The most general elementary statements of spiritual facts, are what Wesley, in every case, tries and reverts to, as the best, most universal, food for popular practical religion. Practice, indeed, is the supreme aim to be kept in view, the object which doctrine has to serve; it is also the touchstone of doctrine.

Truth, the practical truth of religion, is not worked out by any mere mental process, by any effort of learning and reflection on any book, not even the book of Scriptures: what ground is there *a priori* to interpret in one sense rather than in the other so many passages that may be quoted by the despisers of works or zealots of Predestination. Neither the harmony of Scriptures nor the general tenor of the Bible are really sufficient guides here. "First, all the texts which I used to think supported (an absolute unconditional election of some, together with a conditional election of all men), I now think prove either more or less," John writes to his brother Charles on August 8, 1752; "secondly, I find this opinion serves all the ill purposes of absolute predestination." What doubt but that his eyes have been opened to a new meaning of the texts by the actual working of the doctrine? Facts, clearly destructive of Christian life, have risen in condemnation of the former interpretation, and compelled him to look for a different one. That sense of the Bible (or, spiritually, of any doctrine) is the only true one, which, acted upon in the everyday experience of believers, makes for more refined conscience, for a more delicate sense of duty, for a higher moral ideal and efficiency, for more self-sacrificing devotion in the service of God and our fellow-men.

But individual experience indisputably moves, at best, within narrow limits. Unless men are altogether incommensurable units, the vast development of mankind

through time and through space, through the varied problems raised by ever varying conditions and circumstances, surely has something to teach every one of them. Would science even exist, if every scientific man's achievements were, as it were, wiped out the minute he dies and all had to be argued or discovered anew by every member of every generation to come? All the results so far garnered have to be taken into account, before proceeding further. So in religion, while each of us has to live his own life, and personally to assimilate all the spiritual food he takes in, it would be mere waste and foolishness to pretend to do without it. There are decisive experiences, conclusions that hold good for all time. No amount of private judgment will ever cause things to be other than they are, doctrines to bear other than their logical fruit, causes to produce other than their natural effects. It may save time and trouble to recognize this at once.

Indeed, family religion, the catechizing of children, by which Wesley set such store, would be so many indefensible invasions of the duty of personal belief and of the right of private judgment, if something valuable was not handed over thus. The perpetuity of a church system that claims as church-members every one born and bred in it, is a universal phenomenon. Even the new-born jealously trains his offspring in his own faith before he expects them to be, in their turn, born again.

Just as he had fed on all that was best in all the Christian churches he was acquainted with, Wesley, by the public reading of letters from believers in all parts of the world, by his Christian library, by the many cheap reprints he scattered broadcast among his disciples, endeavoured to make them share in a life larger than their own,—benefit by what he considered the flower of universal spiritual experience.

Less satisfactory was his intellectual handling of belief.

At his 1738 conversion, he had made, so to speak, a clean slate; and he had to reconstruct tentatively, as he went on. Thus it is impossible to ignore the fact that, by ostensibly dwelling on a few overstated, because isolated points, which, while far from representing the only aliment of his rich spiritual life, were taken by others as all-sufficient and exclusive of anything else, he at first fostered a narrow sectarian spirit that afterwards proved hard to expand. The doctrinal monsters he was at such pains to lay down, his critics could argue, not without some show of reason, he had himself imprudently let loose. And finally, when, in 1763, "the preaching no other doctrine than is contained in Mr. Wesley's *Notes upon the New Testament* and four volumes of Sermons", was specified by him as the condition upon which his preaching-houses were to be settled upon trust, not only did he, for all time to come, forbid Methodism to learn after him; but he legally bound it by a standard of orthodoxy he himself outlived and materially outgrew for more than thirty years.

Anyhow, the actual progress of his thought comes singularly near what may be called the method of Catholic tradition, meaning thereby, not the oral transmission of religious lore as contradistinguished from Scripture, but the living way in which theological truths, as elaborated in contact with human philosophers and defended against errors of all sorts, are tested in the corporate experience of the Church, and handed down as safe material for further experience.

The remarkable fact is, therefore, by no means an accident, that Alexander Knox, who had learnt from Wesley himself how to appreciate, in the ancient Liturgy of the Church of England, the treasured wisdom of Christianity, should have, in his turn, taught the English Tractarians the same lesson; and that, in this way, however indirect, John Wesley should have begotten John Henry Newman.

However near akin Wesley may have been to the Tractarians in this one particular respect, and indeed in all respects, during the short while that he was under Nonjuror influence at college, is not sacerdotalism the point where he decidedly parts company with High Church Ritualists, and stands irreconcilably remote from Catholicism, Roman or Anglican?

Once more, recollect the primary status of the Methodist Society. As members' joining it "did not imply leaving their former congregation, but only leaving their sins," church ministrations were to be sought by every one outside the preaching-houses. In but a few places, John Wesley, assisted by his brother and other regularly ordained ministers of the Church of England, had chapels, where the Liturgy was used, and the Sacrament administered. In course of time, as Methodists, driven out by church persecution, or actuated by anti-church prejudice, insisted on receiving the Sacrament at the hands of their spiritual teachers, in the places where they heard the unadulterated word of God, difficulties arose, which may be gauged in the Sermon on *The Ministerial Office*, May 4, 1789.

Here we learn both on what terms his lay helpers were commissioned to spread the Gospel, and how sternly he rebuked them, whenever they took upon themselves to baptize or administer: "In doing it, you renounce the first principle of Methodism, which was wholly and solely to preach the Gospel;" break this rule, and you recant the connection. "In ancient times, the office of a Priest and that of a preacher were known to be entirely distinct. . . . While the Pastor, frequently called a Bishop, presided over the flock, and administered the sacraments, the evangelist assisted him, and preached the word, either in one or more congregations." Of Prophets or Evangelists only it is true, that "God always asserted *his* right to send by whom he would send." Not so with "the honour no man taketh unto himself,

but he that is called of God as was Aaron." Ye who call sinners to repentance, do not "like Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, seek the priesthood also" (VII, 279-280).

Some of the vehemence with which he inveighed against unworthy brother clergy, though misunderstood by many of his anti-ecclesiastical converts, really testifies to his exalted notion of that "call to minister in holy things, to offer up prayers and sacrifices, to execute the office of a Priest," of which he spoke with constant reverence. As regards the Christian Sacrament and Sacrifice," chief of the means of grace that had been so important an episode in his championship of works as against Antinomian stillness, his *Hymns on the Lord's Supper*, with a Preface extracted from Brevint in 1745, no less than his earlier correspondence with his mother, make it clear that, while objecting to transubstantiation, he held very strong views of Christ's real presence in the Eucharist. The Sermon on the *Duty of Constant Communion*, preached to his pupils in February 1732, he could reprint in 1788, adding little, "retrenching much, as I then used more words than I do now. But, I thank God, I have not yet seen cause to alter my sentiments in any point which is therein delivered" (VII, 147).

As a proof that he did not believe in any outward sacerdotal consecration, much has been made of a passage in the *Journal*, Feb. 1761, where, answering the Roman Bishop Challoner, he denies "that the Romish bishops came down by uninterrupted succession from the Apostles." But, in the very same page, on the authority of F. Courayer's *Defence of the Validity of the Anglican Ordinations*, he has just argued that, granting the Romish Ministers do come down by succession from the Apostles, so do the Protestant, the English in particular. An obvious acknowledgment, this, that, as a matter of fact, the regular transmission of holy orders goes back at least to pre-Reformation times.

What he "never could see proved and is persuaded he never shall," is something rather different: continuity of tenure of any particular see, with its full list of bishops, each known to history, each in his turn episcopally consecrated, the first link of that unbroken chain duly authenticated as in direct connection with one of the Twelve. At any rate, not one line of his shows that he doubted sacerdotal succession; and he always acted on the principle that such a succession there must be.

Witness his most daring infringement of established ecclesiastical order. When the Church of England missionaries in America found themselves cut off, at the same time as from their allegiance to King George, from the Bishop of London's jurisdiction in which they had been so far, and when Anglican congregations over there were starving for lack of spiritual food, it was in order that there should be a valid administration of the sacraments grounded on some sort of valid institution, that Wesley, attended by fellow-clergymen, consecrated "Superintendents" to look over their brethren west of the Atlantic, and perpetuate the ministry among them. Eventually, the same measure was extended to Presbyterian Scotland, possibly even once to England, with a view to prevent rather than to pave the way for separation from the Church, lest his preachers should after him assume ministerial powers to which they were nowise ordained, and thus make ultimate acceptance of their co-operation impossible.

Peter King and Stillingfleet having satisfied him that Bishops and Presbyters were originally the same order, he considered himself a bishop in the scriptural sense. Territorial or diocesan Episcopacy, such as swelled up since Constantine, "strangely and unnaturally blending together Church and State, the Kingdoms of Christ and of the world, Christianity and Heathenism, poured wealth and honour on the Clergy" (VII, 164), he respected, as a British citizen, because part and parcel of

the established law of the land, but he very little cared for, as a Christian. "As our American brethren are now totally disentangled both from the State, and from the English hierarchy," he significantly remarks in 1784, "we dare not entangle them again, either with the one or the other" (XIII, 252). So, whenever he disowns exclusive belief in Episcopal ordination, this is exactly what he means: beside the State-appointed, temporally ruling prelates, there are other bishops, with quite as good a title, if not even a better and more primitive one. The reality and necessity of a distinct sacerdotal character remain quite beyond dispute.

To the bishops that were, it must be confessed, he paid scant service indeed: obedience to them, he confined "to every point of an indifferent nature." The rest is, either according to the law of God, and then already settled by it; or against it, and consequently to be resisted at all cost by conscience. But does the law of God always speak so clearly and explicitly either for or against a given course of conduct, however momentous? Is the question always to be settled by a clear-cut logical dilemma? If it must be referred to the accumulated experience of the past, should there not be some established guardian and authorized exponent of it? In his correspondence, under the *alias* of John Smith, with Wesley, who professed deference for the Church in 1545, not in 1745, it had been Bishop Secker's plea, that, if the latter did differ from the former, the presumption lay in favour of the modern one: precisely because truth is brought to light, and errors rectified by experience. Consequently, her doctrine is to be looked for in her Creeds and Articles as generally understood and interpreted by her living pastors; the so-called right of conscience and private judgment being frequently nothing more than the rash conceit of youthful ignorance.

This last hint might be not only substantiated in Wesley's own case, but censured in his own words.

"One would not desire," he lectures the Bristol Gentleman in 1758, "to hear any private person, of no great note in the Church or the world, speak, as it were, *ex cathedra*, with an air of infallibility, or at least of vast self-sufficiency, on a point wherein men of eminence, both for piety, learning, and office, have been so greatly divided" (*i.e.* justification). "Though my judgment is nothing altered, yet I often condemn myself for my past manner of speaking on this head" (X, 306). Addressing an opponent, whom he advises not to be so positive, especially with regard to things that are neither easy nor necessary to be determined, he admits with his usual candour that he grounds this advice on his own experience: "When I was young, I was sure of everything: In a few years, having been mistaken a thousand times, I was not half so sure of most things as I was before: At present, I am hardly sure of anything but what God has revealed to man" (XIII, 399, 1765). Again, to Lady Huntingdon, in 1771: "When I was much younger than I am now, I thought myself almost infallible; but, I bless God, I know myself better now" (XII, 369). And again, in the 1787 Sermon on *The more Excellent Way*, "I do not say now (as I should have been very apt to do fifty years ago) that all who indulge themselves in this manner, are in the way to hell" (VII, 29; p. 199). Melville Horne, whose testimony there is no reason to suspect, likewise quotes him as saying: "When, fifty years ago, my brother Charles and I, in the simplicity of our hearts, told the good people of England, that, unless they knew their sins forgiven, they were under the wrath and curse of God, I marvel they did not stone us. The Methodists, I hope, know better now."

Now, however disinterested the motive, sincere the self-devotion, and beautifully frank the *mea culpa*, "to make sad the hearts of those whom God had not made sad" (VII, 199) is surely in itself no light responsibility

for one with the influence of the Wesleys. Nor is it certain that their own growth in grace and knowledge, and consequent adequacy of notions, ever completely did away with some of the early impressions they had stamped deep in the minds of their followers, especially with regard to the Church and to theology. Anglican bishops, fresh from the Antinomian and anti-ecclesiastical excesses of seventeenth century revolutionary Puritanism, surely knew what they were about when objecting to the unguarded zeal with which Wesley and his friends started preaching justification by faith alone, and evolving an independent organization of their own. They clearly foresaw and foretold what would come out of it. When one reads, for instance, the 1745-1748 correspondence between Wesley and Secker, then Bishop of Oxford, it is difficult not to feel that wisdom, for the greater part, lay on the latter's side. No doubt Wesley's enthusiasm effected in eighteenth century England what Secker's more balanced judgment would never have been equal to. Yet, would not some wholesome regard for the superior experience, if not the hierarchical authority of his elders, have spared him many an irreparable blunder, without lessening his efficiency for good?

In more ways than one, has every man been made responsible for his brother? Above anyone else, is every member of a religious society very certainly responsible for the welfare of even—yea, above all—his weaker brethren. Hence, occasional excess, slowness to move, promptness to check every flight of zeal as well as every sally of imagination, is by no means an argument against external control. The very restraint makes for both strength and health. It chafes us, certainly, for a while. If only we allow the irritation to cool down, it compels us to revise our judgments, to test our sentiments more severely: always a salutary necessity, since the more exacting we are for ourselves, in our search after truth,

and the more aspects of many-sided reality we take into account, the safer we are from every form of narrow-mindedness and partial view of things.

True, the problem is where to draw the line, how to strike accurately upon the narrow way surrounded on all sides with deadly bogs. For fear that the fire in the hearth should burn down the house, shall it be smothered to the last spark? Church authority, where exerted, is always in danger of considering itself as an end, instead of a means, however important, to higher ends, and of asserting itself in consequence to the very point of stamping out the very life it is appointed to preserve and promote. A fateful ideal of peace, order, unanimity is suggested to the church by the neighbouring churchyard. In an authoritative body, there are almost suicidal forces at work in this direction which always require keeping in check.

It may be objected that, just as the possible abuse of justification by faith alone by Antinomians is here taken to disprove the doctrine, so any abuse of Church authority, whether merely conceivable in the abstract, or displayed by history, finally disposes of the principle of authority. But is there not a real difference between the inevitable consequences of a definite theoretical statement, taken as it must be by the many in its plain literal meaning, and the practical developments of a disciplinary policy which, learning from its very miscalculations, is always capable of readjustment, without destroying or contradicting its own essence? What remains of justification by faith alone, once you qualify it by saying it must somehow include works? Whereas authority, which history shows us growing stricter under the stress of its struggle with the wilder vagaries of self-will and self-assertion, cannot but stop short of throttling that measure of autonomy in thought and action apart from which experience proves there is no sound sincere personal spiritual life; else, it would doom itself to perish

along with that life, for the sake of which alone it has been built up.

Add, how much easier it is to prevent or correct the abuse, where it really creeps in, than to restore the use, where long abolished!

Now let us notice that nobody ever asserted the claims of authority in stronger language or more energetic deeds than John Wesley himself. His Sermon on *Obedience to Pastors*, preached in 1785, ranks in his *Collected Works* next to those on *Family Religion* and the *Education of Children*. "It is well known to what an extravagant height the Romanists in general carry this direction. . . . And not much less has been insisted on, by several eminent men of the Church of England: Although, it is true, that the generality of Protestants are apt to run to the other extreme; allowing their Pastors no authority at all, but making them both the creatures and the servants of their congregations" (VII, 108-9).

Pastors, he defines as "those that guide you, if not by your choice, at least by your consent: them that you willingly accept of to be your guides in the way to heaven." Are they not few, indeed, in the Christian world, at the present time, those that are ruled otherwise than by their own consent? Any secular compulsion there may be, rather acts away from, than into Christian churches. On the other hand, the ambiguous character of Methodism, a complete ecclesiastical society grown out of what was first to be a mere auxiliary confraternity for mutual edification, makes Wesley's point here slightly misleading: "Who watched over them in love? Who marked their growth in grace? Who advised and exhorted them from time to time? Who prayed with them and for them as they had need? This, and this alone is Christian fellowship" (VIII, 251; 1748). These words aptly describe the spiritual director Wesley was eminently. And a spiritual director, François de Sales used to say, ought to be singled out, not from

a hundred or a thousand, but from ten or a hundred thousand. Not so with ordinary ecclesiastics. If one joined a Church, simply because one happened to like this parish priest, or that bishop, frail indeed would be the bond of Churchmanship, and incessant the changes of denomination. Wesley never allowed such bias to rule over the settlement of his preaching-houses, or the appointment of his preachers; nor would he keep them long in the same circuit, whether the people were fond of them, or not.

To those pastors, of the responsibilities of whom he draws a beautiful picture, "whatever submission, of even our understanding, is short of the implicit faith due only to our one Master in heaven, we may, nay, we ought to yield," willing to receive any instruction from them, to be convinced of anything we did not know before, to lie open to their advice and glad to receive admonition or reproof; ready also to give up our own will, whenever we can do it with a clear conscience, that is, if not forbidden in the word of God.

A reservation this that does not take from, but adds to our duties. In things forbidden, indeed, we are not to obey. In things enjoined of God (the interpretation of which, apparently, never leaves room for doubt), it is God we obey. But, as a curious consequence of this principle, "it is the duty of every private Christian to obey his spiritual pastor, by either doing or leaving undone anything of an indifferent nature; anything that is in no way determined in the word of God." And "how little is this understood in the Protestant world! Yet no more express command"; no command more direct and positive; no words more clear and plain! He who lives in the habitual breach of this cannot plead innocence; such disobedience must grieve the Holy Spirit, hinders the grace of God, is one cause of the deadness of many souls. An application follows: do Methodists take Wesley's advice with regard to dress?

Hence, the most stringent system of disciplinary measures making for holiness by close constant control over the very slightest circumstances of every day life. Nor is any one of those measures to be trifled with. "Nothing will stand in the Methodist plan, unless the Preacher has his heart and his hand in it. Every Preacher, therefore, should consider it is not his business to mind this or that thing only, but every thing" (June 17, 1771). "If one wheel of a machine gets out of its place, what disorder must ensue! In the Methodist discipline, the wheels regularly stand thus. The Assistant, the Preachers, the Stewards, the Leaders, the people. But here, the Leaders, who are the lowest wheel but one, were got quite out of their place. . . . They have not authority to restrain the Assistant, if they think he acts improperly. No more than any member of the society has. After mildly speaking to him, they are to refer the thing to Mr. W." To their getting to the top of all, above the Stewards, the Preachers, yea, and above the Assistant himself, Wesley, on April 3, 1771, chiefly imputes the gradual decay of the work of God in Dublin.

The political activity of Popery is one of the things to which he objects. But does he not himself place his spiritual influence in the service of politics? True, it is only to support the "powers that be," as commanded in Scripture; thus loyalty becomes part of religion. To lack of it, he ascribes the decrease in the work of grace among his followers.

Authority, it seems, could hardly be stretched any farther. His answer to those who charge him with making himself a Pope, is that his authority is not of his own seeking, and that he does not compel any one to acknowledge his sway: people first desired to come under him for the good of their souls; he drew up a few plain rules, and permitted them to join him on these conditions. Whoever, therefore, violates them, particularly that of being directed by him in the work, does *ipso facto* disjoin

himself from him (XIII, 139; Jan. 1780). Here again, his is the position of a freely selected spiritual Director, rather than head of a Church.

A second answer is, he does not consider that, outside his own society, there is no salvation. "I have no authority from the word of God," he writes in 1790 (VII, 353), "to judge those that are without the Christian dispensation; nor do I conceive that any man living has a right to sentence all the heathen and Mahometan world to damnation." This is equally true within that dispensation. Would any Roman theologian disagree with him, as far as individuals are concerned? The soul of the Church is acknowledged to be more comprehensive than its body. But can any society that is at all in earnest, inertly behold the spread of such other-ness in thought and action as seems to threaten eternal interests? Did not Wesley do his utmost to stop or fend off Moravian and Calvinistic contempt of the Law? Pious Moravians surely there were, and religious Calvinists. None the less, the tendency of both systems struck him as mischievous; and he left no means untried to keep his flock from them. His exclusiveness sprang from his love of souls. Read his Sermon on *Free Grace*, and you will ask how he could, with self-respect, have behaved indifferently. Rebels, whether in doctrine or discipline, he ruthlessly put off.

This is the way in which any Church, as it lives on, guarding its mind from lethal heresy, its organic health from schismatic disruption, is impelled to define itself ever more explicitly. But for this sacred duty of self-preservation and defence of something that is at least fancied to be vital to conscience, church plurality and rivalry would dwindle into the meanest shop competition. Non-essentials are no excuse for the sin of Christian disunion. Let all Churches once agree on essentials, and there will be no shadow of call left for them to "come and be separate."

If the social character of religion, the organic solidarity of all believers; the continued test of thought in and by corporate experience throughout climes and centuries; the collective elaboration and preservation of truth in an organized body under some acknowledged supreme and independent spiritual authority, are, in spite of every possible local or temporary abuse and perversion, the grand requisites for the unflagging perpetuity of the Christian message, as instrumental of grace both by its beliefs and sacraments and as available everywhere for the masses of the people both learned and rude, one cannot wonder that the Roman Church should have always asserted them above any compromise. And one cannot but rejoice at their gradual re-discovery, at their even partial or embryonic revival in such a world-wide evangelical agency as Methodism; the only one among the latest developments of Christianity that, from the modest beginnings of voluntary unions of brethren for spiritual mutual help, has undesignedly gone on building up new organs in answer to the discharge of new functions, has shot out missions far and wide over the face of the earth, and has thus, within the last one hundred and seventy-five years, grown through the varied experiences of an ecumenical religious body, whose re-acquired wisdom has already to some extent influenced, and, it may be hoped, will more and more re-enter and re-model other Protestant communities.

The measure in which its great founder did, no matter whether thoroughly or inchoately, consciously or instinctively, give this far-reaching movement the decisive impulse, secures and marks out for him what has been meant here by Wesley's place in Catholic Thought.

Anglicanism and Reunion

By J. G. Simpson,
Canon of St. Paul's Cathedral, London.

So rapidly do situations develop in these days that the circumstances under which an article has been undertaken may be entirely different from those under which it is written. This is abundantly illustrated by the present case. I undertook to offer a few considerations on the Unity question in the light of what had been taking place in Scotland. But the centre of interest has in the meantime shifted to East Africa. For good or for evil "Kikuyu and After" is now a dominant factor in the problem. The public discussion of the issues involved, which has been encouraged by the journalistic press, has aroused suspicions and kindled controversies, which might well have been allowed to sleep. On the other hand, it is scarcely possible to doubt that it has revealed a progress towards mutual understanding infinitely more significant than the differences of outlook which have long stood in the way of the practical consideration of the question.

It is supremely important that we should not allow ourselves to be beaten out of the conviction that we are working towards a synthesis of faith and order, and not a compromise of theory and practice. Some may be content to call this the spirit of "Edinburgh," but it is a pity to prejudice a great movement of Christian thought by seeming to confine it to what is really one of its conspicuous results rather than its inspiring cause. No doubt it was quickened in many minds by the great conference of 1911, upon which those who have felt its influence can never go back. But the vision had been

growing long before the World's Conference was conceived and is even now operative in a far wider circle. Wherever Loyalty and Liberalism are not regarded as mutually exclusive ideas, wherever Authority and Freedom are cherished with an equal passion, there it is.

The temper, of which I speak, can only define itself in practice. But it is none the less positive and real because it is necessarily beset by perplexities and exposed to criticism on both sides. Truth is in many ways much more difficult to defend than partial systems because it is generous and large. People understand you, if you keep to one side of the road or the other. They will accuse you of fundamental inconsistency, or worse, if you attempt to walk on both sides at once. They understand the championship of "the faith which was once delivered unto the saints" as it is expressed in creeds and symbols, on the one hand, and the freedom of what is often called "liberal Christianity," on the other. What they cannot comprehend is the combination of the two. They cannot see how a generous sympathy may be the best guardian of cherished convictions. Good churchmanship and comprehensiveness appear to them to be at opposite poles. It needs, therefore, no small resolution to hold on our way undismayed by the indiscretion of our friends or the criticism of our opponents, believing that apparent contradictions are the indications of fundamental agreement and that the reconciliation of apparent opposites must ultimately disclose itself to those whose watchword is reconciliation without surrender and reunion on a basis which lies somewhere down below our differences. This means a faith so strong that it will not shrink from risks, on the part of those who are as convinced that "our redemption draweth nigh" as that the Lord God omnipotent reigneth.

If this temper is only assured, if this religious climate be only preserved, approximation will go on apace. For it becomes a question not of how much we are pre-

pared to surrender in order to attain co-operation, but of how clearly we are able to perceive the essentials of our own position and the true bearing of the truths for which others stand. We have suffered in the past from isolation and from a consequent incapacity to see one another from within. That is the situation from which the new spirit is liberating us. We have not really tried to see whether adjustment is possible. A new approach to the problem has been found, and the calls, which come to us on either side from such as misread the times, are not going to turn us back from the gate.

We shall do well to remind ourselves at this juncture that the consummation, which we are trying to set steadily before us, is organic union. This is a supremely practical question and we must deal with it in a practical frame of mind. The aim is to bring about on a yet wider scale an amalgamation like that which is now absorbing the attention of the two great Presbyterian communions in Scotland. In a word we desire to replace a dozen separately organized communions by one undivided society in which there shall be complete interchange of relations such as at present exists, let us say, between the various branches of the Anglican communion throughout the world. If this be the case, then the conditions under which sacraments are celebrated and ministerial functions conferred is strictly relevant to the issue. It ought to be clear to every one that some sort of adjustment between the ministries of churches differently organized is an essential condition of such a unity as is here contemplated. Some sort of principle must be sought which will regularize the ministry of each community from the point of view of one another's systems. This is the only way in which chaos and confusion are to be avoided.

A consideration of the Anglican hierarchy will at once make this clear. Here we have a threefold ministry, each order of which has its appropriate functions. While

a member of the first degree may discharge all the duties of the second, and a member of the second those of the third, the process cannot be reversed. The deacon may not celebrate the Eucharist, nor may the priest ordain and confirm. How, then, as a practical question, are the ministries of the various non-episcopal churches to be correlated with the Anglican ministry? The case of the Presbyterian clergy, though by no means without difficulty, is comparatively simple compared with that of other ministries. And, in Great Britain at any rate, the local distribution of the Presbyterian and Anglican churches might materially facilitate arrangement. But, as soon as we travel further afield, it is obvious that the ministries of the various communions must be reduced to some common denominator, if the clergy of one body are to become available for another. Federation, for example in mission work, is only a stage. Interchange of pulpits solves no difficulties. It is at best a temporary expedient. The question of the ministry, therefore, at once comes into prominence, as soon as the reunion of churches becomes a question of practical politics. This is certain, quite apart from any doubts which may be raised concerning the "validity" of this or that method of ordination and of the sacraments administered in virtue of it. Sooner or later, then, the consideration of this problem has to be faced by us all.

It may not be out of place at the present juncture to ask what are the limits of the fourth requirement of the Lambeth Quadrilateral, namely, the Historic Episcopate. That, as is well known, is the suggestion of the Anglican bishops in the matter of order. Any union between the churches, which they represent, and other Christian communions, would involve, so far at least as they are at present advised, the incorporation of this element in the ministries of those churches, with which it might be proposed to unite. Now this requirement has always loomed large in the imagination of the non-

episcopal churches as the great and insuperable obstacle to negotiation. The reason of this is quite intelligible. It is customary to read it in the light of what are known to be the convictions of a very large number of Anglican churchmen. These convictions it is, of course, quite impossible to ignore. They hold, rightly or wrongly, that the episcopate, as the guarantee of apostolic succession, belongs to the constitution of the Christian Church. From this they deduce the conclusion, though the peremptoriness with which it is advanced greatly varies. that no valid sacraments can be administered without it and that those communities which lack it have no claim to the title of a Christian Church. Whatever may be thought of this plea, it undoubtedly constitutes an important factor in the problem of reunion as it presents itself to Anglicans. When, for example, as happened the other day, a petition, which virtually involved it, is signed by more than six hundred of the London clergy, and presented by their Bishop to the Convocation of Canterbury, it becomes inconceivable that any course should be adopted, which might heal one schism only by provoking another.

But to recognize this fact is wholly different from asserting that, in stipulating for the acceptance of the historic episcopate, the Lambeth bishops insist upon the repudiation of all non-episcopal ministries as a condition of union. It is notorious that those who today are working together within the bounds of the Anglican communion are very far from agreeing that episcopacy is essential to the being of a Christian Church. Nor do those, who hold this view, ask for anything more than to be allowed to remain in a communion which possesses what to them appears to be a duly accredited ministry. They do not ask what may be the views of others who are content to exercise the same ministry. Nor must it be forgotten that the Lambeth Quadrilateral is not the work of the High Church party but of the united episcopate,

the composition of which is as varied as that of the churches of which its members are the fathers in God. It is a mistake to read into the requirement of the "historic episcopate" a condemnation of all non-episcopal churches and to regard it as a demand, not for union upon equal terms, but for the absorption of all other religious bodies in the episcopal system.

What the bishops ask is the acceptance of the "historic episcopate." The phrase is reminiscent not of Pusey but of Lightfoot. It recalls, as doubtless it is meant to recall, the words employed by the great Bishop of Durham in his Commentary on the epistle to the Philippians. "The three-fold ministry," so he sums up the result of his historical investigations, "can be traced to Apostolic direction; and short of an express statement we can possess no better assurance of a Divine appointment or at least a Divine sanction. If the facts do not allow us to unchurch other Christian communities differently organized, they may at least justify our jealous adhesion to a polity derived from this source." And in the preface to the sixth edition he cites the words of the English Ordinal which declare "that from the Apostles' time there have been these orders of Ministers in Christ's Church, Bishops, Priests, and Deacons."

The "historic episcopate" is, of course, the cardinal feature of this threefold ministry. It will be generally admitted that it is the episcopal order and not the triple orders that is characteristic. Few would go so far as to assert that the discontinuance of the diaconate as a separate grade of ministry, would fatally impair a church's apostolic character. What the Lambeth Encyclical really throws us back upon is the statements of the Anglican formularies with regard to the ministry, to which Lightfoot refers. It is of the utmost importance that all those who seek a reunion, which shall not exclude the Church of England, should have a clear understanding of the scope of these statements. For it is by these,

and these alone, that the Lambeth proposition must be interpreted.

It ought, then, in the first place to be carefully noted that in the only place, that is in the 23rd Article of Religion, where the Church of England declares its relation to the principle on which the Christian Ministry rests, not a word is said about episcopacy. The principle is stated in such a way as would probably command the assent of the vast majority of Christians. No one is to presume to execute the ministerial office who has not been "lawfully called." And what constitutes a lawful calling is defined in the words which follow: "Those we ought to judge lawfully called and sent, which be chosen and called to this work by men who have public authority given unto them in the congregation" for this purpose. Now we know from history that this article is dependent on a previous document drawn up by a joint committee of Anglican and German Lutheran theologians. It cannot, therefore, be held to prejudge the case of the Evangelical Church, which has no bishops. But neither has it a word to say against the lawfulness of ministry in churches of the Genevan model. In fact it makes no pronouncement against the ministry of any body of Christians existing before or since its publication. Of course it is equally true that it makes no pronouncement in its favour. But, then, it was not called upon to decide that delicate and difficult question. The one question of immediate importance was to secure a lawful ministry for the English Church.

The English reformers in one important respect differed from their neighbours on the continent. They found themselves in a position to continue the ministry in its existing and canonical form, which on any showing was "historic." They resolved to do so and took considerable pains to observe continuity. The only reference to the hierarchy in the Thirty-nine Articles is to be found in No. 36, the object of which is to assert the sufficiency

of the reformed Ordinal of Edward VI as a means of securing their object. It is, however, when we turn to the Ordinal itself that we are informed of the principles upon which their resolve rested. This is the document from which Bishop Lightfoot drew the citation, to which reference has already been made. They take their stand upon history. Here at any rate, they seem to say, is a ministry which satisfies the conditions laid down in the 23d Article. It certainly has a continuous history "from the Apostles' time." In that sense, as Bishop Lightfoot puts it, it is of "divine institution." It is clearly our duty to see that these Orders "be continued, and reverently used." Hence the Ordinal.

It ought to be perfectly clear that nothing in this statement either modifies or is intended to modify the silence of the article with regard to non-episcopal ministries. When a principle is stated which applies to the Church Universal there is advisedly no reference to bishops. And the opinions expressed by many divines alike of the Elizabethan and Caroline period show that, while no doubt there was always a party in the Church which held a more exclusive view, the formularies cannot be interpreted as "defacing foreign churches." Moreover the moderation of the historical statement must not be forgotten. It is simply maintained that this form of ministry, universal, of course, at the beginning of the Reformation, has been in the Church from apostolic times. It is not said that it was universal in the primitive church, still less that it obtained an exclusive privilege from the apostles themselves. It is, in fact, just such a statement as leaves room for further historical inquiry. I must repeat that the English Reformers did no more than jealously preserve the "historic" ministry in their own church. That they were probably not even contemplating the case of ministers from non-episcopal national churches, who might seek office in the Church of England, seems proved by the fact that Archbishop

Grindal, for example, thought he was within the law in admitting Scottish ministers to English benefices, when he had granted a certificate that they had been ordained according to the custom of their own communion. No doubt such action was in some quarters resented. Since 1662 it has been rendered impossible by the insertion of a clause definitely preventing the ministration of persons not ordained according to the English book except they have "had formerly Episcopal consecration or ordination." But it is not at all unlikely that even this exclusion is positive in intention, meant to cover the case of clergy ordained by the Scottish bishops.

That the "historic episcopate" should have been included in the Lambeth Quadrilateral represents the instinct, not of High Churchmen only, but of the whole Anglican communion. Those who would freely admit the "validity" of non-episcopal ministrations are probably no less certain than their most uncompromising neighbours that to surrender episcopacy would be to sink the identity of the Church and to surrender its peculiar contribution to the general life of Christendom. It belongs to the genius of the Church of England and to injure its integrity is, therefore, unthinkable. For what we are considering is not temporary accommodation or federation for certain practical purposes, but that organic union which is the ultimate, if not the immediate end of all our efforts. Attempts to distinguish between a sacramental and a prophetic ministry might possibly lead to certain immediate approximations. It is understood, for example, that the Kikuyu proposals include provision for the admission of non-episcopal missionaries to Anglican pulpits "with the status of lay-readers." But it is difficult to imagine that the ministers of other churches would acquiesce in such conditions as a final arrangement. And the distinction, though it is not entirely without a basis in fact, does not really represent

the mind of the English Church, which joins "the office of public preaching" with that of "administering the Sacraments." It is not really a question of two parallel ministries, but of where the emphasis falls in the conception of the minister. We are, therefore, in the last resort bound to consider upon what terms the common ministry of a united Church is to be allowed to discharge all the functions of the Christian Ministry. And the Lambeth Conference, looking first to the identity of the Church which it represents, then to that section of it which insists upon the episcopate as an essential of apostolic Christianity, and lastly to those possibilities of yet wider reunions which can never be neglected in the attempt to unite the Reformed Churches, puts forward a claim for the acceptance of the "historic episcopate."

In view of what has now been said, the limitations of this claim ought to become clear. First of all, it is not a claim for the acceptance of the whole Anglican system, in other words for the absorption of other churches under the pretext of reunion. It is not even a demand for the admission of the typical Anglican prelate into alien organizations, where his presence would be like that of a bull in a china shop. It is the *historic* episcopate for which acceptance is claimed, that is, such modification of existing ministries, and such only, as shall bring them into line with that historical institution which Anglicans prize. They desire for those who are to become their own ministers an authorization derived from a source which has had a continuous and uninterrupted history from the primitive age, not the adoption of any particular model of ecclesiastical government.

What this involves may, perhaps, be best illustrated in relation to a particular case. Take that, for example, of the Church of Scotland. This Church, as all are aware, is Presbyterian in its government. But it would be truer to history to assert that its genius consists in government by a hierarchy of church courts, of which the highest

and most characteristic is the General Assembly. The Presbytery was not originally one of these. It was inserted in the system under the influence of Andrew Melville and other admirers of the Genevan model. Though, to use the language of the Convention of 1689 the Church had "been reformed by Presbyters," and in consequence ordination by presbyters was deemed sufficient, this did not prevent the establishment of Superintendents to exercise what were practically episcopal functions. And even the legal recognition of "Presbyterianism" in 1592 did not prevent the appointment by the Assembly in the very next year of Commissioners who were practically Superintendents, and the filling of the ancient sees as early as 1600 by officials who were bishops in all but canonical consecration. It was this canonical consecration, and this only, which the English bishops supplied in 1610. It ought never to be forgotten that it was not episcopacy, but only consecration for which the Southern church was responsible. They performed, that is, the very minimum of what was necessary to bring the northern ministry into line with their own. Nothing was said or done to cast doubt upon the ministry which those who were so consecrated had previously exercised. When they returned to Scotland the bishops did not proceed to reordain the clergy within their jurisdiction. The Presbyteries continued, both under the first and second episcopacy, to meet and act as before. The general structure of the Church remained unimpaired. But the King made two fatal mistakes. He procured the consecrations in England without consultation with the Scottish Church, and he ceased to summon the General Assembly. If James had been wise enough to allow the consecrations to take place on the authority of the Assembly, and if he had then allowed the Assembly to continue to exercise its powers as the supreme court of the Church, there is every probability that at this day the Church of Scotland would

have differed from its present constitution only by the possession of permanent Moderators, while there would have been no barrier to the full recognition of its ministers as capable of holding office in the Church of England.

This short sketch of what has been actually attempted in the past, ought to make it quite clear what a wide scope there is for negotiation and adjustment, when in the good Providence of God the time comes for unrestricted conference between Episcopalians and Presbyterians. The same may be applied *mutatis mutandis* in the case of other communions differently organized. The term "unrestricted conference" comes to us from the movement now in progress for the reunion of the two great Presbyterian Churches in Scotland. In adopting the method which the phrase covers they have shown a light for all subsequent efforts to bring together separated bodies of Christians. It does not mean for a moment that principles have been thrown into the crucible. The Established Church still insists upon a national recognition of religion. The United Free Church has not abandoned its claim for spiritual freedom. Whatever be the outcome of their discussions,it is the adjustment of principles which is their motive and aim. That is the characteristic of the new stage, which has now been reached, in the development of the spirit of unity. The belief that union is attainable is no longer inconsistent with a full appreciation of distinctive witness. Conference becomes unrestricted so soon as it is perceived that loyalty to principle does not necessarily involve a preconceived idea of what is necessary to give due effect to it. And the Lambeth Quadrilateral must be understood in the light rather of a statement of principles than of a formulation of demands. The bishops must not be interpreted as saying: "Here is the 'historic episcopate'; take it or leave it; but do not look for fellowship with us, if you refuse it." This rather is the significance of their claim. The episcopate, not neces-

sarily in its present proportions but in its essential quality, stands for a principle of Anglican life and witness. Without this principle the Anglican Church would not be what it is, and to seek communion with that church on any terms which ignore it, is to require an act of self-extinction on its part. The problem for discussion, therefore, is how this principle is to be conserved for the future in any fusion of churches to which the Anglican communion is a party. The solution in any given case might take a form which had never been anticipated.

Events have moved so rapidly, situations have developed with such apparent suddenness, in recent years, that it is of the utmost importance to be prepared for contingencies which may arrive, when they are least expected. It is for this reason that I have attempted to disencumber the Lambeth pronouncement anent the episcopate of some of the misapprehensions that attach to it in many minds. What we are likely to see is the repetition on a somewhat more extended scale of what has been taking place in Scotland, namely, the gradual approximation of bodies the differences of which once seemed irreconcilable, aided, perhaps, by earlier stages of progressive federation, till at last the frank discussion of distinctive principles is demanded by the necessities of the situation. With these possibilities in view, it is surely wise to accustom our minds to approach the problem in a practical shape. This I have attempted to do, so far as it concerns the communion to which I myself belong.

Some Reflections on the Christian Priesthood

By Richard Roberts.

The word ἐκκλησία is used by St. Paul in two different but related senses. He applies it first of all to separate communities of believers; the second use is wider. It would be wrong to say that in this wider sense the word denotes the aggregate of the ἐκκλησίαι; or that it represents an ideal society which existed only in St. Paul's own mind. It is neither so concrete as the one, nor so abstract as the other. What ἐκκλησία in this larger sense actually covered it is difficult precisely to define. It was certainly something more than an abstract criterion by its approximation to which the single ἐκκλησία justified its title. Rather it was something which existed in and subsumed each separate community, the underlying *continuum* of which the individual society was the local manifestation and embodiment. The Church in the whole truth of its being was present and its essential character repeated in every separate society. It was many and yet essentially one,—one by virtue of an ever-expanding life which took on a living form in every place wherein it found foothold.

The constituents of the societies in which the Church embodied itself locally are variously described,—"saints," "called to be saints," "sanctified in Christ Jesus" and so forth. These descriptions however reflect the same fundamental standing. The Church is the society of the redeemed, of those who are "in Christ." It was not a voluntary association of men and women who shared

a common hope and a common experience, and who foregathered in obedience to a native instinct for fellowship. The fact that a man by faith appropriated the Christian redemption made him a member of a redeemed society, a divine commonwealth; and the particular society with which he was formally connected was the local expression and representative of the universal community of redeemed souls. The unity of the Church is deeper than that of the formal association of Christian individuals with one another. It is the solidarity of those who have received and continue to receive life and grace from a common source, like the members of the body and the branches of the tree.

It is this sense of the Church as an organism that leads up to the Pauline metaphor of the "body." It is possible to press a figure of speech too far and one is conscious of a peculiar danger of this kind in dealing with such a figure as "the body of Christ." But it can hardly be maintained that the Protestant tradition has fallen into this danger, and a more thorough exploration of its content seems called for. That personality should have a body, an organ of adaptation and self-expression is obviously necessary; but there does not seem to be equal necessity that this organ should be a body of flesh. The hope of personal immortality entails the belief that personality may exist independently of a fleshy vesture. Is there any reason why we should not conceive of a personality habited in an *institution*, and may this not be the clue to St. Paul's mind concerning the "body"? The body is only the vehicle, the instrument of personality; personality can quite conceivably dwell in and use other vehicles and instruments. It is true that we have no data from which such a possibility may be safely inferred; but in this case we are dealing with a unique personality to which the normal conditions do not apply. It seems to the present writer that the full content is not given to this figure of the "body" except the Church be

regarded as the living organism in and through which that personality which once dwelt in a body of flesh in the man Christ Jesus operates and expresses itself in the world. It is Christ continuously incarnated in an institution, in a body of living souls. The Church is, to use Bishop Gore's phrase, the extension of the Incarnation.

It is of course necessary to qualify this view by the implications of the figure of the "bride." This suggests a certain quality of alterity in the relation of Christ and the Church over against the identity which the figure of the "body" seems to involve. May not these two views coalesce in a third, namely that the Church is Christ's *alter ego* in history, as Christ Himself is God's? But in any case it seems a necessary inference that it is the vocation of the Church to continue and to perpetuate the work of Christ in the world. But how and how far does the Church do this? The Pauline figures rule out at once any conception of the Church as an institution founded to continue the activity and teaching of Jesus, guided and sustained by the inspiration of His memory, in which His presence may indeed be spoken of, but as a kind of pious uplifting poetical fiction. The relation of Christ and the Church is clearly something of a far profounder and more organic character; and the continuity of Christ's work through the Church is something more than propagandist activity.

It seems necessary to differentiate between two things: first, an atonement, something done completely and once for all; and second, a redemption, which is a continuous process in history. There is a sense in which the Cross could only be suffered once; there is another sense in which it must be for ever endured. The Atonement, in so far as it was the act of God and the gift of God to man, was a finished work, but the Cross in so far as it was the offering of Christ to God was a symbol and a beginning. This is the unfinished element in the redemp-

tive process and it is the burden which the Church has inherited. In and through the Church Christ offers Himself to God in sacrifice and intercession continually for men and their salvation. This is the priesthood of the Church,—the counterpart and reflection in history of the heavenly priesthood of the exalted Lord.

II

Priesthood would therefore seem to be primarily the prerogative and vocation of the Church *as a whole*. It is an office which in its completeness must be exercised corporately. Nevertheless this fact of corporate priesthood entails as its corollary the personal priesthood of all the members of the Church. We are made not only a priesthood but priests unto God. It may however be questioned whether Protestantism with all its emphasis upon the priesthood of every believer has always in practice invested this conception with its full value. On the whole it is probably true that in common use the stress has been on its negative and "protesting" side,—that no man has a right to stand between the soul and its God. What is overlooked or perhaps not always clearly apprehended is the positive element. A priest is one whose vocation it is to offer himself to God in sacrifice and intercession for his fellows; and the Christian possesses this calling and privilege by virtue of his participation in the corporate priesthood of the Church. Our personal priesthood is only real in so far as it derives from and stands in that of the Christian society. The fact of "corporate priesthood" is primary and central for all our thought upon the subject. The Church therefore appears first of all as a society existing in the world in order to offer itself in sacrifice and intercession for the world; and it symbolizes and focuses its activity in the Eucharist. The Eucharist is the Church's great central affirmation of its unity with Christ in His offering of Himself to God; it is the key, the interpretation of the Church's life. The

priestly office of the Church is not however contained exclusively within the eucharistic act. Its entire life is eucharistic. It is priestly in all its worship and its work; and what it does in the Eucharist is to gather up all its life, in worship and in work, and offer it to God in a symbolic act. But the historical background of the Eucharist entails that the Church in this offering should, first of all, consciously offer itself for the redemption of the world, and secondly, as it does so, acknowledge that redemption is wrought only through the perpetual sacrifice of love.

The Eucharist is to be typical and regulative of the entire life of the Church, not only on this particular side but in all its implications. To say that the Church is a priestly body is an incomplete statement of its significance. The better and fuller description is contained in the word "*mediatorial.*" In this character is included both the priestly and the prophetic offices of the Church; and both these offices are symbolized in the Eucharist. "As often as ye eat this bread and drink this cup, ye do represent the Lord's death till He come." And whatever the whole content of the Lord's death may be, it is all recapitulated in the Eucharist. Two friends were speaking of the Cross not long ago, and as their conversation led them from one thought to another concerning it, one of them suddenly remarked,—"Why, everything is in it." That is true,—everything is in it; and that which we may read into Calvary, that we may not exclude from our thought of the Eucharist. In the Cross we have the convergence of two movements, human and divine. It is God in the person of Jesus giving to man the free gift of forgiveness; it is man in the person of Jesus offering to God the sacrifice of love and obedience. God at His divinest, man at his highest meet in one and the same act. Dr. Fairbairn said once that Calvary is an epitome of the world. It is more,—an epitome of two worlds, of God and man at the same time. The

Eucharist represents all the infinite wealth of the Cross in the symbolism of a common domestic act. It is God giving to man forgiveness and grace; it is man offering to God the sacrifice of love, in penitence and devotion. It is the focusing of all that the relations of God and man should be, in their whole inmost truth, down to one luminous and pregnant point. In its mediatorial character, not alone in the Eucharist but in its entire life, the Church not only offers itself to God but receives from God a gift, primarily for itself, but in a sense also in trust for mankind. This gift is the assurance of forgiveness and all that that implies of grace to follow; and on the ground of this assurance, it stands empowered to proclaim the divine forgiveness to such as are truly penitent. This is the essential truth of Absolution,—the right to declare forgiveness to those who contritely seek it. At this point the priestly character of the Church merges into the prophetic. The Church appears for man before God, but it also stands for God before men, uttering to men the word of God, the gospel of forgiveness. The Sacrament of the Eucharist cannot be dissociated from the Word. It involves the Word and is incomplete without the Word; and it is only as Word and Sacrament continue to receive their full value and stand in vital connection with one another that the Church realizes completely its mediatorial vocation.

III

The mediatorial office of the Church becomes vocal and articulate in a person to whom is committed the administration of Sacraments and the preaching of the Word. But this person acts for the Church, and can only act in this way so long as he acts in the Church's behalf. He is, as Moberly suggests, the organ of the corporate priesthood of the Church, and no less the organ of its corporate prophethood. Our present concern is with the former; and from this standpoint this kind of priesthood

is always dependent on its representative quality. This individual's personal priesthood does not thereby become different in kind from the priesthood of all believers, only that for certain ministerial and pastoral purposes he is invested with representative powers. He is mouth and hand to the Church, by the will and the appointment of the Church. The first condition therefore of effectual ministerial priesthood would seem to be the call of the Church to the individual concerned; and it is the corollary of this position that the ministerial priesthood of a given individual continues only so long as the Church recognizes him as its appointed organ. It is not an inalienable and permanent prerogative. When its representative character is for any reason lost, the priestly office lapses. Only so long as the minister retains the authority of the Church to act and speak on its behalf does he remain a priest in this special sense.

How then is this authority conferred? It has already been stated that it seems implied in the Pauline view that the Church in the whole truth of its being is present and its essential character reproduced in every separate ἐκκλησία. From this it follows that every ἐκκλησία has genuine executive powers. This doctrine of the Church entails that every local community is competent to call a man to be its representative priest, and further, that normally such a call is a necessary condition of regular standing in the ministerial priesthood. Obviously, other modes of appointment cannot be precluded, nor does this view affect in any way the question of the method by which the representative priest is formally installed in his office. But some stated selection, either by direct invitation, or by the formal endorsement by the community of a person otherwise appointed, seems to be essential to the existence of those relations between the individual and the community which make the former truly and organically representative of the latter. Whatever other conditions of ordination the

relations of the local communities to each other within the larger unity of the Church may call for, this requirement at least is central. The call of the Church to the individual mediated in the first instance through the voice of the local community should be normally an indispensable preliminary to the assumption of ministerial priesthood; and on the principle that the Christian community acts and speaks only as "Christ in the midst" directs it, here "*vox populi*" is clearly identical with "*vox Dei.*" On practical grounds, moreover, a call thus mediated seems necessary in order to authenticate the capacity and fitness of the individual for the office.

IV

This view may claim impressive historical endorsement. The early Christian communities were enjoined in the "Didache" to elect their own bishops. The apostles doubtless in the first instance appointed bishops, but when the churches passed—in the process of time and growth—out of apostolic tutelage they exercised the prerogative of appointing their own officers. χειροτονήσατε οὖν ἑαυτοῖς ἐπισκόπους καί διακόνους is the direction of the Didache (cap. xv) and the verb takes us back to the method of voting in the Athenian civil ἐκκλησία. And when we pass on to the Apostolical Constitutions which reflect a very much later phase, the practice still seems explicit enough. In Book viii., iv., of the Coptic version, we have: "In the first place therefore I Peter say that a bishop to be ordained is to be (as we have all of us already appointed) unblamable in all things, a select person chosen by the whole people, whom being named and approved, let the people assemble with the presbytery and bishops that are present on the Lord's Day and let them give their consent." The question is then to be put three times, "whether he be worthy of this ministry." If they agree the third time that he is

worthy, "let them all be demanded to give their vote, and when they all give it willingly let them be heard." It is not easy to trace the process by which this part of the prerogative of the whole society passed into the hands of its officers; but it is not perilous to infer that the centralizing tendencies of current imperialism gradually invaded the Church and led to a movement of which we see a quite definite expression in the Synod of Laodicea which met somewhere about 350 A.D. The twelfth canon of Laodicea states that bishops must be appointed by the decision of the metropolitans and comprovincials; and the thirteenth that the choice of those to be appointed to the priesthood shall not rest with the multitude. The word "priesthood" in this canon probably applies to all the offices of the Church. That elsewhere this movement had not reached the same stage seems clear. Hefele quotes Van Espen as showing that after the Synod of Laodicea the people still took part in the election of their clergy. The East was generally much ahead of the West in this tendency. In the West the change was not registered in Canon Law until the eleventh century. During the interval we still find vestiges of the original practice of popular election. For instance the Second Synod of Arles A.D. 443 or 452 (Canon 54) decreed that if a bishop is to be elected three candidates shall be named by the comprovincial bishops, and of these three the clergy and citizens of the city may choose one. And though the Synods of Laodicea (343-381 A.D.) and of Antioch in Encaenius in 341 had decreed that the election of bishops was the prerogative of bishops only, yet the Synod of Rome in November 465 directed the clergy of Barcelona to elect a bishop instead of Irenaeus whom it deposed. It is clear that there was no uniformity of usage, yet the general tendency is obvious. It was that of the gradual passage of the authority of ecclesiastical appointment from the congregation, by way of the presbyterate, into the hands of the bishop.

V

The "call" as in the practice of the Presbyterian and other Protestant communions is on this showing a reversion to the primitive usage of the Church. That the exigencies of the Church's growth called for a certain measure of centralized authority for the regulation and unification of the local societies goes without saying; how far this process of centralization should be permitted to go is a question upon which opinion may be divided. It was implicit in the general position of the Protestant reformers that they should, in the interests of the rights of the individual believer, challenge the existing situation as it had shaped itself in the middle ages; and the natural issue was a resumption of the early practice of popular appointment. This is a separate question from that of the mode of ordination; but whatever the mode of ordination, the priestly quality of the ministerial office has its primary ground in the will of the Church. Its validity is connected with its representative character; and its effectualness is not independent of the respect, the good will, and the affection of the people. That the ministerial office is a representative one involves that there is a sense in which the minister becomes the symbol of the unity of the Church; and Ignatius was so far right in insisting upon the integrity of the bishop's position as the unifying fact in the life of the local society. There are certain obvious qualifications to be made here; but no theoretic objection can remove the fact that in practice the outward unity (at least) of a Christian congregation gathers around the minister and is contingent upon a certain organic moral quality in the relations of minister and people. While it would be idle to affirm that congregational selection is the only valid ground of ordination to ministerial priesthood, it is a necessary inference from the conception of the Church as the fellowship in Christ of those who believe in Him that in normal circumstances such a selection is at least an indispensable preliminary.

The Renascence of Catholic Lyricism

By Robert Vallery-Radot

Editor-in-Chief of the Cahiers, Paris.

While politicians are persisting in serving up to the masses, in the name of the laïc spirit and of Progress, the pernicious puerilities of the *Encyclopédie* now superannuated, while certain professors of the Sorbonne are madly bent upon ruining our worldwide reputation for straight thinking and clear speaking, while the fashionable stage and fashionable fiction are rehashing in senile fashion their tiresome physiologies, while the reviews are leading opinion astray upon fictitious glories, and the magazines are exalting stage-players, mountebanks, dancers and courtesans, it is good to turn aside for a moment from all this din and grimacing and, entering into the silence that is within, to give ear to the new and mysterious sounds which are awakening from out of the very depths of the French soul.

It is indeed true that the atmosphere in the intellectual regions of our country is becoming purer and lighter; literature, in particular, seems to be shaking off the stifling yoke of naturalism, and aspiring to some sort of heroic state, which is transfiguring it. We must go back to romanticism to find such an effervescence, principally in lyrics, such an ebullition of restless, ardent forces. Now lyric verse is the very soul of a literature, its secret love. Thus may we say to a given epoch: "Tell me your company, and I will tell you who you are."

We find in the *Traité de la Vraie Contemplation* these words of Ruysbroeck:

"The sons of nature are those who give themselves up to the elements and obey the movements of the firmament; as for the children of God, they dominate the course of the firmament and the planets, and all things obey them."

In the strange, crowded, tumultuous medley of sounds which rise from the lyres of our time we can distinguish two choirs: on the one hand, that of the sons of Nature, prostrate before Life, Love and all the idols named with capitals which can be engendered by the pesilent mythology of the Unconscious; on the other hand, the sons of God, for whom the universe is not at all a matter of chance, but ruled and protected in every detail by its Creator, for whom every being is sacred, the glorious reflection of its eternal Beginning. Before giving our attention to the latter, even before separating the cockle from the good grain, we may assert without fear of contradiction that on every side rationalism is in headlong flight, that even among unbelievers the religious forces are awaking from their long sleep, and that, astonished at feeling as hungry for spiritual life as they were before, and with intuitions a thousand times more fertile than all the dialectics cut off short from an emancipated reason, they are asking themselves if those intuitions are not the very roots of the human tree, and whether cutting them away was not effectively drying up all the sap of that tree. And resting upon the world which for them has again become unknown, somewhat intoxicated with the new wine that is turning their heads, not measuring their language and yet well expressing by it their state of utter confusion, they repeat the strange cry of Zarathustra: "Deep is the night, deeper than the day thought." To avoid all misunderstanding let us say at once that this obscure and feverish exaltation conceals many dangers.

"The love of God," Angela da Foligno admirably says, "is above everything an object of suspicion to me. If it is not armed with discernment it goes to death and illusion; if not discreet, it runs

to a catastrophe: *that which begins without order cannot issue in anything.*"

Far be it from us, then, to rejoice unreservedly in this vaguely mystical current which runs through the lyricism of today. What we would first of all clearly deduce from it is, once more, that the religious realities, far from being contemned and ignored as they were forty years ago, are again becoming the primordial concern of all minds. Men are ranging over Catholic dogma, sometimes with sympathy, sometimes with fear, but always with respect. Already such phrases as "unconscious," "intuition," "the will to live" have been abandoned for another—very much perverted from its sense, indeed, but so very symptomatic. That other phrase is "faith," simply that; "faith," the word so discredited but yesterday, considered so unscientific! Here is M. Romain Rolland, a free-thinker, naming one of his works *Tragédies de la Foi* and, for the purpose of incarnating the hero of religious faith, choosing St. Louis. It is a faith evidently besmirched with errors, but after all it is interesting to note that the word is coming back upon the lips of men, that it has reconquered its right of citizenship. M. G. Hanotaux, in his turn, does not hesitate to affirm, in his *Jeanne d'Arc:*

"Between reason and faith there is neither contradiction nor necessary conflict. It belongs to the highest reason to accept faith, and faith incessantly appeals to reason. According to the scholastic formula, faith seeks understanding, and understanding finds faith."

It is no longer fashionable to laugh at mysticism, to regard it as dreams. It attracts and holds men; they seek to derive heroic inspirations and wise lessons from its boldest flights. A Francis of Assisi is surrounded with fervent homage. M. Barrès seeks of St. Teresa and St. Ignatius lights for the discernment of the most complex spiritual states, and, while he transposes, only applies their methods in his *Homme libre.* Such a pagan as d'Annunzio is moved by the profundity of insight of a Catherine of Siena, by the manner, at once lyric and prudent, in which

she draws on the most hesitating souls; the works of Ruysbroeck demand a Maeterlinck. An Angela da Foligno, a Tauler, are translated and read with avidity. A great publishing house has commissioned M. Henry Bordeaux to present to the public, in a series in which famous romances are chiefly to be found, the *Introduction à la vie dévote*, and has issued thousands of copies of it. The rival house has this year (1913) countered with an *Imitation de Jésus-Christ*.

Undoubtedly, the mass of readers interpret the mystics in their own way—that is, understand them very badly. To comprehend them, they lack the spiritual tradition of the Church. But are not these promptings of sympathetic curiosity indubitable evidence that at the end of its inductions contemporary reason finds itself obliged to see that there is an infinite reality which surrounds it, engulfs it, supports and nourishes it, and outside of which it cannot but fade away in unsubstantial visions? Is it not a way of confessing after all that to reason is not to create—that in presenting to us only the idea of things, whilst all our being urges us to embrace the reality itself, Kantian idealism gives us but stones instead of bread? Yes, reason understands that abstract metaphysics could never afford any nourishment, and that man must have a kind of revelation which shall place him in intimate relation with beings; reason confesses itself impotent to construct from the ground up a religion, a morality, a system of politics, and, remorseful at having ruined the whole heritage of mankind by laying down the most fantastic laws, it seeks its lost God, ranging through the most obscure manifestations of His will as to being and duration, manifestations which it names heredity, race and society. Once more, this is the bankruptcy of rationalism. *Reason no longer seeks the pure idea, it seeks pure Being.* It no longer cries out for an ideology, but for an ontology. It calls aloud for *Him who is.* How pathetic is the moment in which it is our lot to live! To

whom is reason going to open the gates of the city? What God is it going to recognize as its sovereign?

Its salvation depends on this and on nothing but this. Now it would be foolish to deny the prodigious power of the modern false god who moves forward *more terrible than Moloch*. He is the son of the far-off dreamers of India, and the philosophers of Jena have but dressed him in their own fashion. He has a complete theology and a complete lyric poetry at his service: he is called the Unconscious. This dark and dangerous god has no personal life; he is the weird flower of the human soul, its limitless desire that wanders in all directions; it is the pride of man who believes himself deified because he is mad, and mistakes the vapours of the instinct which leads him astray for the inspiration of the spirit; it is he whom Baillard, in Maurice Barrès' *Colline Inspirée*, strives to possess by communicating with the creative forces which rise up from the fields, when he hugs only his own shadow; it is he, again, whom reason invokes when, failing to possess the true God, it gives itself over to a blind necessity which it calls by turns Progress, the Universe, Nature, Humanity, Justice, Liberty, Life, Love, and which attracts to its worship a religious feeling that has strayed away from its legitimate end. Read Romain Rolland's *Tragédies de la Foi* and you shall see how that lyric, carried away by its revolutionary mysticism, is led into parodying every sacred phrase, every rite, and dedicating sacrifices and whole burnt offerings to its idols. His speech quite naturally employs the terms *Messiah*, *expiatory victim*, *martyr*, *cross*, *crown of thorns*, and the like.

Such parodies scandalize, at first sight, every soul that loves Christ and His Church. But we must remember the dying words of Jesus: "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." Without their knowing it, thinking to advance the evolution of the human soul, as they say, poor things, they are simply beginning over

again the eternal rebellion of the fallen archangel. It is the supreme temptation, to wish to attain Being, the first principle of our essence, of our acts, and of all things —even Him whom we call the Father—without any intermediary or mediator; the temptation to be one's own Redeemer, to be the incarnation of God. It is a doctrine full of sorceries, seducing the best. It is not only Romain Rolland who bows before this phantom, there is Maurice Barrès, who speaks to us

"of that admirable vision of the Divine in the world which, under the most modern name, the Unconscious, Philip found in *Le Jardin de Bérénice.*"[1]

It is Maeterlinck who in his latest book, *La Mort*, delights in hiding himself from death in the fog of this most barbarous of names, which they call the most modern; it is the Comtesse de Noailles who, in her *Les Vivants et les Morts*, a work so unspeakably moving, cries out with magnificent ingenuousness to what she thinks to be God:

"I cannot explain it, but Thy supreme brightness seems like my reflection in the lake of a Paradise. One evening I saw Thee like myself, on the road where my body was grown large through the shadow. . . . It is ever oneself that one seeks when one thinks to escape oneself; one would wish to repose in its blessed arms . . . "

A terrible annihilation, at the end of which one would but hug death! But there precisely is the stumbling block of the lyricism of the Unconscious, the wall against which it is fated to dash itself to pieces. After reaching the extreme point of its desire, it will have to define its object; there remain but two alternatives for it: either a mortal doubling-back upon itself, the raving, anarchic delirium of all the powers of humanity, or the cry of deliverance to the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob, Whom Pascal invoked, the personal God, the eternal Being distinct from us, Who frees us from ourselves. This dilemma our generation is actually living.

[1]Everyone knows that since *Le Jardin de Bérénice*, M. Maurice Barrès has been moving in the direction of the light.

It is the pathetic drama which has been enacted in all of us, and which is still being enacted in thousands of young minds. Happy are they who have slowly but surely freed themselves, through Catholic theology, from the horrible slavery in which this doctrine of shadows holds us—those who have already turned to the pure, true voices which rise swelling, and who will in the end, we are certain, dominate all the other voices. It is such as Claudel, Jammes, Le Cardonnel, Péguy that give back in the face of the astonished century imperturbable testimony to the Incarnate Word, unsealing our eyes to the abyss that yawns at our feet. The whole of their work proclaims that Christ alone can save us from ourselves and make us live, that He alone can pronounce over the tomb of Lazarus the liberating words: "Come forth, come forth from the cult of your Ego, and come to us, the Father and Son in the unity of the Spirit." Their work proclaims that Christ is the light that enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world, that he who thinks himself wise apart from Christ, he who thinks to find the truth outside of Him *through whom all things were made*, he who refuses Him His real, incarnate, eucharistic existence,—he repulses all the light, extinguishes all understanding in himself, and annihilates himself in a pantheism from which there is no issue.

In presence of this sublime hymn, some are disconcerted by the new technic employed in its interpretation, smile and shrug their shoulders. Nevertheless, the young, who go deep into things, for whom literature is no simple, banal display of elegance—those who lean over their books eager for, and unsatisfied by, the teaching or, rather, the absence of teaching, that falls from the official chairs—the young hasten to listen to these voices with inexpressible emotion; they feel their purer infancy reawakening in them, and as it were the eternal youth of the world. This lyricism persuades them, it gives them the orientation of their hearts which have for so long

been lost in inextricable shadows. Here they find, for the first time, lyrics which offer them no disquieting potions, no deadly philters, but the bread and wine of the family table.

It is not difficult to find—in Lamartine or Hugo, for example—beautiful religious inspirations, but they come as it were by accident; at one moment their lyre vibrates to the wind from the everlasting hills, but the next moment they will be singing, with just as much earnestness, of passion or of pantheistic dreams; their prayers and meditations are often directed to a perfectly abstract Infinite; God is an idea of perfection, of goodness, of justice, not a living being present in us. They sing of God from outside the temple. On the contrary, open the *Magnificat* of Claudel, listen to these new accents or, rather, these revived accents:

"O my God, you have called me by my name, as one who knows it, chosen me amongst all those of my age. You know, my God, how full of affection is the heart of the young, and how they are not obstinate in their impurity and their vanity. And, behold, on a sudden you are someone!"

Here is the great revelation. God is no longer a vague, uncertain spiritualistic conception, He is *someone who speaks to us, and we to Him;* He is the Father and the Friend; He has made with us an alliance which nothing can undo; we have His promise for it; He has repeated it without ceasing to His faithful, and His words are recorded in the Book of His Covenants. "All that is," Ruysbroeck had exclaimed, "is God or creature;" there is, therefore, nothing outside of these relations between the uncreated Being and creatures. Everything else is entity, abstraction, nothingness. There is no real metaphysics outside of theology, and the true name of that is mystical theology. Such is the philosophy of Claudel, and his aesthetics is only the natural flowering of his faith.

We must go back to Dante to find a poet possessing

in so rare a degree the profound feeling and the touch, as it were, of the Divine Presence. In his work the visible worlds are penetrated and impregnated with, and lifted up by the invisible virtues; matter is forever groaning with Providential thought. And the eternal order shines forth in it; at every moment we plunge into the heart of Divine love. Christ is not summarily and confusedly the just man charged with the sins of the world, the Son made an oblation to the offended Father; He is, even antecedently to the mystery of redemption, the firstborn Man, the new Adam from among the dead, in whom we are all of us, substantially, crucified. To be united to Christ is to be deified, because in Him, and in Him alone, at once God and Man, the marriage of Being and His creatures can be consummated. In Him alone, and through Him alone, we rise to our Beginning, the Father, the *actus purus*. A sublime system of metaphysics, very far removed indeed from modern philosophy! It is the great drama of creation, the pursuit of the lost sheep, the call of the Spouse from beyond the hills; it is the groaning of the outraged Beloved, His anger, His mercy. It is the incomparable dialogue between God and man—"And, behold, on a sudden you are someone!"—behind the vain phantoms born of the sophists' imaginations and those that make systems! The world, the world of bodies and spirits, is restored to us in its integrity. And the poet intones his canticle, which is truly the symbol of Catholic poetry and of all truly sacred poetry.

"Blessed be Thou, my God, who has delivered me from the idols, who makest me to adore only Thee, and not Isis and Osiris, or Justice, or Progress, or Truth, or Divinity, or Humanity, or the laws of Nature, or Art, or Beauty; and who hast not suffered all these things to exist, which are not, or which are the void left by the absence of Thee. Even as the savage that buildeth himself a canoe and from what is left of the same piece of wood fashions Apollo, thus do all the speakers of words; from the surplus of their adjectives they have made insubstantial monsters more hollow than Moloch, devourers of babes, more cruel and more hideous than Moloch. A sound they have, but not a voice; a name, and there is no person. And there is the unclean spirit that filleth the waste places and all the things

that are empty. Lord, Thou has delivered me from books and from ideas, from the idols and their priests, neither hast Thou suffered Israel to serve under the yoke of the effeminate. I know that Thou art not the God of the dead, but of the living. I will not pay honour to the phantoms and the puppets, neither Diana, nor Duty, nor Liberty, nor Apis the ox. And your 'geniuses' and your 'heroes,' your great men and your supermen, the same horror of all these formless things; for I am not free among the dead, but I exist among the things that are, and I force them to hold me indispensable, and I desire not to be superior to anything, but to be a just man—just as Thou are perfect—just and living among the other real spirits."

Here then is the man, the just man, such, that is, as he should be and where he should be; here is the true hero, no longer the useless, sickly dreamer, the being of caprice linking us with romanticism, but the conqueror and the apostle, the priest or cathedral-builder, cultivator or tamer of the multitudes, who has scorned enjoyment and never lingers, but ever plunges into the most burning current of life and bravely throws the weight of his will into the balance of events. In him he has a power of life which he wishes to dispense, which only the absolute will satisfy. This is man in his majesty as a predestined creature, as David evokes him in the eighth Psalm:

"Thou hast set him a little lower than the angels. Thou hast given him the empire over the works of Thy hands. Thou hast crowned him with glory and honour."

He that will grow into the infinite perpetually feels in him that secret being which Claudel calls "the germinal means, the innermost grain, the seed of our own proper name." And again, in another place: "This life of mine, this thing not married, not born, the function which is above myself." Woe betide him if he turns it aside from its end and aim, which is God, and makes it but a food to nourish his own pride; he shall die miserably, like *Tête-d'Or*,[2] and all his labour shall disappear in nothingness. On the contrary, if, like Violaine,[3] one's soul mur-

[2]The title of one of P. Claudel's dramas.

[3]In *L'Annonce faite à Marie*, a recent drama of Claudel, and an admirable one.

murs, "Behold the handmaid of the Lord," in answer to the angel's announcement, it shall know the ineffable joy of possession; it shall receive, as Violaine expresses it:

"More than an answer, the drawing forth of all my substance. Like the secret shut up in the heart of the planets, the due relation of my being to a greater being."

Here below we have but one rôle to play: to accomplish the task assigned to us, to take the part which is assigned us by the office that is incessantly sending for us. Let us set out for our Father's house, considering each advancing day the messenger of God; all brings us to Him, sorrow as well as joy; it is not for us to choose the road. Let us follow the Son of Man, who tells us, as of yore He told Peter: "I will lead thee whither thou wouldst not." The essential here below is, to be in God's hand, to leave ourselves there in order that we may co-operate in the Redemption by crucifying ourselves, in imitation of Jesus Christ, upon the cross of our miseries. In this state is no shame, no night, no death, only a continual exaltation in the eternal Being from Whom nothing can separate us.

"Hail to thee, O world so bounteous in my eyes. I know by what thou comest to be present. It is because the Eternal is with thee, where the creature is the Creator has nowise left it."

Such is Claudel in his great lyric passages. Here we are at the first sources of all poetry. It is Claudel's magnificent gift to be incessantly bringing us thither, to set us, according to his own expression, "on the very pulse of Being."

Where Claudel is of the kindred of St. Thomas, Francis Jammes is related rather to St. Francis. We already owed him much. He it was who, just when poetry was mad with the extravagancies of symbolism, caused the voice of the child to be heard, a fresh voice that sang with the greatest simplicity about things that are. It did not invoke the gods, boasted of no aesthetic theories; it told the adventures of the everyday walk abroad, of the little

donkey going to market, of the cart with the sheep bleating in it because its feet were hurt by the ropes that tied it, of the geese trooping along the road and cackling as they went, the sparrows strung out along the telegraph wire, the kitchen garden that knows the sun. This note seemed so new, in an age accustomed to bookish verse, that people thought a new Rousseau had come into existence, that nature was once more given to us in her entirety, with her sap and her smells, her lights and her greenery. This poet, not at all touched by the pantheistic atmosphere which at the time impregnated all the sensitive faculties, as far removed from the romantic overflowing of the personality as from Parnassian annihilation in the great All, he alone considered creatures as having a distinct life, an individual being, beautiful every one of them, and all worthy of love and admiration because they all showed forth this miracle—*being.*

It was his daily joy to see them, and he could never tire of telling us about it: the commonest stone on the road, the poorest weed by the roadside, held his attention. For him the universe was an immense Noah's ark, with flowers, fruits, plants, beasts and men, all painted and articulated; and above all this was the sky, like a canopy embroidered with clouds, or with smooth blue and a great sun in the middle, during the day, and a white moon and thousands of stars during the night. Jammes is full of astonishment at all this; he does not describe, he sings; the commonest words become ennobled in passing through his mouth and take on a splendid gravity of which we had been unaware, an unknown and venerable sense, the sense that God Himself gave them.

Let us go with this poet along the village street, its pavement cluttered with dirty children, between dark, stuffy cottages, such a street as he has described in an immortal elegy, *Deuil des Primevères:*

"The scene was so humble, where you were so fair."

The whole of Jammes is in that line, all the great gift

of love that he has given to the earth, all the humble outpouring which we had not heard in such tones since Francis of Assisi.

This love,—let us call it by its true name—this charity was quite the best way to go to God. And no one was astonished to learn that Jammes, walking with his dog along the road, had, like a shepherd of primitive times, gone into the *Eglise habillée de feuilles;* the swallows of course had made their nest there, and the blind man at the door was of course shaking his tin cup. He had not to change his voice or raise its pitch; with his rosary in his hand, he had knelt, had confessed his sins and gone up to the holy table with the servant-girls and the old women. And as he had admired the visible universe, he admired just as simply, with the same great humility, the invisible universe; he did not go wandering among intellectual subtleties, but looked in silence, weeping with love, as the work of grace and the mystery of the Eucharist purified his heart and ripened in him magnificent fruits. With docility he surrendered himself, only listening to those unspeakable groanings of which St. Paul speaks, and faithfully expressing them, thus giving us utterances of the deepest and most wholesome mysticism. His eyes saw farther than they had seen; they saw as far as God Himself, not the abstract, distant God, but a God in whom all things live, and move, and exist, a God who is careful of his creature, who keeps account of the sparrow's feathers and the hairs of our heads, a God whose glory he read every moment in the face of the sun and the opening of the flower, whose love he read in the roadside crosses, in the silence of the churches, at the bedsides of the people, and in the downcast eyes of poor women. His vision was not changed, it was enlarged and transfigured, it saw as far as the glorious resurrection, it saw as far as the new heavens and the new earth foretold by Scripture, and inspired by this certitude, he cried out to the creatures he had so loved:

"Blessedness for you, O rose-bedecked hedges, O gilded Junes, O balmy odours and sombre verdures of the shy woods! For love shall touch you with its eternity."[4]

And after that time Francis Jammes lived only in this transfigured love.

In his last poem, *Géorgiques chrétiennes*, we find him offering up to God the brilliant and robust work of his maturity. It has by no means deceived our expectations, but on the threshold of the century bears witness to the wonderful Catholic revival manifesting itself in the domains of art. Less than thirty years after Zola's *La Terre*, he reconsecrates the soil to its Creator. Whether under the veil of figurative speech or in reality, it is indeed the Eucharist that this poem of the Bread and the Wine celebrates, and there is not a verse of it but brings us the presence of God felt and savoured in the humblest daily task. The reader will pardon us if we quote the invocation to Bernadette:

"On the seventh of January, year eighteen hundred and forty-four, Bernadette brought light to the most obscure of creatures. She was born of the Soubirous, in a mill that fell short of affording them bread. Timid, patient, intelligent and good, from eight years of age she went to watch in the pastures. Grotto of Massabielle! Forever do flocks, but human flocks, take the place of the lambs. Where a hundred thousand tapers burn today, there was a corner lifted of the curtain of heaven; this child saw the Virgin. What God denies to the most powerful here below with it He dazzled this soul of but fourteen years. The eglantine clasped beneath the feet we honour. Bernadette turned pale, her eyes fixed upon this outburst of light. Thereupon all the nations, their voices broken with sobs, fall down with arms extended in prayer; and the groans of human sorrow have taken the place of the bleatings of pastured sheep; and the mother shows to the Mother her dying son; leprosy is healed in the pellucid stream; and the inmost sorrow hidden in us is poured forth in the holy fragrance of the valley; and the artist, escaping his last peril, lays down all his pride in presence of an artless art. There in the solemn grandeur of night I have seen a population encamped, sleeping on the grass; that night I saw a bishop officiating at the altar beneath lights which the heavens carried as they moved in their course, and I saw that population rise like one man turning to the

[4] *Béatitude, haies de roses, juins dorés,*
Baumes, sombres verdeurs des timides forêts
L'amour vous frappera de son éternité . . .

God in whom death is for ever ended. It was you, Bernadette, poor girl on bended knees, you who, being dead, in your turn revealed yourself to us."[5]

One would wish, for the sake of its teaching, that a book like the *Géorgiques chrétiennes* might be scattered

---

[5] *Le sept Janvier l'an mil huit cent quarante quatre*
Bernadette éclaira le plus obscur des âtres.

Elle naquit des Soubirous, dans un moulin
Qui ne suffisait pas à leur donner le pain.

Timide, souffreteuse, intelligente et sage
Dès huit ans elle alla veiller aux pâturages.

Grotte de Massabielle! A jamais des troupeaux
Mais des troupeaux humains, remplacent des agneaux.

Au lieu où aujourd'hui brûlent cent mille cierges
Un pan du ciel s'ouvrit; cette enfant vit la Vierge.

Ce qu'ici-bas refuse Dieu aux tout-puissants
Il en a ébloui ce coeur de quatorze ans.

L'églantier s'embrasa sous les pieds qu'on honore
Bernadette pâlit, les yeux vers cette aurore.

C'est depuis lors qu'avec des sanglots dans la voix
Toutes les nations tombent les bras en croix.

Que le gémissement de la souffrance humaine
A remplacé le cri des brebis qu'on promène.

Que lá mère à la Mère offre son fils mourant
Que la lèpre guérit dans le flot transparent;

Que la douleur intime au fond de nous cachée
Se fond dans le parfum pieux de la vallée;

Que l'artiste échappant à un dernier écueil
Devant un art naïf dépose tout orgueil.

Là, j'ai vu dans la nuit solennelle et superbe
Un peuple qui campait et qui dormait sur l'herbe.

J'ai vu dans cette nuit un évêque à l'autel
Officier sous les feux que charriait le ciel.

J'ai vu ce peuple se lever comme un seul homme
La bouche vers ce Dieu où la mort se consomme.

C'était vous Bernadette, ô pauvresse à genoux
Qui, morte, à votre tour, vous révéliez à nous.

broadcast through our schools and our homes. In its splendid simplicity it has all the quality of the popular song: variety of episodes, abundance and brilliancy of images. Far removed from rhetorical vanities, it blooms like a flower of the fields in which there burns all the fire of summer.

In Charles Péguy's books we get the same Catholic vision, still infinite love, the God of the Catechism loved in the heart of each man, felt and tasted in every one of His creatures. Of small importance are all the objections which may be raised in detail about the misuse of repetitions, a rather artificial and, indeed, puerile practice which the author could justify in many places. Those brusque repetitions, that obstinate, awkward insistence, that greedy dwelling upon words, all contribute to impart an impression of homespun roughness to the charm of which, I must admit, I am not insensible. But let us pass over these questions of literary taste and stick to the intimate strength of the work, its singular power in a sceptical and emasculated age, a power that seems to spring straight from the Middle Ages—from the soul of some Villon inspired with a Dantesque vision to reveal to us the invisible worlds in the simple, everyday language of a child playing hop-scotch, or a servant-girl sweeping out her kitchen, or a shepherdess spinning, the lowly language of old time cottages where the pot steamed, where duty was always apparent, tangible, imperious, in the mean, repellent, monotonous, truly heroic task.

In the presence of Jeanne's bitter sorrow, little Hauviette exclaims:

"You see, you see what all the rest of us know. You see it. You see what they are telling us. Catechism, the whole Catechism, and Church, and Mass, you don't know it, you see it, and your praying you don't do it, you only see the prayers. There's no weeks for you. There's no days. There's no days in the week, and no hours in the day. All the hours strike for you the same as the Angelus bell. All

the days are Sundays—more than Sundays,—and Sundays more than Sundays, and more than Christmas Sunday and Easter Sunday, and Mass more than Mass."[6]

It seems to me that we shall have to thank Claudel, Jammes and Péguy for curing our sensibilities of their feverish disorder, for they alone, reawakening our innermost energies, the most secret recess of our being, our very substance engendered by God, and by thus binding together again the great Catholic tradition of the Middle Ages, have known how to give back to us something beyond all the pantheistic efflorescence—the reality of Being and of that providential order which is traced here below and realized beyond this life in the integrity of all substance. And for this reason, leaving the many to linger before the stages upon which the favourites of the hour are strutting, a whole generation is being carried away after them and is singing the hymn that Jammes set ringing last year on the boards of the Théatre de l'Oeuvre in the *Brebis égarée:*

"You will not be happy if you live away from God. Too long have we been afraid to mention Our Lord's name. I will take it out of the shadow, even if I do it alone, before the crowd. For it is always alive, and it speaks to us at this moment. Younger than youth itself, it gives us nourishment at Mass. And here, on the horizon, behold a generation. It knows where is strength, and it is coming out of its bark. And it bursts into flower and comes back to you, O Lord! It is coming back with its eyes upon Your Cross. For

---

[6] *Tu vois, tu vois ce que nous savons, nous autres, tu le vois. Ce qu'on nous apprend, nous autres, tu le vois. Le catéchisme, tout le catéchisme et l'église, et la Messe, tu ne le sais pas, tu le vois et ta prière tu ne la fais pas seulement tu la vois. Pour toi il n'y a pas de semaines. Et il n'y a pas de jours. Il n'y a pas de jours dans la semaine, et pas d'heures dans la journée. Toutes les heures te sonnent comme la cloche de l'Angelus. Tous les jours sont des dimanches et plus que des dimanches et les dimanches plus que des dimanches et que le dimanche d Noël et que le dimanche de Pâques et la Messe que la Messe.*

You are, we know, He who is. It has conquered its pride, and, behold, it stands already at the threshold."[7]

Yes, here is the threshold—our Father's house at last. It is the threshold of no superb palace, one of those proud monstrous monuments in which one is so cold and so lonely; *it is the threshold of a stable;* but in that stable radiates the glory of Him who has overcome the world; and this generation that has set out to go thither, guided by the star and the singing of angels, you can see it. As in the old pictures of the Nativity, shepherds and kings of the Magi are bringing their gifts.[8] The generation

[7]*Vous ne serez pas heureux*
Si vous vivez loin de Dieu.

Trop longtemps on a eu peur
De nommer Notre-Seigneur.

Je le sortirai de l'ombre
Même seul devant le nombre.

Car il est toujours vivant
Et il nous parle à présent.

Plus jeune que la jeunesse
Il nous nourrit à la Messe.

Et voici à l'horizon
Une génération.

Elle sait où est la force
Et elle fend son écorce.

Et elle éclate de fleurs
Et revient à vous, Seigneur.

Elle revient les yeux droits
Et fixes sur votre Croix.

Car vous êtes on le sait
Vous êtes Celui qui est.

Elle a vaincu son orgueil
Et déjà voici le seuil.

[8]The movement which we have been discussing finds its expression in the *Cahiers*, a Catholic review of literature and art, published by Lethielleux, 22 Rue Cassette, Paris. Among the regular contributors are: Paul Claudel, Francis Jammes, Emile Baumann, Thomas Braun, Louis Le Cardonnel, Georges Dumesnil, Georges Goyau, Eusèbe de Brémond d'Ars, André Lafon, Henri Massis, Jacques Maritain, François Mauriac, Martial Piéchaud, Ernest Psichari, Robert Vallery-Radot.

"has conquered its pride, and, behold, it stands already at the threshold." One brings myrrh and balsam; another, bread, wine and the fruits he has taken from the rustic table of his dwelling; another, the flowers of his Christian childhood, gathered by the paths of the family domain, on the steps of the altar, by the college walks, when, in the enchanting silence after Vespers were ended, the incense was still mingling its smoke with the odour of extinguished tapers; another lays down branches of oak, moist with sap, freshly plucked from its native forests, another runs from the deserts of Africa to offer his sword—they come without end. And all these youthful forms prostrate themselves before the Emmanuel, the newborn child in whom they behold the eternal purity of Being, the Divine Infancy radiating beyond all the systems of men, and they sing the old Noël of bygone days:

Il est né, le divin Enfant.
Chantez hautbois; résonnez musettes . . .

Yes, He is born at last, He for whom we waited; He is born in our French literature, in our lyric poetry; the freshening dew has fallen. He has been given to us who knows not evil and sees the truth. He is born, the Divine Child who triumphs over our old doubts and our desiccated argumentations. He is born, the Child who knows not how to lie, the Child who knows how to repose in peace in the tranquillity of the eternal order. He is born, the Child who proclaims life, who proclaims hope, who proclaims Being. He is born, the Divine Child, and that not only in time and space, but in us ourselves forever, and merely by opening his blessed eyes he drives out of us old age, and scepticism, and doubt, and darkness, and death.

A Layman's Thoughts on the Church and the World

By Eugene Stock, D.C.L.

I have sometimes tried to imagine what an absolute outsider—if there could be such an one—would think of the state of the World and of the Church; and with this object I have asked myself this question, Now, what would the angels think of this, or of that?

Let us imagine a party of angels looking down upon the earth at this present time. They know that their Divine Lord and ours, some nineteen centuries ago, laid aside His glory, "emptied Himself" of much—we need not speculate how much—of what was His as the Son of God, and came into this lower world "in the likeness of man." They know what His purpose was, to bring back a rebel race to its allegiance to the one God, and to lift it up to a height of blessing as yet unknown,—doing this great work by the sacrifice of Himself. They watched His career among men, and they welcomed Him back to His throne as the King of glory, now in His twofold nature as both Son of God and Son of Man. They noted that when He returned to heaven, He left a work yet to be done, a mission to be accomplished. It was a simple mission, but obviously a necessary one. It was to tell the whole human race what He had done, and to invite all to share the untold blessings ready to be poured out upon them.

With these recollections, the angelic visitors—let us imagine—inquire how far this mission has been accomplished; and they find that after nearly nineteen centuries it is not accomplished yet. Can we not, then, imagine them saying to one another, Why did He not give it to

us angels to do? For after all, who could wish for a happier work to be engaged in? Who is not eager to spread good news? and what news could be more gladsome and delightful than this?—that the great God was ready to pardon the whole rebel race, and to put away forever all the evils that oppress mankind; and that the one only plan by which this could be effected had actually been worked out, by the "taking of the Manhood into God" and by the sacrifice of Him Who died upon the Cross. "If only"—we can imagine one saying to another —"He had let *us* do the work, we would have finished it long ago!"

But this was not God's way. Very significantly is this shown in the book written by that Greek physician Lucanus which relates the earliest history of the attempt to proclaim the Divine Message, and which we are accustomed to call "the Acts of the Apostles." In that book there are at least seven cases of angelic interposition in the affairs of men; but not once does an angel preach the Gospel. Take two illustrations. Here is a high official in an African kingdom who has been to Jerusalem, and who on his return journey is reading one of the Jewish sacred books. An angel suddenly comes on the scene, not to accost the Ethiopian, but to fetch Philip the evangelist from a town fifty miles off, that he may instruct the reader and tell him what is meant by the "lamb led to the slaughter" about which he is reading. Here, again, is a Roman centurion, at Caesarea. To him an angel does come; but not to tell him the good news: only to advise him to send to Joppa for a man named Simon: "*He* shall tell thee." What these two angels could not do, Philip and Peter could do.

So, although it was an angel who, on the night when the Son of God became Man, did, for that one and only time, proclaim the "good tidings of great joy" that a Saviour had been born, yet when that Saviour had finished His work on earth and re-ascended to the

throne of God, it was not to angels that the task of telling the good tidings was entrusted.

Why not? May we not reverently say that the Lord wanted for this purpose not heralds but witnesses; that to those who had received and believed the good tidings for themselves must be committed the duty and high privilege of passing them on to others? And is not this the whole meaning and purpose of the formation of the Church? Man is a social being; he is not made to stand alone. Christ chose out the Twelve as the nucleus of a great Body to which He would entrust the completion of His sacred design; and when, on the Day of Pentecost, the Holy Ghost descended to endue that Body with "power from on high," for what purpose was the power given? Our Lord Himself had given the answer to this question ten days before, in what were apparently His very last words before the Ascension: "Ye shall receive power, when the Holy Ghost is come upon you; and ye shall be My witnesses . . . unto the uttermost part of the earth."

On that same Day of Pentecost three thousand souls were—were what? Individually converted? individually forgiven? individually "saved"? Such answers would be true enough, but they are not the words used. What we read is this: "There were *added* . . . about three thousand souls." Added to the Body. They joined the community of which the Apostles were the nucleus; and we read on, "And they continued steadfastly in the Apostles' teaching and fellowship," etc. The Church's foundations had been laid, and the building was already rising up.

Now let us recall the subsequent history, and also indulge in a little further imagination as to what might have been.

It is quite possible to exaggerate the zeal of the early Christians in executing the great Commission. Glowing pictures have sometimes been drawn of a multitude

of self-denying missionaries going forth in all directions from Jerusalem; but there is nothing of this in the New Testament. The only foundation for it is in Acts 8, where we read that "they that were scattered abroad" by the persecution following on the murder of Stephen "went about preaching the word"; and the area of their preaching is defined, "throughout the regions of Judea and Samaria." They were not missionaries, but fugitives; but they did what they could. Some of them did presently go further afield, to "Phoenicia, and Cyprus, and Antioch," as we learn from chap. 11; and this is the only recorded case of any considerable number engaging in the work. When the Church at Antioch organized what we may fairly call a foreign mission, it sent out two men, named to it by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, and one other whom we might call a layhelper, but who soon turned his back on the work and came home again. We do find in the Epistles a few indications of missionary zeal in some of the Churches; in 1st Thessalonians, for example, where we read (1: 8), "From you hath sounded forth the word of the Lord, not only in Macedonia and Achaia, but in every place your faith to God-ward is gone forth." But for the most part St. Paul's letters are full of corrections of what was faulty, doctrinal or moral. The glimpses we have of evangelistic work are of the work of individuals like Apollos and Epaphras. And while Church history tells us much of both external persecution and internal controversy, it tells us very little of the execution of the great Commission.

Nevertheless, within three hundred years Christianity triumphed in the Roman Empire, and that is one of the most impressive facts in history. The religions it superseded were enshrined in literature of immortal beauty. Zeus and Pallas and Artemis are to this day more familiar to the average school boy than the saints of the Christian calendar; but they have ceased to be worshipped for fifteen hundred years. Gamaliel little

dreamed of the overwhelming proof destined to be given to his memorable words about the new Galilean superstition, "If it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it."

So three centuries saw a great and lasting work done. We might say even of this achievement that if the Church had unitedly used the power of Pentecost with the devotion that such a cause demanded, it might have been accomplished more quickly. But what are we to say of the next few centuries?

The Church was now free from persecution. It had gained the dominant position. It was as yet undivided. What an opportunity for the fulfilment of our Lord's own prayer to the Father on the night before His crucifixion: "That they all may be one . . . that the world may believe that Thou hast sent Me." Suppose the whole Church had risen up to cover the whole world with its missionaries. Suppose the great General Councils, when they met at Nicaea or Chalcedon or Constantinople, had had for their chief business the one work for which the Church had been founded. Suppose the meetings had been occupied, if not exclusively yet mainly, with reports from distant fields of the progress of the Gospel and with plans for further development and extension, what would the angels have said then? and how many years, or decades of years, would the Evangelization of the World have taken?

Is the retort suggested that the whole world was not then accessible, not even known? At all events it was known from the Ganges to the Atlantic, from the Sahara to the Baltic. Travel, as we now know, was possible further East. Were there any insuperable obstacles to reaching South Africa? As for the great unknown Continents of the West and the South, who shall say that Divine Providence could not have raised up a Columbus in the fifth century as well as in the fifteenth, if only the Church had been ready to fulfil the Divine Commission?

How was it that the Church failed to rise to the greatness of its opportunity? Let it be granted that the triumph under Constantine was far from an unmixed benefit; that instead of the Church overcoming the world, the world permeated the Church; that nominal Christianity is powerless to do the work of God. But there was in fact no lack of zeal in the Church. The real trouble was that it flowed into other channels. It found its vent in internal controversy. The Church was no longer one!

From the first there had been differences among Christians. That was inevitable. St. Paul had to rebuke, not Corinthians and Galatians only, but a Peter and a Barnabas. But now that the Church was no longer annealed together, so to speak, by the pressure of opposition and persecution, minor differences developed into bitter controversies, and then into actual schisms. The great Enemy of mankind had failed to prevent the outward victory of Christianity in the Empire; and now his device was to set Christians at variance, and split the Church into fragments. First the Churches of the East anathematized one another, and presently the East and the West separated altogether.

Meanwhile, the Christian Message was carried, slowly and gradually, all over Europe, and over large portions of Asia. But the enterprise occupied hundreds of years. And it was for the most part the work of zealous individuals. Augustine's mission to England, indeed, being under the auspices of Pope Gregory, may be regarded as an official Church Mission; but Columba and Boniface, Ulfilas and Cyril and Methodius, Anschar and Adalbert, and other intrepid pioneers, were examples of personal devotion. As for the Church in North Africa, it made no attempt to evangelize the Dark Continent, and quickly was it swept away by the hosts of Islam. A non-missionary Church is a lifeless Church.

But a day came when it may almost be said, with reas-

onable hyperbole, that European Christendom did, for once, rise as one man to undertake what seemed to be a grand Christian enterprise. The cry "*Dieu le veut*" uttered by Peter the Hermit rang throughout Europe, and the Crusades ensued. Their temporary success and eventual failure are familiar history; but their whole motive and purpose only show how far the Church had wandered from the true path of the will of God. One man had the insight to perceive this. Just as the Crusades were coming to a disastrous close, there was born in Majorca the greatest of mediaeval missionaries, Raymond Lull; and he, taught by the Spirit of God, saw what a true crusade ought to be. "The Holy Land," he said, "can be won in no other way than as Thou, O Lord Christ and Thy Apostles won it, by love, by prayer, by shedding of tears and blood." Not with the sword, but with the message of salvation, would he seek to overcome Islam; and to this enterprise he summoned the Church, travelling to Rome and Paris and other famous centres of influence. Europe admired his philosophy, and the "Lullian Art" held a high place in the Universities for two centuries; but his appeals for missions and missionaries fell unheeded. Then he went forth himself, and preached in North Africa, in Cyprus, in Armenia; and then again he appealed to "the shepherds of the Church and the princes of Europe," to use his own words. But it was all in vain; and at length, at eighty years of age, he went forth once more alone, crossed the Mediterranean, and was stoned to death by the Moors.

Raymond Lull, however, was not the only martyred missionary of the Middle Ages. Franciscans and Dominicans did go forth to evangelize the Moslems, and met death heroically at their hands. Friar John of Monte Corvino went to China with letters from "the Lord Pope" to Kublai Khan; and Clement V consecrated seven Franciscan bishops to follow him, though only two reached Peking; and Friar John himself became Arch-

bishop, but died and left no successor. The Nestorians had, long before, scattered mission churches over large regions of Asia, and in China itself; but at length the Turks and the Tartars put the Christians to death with horrible tortures, and swept their churches and their faith off the face of the land. As the fifteenth century ran its course, the repulse of Christianity was more evident than ever. The African Church was gone; the Churches of Central and Eastern Asia were gone; the Churches in Bible lands scarcely breathed under Moslem oppression. Europe itself was assailed. Spain had not yet been wholly freed from Moorish dominion. Constantinople fell at last, and the Turk transformed Chrysostom's cathedral into a mosque. What must the angels have thought of it all!

Then came the Reformation, and a great missionary epoch. But it was not the Reformed Churches that now undertook the evangelization of Heathendom. It was the Roman Church, which, having lost the nations destined by and by to be in the van of progressive civilization, "called"—if I may adopt Canning's famous phrase—"a new world into existence to redress the balance of the old." What is the explanation of this? Simply that the great navigating and exploring and colonizing nations were Spain and Portugal. Holland had not yet cast off the yoke of Philip, and in England the days of Drake and Raleigh were yet to come. But observe: it was by no official action as a great Church that Rome now set such an example of missionary fervour. It was an individual man that arose, or rather two men, two of the seven men who banded themselves together, in the crypt of St. Denis, on the heights of Montmartre—to form the Society of Jesus—Ignatius Loyola and Francis Xavier. The Religious Orders did the Church's work, as in Protestant Christendom the Missionary Societies do now.

In the very year in which the Jesuit Order was founded,

1534, Erasmus wrote his celebrated *Treatise on Preaching.* He was only in a partial sense a Reformer, but his brilliant mind realized, as neither Luther nor Calvin nor Cranmer did, the duty of the Church to evangelize the world.

"Everlasting God!" he wrote, "how much ground is there in the world where the seed of the Gospel has never yet been sown. . . . What, I ask, do we now possess in Asia? In Africa what have we? . . . Regions hitherto unknown are being daily discovered, into which the Gospel has never yet been carried. . . . Travellers bring home gold and gems; but it is worthier to carry hence the wisdom of Christ, more precious than gold, and the pearl of the Gospel, which would put to shame all earthly riches. Christ orders us to pray the Lord of the harvest to send forth labourers. . . . Bestir yourselves, ye heroic and illustrious leaders of the army of Christ. . . . It is a hard work I call you to, but it is the noblest and highest of all. Would that God had accounted me worthy to die in so holy a work!"

It was to the Religious Orders that Erasmus appealed; and they did respond. Asia and Africa and America witnessed their zeal and endurance and their astonishing success—outward success, at any rate. Their methods have not won the approval of most of us. The Popes themselves did not endorse all they did. But in courage and devotion they set an example to us all.

Modern Protestant Missions are almost all the fruit of individual zeal. John Eliot and David Brainerd were the pattern missionaries before Carey. The two oldest Anglican Societies, the S.P.C.K. and S.P.G., were founded by a Warwickshire rector, Dr. Bray. A King of Denmark sent the first missionaries both to India and to Greenland. When Carey attempted to set before a church meeting of Baptist ministers their responsibility to the heathen, the chairman told him to sit down; and when with a band of friends he formed the Baptist Missionary Society, he started it by going to India himself. Two Anglican rectors combined with two or three Congregational ministers to form the London Missionary Society. A small company of despised Evangelical Anglicans started the Church Missionary

Society. The exceptions in Britain were that the Wesleyan Missions were established under the authority of the Conference, and the Scottish Presbyterian Missions under the authority of the General Assembly. Many of the American organizations have a more definitely official status; but we can never forget that the little "Haystack Meeting" first aroused the missionary spirit on that side of the Atlantic. The Moravians are the one Church that has really made the fulfilment of the Lord's Commission its chief concern.

We will not fail to acknowledge our debt to consecrated individual men. To take only one example: what does not China owe—what does not Christendom owe—to Hudson Taylor? God has indeed shown us how He can use "free lances." But that is no excuse for the Church's neglect which has made their work necessary.

Now let us turn to the position of the Church and the World at the present time. What do the angels see as they look down on us today?

They see an enormous extension of the dominion and influence of Christendom. They see four continents professedly Christian. They see a fifth almost wholly divided among the Christian Powers. In the sixth—the largest of all, with half the whole population of the globe within its borders—they see five or six non-Christian States; but these between them do not cover half the area, and the rest of it is under European and Christian authority. What an opportunity to complete the execution of the great Commission! How is the opportunity being availed of?

Among the vast populations in these two non-Christian continents that are under Christian rule, the administration, the trade, the education, the social influence, are in the hands of white men, thousands of them, able, vigorous, patient, just. In the still independent States there are hundreds more of these fine men, the representatives of the Christian Powers. England in par-

ticular is proud of her sons scattered over Asia and Africa. Now if these men were Mohammedans, they would spread the faith of Islam, as a matter of course, wherever they were sent. They would not dream of its being inconsistent with their secular duties to do so. Surely, they would say if Islam is true, it is our business to propagate it. And so they actually do in some parts of Africa where the British Government employs them. But the Christians—no! Why should they "proselytize"? Why should they "thrust their religion down other people's throats"? "Let the missionaries do that; they are paid for it; and a great nuisance they are, and as for their few so-called converts, they are a bad lot altogether!"

Let me not be misunderstood. There have been, and are, noble exceptions. In India, for example, high civil and military officers have been the most ardent friends of Missions. Almost all the principal mission stations have been established at their request, and largely at their expense. They have faithfully observed strict "neutrality" in official matters. If a Mohammedan clerk proved more efficient than the Christian clerk at his side, he was promoted over the latter's head; and conversely, if the Christian were the better of the two, his Christianity was no bar to his promotion. Nevertheless, these representatives of the British Power claimed the right, and exercised it, to pass on to their non-Christian neighbours the Divine Message they had accepted for themselves. "Thrust my religion down other people's throats!—not for a moment. That is not it! What I am doing is to give the people a chance of sharing in the greatest of all blessings, blessings meant for them as well as for me!"

But these are the exceptions. How comes it that the rule is so different? Well, what has the Church at home ever said to the representatives of Western civilization in non-Christian lands, most of them her own baptized

members? Have they ever been reminded of their Christian profession and of the duty involved in it? Even the earnest Christians among them, who have truly done what they could, have done so as individuals, constrained by their personal love for their Lord and Master. Which of them ever thought of their membership in a great Divine Society requiring them to carry out the objects of that Society? The simple fact is that the Church has not realized its own duty. It has forgotten the great Commission.

But has not the Church sent out some thousands of missionaries, and supported them by its prayers and offerings? This is partly true, but only partly. The Missionary Societies have been the Church's arms for the purpose, and have done their part well. They have banded together great numbers of Christian men and women in the holy cause; and they have sent forth noble messengers of the Cross to all parts of the world. But the Church as a body: what has it cared? How many of its ministers have taught their congregations the supreme duty of fulfilling the great Commission? How many of its lay members take any really keen interest in the work?

I speak of "the Church." What do I mean by "the Church"? Ought I not rather to say "the Churches"? That would be a Scriptural phrase. In the New Testament we have many references to "the Churches," to "all the Churches," in a country or province, each town or city having its own "Church." But when St. Paul wrote to Corinth or Thessalonica he addressed his letter, not to "the Churches," but to "the Church." At Corinth there were grave divisions, but no separate "Churches" glaring at one another across the street. St. Paul was very severe on the divisions: what would he have said to separate Churches? In the principal square of the town in which I reside, I can stand and count five spires pointing heavenward just round about it. They are Roman, Anglican, Presbyterian, Metho-

dist and Congregational. I do not doubt that they represent zealous congregations each worshipping and working on its own lines; and now and then, perhaps, three or four of them may combine for some common philanthropic object. But there is no organic connection between any two of them. What would St. Paul say to that?

Of course we must not forget past history. Each of the five congregations could no doubt make out a reasonable case for its separate existence. But I protest with my whole soul against the doctrine that such a state of things is right in itself. It is wrong! I do believe that God's gracious providence has, in this as in so many other earthly circumstances, brought good out of evil; but that does not make the evil in itself good. Nor can I see any real remedy in schemes for "exchange of pulpits" and the like. Let all possible combinations and co-operations be fostered. If we cannot in this dispensation hope for organic union, let us do what we can to minimize the evils of disunion; but do let us make up our minds that nothing short of organic union is in accordance with our Lord's high-priestly prayer, or will have the power to make the world believe in the one Saviour.

I submit that these divisions are one main cause, perhaps *the* main cause, of the Church's failure to execute the great Commission. In an earthly campaign, what would be the result of a hundred regiments marching each its own way, under no controlling authority, and not even with mutual consultation? Each might fight valiantly; each might fight successfully; and yet the whole enterprise might fail for lack of strategic or tactical co-operation. Our Missionary Societies have done splendid work, and won real victories for the Cross; but how much greater might have been the triumph if their forces had been wisely distributed in accordance with a well-thought-out plan of campaign!

It so happens that we have in the mission field one signal example, at least, of the advantage accruing from the absence of these divisions, while at the same time indicating the disadvantage of their presence. In Uganda there are only two Missions, the Roman and the Anglican, instead of, as elsewhere, half a dozen or more. The result is that, instead of a number of small and weak bands of Christians unconnected with one another, we see two strong Churches; and one of them at least, of which I can speak with intimate knowledge, self-governing, largely self-supporting, and extending its influence into countries all around. A real rampart has been built up against the Mohammedan advance from the north, which is sweeping over all other parts of Equatorial Africa. Obviously the effect would be far greater if instead of two Churches there were only one; but at any rate two are better than a dozen.

But no doubt I shall be challenged with the practical question, What, in the actual position, can be done? Here is the World, waiting to hear the Divine Message meant for all mankind, and exhibiting openings for its effective delivery in all directions, openings simply unprecedented in human history. And here is the Church —or I should rather say, here is Christendom—split into fragments, and the execution of the great Commission left to a small minority of its members. Let it be granted that one absolutely united Church is beyond the bounds of present possibility: in what way can we make the best of the actual position?

I reply, let us at least realize it, and its disadvantages. Let us cease to boast of the number of independent associations, regular and irregular, which are pouring their forces into Heathendom without plan or order. To perceive the meaning of this is the first step to remedying it. Let us acknowledge that such a condition of things is wrong, and we shall wish, so far as may be in our power, to set it right. But this is not the place

to enter into details as to the practical steps that might be taken. Dr. Mott's Conferences in the Far East give us at least valuable suggestions.

But whatever we can do we must do quickly. Very solemn language was used a few years ago by a great public man, not a missionary, not an ecclesiastic, but a layman and a statesman. In the recently published *University and Historical Addresses*, by the Right Hon. James Bryce, O.M., late British Ambassador to the United States, an address is included which was delivered at a Laymen's Missionary Conference in America in 1907; and in that address Mr. Bryce said: "This is the most critical moment ever seen in the history of the non-Christian nations and races." He had been speaking of the shrinkage of the world through the unprecedented facility of communication, and of the consequent impact of the white races on the coloured. In half a century, he said, "things which have endured from the Stone Age until now are at last coming to a perpetual end," and "will vanish from the face of the earth." "This," he added, "is something that has never happened before and can never happen again."

These weighty words were spoken seven years ago. Are they less weighty now? In 1907, who could have dreamed that China would have dethroned the Manchus, become a Republic, put Christian after Christian into high office, and invited prayer from Christians for the new Government? And this, though certainly the most startling of recent events, is not the only one that calls us to fresh effort. Japan is realizing the practical impossibility of securing common morality without some kind of religious basis, and by inviting Christians as well as Buddhists and Shintoists to confer on the question has recognized Christianity as one of the religions of the country. In India, the mass movements have awakened fresh hopes of missionary success. The nationalistic spirit is rising in Asia, and the peoples are begin-

ning to understand the meaning of patriotism. Everywhere it is the Day of Opportunity.

It is time that the Church summoned its lay forces to the great campaign. We need the ordained and trained missionaries, especially for the purpose of fostering the infant native Churches. But the lay members of the Church must be the backbone of the enterprise: those abroad helping it on, not only by active co-operation but by open avowal of their religion; and those at home ceasing to regard the Church's fundamental and primary duty as one of a hundred "charities," needing what in England we call "guinea subscriptions." Business men are attracted by big schemes, and the Evangelization of the World is emphatically a big scheme. Let it be put forward in all its greatness, and in all its difficulty, but as the *raison d'être* of the Church. And let there be no concealment of what it involves. "Your duty," said Mr. Bryce in the address already quoted, "does not end with subscribing to the missionary societies. It requires you to watch wherever the advance of Christianity is being hindered by the wicked practices of white men, to see that the adventurer and the trader are restrained if they wrong the natives by force and fraud, and absolutely to prohibit the sale of liquor to the natives"—that is, in Africa and the other uncivilized parts of the globe. It is of these that he adds, "The natives ought to be regarded as children, and have the measure of care and tenderness which is given to children." And with his closing words this article may also close,—

"Let the Gospel of Christ . . . be a bond between all races of mankind, . . . a sacred bond to make them feel that they are all the children of one Father in Heaven."

School and College Missions and Settlements of the Church of England

By C. P. S. Clarke.

I

During the past hundred years the population of England has been more and more concentrated in great towns, and each of these has tended to become two cities, the city of the rich and the city of the poor. This is notoriously so in the case of London, only here it may be said that there is a city of the rich and three cities of the poor.

One of them lies south of the Thames. Travellers from the continent pass through it before they arrive at Charing Cross or Victoria, or enter it if they alight at London Bridge. It is now in the diocese of Southwark, and in the administrative area of the London County Council. Until 1904 it was in the diocese of Rochester and before 1875 in that of St. Albans. It contains two famous hospitals, Guy's and St. Thomas's, many ancient churches and historical monuments. Part of it was once the abode of wealthy city merchants. It now houses more than two million souls, mostly poor. The other part stretches east from the Mansion House and the Bank of England. This is how the famous novelist Mr. Walter Besant described it thirty years ago, when the school and college missions began to come into being:—

"Two millions of people, or thereabouts, live in the East End of London. That seems a good sized population for an utterly unknown town. They have no institutions of their own to speak of; no public

buildings of any importance, no municipality, no gentry, no carriages, no soldiers, no picture-galleries, no theatres, no opera—they have nothing. It is the fashion to believe they are all paupers, which is a foolish and mischievous belief, as we shall presently see. Probably there is no such spectacle in the whole world as that of this immense, neglected, forgotten great city of East London. It is even neglected by its own citizens, who have never yet perceived their abandoned condition. They are Londoners, it is true, but they have no part or share in London: its wealth, its splendours, its honours, exist not for them. They see nothing of any splendours; even the Lord Mayor's Show goeth west-ward; the City lies between them and the greatness of England. They are beyond the wards and cannot become Aldermen: the rich London merchants go north, south, and west; but they go not east. Nobody goes east; no one wants to see the place. No one is curious about the way of life in the east. Books on London pass it over; it has little or no history; great men are not buried in its church yards, which are not even ancient, and crowded by citizens as obscure as those who now breathe the upper air about them. If anything happens in the east, people a' the other end have to stop and think before they can remember where the place may be."

This is only a superficial account but it contains some elements of truth. Since Besant wrote, it has spread over the river Lea into Essex, past the jurisdiction of the London County Council; and Canning Town and the district round about the Victoria and Albert Docks in the borough of West Ham can show perhaps the largest area of unrelieved squalor and poverty to be found in England.

The total population of these three cities of the poor all told is not less than four millions, more numerous than the total number of the inhabitants of Paris or Berlin or Chicago. And the growth has been very rapid. In 1800 the total population of London was not much more than a million. It is not surprising that the Church failed to keep up with this phenomenal growth of population, though it is easy to exaggerate the neglect. Many parish priests, whose names have not been recorded, were doing their work quietly and faithfully, without advertisement or notice; but their numbers were too few and the parishes too large for the whole ground to be covered adequately.

As early as 1836 Bishop Blomfield had appealed for

funds to build fifty new churches in London. Father Lowder began his apostolic labours at the London Docks in the fifties. Dr. Pusey had preached a great sermon on Dives and Lazarus which shook Belgravia. But for a long time, neither the colleges of Oxford and Cambridge nor the great public schools, which between them educated nine-tenths of the leisured and ruling classes of the country, took any corporate action.

II

But in time a leaven began to work. The speeches and writings of men like F. D. Maurice and Charles Kingsley had touched men's consciences. A pamphlet called *The Bitter Cry* stirred the country. The spirit at work was that of brotherhood and debt. There was a sense of debt in the air. They had received so much and those others so little. Those to whom much had been given should give something in return. The pioneer was Edward Denison, a young graduate of Christ Church, who lived in Stepney for eight months in 1867 and 1868, and was the first to see, or at least to say, that these poor districts, denuded of their leisured classes, needed the presence of educated men.

"You never saw such places," he wrote, "humanity swarms there in such quantity, of such quality and in such streets that I can only liken it to the trembling mass of maggots in a lump of carrion."

But Edward Denison stood alone. His example was known to few and he died young. A few years later in 1870 or 1871, a little band of Oxford dons, recently ordained, resolved to try to bridge over the gulf between the life of the University and the life of the poor quarters of the great town. They were the present Bishop of Winchester, the present Archbishop of Calcutta, Robert Moberly, Stephen Freemantle, and Dr. Holland, now Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford.

As Dr. Holland has put it in a private letter:—

"It came to rather little because of the difficulty in vacations. We discovered in our innocence that the Long was perfectly useless for such purposes; and it finally reduced itself to an annual raid on St. Saviour's, Hoxton, and on Oakley, where we used to go and settle for a fortnight, preaching in the streets, etc. This historically meant a great deal for us; it brought us into touch with labour and labour leaders for the first time."

But the schools were the first to begin. As early as 1869 Clifton under Dr. Percival, now Bishop of Hereford, opened a ragged school in Bristol. This was given up when the new School Board built a school which made its work unnecessary, and in 1875 the School undertook to provide a Mission Curate for a poor and neglected district in Bristol. The first curate, now Canon H. D. Rawnsley, has given the following account of his experiences:—

"I remember the impressions of the place. Muckheaps and farm refuse, on which jerry builders had set up rows of houses which periodically got flooded, and sucked up fever and death from chill for the poor folk who lodged therein. No lamps. Streets only wadable through.

"Service on Sunday was much as follows: On arriving there was a free fight going on outside the public, or the doors of the mission room, among 'Mr. Rawnsley's boys' as they were called. Then calling upon them to be gentlemen and let the women go upstairs first, there was a pause, and up bundled the women and girls who dared face the meeting. Then, to seats reserved in front close by me, the lambs came up, and just as prayer began, a fusillade of stones from outside would rattle all along the wooden walls of our conventicle, and the noise of horses in the stables below added to the din. In the midst of prayer, the door would be knocked at, and the porter would often be overpowered by a strong rush, and fighting would go on below stairs till I appeared, passed up one or two, and sent off the others.

"All would go well, till—in the middle of the hymn perhaps—cat calls and whistles sounded outside, and one of my lambs, rising quite courteously, would walk out, saying, 'Sorry we've got an engagement with a pal, sir. Good night.' Often a man, disguising the fact that he was in liquor, would be in the midst of the mission congregation, and I had to rise from my knees and help to tumble him out, and come back and go on with the prayers, as if nothing had happened. I think that is hard work—very—to fight a man downstairs and come up and try to be in breath as you go on with sermon or prayer.

"The experiment of a Working Men's Club, which Mr. Barnett so generously and genially helped me to set on foot, failed chiefly for want of accommodation, and owing to the fact that we had a weak

fellow for manager. On three occasions I was summoned because the members of the Club were murdering him.

"Yet the Club had this about it. Some fine political discussion went on and some of the mechanic thinking class were made friends by means of it. The free-thinker came there too, and he was an interesting being, who gave one nuts to crack."

In 1886, largely through the energy of Canon J. M. Wilson, the Headmaster, a fine church was built, dedicated to St. Agnes, and soon afterwards the mission district was endowed and made into a parish.

The Uppingham Mission also was started in 1869. It arose from a suggestion in a lecture given in the School in April of that year that the School should "found and maintain a separate centre for home missionary work." Thring, the celebrated Headmaster of Uppingham warmly supported the idea, and St. Mark's parish, Victoria Docks, was chosen as the Mission parish. One result was the building of a new church, St. John's, consecrated in 1872. In 1883 the Mission was transferred to the Parish of St. Saviour's, Poplar, and in 1898 the East End Mission was given up, and instead the School undertook to provide a missioner for the Mersey Mission to Seamen at Liverpool.

Winchester and Eton soon followed. Winchester began in Poplar, but after helping to endow the parish of All Hallows, East India Dock, it moved to Portsmouth, where in the slum district of Landport the apostolic labours of Father Dolling made it famous.

"It was a huddled mass of miserably small and overcrowded dwellings. It had no less than fifty-one public-houses, most of them with 'sing-song' rooms of a low type. The many houses of ill-fame were a foul feature of certain of the streets in the district, most of which Dolling succeeded in uprooting."

He was the means of closing fifty houses of ill-fame in ten years. His biographer thus describes Saturday nights there.

"The public-houses poured forth their patrons; the voice of intoxicated expostulation proceeds from husband to wife or wife to husband; not seldom a free fight prolongs the noises of the night."

He wrote himself of his first Sunday:—

"My first Sunday afternoon as I was walking in Chance St. I saw for the first time a Landport dance. Two girls, their only clothing a pair of sailors' trousers each, and two sailor lads, their only clothing the girls' petticoats, were dancing a kind of break-down up and down the street, all the neighbours looking on amused, but unastonished, until one couple, the worse for drink, toppled over. I stepped forward to help them up, but my endeavour was evidently looked at from a hostile point of view, for the parish voice was translated into a shower of stones, until the unfallen sailor cried out, 'Don't touch the Holy Joe; he doesn't look such a bad sort.' "

He then went to take a children's service.

"Two boys calmly lighted their pipes and began to smoke. One remedy alone seemed possible—to seize them by the back of the neck and run them out of church, knocking their heads together as hard as I could. Amazed at first into silence, their tongues recovered themselves before they reached the door, and the rest of the children listened delighted to a vocabulary I have seldom heard excelled. We had no sooner restored order than the mothers of the two lads put in an appearance. As wine is to water, so was the conversation of the mothers to their sons. I wish I could have closed the children's ears as quickly as I closed the service. But they listened with extreme delight, even following me in a kind of procession, headed by the two ladies, to my lodgings. The contrast between this, my first procession, and the last which took place when my church was opened, is a true measure of the differences which ten years have made."

And his influence was as powerful at Winchester as it was in Portsmouth.

Eton also began in 1881 partly at the instigation of the Rev. James Warre, afterwards Headmaster. A district known as Hackney Wick was assigned to the Bishop and put under the care of the Rev. W. Carter, now Archbishop of Cape Town. The district has since been made into a parish containing 14,000 inhabitants; it has a magnificent church by Bodley, dedicated to St. Mary of Eton, a wonderful organization of clubs and perhaps the finest and most complete parochial buildings in London.

At the Universities Christ Church, Oxford, was the first College to have a Mission. Dr. Holland preached a sermon, a meeting was held and a committee formed, with the late Dean Liddell in the Chair, the late Bishop King of Lincoln, Canon H. Scott Holland, and the late Mr. H. O. Wakeman amongst its members, and the Rev. E. F. Samp-

son, secretary. They applied to Bishop Walsham How for a district, and he assigned them one near the East India Dock Gate, containing about 7,000 people, and described as "a compact mass of heathenism" in the first report issued. The Rev. H. L. Paget, the present Bishop of Stepney, was sent to take charge and be the first missioner. There was no church and the first building used was a little one-story cottage with the kitchen and bedroom made into one room about 20 ft. by 12. It was used both as a church and a boys' club. The inhabitants were at first suspicious and hostile. They resented the ringing of a bell for service, and threatened to kill the verger if he would not desist. But they soon began to respond. The little room was found too small, and a temporary building, church below, and room above, was erected. The Rev. the Hon. James Adderley built a church holding 500 people, and in his time Miss C. M. Phillimore added a magnificent Mission House for Clewer Sisters and visiting ladies, containing also club rooms, a soup-kitchen and other parochial conveniences; later on she built a Coffee Tavern. Canon Tupper-Carey built a Mission Hall and a House for clerical and lay residents, and the buildings were complete.

Twenty-five years after Mr. Paget's arrival there were four clergy, two permanent lay residents, besides many spasmodic Oxford visitors, five Sisters of Mercy, several ladies, and a nurse. There were over 600 communicants, and among the more secular activities were a men's club, containing about 200 members, two boys' clubs, and three girls' clubs. Besides which every year a party of undergraduates undertook a three weeks' social and religious campaign among the hop-pickers in Kent in September and one of the lay residents, Mr. Gordon Crosse was a Guardian and later on a Borough Councillor. The main objective of the whole Mission was religion from first to last, but

incidentally an enormous amount of civilizing and social work was achieved.

In the services, as with most School and College Missions, it has always been the tradition to combine homeliness and simplicity with colour and richness and glory in worship. Men and women who lead hard lives long to feel "at home" in church. Its worship must somehow speak to them of a Saviour Who walked the earth as a man, to whom the weary and heavy-laden could pour out their griefs. And there is a stiffness in some forms of worship which is as repellent as stiffness in manner.

But the church has to witness also to a Saviour Who is risen and glorified; its worship therefore needs to be exceeding magnifical, and to lift these dwellers in sordid streets into an atmosphere of glory and beauty. It is perhaps worth noting that the clergy who first called attention to the need of work in the slums and appealed to the principle of brotherhood, were men of the type of F. D. Maurice, Charles Kingsley, and later on Canon Barnett and "Hang Theology" Rogers, while those upon whom their social mantle has fallen have been for the most part followers ecclesiastically of Newman and Pusey. The Rev. S. Headlam, founder of the Guild of St. Matthew, was the first to combine the social teaching of Maurice with the religion of Pusey, and may in that respect be said to be the precursor of Dolling and James Adderley, and the race of missioners. Mr. Headlam, however, was and is a politician, while the great majority of missioners have eschewed politics.

Quite recently Christ Church has endowed its Mission as a parish and handed it over to the Bishop of London, who has assigned in its place a neglected parish in Notting Hill to be evangelized in its turn.

III

The Mission was followed by the Settlement. Arnold Toynbee, a tutor of Balliol, fired by T. H. Green, the

famous philosopher, had flung himself into the movement, but died tragically of brain-fever under the strain. Milner, Lyttelton Gell and Montague of Oriel were determined to perpetuate his memory. Then the Rev. S. Barnett, Vicar of St. Jude's, Whitechapel, came forward with his idea of a Settlement, and the thing was done. Apart from the accident that its first Warden was a priest of the English Church, Toynbee Hall has always been definitely non-religious, and has welcomed men of any religion or none at all, and has mainly confined itself to the propagation of culture by lectures, music, picture galleries and other ways. It lies, therefore, outside the scope of this article except for its importance as an example.

The Oxford House soon followed. Some undergraduates of New College and Magdalen wanted a Church Settlement and the Oxford House was the reply. It was planted in Bethnal Green, and its first Head was a layman, the Hon. James Adderley. He was succeeded by the present Dean of Durham, and in 1889 came the present Bishop of London, then the Rev. A. F. Winnington Ingram. Its object was well expressed by its third Head:

> "It is an effort of brothers to help brothers; it is an effort on the part of men at Oxford to share with their brothers in East London any advantages in education or culture which in the Providence of God have fallen to them; it is or at any rate should be an effort on the part of the men in East London to transmit to their brothers in Oxford, some of that independence of character and knowledge of human nature which contact with real life alone can give."

Its aims were therefore social rather than religious. It was to pass on to Bethnal Green some of the many social and civilizing advantages Oxford had received. Its social activities are endless. It has clubs for men and lads containing nearly 1,000 members, it runs football and cricket teams, collects for savings banks, manages an orchestra, visits for the Charity Organization Society, organizes children's country holidays, provides Sunday

School Teachers and other help in the surrounding parishes, has representatives in the Bethnal Green Board of Guardians and other local bodies, besides maintaining a Sanitary Committee, an Apprenticeship Committee, and a Public Welfare Association. The present Head, the Rev. F. A. Iremonger, has also plunged into journalism and founded a newspaper called *The Excelsior*, for circulation in the Borough.

But though religion is a bye-product, it is a recognized bye-product. The Head is a priest of the Church of England. His workers are almost invariably communicant members of that Church. They are identified with the work of the Church in the neighbourhood. They are looked on by their neighbours as representing the Church of England and in some way reflecting its spirit. Recently the present Head has taken over the care of a parish in Bethnal Green in addition to his other multitudinous duties. It is manned by the Head and Chaplain, assisted by a small nucleus of permanent laymen and twenty young Oxford men, who come down for varying periods from a month or six weeks, to a year or eighteen months after taking their degree. Of these perhaps the majority eventually take orders, and the rest adopt some profession. Besides these there are a large number of men who come down for a few days at a time, and twenty to thirty who live elsewhere in London and come down at night to give what help they can. It is plain therefore that whatever effect Oxford House may have on Bethnal Green, the effect of Bethnal Green on the young men who come there from Oxford is very considerable.

IV

It was now the turn of Cambridge and South London, which was so to speak adopted by Cambridge. St. John's College was the first to begin, soon followed by Clare. Now there is a Cambridge House Settlement,

and St. John's, Clare, Trinity, Pembroke, Corpus and Caius all have Missions, while Queen's, Magdalene, and Trinity Hall are responsible for Clubs or Boys' Homes. There is also a Cambridge Medical Mission in Bermondsey.

Wellington College and Charterhouse School have most flourishing missions in South London, while Cheltenham and other schools have clubs and small settlements. Christ's College, Cambridge, and Dulwich School each support a small Home for working boys with bad homes or no homes at all.

The following extract from a description of the Charterhouse Mission Buildings is valuable not only because of the light it throws on the particular mission it describes, but also because it may be taken as typical of the school or college mission—the church, simple and homely, but dignified and suited for Catholic ceremonial, as the centre, and clustering round it accommodation for very varied and full social and civilizing adjuncts.

"The building consists of three floors. The ground floor which is about eight feet below the level of the street, is used as a Church, and a very handsome Church it is—plain, spacious, and dignified. It measures 93 ft. by 75 ft., and is about 20 ft. high. It seats between 400 and 500.

"The first floor contains two rooms. The largest, 81 ft. by 30 ft., is called Charterhouse Hall, and is used for a variety of purposes. Here is held a Mothers' Meeting, Sunday School, Band of Hope meetings, Singing and Drilling Classes, Social Entertainments, and Dramatic performances. Under the kind supervision of the well-known actor, Mr. Cyril Maude, an enthusiastic Old Carthusian and a warm friend of the Mission, as has been proved more than once, this room has been fitted with a stage, with all needful appliances. Mr. Maude presented the drop scene, which gives a representation of New Charterhouse. The room seats 400 people. The smaller room, 81 ft. by 18 ft., is used for the Men's Club, which meets nightly. It is supplied with billiard and bagatelle tables, draught boards, and tables for dominoes, and is fairly well provided with newspapers and illustrated periodicals, many of which are sent from Charterhouse. The Men's Club does not confine itself to indoor amusements. It is also strong in some forms of athletics, such as Cricket, Football, Cycling, etc., and frequently has matches, not without success, with several other clubs.

"The second floor is divided into three rooms. The largest is

the Gymnasium, 48 ft. by 30 ft., which is fitted up with every requirement needed for gymnastic exercises, and is one of the most complete in South London. It is used, by boys chiefly, every night in the week but Sunday. On Sunday afternoon it is pressed into the service as an addition to the accommodation for the Sunday School. A smaller room, 32 ft. by 30 ft., forms a Club Room for boys. It is fitted with tables for bagatelle, table bowls, table tennis, cannon, etc. Here also they practise the arts of wood-carving and of boxing. On Sunday the Boy's Club is used for Bible Classes and quiet recreation. The third room, which is small, is used for the Boys' Library. There is also on this floor a small open-air play-ground, shut in top and sides by a wire guard, so that it can actually be used for cricket and football. It is lighted with gas, and cricket and football are carried on at night!"

In London over the Border as it is called, the region lying east of the river Lea, Trinity College, Oxford, has a Mission in Stratford, and of the Schools, Felsted and Malvern, have Missions near the Albert Dock, a region once famous for hooliganism. Trinity has a lay Settlement House attached to the Mission, which has been remarkably successful in attracting residents. In the neglected parts of the West End, Harrow has a Mission, so has Magdalen College, Oxford, and Christ Church has just joined them. Rugby has a magnificent Boys' Club, which is all that such a Club can be, under the management of the Rev. C. S. Donald. The Oxford and Bermondsey Settlement is run on special lines of its own and is well worth study. It is much less shy of religion than most settlements, and all the six clubs close nightly with family prayers.

Women also have had their share in the movement. Several Girls' Schools have united to support a large and poor parish in South London, and have a settlement for women there. It is known as the United Girls' School Mission and has had a most successful career.

Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford, and the Cheltenham Ladies' College have Settlements in Southwark and Bethnal Green respectively.

The example of the Church of England has been followed by various Nonconformist bodies, and Mans-

field House in Canning Town and the Leysian Mission in the City, among others, are well worth attention and study. But the Church of England can claim to be the pioneer and to have no rival with regard to quantity of output.

V

Figures are often misleading but occasionally illuminating, and may help to give an idea of the magnitude of the work undertaken. Altogether five parishes containing a population of about 40,000 souls have been created mainly through the instrumentality of these Missions. Twenty-one Schools and Colleges between them minister to the needs of a population of over 140,000. Apart from them there are the Oxford House, with 1,000 men and boys in its clubs, the Cambridge House, with the two Medical Missions in Bermondsey, while over forty Schools and Colleges support clubs and boys' homes, and settlements, or assist the work of the Church in some other city.

What has been the effect, over and above the individual lives reclaimed often for Christ, or if not for Christ at least for decency and order and civilization? On the neighbourhood the effect has been to impart new life and vigour into church work. The Missions are manned by youth. They are often impetuous and hasty and presumptuous, and make mistakes. But they do go out into the streets and lay hold of people by the coat and compel them to come in. If they make mistakes, they try experiments and make ventures and so stimulate church life generally, which always tends to get stereotyped and into grooves, and too much controlled by the middle-aged and elderly. They have also set free many large parishes from the dead weight of the care of derelict and hopeless portions.

But most who have had practical experience of their working are agreed that their principal fruit has abounded

to the benefit of the giver rather than the receiver. The boy or young man who first goes down to his School or College Mission sees lives and conditions of living for the most part unknown and unguessed. New vistas are opened and sometimes life is turned into a new direction. One of the ablest priests in the London diocese, whom any diocese might be thankful to have as its Bishop, who has spent twenty years in East End parishes, after taking his degree accepted a mastership at a public school. Before beginning work, he went to see the Oxford House where the Rev. A. F. Winnington-Ingram, now Bishop of London, was just beginning work. He threw up his appointment, stayed there two years and was ordained. This is only one instance out of many.

But it may be affirmed that the majority of those who visit their Mission are influenced; though most Missions deplore the comparatively small number of visitors. This is the weak point. Here the Schools have an advantage over the Colleges. In many of the School Missions it is customary for prefects to spend week-ends at their Mission. This practice has not, I believe, commended itself to the Heads of Oxford and Cambridge Colleges, no doubt for sufficient reasons. But the result has been that comparatively few have had the self-denial and enterprise to make their visit in the vacations, and the loss has been great.

Altogether in spite of failures and disillusions, the story of its School and College Missions has been a notable chapter in the history of the Church of England. The movement is full of promise for the future, and an assurance that that Church is no dead branch, but living and fruitful in good works.

The Churches and the Social Problem

By Philip Snowden, M.P.

A Dean of the Anglican Church recently said that "many Christian ministers find in politics a welcome refuge from the preaching of dogmas in which they no longer actively believe, and which bore their congregations. Any average citizen can talk about temperance, the poor, and the iniquities of ground landlords, so we have an acute secularizing of Christianity."

In this declaration we have a number of statements made which raise points of acute controversy. It is admitted by this Church dignitary, but evidently with regret, that the old theological dogmas no longer interest Churchgoers, and that what he calls secular things are more popular topics upon which to preach. There will be general agreement that the ancient dogmas no longer find general acceptance, but it is by no means so certain that the "secularizing" of the pulpit has been carried to any great length. The number of Christian ministers who talk from the pulpit about such topics as temperance, the poor, and the iniquities of ground landlords is comparatively few, and it is because of the comparative rarity of this type of preacher that he stands out conspicuously.

The comparatively few Christian ministers who do see the social implications of the Christian faith in their full integrity, and who feel that the Church is not doing its duty in quietly tolerating the abominable conditions under which so many people work and live,

meet with most depressing experiences in their efforts to stir the social consciences of their people. The present Bishop of Oxford, when leaving his late diocese of Birmingham, addressed a letter to the clergy and laity of that great industrial centre, which was a painful confession of his signal failure to stir Churchmen to a sense of their duty to contribute to the social and industrial reconstruction of the nation.

There are two reasons which explain the general indifference of the Church to the industrial and social condition of the people. The first reason is that so many Church members and professing Christians have no real belief in Christ. If they loved God with all their strength and their neighbours as themselves it would be impossible for them to be callously indifferent to the suffering and poverty which everywhere abound. The second reason is that many sincere and devout Christians believe that it is not the duty of the Church to attend to the material welfare of the people, but to confine its efforts to the saving of their souls. The view is still widely held and preached that it is the Christian duty of the poor to be contented in the sphere in which it has pleased God to place them. Poverty is regarded by these people as a divine institution for the discipline of the soul, and riches a divine endowment for the practice of charity. All these views are opposed by those who believe that Christianity has an all-round application, that the body—the temple of the soul—is precious in the sight of God, and that it is our duty to Him to preserve and develop the body and mind as much as it is our duty to prepare the soul to appear before Him in the beauty of holiness.

The appeal to the Christian Churches to attack the social and industrial wrongs of the age might be made from the viewpoint of the self-interest of the Church as an organized institution. But that is not a worthy form of appeal. But it is nevertheless true that unless the Churches do take up the question of the social con-

dition of the people they will become more and more something apart from the lives of the people, and the direction of the working-class movement will pass into other hands, uninfluenced by the religious and moral guidance which a true Christian Church can give. Many theological dogmas, it is admitted, have lost their force. The fear of hell, which one religious journal some time ago said had been one of the most awful and tremendous incentives to earnestness which the Church had had in the days gone by, no longer terrifies the people into a profession of religion. A gospel of "other-worldliness" will not suffice. It will be impossible in these days to gain the support of the masses for a gospel which promises eternal joy hereafter, but which is indifferent to the misery of the life which now is. We desire to see the Church exercising a dominating influence over the minds and actions of men and women because we believe that it, of all institutions, is the one specially qualified to prepare the way for the establishment of the coming of the Kingdom of God upon earth. The religious instinct is deeply embedded in human nature, and there is an almost universal longing among the people who now stand aloof from the Churches, for the help of a Church which will satisfy their craving for the spiritual life. The Church has only to show that it really sympathizes with the people, that it is anxious to help them, that it shares their hopes and desires, to become again a real, living, vitalizing, and catholic Church.

But the appeal is made to the Christian Church, by those who are working in the Social Movement, to lend its aid in the work of moralizing the industrial and social system, not merely on the ground that the Church will be revived by so doing, nor on the ground that the help of the Church will be of great value to social reform, but upon the much higher ground that it is the duty of the Church, imposed by everything in which it

professes, as a Christian institution, to believe, to identify itself with the work of social reform. If the Church will get back to the Christ of the Gospels, and will do the work which was left by Him as His legacy to the Church, then there need be no fear about the health and influence of the Church. That will naturally follow if the Church is true to its original mission.

The Church is in a transition period. We have outgrown many theological statements which satisfied our fathers. We are seeking for a religion and a Gospel which will meet the social and spiritual needs of our time. And that need is to be found in all its satisfying fulness in the Gospel of Jesus. As has been pointed out already the Church has no united or settled policy in regard to the Social Problem. As a Church it can give neither light nor leading on the great questions which are troubling the minds of thoughtful men and women in every industrial country. Individuals here and there, many of them eminent in the religious world, are speaking and writing courageously about social evils and economic injustice. But they do not speak for the Church. The strongest mental and moral movement of the present time is that social current which is variously known as socialism, social reform, labour unrest, syndicalism, and the uprising of democracy. Every observant man is profoundly stirred by the world-wide unrest and disaffection. Economic and social institutions are threatened with destruction. It is obvious to everybody that we are approaching one of those historic epochs of revolution when, either by peaceful movement or violent change, the old order must give place to the new. There is a real danger that unless the true lessons of the labour and social unrest are understood, and unless wisdom and experience are brought to bear on the treatment of the problems involved, blind ignorance, class hatred, and a burning sense of injustice on the one side, and on the other, fear of the dispossession of property and the loss of social position, may lead

to violence, bloodshed, and inconceivable suffering. The hope of a peaceful and permanent change of the industrial and social order, by which the abolition of preventable poverty will be achieved, depends upon the extent to which all classes appreciate the fact that change must come because the present distribution of wealth, and the lot of millions of human beings, are so unjust and un-Christian that if they are not reformed they will undermine the existence of society and bring down all classes in the ruins.

Unless it be contended that the Christian Church has no concern with anything that happens in the secular affairs of a nation, it will be admitted that the Christian Church has a serious duty and responsibility in regard to the social unrest and the social outlook. But, as has been said, it has no message, no advice, no guidance to offer. The Church of the present day seems to be like the Church at every former period of revolutionary change. It stands by the old order, defending it actively or passively, until it sees it falling to pieces, and then it rushes to find a place of safety under the protection of the new régime. In recent years, it is true, societies of Christian men and women have come into existence in considerable numbers which exist for the study of social questions, and work for the application of Christian principles to industry and social affairs. But so far, these unofficial societies have made no great impression upon the great body of Church membership, nor are they entitled to speak as representing the Churches with which, as individuals, they are connected. But though the social movement inside the Churches is so slow, there is a movement. It may be that our impatience to be moving quickly makes us underestimate the real rate of advance, which maybe is much faster than we imagine. Be that as it may, it must be confessed that the Church is moving, and if we appear to be too condemnatory of its apathy it is because we feel so keenly

the need for its help in the religious work of translating the will of God into acts of practical statesmanship.

We have committed ourselves to the statement that the Christian Church is required by its profession of Christian discipleship to identify itself with the work of social reform. It will be accepted without dissent that a Christian believes that we ought to love God with all our hearts, and our neighbour as ourselves; that he believes in the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man; that he believes in a life hereafter which will be a continuation o the life which now is; that he believes in the ultimate triumph of good over evil, and the establishment of the Kingdom of Heaven, for which he prays, on earth; and he believes that God's love goes out in an equal measure to all His children. Let us then see if these accepted beliefs of Christians and the Christian Church do not involve the active work of individual Christians, and the Church as an institution, in attacking everything in our industrial and social systems which prevents or hinders the living of the Christian life.

We are required to love God. To do that requires certain conditions. The human heart cannot love an abstraction. Love is begotten by love. God is the giver of all good things. If human beings are to love God they must be conscious of His goodness to them. The Christian must therefore work to ensure for all human beings such blessings of health and mental development as will evoke love of God, and will make the individual capable of loving. The inconsistency between the teaching that God is Love, and that He takes a paternal care in the welfare of every human being, and the existence of so much appalling poverty, and the physical suffering and moral corruption which result from it, is an insuperable obstacle to the spread of religion. We cannot love God unless we love His creatures. Everything which comes from God is of God, and our lives and all our faculties have been given to us to be made as useful and

perfect as possible. Every individual, who by his own action neglects his opportunities, or a community which allows individuals to live in such conditions that the development of their physical, moral, and spiritual faculties is prevented, is destroying God's work and is doing an injury to the eternal welfare of His children. Love shows itself by service, and we cannot love God if we allow those whom He loves to suffer or to be deprived of their rightful chances of development. God creates His children with infinite capacities for love, for goodness, for development. Love of God would show itself in working for the removal of everything which hinders the growth of the individual towards perfection of body, mind, and soul.

We cannot love God if we are not fighting every evil which exists. The child born into the slum is God's creature. If we allow it to be brought up in such surroundings, it will, in ninety cases out of a hundred, have a body attacked by disease and a mind filled with moral leprosy. If the parent of children is unable through no fault of his own, but through an industrial system, to earn a wage which is sufficient to provide the means to keep his family in physical health and to give the decencies of human life, the result will be the destruction of human bodies and human minds which God created for health and culture. Is there not an obligation upon those who profess to be Christians to do something about such conditions as those? If bad housing, inadequate wages, long hours of labour, a liquor traffic, unemployment, commercial competition, injure human beings physically and mentally and morally, if these things are inconsistent with the love of God, then it is surely the duty of the Churches and all professing Christians to wage war upon these iniquities. The love of God cannot be developed except by the training of human beings in the perception of lovableness, and by kindly association one with another. To the great mass

of people life today is a dismal, murky, cruel experience, and the severity of the struggle to keep themselves from abject want is not the way in which kindly feelings and love can be developed. That there is much goodness in the world, in spite of so many influences to make men bad, is proof of the infinite capacity for goodness and love which is inherent in the human race.

To love one's neighbour as one's self is a duty intimately associated with that of loving God. It is impossible to do one without the other. If conditions of life and work make it difficult for the individual to love God, they make it equally difficult for him to love his neighbour. To feel a love for others one must feel that one is loved. Love is not a mere sentiment which does not express itself in deeds. The existence of so much class hatred in the world is the inevitable outcome of an industrial and social system where individuals are at war with each other for their own personal advantage or gain. It does not develop a love for one's neighbours to have to fight them at the dockgates or the workshop door for the chance of a day's work. The extremes of poverty and wealth which parade themselves everywhere are not calculated to promote affectionate relations between the two classes. The workman who is unable through his poverty to give to his children the things they need for their physical and mental development, who sees them attacked by disease and he unable to provide them with proper medical skill, and who contrasts his position with that of others who can command every care and attention, is not likely to be much impressed by sentimental talk about loving his neighbour and about the Brotherhood of Man. An ounce of practice is worth a ton of theory even in matters of religion, and the best way to make men into Christians is to be working to make conditions such that it will be possible for them to be Christians.

If, then, the facts and experiences of industrial and

social life tend to make men selfish, unloving, unreligious, and to make the work of the Christian Churches and Christian ministry largely ineffective, it must be a primary duty of the Churches to attack these hindrances. Even from the point of view of those who believe that the primary work of the Church is to prepare men for a future life, the call for service in industrial and social reform should appeal to them. It is these conditions which are preventing the Churches from reaching the people, which make the evangelistic efforts of the Church so futile. How much more powerful would be the appeal of the Church to the masses if, instead of justifying the popular impression that it is out of sympathy with the poor, it showed a kindly interest in their struggles, and was not afraid to denounce systems which grind the faces of the poor. Those who believe that the future life will be determined by the life which now is are compelled to be active in making the conditions here such as will help to develop a Christ-like humanity. This generation, to a greater extent than ever before, has realized the influence which environment, in the wide sense of the term, has in moulding human nature and human character. We do not gather grapes from thistles, nor can we grow the fine flowers of cultured humanity in slums, and in an atmosphere reeking with the fumes of liquor shops. In short, the fundamental principles of the Christian faith, separately and collectively, each and all demand that the professing Christian, and the Christian Church as the organized body of Christian faith, shall interest themselves actively in Social Service.

There is one phase of Social Reform work which the Church can do better than any political organization. Christianity makes its special appeal to the individual. The political reformer devotes himself mainly to the task of reforming conditions. There is not, when these two methods are rightly understood, any antagonism between them, but the special emphasis of either plan

of salvation is likely to give an impression that the other method is unimportant and unnecessary. There has been in the past a good deal of needless controversy between the advocates of these two methods of salvation. The individualistic Christian has said, "Get the heart of the individual cleansed from sin, and all will be well with social conditions." The social reformer has replied, "Change the environment of the individual, and you will reform the man." Through the refusal of the individualistic Christian to admit the influence of industrial and social conditions upon character, the social reformer has been driven to unduly emphasize his own position, sometimes to the extent of denying altogether the power of individual will. This has had a very disastrous effect upon the Labour and Socialist movement. It has encouraged men to excuse their own weaknesses and vices by putting the responsibility upon economic and social conditions. Many of the regrettable features of the labour unrest of the last three years have been the result of a popular teaching by politicians and labour leaders which has talked to working men about their rights and power, but has not impressed upon them their duties and responsibilities. The Christian Church can remedy this mistake if it will combine an emphatic teaching of the responsibility of every individual to do his best in whatever unfortunate circumstances he may be placed with the message of a social gospel.

To say that it is the duty of the Church to preach a social gospel does not mean that it should, as an institution, identify itself with any particular school of economic thought. The duty of the Church is rather to arouse the consciences of its members about immoral social conditions, to proclaim certain moral truths, and to demand the application of just principles to industrial and social affairs. The quickened social consciences of Christian men and women will find the opportunity and means for a practical satisfaction of their desires

in economic and political organizations. That is to say that in Citizenship lies the practical means of establishing the Kingdom of God. The City and State ideally represent the common or public interest as opposed to private or sectional interests. The individual life is impossible except through the corporate life. Without the performance of the present functions of the City and the State the individual would be deprived of, not only the conveniences, but the necessities of existence. Health, education, the safety of life and property, the succour of the destitute, the care of the infirm and aged, and innumerable other services are performed now by the City and the State for individual needs and comforts. The City and the State are today the protector, guardian, and helper of the individual from the cradle to the grave. The good which is done now by the City and the State is limited, owing to the very limited appreciation by the great body of citizens of the value and possibilities of corporate effort; and the great lesson to be impressed today (and it is emphatically the duty of the Church to teach it) is that as we extend the functions of the City and the State we are superseding the selfishness of competitive individualism by the altruistic spirit of mutual aid,—provided always that the advances in civic enterprise express the desire of the individual citizens. The character of City and State government will reflect the intelligence, the interest, and the morality of the citizens. If they be indifferent, if they be selfish, if they care little for the honour of the city and the nation and for the purity and efficiency of government, this state of mind will reflect itself in the character of the public representatives, who care little for the welfare of the State and City, but who use the indifference of the citizens to serve their own private interests. An inefficient or corrupt city or national government is a standing reproach to the Christian Church, a painful evidence of its neglect of duty.

The task of laying down the precise limitations of the sphere of the Church in the matter of Social Reform would be a difficult one to discharge. Indeed it is not possible to fix limits which would apply to all cases and circumstances. But, speaking generally, it may be said that it would be a grave mistake for the Church to identify itself with any political party. Individual ministers may do that, but the Church as an institution, and the moral influence of the Church, should be free to support every movement and every cause likely to be a moral and social blessing; it must be equally free, and it must have the courage, to denounce everything that is anti-social and immoral. Though it would be a serious mistake for the Church to lay down economic theories of reform, it is its duty to attack existing institutions which are clearly immoral in their character and harmful in their effects. For instance, in such a matter as the distribution of wealth it is the duty of the Church to point out that it is un-Christian that a few people should have enormous riches while others are always at the verge of starvation. It is not for the Church to set out a detailed scheme of social re-construction where there will be neither rich nor poor, but it must rouse such a public conscience about the iniquity of the present distribution of wealth that politicians and economists will be compelled to set to work to establish a juster system. So in regard to the pressing question of a Living Wage. The Church must stir the public conscience about the sweating evil, and force politicians to legislate upon it. When the Church does attempt to do the work of the economists and statesmen it generally makes a mess of it. Not long ago the Archbishop of York delivered a very striking address in which he described with a force and eloquence which no socialist agitator could surpass, the contrasts of wealth and poverty, of luxury and squalor, and of idleness and hardship, which are the features of present social conditions. He declared that the question of the

distribution of wealth is the most pressing of all present-day problems, and that the Church would be lamentably lacking in its duty if it did not direct the thoughts of its members to the changes which are inevitable. That was right and proper, but unfortunately the Archbishop went on to point out how the evil of unequal wealth distribution might be remedied, and his proposal was that the shareholders of capitalist companies might be content with smaller dividends! Such a suggestion as that (which is the old idea of individual renunciation or charity) is grotesque to the economist and sociologist who knows something about the economics of the industrial system. The real social reform is to prevent a man from getting riches by unjust methods or by an unjust system, not to permit him to get prosperous out of it, and then be generous with his ill-gotten riches.

The increasing interest which is being shown by leaders of the Christian Churches in the condition of the people is a thing the social reformer heartily welcomes, but while recognizing the tremendous influence for good that the sympathy and active support of the Church will have upon the social movement it must be understood that it is not the work of the Church to take in hand the control and direction of that movement. That is the work of citizenship; but vast and tremendous indeed is the influence that the Christian Church may exercise upon the citizens and the social movement by preaching with courage and truth those eternal Christian ethics which should guide the conduct of individuals and nations in their relations with each other.

The Poet of the Franciscan Movement

Fra Jacopone da Todi

By Edmund G. Gardner, M.A.,
Barlow Lecturer on Dante, University College, London.

Fra Bartolommeo of Pisa, writing about 1385 of the Friars Minor of the city of Todi, says: "In that place of the brethren, but in the monastery of the sisters of Saint Clare at Collazzone, lies a holy friar of the Benedetti family, who was called Fra Jacopo of Todi, a man of wondrous sanctity and all burning in the love of God. He suffered patiently many tribulations from the Lord Pope Boniface, who was ill informed; but was afterwards liberated. He composed many songs of praise in the vernacular, of lofty doctrine and full of sweetness, and cried out manfully against the life of the said Pope Boniface."[1]

This brief passage is the earliest biography of the man in whom mediaeval Franciscan mysticism appears in its most perfect lyrical form, and whose career seems summed up in the words attributed to him: "I weep because Love is not loved." The so-called *Vita del beato fra Jacopone da Todi*, first published by Professor Tobler, is now known to be a work of the second half of the fifteenth century.[2] Of the legend therein contained, of Jacopone's madness

[1] *De conformitate vitae beati Francisci*, lib. i. fruct. viii. pars. ii. To this biographical notice is appended a Latin version of Jacopone's prose *dicta*, beginning with one on perfect charity.

[2] A. Tobler, *Vita del beato fra Jacopone da Todi*, in *Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie*, Band II. Cf. Livarius Oliger, art. *Jacopone da Todi*, in *Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. VIII.

through excess of love and his wild hunger to become the most despised of men, the earlier Franciscan historians know nothing. To them he is simply an ideal friar minor, a great poet, a man of influence in the order, a leader of the spiritual party that strove to tread more closely in the footsteps of their founder.[3] Indeed, if we were merely to compare the *Vita* with the few extant contemporary documents and fourteenth century references to Jacopone, it would be tempting to conclude that we have to deal with two totally different people. It is probable, however, that the legend is not, as some have supposed, a mere work of fiction; but that, mingled with things unwarrantably deduced from poems not always correctly attributed to him, it contains a core of historical truth handed down by tradition in the convents of the order. The compiler, no doubt truthfully, says that he has it on the authority of *frati antichi degni di fede*. And the poems, the *laude*, are the connecting link between the legend and the documents, making it fairly clear that the *Fra Jacopone* of the legend and the *frater Jacobus Benedicti de Tuderto* or *Jacobus Tudertus* of the documents are one and the same man.

I

Jacopone seems to have been born between 1228 and 1236, shortly after the death of Saint Francis. In the world, he was Ser Jacopo Benedetti, a wealthy lawyer of Todi in Umbria; a hard and avaricious man, bent on amassing a fortune in his profession. He had studied at Bologna, and was probably learned in literature as well as in the law; like many other lawyers of the day, he no doubt wrote verse. About 1267 (two years after the birth of Dante), he married a young wife named Vanna, the daughter of the Count of Coldimezzo, a

[3]Alvarus Pelagius, who wrote about 1330, speaks of *frater Jacobus benedicti Tuderti frater minor perfectus* (*De Planctu Ecclesiae*, lib. ii. cap. 73).

petty Ghibelline noble. According to the *Vita*, Ser Jacopo loved to see her beautifully dressed and taking a leading part in the social life of the city; but she, fearing for his soul, secretly gave herself up to penance. A year after their marriage she had gone to a banquet, outwardly clad in all the exquisite finery of the age; during the dancing a balcony fell, and, though many were injured, she alone was killed. Under her rich robes, they found a hair-shirt next to her flesh. The shock seems to have driven Jacopo actually mad, and, when he recovered, he was another man. Divine love had become to him all in all; annihilation of self, the one mode of life; madness for Christ's sake, the true wisdom. Ser Jacopo Benedetti was no more; the inspired fool, Jacopone, lived in his stead.

There is one of his *laude* that may, perhaps, have been written at this time; in any case, it gives the fullest expression to this phase of his spirit:—

"Wisdom, methinks, and courtesy, to go mad for the fair Messiah. Such great wit I deem it that one for God's sake should choose madness; in Paris never yet was seen such great philosophy. Whoso goes mad for Christ, seems afflicted and in woe; but he is a master graduate in nature and theology. Whoso goes mad for Christ, seems crazy to the people; to him who has not experienced it, he seems wandering from the way. Whoso would enter this school, will find new doctrine; a madness which no one knoweth rightly, save he that feeleth it. Whoso would enter this dance, finds love in boundless measure; pardon in abundance to all who cast reproaches at him. Now he who seeks through honour, is not worthy of this love; for Christ hung upon the Cross between two thieves. But he who seeks through shame, I think will quickly reach his goal; he need no more go to Bologna to learn other skill."[4]

To win contempt where formerly he had been honoured, Jacopone crawled through the streets of Todi, bridled and saddled as an ass, or, when invited to a wedding at his brother's house, came naked, tarred and feathered. For ten years he wandered about as a hermit, probably a

[4]Lauda 84 (*Senno me pare e cortesia*). I quote throughout from the reprint of the edition of 1490 issued by the *Società Filologica Romana*, under the editorship of Giovanni Ferri (Rome, 1910).

Franciscan tertiary, singing his songs to the people, like Saint Francis's "minstrels of the Lord", exhorting them to love and repentance. Then, to his dread and horror, he found himself acclaimed as a saint,[5] and resolved to fly temptation by becoming a friar and submitting himself to the rule of a superior. In 1278, after much opposition (for the friars, not unnaturally, were apprehensive of the scandal that such a seeming lunatic might bring upon the order), he became a friar minor in the convent of San Fortunato at Todi. These were dark days in the history of the order. After the death of the great minister-general, Saint Bonaventura, whose strong and holy personality had kept the factions under control, the schism between the *relaxati* and the *spirituales* grew ever wider; the former, now known as the conventuals, had gained the upper hand, while the latter, who trod in the footsteps of the founder's first followers and clung to the strict observance of the rule, had become a small and persecuted minority. San Fortunato was a convent opposed to the spiritual party, and Jacopone probably had to endure much persecution. The *Vita* (which studiously conceals the controversial aspect of Jacopone's career) tells us that, during the mortifications of those ten years of wandering, he had never known what it was to subject his own will to that of another, and at first this new obedience was very bitter to him; but that, at last, this bitterness, too, was turned into joy, and he sang his song of true spiritual freedom:

"O liberty, subject to every creature, to show the height that reigns in divine goodness."[6]

The *Vita* describes at length the poet's life in the order, and how he wrought to gain the contempt of the other friars as he had previously done that of his fellow-citizens. It represents him as dying in 1296 (an error perpetuated

---

[5]Cf. Lauda 47 (*Or udite la battaglia*).
[6]Lauda 34 (*O libertà, subiecta ad omne creatura*).

on his tomb); but, in reality, he lived ten years longer—ten years concerning the events of which the *Vita* is discreetly silent (though, as we saw, they were known to Fra Bartolommeo of Pisa)—and there is documentary evidence that he was by no means regarded as *lo menore fratecello desprezato*, "the least, despised, little friar", but as a leading spirit in the religious struggle of the day. It may be observed that there was nothing abnormal in a laybrother, like Jacopone, thus playing a prominent part in the drama. Some years later, when the two factions in the order fought out their differences before Clement V at Vienne, one of the advocates of the conventuals was a laybrother, who, like Jacopone, had been a lawyer in the world.[7]

In July, 1294, Pier da Morrone, the hermit of the Abruzzi, had been elected Pope as Celestine V. "And what am I", cried the old man, "to receive such and so great a burden, and such a power? I am not strong enough to save myself; how shall I save the whole world?" From the zealots and visionaries all over Italy, a shout of exultation arose; for, though more than thirty years delayed, was not this the beginning of the age of which Joachim of Flora had prophesied, when spiritual men would be the rulers of the world? But Jacopone seems to have had no such illusions. In the poem that he addressed to the new Pope, he laments that the word of consent (*voglio*) should have fallen from the old hermit's lips, and warns him of his danger and responsibility:—

"What wilt thou do, Pier da Morrone? Thou art come to the test. We shall see the work that thou hast contemplated in the cell; if the world is deceived by thee, malediction will follow. Thy fame has mounted high, through many lands has it gone; if thou defile thee at the end, to the good thou wilt be confusion. As a mark for an arrow, all the world is looking to thee; if thou hold not the balance justly, the appeal will go to God. . . . Great heart-sorrow have I had for thee, that *I consent* issued from thy mouth—for thou hast put a yoke upon thy neck, that is thy damnation."[8]

[7]Cf. F. Callaey, *Étude sur Ubertin de Casale*, p. 170n.
[8]Lauda 54 (*Que farai, Pier da Morrone*).

The famous leader of the Franciscan spirituals, Angelo Clareno, names Fra Jacopo of Todi (*Jacobus Tudertus*) among the principal friars, "in whom Christ and His spirit were firmly believed to dwell", who, "aspiring to a pure observance of the rule", sent two of their number to Celestine, shortly after his accession, to ask that they and all other friars who wished to observe the rule of Saint Francis might be suffered to do so without hindrance or molestation from the conventuals.[9] Celestine gave them the leave they desired; but, while a certain number (including the writer) separated themselves from the Franciscan family and formed a body apart under Celestine's name and patronage, Jacopone remained in the order. Then came the *gran rifiuto* of December, 1294,—Celestine's abdication, which seemed to Dante an act of such pusillanimity as to exclude him who made it alike from Heaven and from Hell. Benedetto Gaetani, whom Jacopone had known of old in the world, was now Pope as Boniface VIII, and the hopes of the spiritual Franciscans were shattered. A little later, the thunders of the Apocalypse were to be hurled from La Verna upon the new Pontiff's memory; Ubertino da Casale, the spokesman of the Franciscan rigorists, declaring that he was the *beast rising up out of the sea, having seven heads and ten horns, and upon his heads the name of blasphemy* (Rev. 13: 1).[10] The true character of Boniface VIII is one of the problems of mediaeval history. Not only Dante but a great canonized saint, Saint Bridget of Sweden, has condemned him. It may safely be said that, although a large part of the contemporary accusations may be disregarded, enough remains, and has been confirmed by modern research, to make the task of his would-be apologists an exceedingly difficult one.

---

[9] *Die "Historia septem tribulationum ordinis minorum" des fr. Angelus de Clarino*, ed. F. Ehrle, in *Archiv für Litteratur und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters*, Band II, p. 308.

[10] *Arbor Vitae Crucifixae*, lib.v.cap.viii.

In any case, the peculiar circumstances of his election had profoundly troubled the minds and consciences of many. Celestine was already dead in captivity, when, on May 10, 1297, at Lunghezza, between Rome and Tivoli, Jacopo and Pietro Colonna, cardinals of Santa Maria in Via Lata and Sant'Eustachio, issued their famous manifesto against "Benedetto Gaetani, who, not without the instigation of the evil spirit, calls himself Roman Pontiff". They declare the renunciation of Celestine uncanonical and invalid, profess their belief that Boniface is not Pope, and appeal from him to a general council. The manifesto is witnessed by five foreign prelates and three Italian friars, among whom the name of *frater Jacobus Benedicti de Tuderto* stands first.[11] We know nothing of the circumstances under which Jacopone had left his convent and joined the insurgent cardinals. With a second manifesto, issued a few days later from Palestrina, in more violent terms, directly accusing Boniface of the murder of his predecessor,[12] he was not concerned. But he had fully committed himself. In September, 1298, Palestrina was taken—through the treacherous counsel, according to Dante and the chroniclers, of another friar minor, he who in the world had been the great soldier, Count Guido da Montefeltro—and Jacopone, falling into the Pope's hands, was condemned to perpetual imprisonment in a dungeon under the castle that dominates the city.

In his prison, where his food is brought him once a week, and no man can speak to him save his gaoler, who is bound to report all he says, Jacopone remembers his poem to Celestine. His own turn has come now, and the same words, adapted to his own case, open his *lauda* on his imprisonment:—

"What wilt thou do, Fra Jacopone? Thou art come to the test."

[11] H. Denifle, *Die Denkschriften der Colonna gegen Bonifaz VIII* in *Archiv cit.*, Band V., pp. 509-514.

[12] *op. cit.*, pp. 515-516.

But, against all the rigours of his captivity, he is armed with invincible patience, that receives no injury, recognizes no foe, but holds every one as a friend; and, after all, he has only found what he has sought and desired all the years since his conversion:—

"This penalty that is given me, I have loved it for thirty years: now has come the day of this consolation."[13]

But there is one pain that he cannot endure. The Pope has deprived him of the sacraments:—

"O Pope Boniface, I bear thy sentence, and thy malediction and excommunication. This wound of mine cannot be healed save by absolution. Of thy grace, I pray thee, say to me: *I absolve thee;* and leave me all the other penalties until I pass from the world."[14]

The jubilee of 1300 finds him still incarcerated. To another Franciscan, Ubertino da Casale, the jubilee seemed but an aggravation of Boniface's usurpation of the papacy; it was *healing the deadly wound of the beast* that had been *as it were wounded to death* by the proclamation of the Colonna cardinals. But Jacopone regards it with the same reverence as Dante was to do (*Purg.* ii. 98-102). He hears of the indulgences and spiritual joys of the *anno santo*, in which he can have no share; for a special bull had exempted the adherents of the Colonna from all participation therein, and he is still unabsolved:—

"The shepherd for my sin has placed me outside the fold; my loud bleating avails not, to put me back through the gate. O shepherd, how dost thou not wake at this my loud bleating, and free me from the sentence of thy excommunication? To stay ever imprisoned, if this penalty suffice thee not, thou canst strike with some other weapon, as pleaseth thy power."

He likens himself, stanza by stanza, with the *blind man who sat by the highway side begging*, with the servant of the centurion *grievously tormented with the palsy*, with

[13]Lauda 55 (*Que farai fra Jacovone*).

[14]Lauda 56 (*O Papa Bonifatio, io porto el tuo prefatio*).

the *dumb man possessed with a devil*, the dead daughter of the ruler of the synagogue, the infirm man at the pool by the sheep-market, and Lazarus dead four days; beseeching the Pope in each to imitate Christ, heal him, and raise him to life:—

"Stretch out thy hand, I pray, and give me back to St. Francis."[15]

In September, 1303, five years after the fall of Palestrina, the golden lilies entered Alagna—the act of royal sacrilege so passionately denounced in the *Purgatorio*. A month later, Boniface was dead, and Jacopone, absolved by the new Pope (Benedict XI), was set at liberty. An amazing satire, addressed to the fallen Pontiff, is said to have been composed by Jacopone at this time, though some place it earlier and regard it as one of the motives for his imprisonment; in any case, the form in which it has come down to us bears the trace of later interpolations.[16] The friars took him back to their convents, first to one and then to another, and he passed the few years of life that remained to him in contemplation, taking no further part in the affairs of the Church.

II.

Jacopone's poems, *laude* or *cantici*, were first published at Florence in 1490 by Francesco Bonaccorsi. Owing to a pious belief that the poet was in reality a learned man, who wrote in the manner of the people and in the Umbrian dialect from motives of religious humility, the text was not tampered with, and the editor worked in a reverentially critical spirit from the best manuscripts that he could procure. This edition contains 102 pieces. In 1617, Fra Francesco Tresatti published at Venice *Le*

[15]Lauda 57 (*Lo pastor per mio peccato*).

[16]Lauda 58 (*O Papa Bonifatio, molt'ài iocato al mondo*). Cf. A. Tenneroni, *Le Laude e Jacopone da Todi nel sesto centenario dalla sua morte*, in *Nuova Antologia* (June, 1906), pp. 633-4.

poesie spirituali del beato Jacopone da Todi, divided into seven books, with a copiou commentary, the text being considerably modernized and frequently altered, and the whole number of poems amounting to more than two hundred. Though many of these new poems have since been cited and studied as throwing light on Jacopone's inner life and elucidating his doctrines, a considerable proportion can no longer be accepted as authentic. The edition of 1490, in its admirable reprint under the auspices of the *Società Filologica Romana*, remains for the present our chief authority and guide.[17]

These *laude* cover each phase in Jacopone's life after his conversion. Some are satires or reflect current events; others are personal confessions or outpourings of divine love; not a few are ascetical treatises in verse. Those in the form of dialogue are sometimes miniature miracle-plays, like the famous *Donna del Paradiso*, the vernacular counterpart of the *Stabat Mater*, in which the whole of the Passion of Christ is set forth in lyrical dramatic form.[18] As Novati and, more recently, Giuseppe Galli have well shown, it is a mistake to regard Jacopone's poems as mere improvisations. He has not entirely shaken off the learning acquired in the world, nor the influence of the secular poetry of his century, and his *laude* show not only mystical inspiration, but artistic design as well.[19] But he is essentially a lyrical poet, and, with some exceptions, his more elaborate compositions are the least successful. His short poems have frequently a wonderful efficacy of expression and dramatic intensity. Take, for instance, this piece of personal confession, *On impatience that causes the loss of all spiritual goods*:—

---

[17]*Laude di frate Jacopone da Todi secondo la stampa fiorentina del* 1490, *a cura di* Giovanni Ferri (Rome, 1910).

[18]Lauda 93.

[19]Cf. *Giornale Storico della Letteratura Italiana*, vol. LXI., pp. 89 et seq.

"Much do I strive to attain; if only I could keep it. A religious have I been, long time have I laboured, and I have so preserved my gain that nought thereof can I show. I have been to the retreats, I have striven in prayer, I have endured discomfort, tried to labour for the poor. I have been in obedience, poverty, and suffering; have delighted in chastity, according to my poor power. Much hunger have I borne, heat and cold have I sustained; a weary road and pilgrimage methought had been mine. Right early I rise to matins, to the divine office; terce and nones, vespers and compline done, I remain to keep vigil. And a vile thing is said to me, the arrow pierces my heart; and my tongue is ready to hurl fire if it could. Now see all my gain, how rich and perfect I am; for a word has so disturbed me, that I can hardly pardon."[20]

Like Saint Francis before him, Jacopone dreads the growth of idle knowledge and mere subtley of intellect among the friars under the guise of theology: "Paris has destroyed Assisi."[21] With agonized apprehension, he follows into the other world the soul of his friend, Fra Ranaldo, an eminent theologian of the order, who had recently died:—

"Frate Ranaldo, where art thou gone, that hast so sustained thy disputations? Now tell me, Frate Ranaldo, for of thy account I am not sure; whether thou art in glory or in torment, God hath not revealed it to me. I know full well that thou didst meet death with patience, thou didst confess thy faults, wert absolved by thy prelate. Now here is the question: if thou hadst contrition, which is the true unction that extinguishes sin. Now art thou come to that school, where the Truth alone judges every word, and reveals every thought. Now art thou come to that place where thy deeds are all shown forth; the records are brought out, of the evil and the good that thou hast wrought. For no sophistries will avail against those mighty syllogisms; neither for prose nor for verse will the truth not be made plain. Thou wert made doctor at Paris, with much honour and great cost; now art thou come to that plight that thou art entombed in earth. I fear lest the honour may have made thee too proud to hold thyself the least little despised friar. I have doubts of the reckoning, lest it be not cleared from debt; if thou hast not fully paid the tribute that the Lord has commanded from thee."[22]

---

[20]Lauda 28 (*Assai me sforzo a guadagnare*).

[21]Lauda 31 (*Tale qual'è, tal'è*).

[22]Lauda 17 (*Frate Ranaldo, dove sè andato*). In the later texts of this *lauda*, two additional stanzas appear, Jacopone declaring that he himself is writing in prison.

Throughout Jacopone's poems is the vision of Christ the lover of the soul, "mad with love", pleading for love, One impassioned *lauda* begins:—

"Lord, give me death before I offend thee more; let my heart break in twain, that still persists in evil";

and it ends:—

"O heart, how canst thou think it, to leave Love sorrowing, to take thyself from Him, when He endured such labour? Now weep for His dishonour, and reck nought for thyself."[23]

In another, the enamoured soul finds God in all creatures through the senses:—

"O Love, divine Love, why hast Thou besieged me? Thou seemest mad for me; for me Thou canst not rest. On five sides I see that Thou hast besieged me: hearing, sight, taste, touch, and smell; if I go forth, I am taken; I cannot hide me from Thee. If I go forth by sight, all that I see is love; in every form Thou art painted, and in every colour. Thou dost show me then that I must take Thee in. If I go forth through the gate to rest me in hearing; what doth all sound signify? It represents Thee, Lord. Through that I cannot issue, for all I hear is love. If I go forth through taste, every savour calls Thy name: Love, divine Love, Love full of craving; Love, Thou hast taken me at this hook that Thou mayst reign in me. If I go forth by the gate that is called that of smell; in every creature I find Thee there formed; I return wounded, Thou dost take me when I smell. If I go forth by the gate that is called touch; in every creature, I find Thee there portrayed: Love, how am I so mad as to wish to fly from Thee? Love, I go in flight, not to give Thee my heart; I see that Thou dost transform me, and make me become love, so that then I am not and cannot find myself again. If I see in man evil or fault or temptation, I transform me, I enter him, and he makes my heart suffer. Measureless love, and whom hast Thou taken to love? Take me to Christ dead, draw me from sea to shore; there make me feel the pangs, seeing Him so wounded. Wherefore hast Thou so suffered? That Thou mightest make me whole."[24]

Jacopone's longest poem of this kind is the famous hymn to *Pure Love, Love of Charity*, ascribed of old to Saint Francis himself:—

"Love for love's sake, why hast Thou so wounded me? I have my heart cleft in twain, and it is burning with love."

---

[23]Lauda 11 (*Signore, damme la morte*).

[24]Lauda 82 (*O amor, divino amore*).

It is there that the two stanzas on love and order, echoing a passage in Saint Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*, occur, with the well-known line: *Ordena questo amore tu che m'ami*: "Set this love in order, thou that lovest Me." Stanza after stanza follows, of ever gathering ecstasy of love, ending at last in the cry to the Divine Love: *Abyssame en amore;* "Plunge me into love's ocean."[25]

Side by side with this creed of love is the exaltation of Holy Poverty:—

"God dwells not in a narrow heart; thy heart is as great as thou hast affection; poverty has so wide a breast that it can harbour the Deity. Poverty is to have nothing, and then to desire nothing, but to possess all things in the spirit of liberty."[26]

And, above and beyond Holy Poverty, is *santa nichilità*, Holy Nothingness, Annihilation of Self. In the *lauda* which is, perhaps, the fullest expression of the poet's mysticism, the soul, through love and holy annihilation, reaches an "unknown and unspeakable state". "Love above all speech, Goodness without figure, Light beyond measure, shine Thou into my heart". The soul strips herself even of faith and hope; she is drawn out of her natural condition into the boundless ocean where Love itself is drowned; there she is transformed, united to God, in possession of all that is God's:—

"Now, still willing, she wills not, for she hath not her own will; and now she cannot will, aught save this Beauty. She asks not as she was wont, she wishes not to possess; she holds so sweetly, that nothing is her strength. This supreme height is founded in Nothingness, annihilated, formed, placed in the Lord.

"High Nothingness, thine act is so strong, that it opens all doors, enters into the Infinite. Thine is the truth that fears not death; thou makest straight the crooked, makest the dark light. Thou makest the heart so united in divine friendship, that there is no unlikeness left, to gainsay love. . . .

"Thou dost possess and art possessed, in so close a union there is

---

[25]Lauda 90 (*Amor de caritate*). The last line anticipates that of Leopardi, centuries later: *E il naufragar m'è dolce in questo mare.*

[26]Lauda 60 (*O amor de povertate*).

no division that can draw thee back from Him. Thou dost drink and art drunk up in transformation; from such perfection there is none can sever thee. Nor can aught now be found to make His hand withdraw, unwilling to give more. Thou art Mistress and Lord."[27]

III.

Jacopone died in a convent of Poor Clares at Collazzone, on a hill between Perugia and Todi.

"When he was near to death, the friars would fain give him the sacraments of the Church, but he answered that he wished not so. And they, all scandalized, spoke in this wise: 'Frate Jacopone, wilt thou die like a heretic, that thou sayest thou wilt not take the holy sacraments?' At these words he raised his eyes to heaven, and spoke thus: *I believe in God the Father Almighty*, etc. . . . And when the friars still urged him to receive the sacraments, he answered that he was awaiting his father, Friar John of La Verna, for he wished to receive them from his hands. But because from that place where Frate Jacopone lay sick, which is called Collazzone, to La Verna, where the said Friar John abode, it was a long journey, the friars mocked at his words, deeming it impossible that Friar John would come, since he had been in no way informed. And, while they remained ill-content at his obstinacy, still urging him to receive the sacraments, Fra Jacopone, in fervour of spirit, began that *lauda* that says: *Soul blessed by the high Creator.* And, when this *lauda* was finished, one of those friars looked towards the plain, and saw two stranger friars coming; and, when the others drew near to see who they were, they knew that one was the holy man, Friar John of La Verna, who, inspired by God, was coming to console his dearest brother in Christ, Frate Jacopone."[28]

A generally accepted tradition says that Jacopone, singing his *laude* up to the last, passed away in the early hours of Christmas Day, 1306, as the priest was beginning the *Gloria in excelsis* at the midnight Mass. On his tomb is written: "A fool for Christ's sake, he deceived the world by a new artifice and took heaven by storm".

We are accustomed, perhaps, to think of Jacopone mainly as the author of the *Stabat Mater*, which tradition says was composed by him a short while before his death. The authorship of this most wonderful sequence is still

[27] Lauda 91 (*Sopr'onne lengua amore*).

[28] *Vita*, p. 38; the writer may be following an authentic tradition.

a matter of dispute, and the form in which we now read it in the Roman Missal has undergone alterations and emendations, by no means for the better. The question remains an open one, but for the present we may provisionally continue to believe that the Church has chosen (perhaps unwittingly) to worship the Blessed Virgin with the words of the prisoner of Pope Boniface.

THE
CONSTRUCTIVE
QUARTERLY

Spiritual Factors of Unity

By H. P. Bull, S.S.J.E.

In the second article of the March issue of The Constructive Quarterly, Mr. T. R. Glover presented a plea, expressed with great simplicity and earnestness, for the recognition of "Unity in the Spiritual Fact," and especially in the spiritual fact of common spiritual experience. He urged "a quiet and disinterested concentration on fact," as opposed to the erection of edifices "of dogma and tradition." He urged that divisions were deep rooted in inherited and personal convictions of truth, and as such were serviceable, and even necessary in our present state; and yet that co-operation in "working together at the redemption of the world for Jesus Christ and in Him" was possible, and a true expression of unity, especially if we realized that differing forms and expressions of worship were only differing modes of approach to the one Christ. And he closed with a plea that we should begin again to sit at the feet of our Lord, and learn how not "to use His language without His meaning," and to seek "in God-given power" a closer "identification

with His thought and His life Godward, manward, every way." (pp. 20 to 26.)

As a survey of spiritual fact in the region of human endeavour—Christian, and leaning on God, and aspiring to Him, and yet confessedly in "quest of truth"—this article touches the deep of our souls, and lays anew a foundation for an edifice of sympathy and of prayer. Are not edifices always the result of contact with facts? Has not true science its edifices of "dogma and tradition" with foundations well and truly laid? But it leaves me, as one of its readers, with the cry of the Psalmist in my ears as its antiphon, "Out of the depths have I cried unto thee, O Lord." "Lead me up to the Rock that is higher than I." (Pss. 130:1, 61:2.)

The unity proposed is "a frank recognition of one another on the terms of Christian co-operation," resting at last, it is suggested, on "a recognized common religious experience", which even finds expression in the pagan world (pp. 23, 26).[1] The writer assuredly hopes for more than this some day. But is this all we may even now hope for from "the Revelation of Life" which St. John in his First Epistle so lovingly recalls, and so earnestly declared? Is this what he meant by the "Fellowship with the Father and with His Son Jesus Christ," in which we were to find our fellowship with one another? Is this "the right direction" in which to look, our real "*via prima salutis*"? (p. 25.)

I do not feel that the foundation is clear enough

[1]Of what real avail is it to trace up to pagan times the history of Sacrifice or Sacrament, save as illustrating the way in which God has answered to man's needs, and having made him for Himself has never left him alone? We do not value, or measure, our Christian Sacrifice or Sacraments by the analogies which the history of man's spiritual strivings may suggest. Everywhere a desire for God, a sense of sin, and of the need of reconciliation, and a joy in the belief of its accomplishment find similar expression. But the Light that has illumined all, the Life that has given worth to Sacrifice, the Grace that has given reality to Sacraments, is from Christ our Lord. The risen sun reveals the source of the growing light as darkness gives place to day. There is no longer need for men to wander aimlessly or fearfully.

or broad enough for that Co-operation, with I suppose its attendant Comity, in working together for the redemption of the world, which is indeed our common desire, and our common task. To take the scientific parallel which Mr. Glover suggests, it is certainly true of religious, as of scientific, endeavour that independent workers should have free scope, and should not interfere with one another. But in a scientific inquiry each inquirer, and the more so if confessedly the advocates of rival theories, must demand equally free and full access to every field of inquiry. Co-operation in inquiry is a different thing from co-operation in work. The rival theories will demand the employment of differing tests. They will scour the same fields. They will overlap continuously. Co-operation in work, and division of the field, can only be where there is agreement in the principles accepted, or the objects sought, or the methods to be pursued. So a common zeal for the redemption of the world requires the fullest liberty of all to employ those methods, and proclaim those truths, which each believes to be essential factors in the process. But it is agreement on those factors which provides ground for co-operation. Union demands unity. And when we are put in trust with a Revelation, is there not the more insistent necessity for the reality of unity, in respect of its contents, ere we can really co-operate?

It is God "that maketh men to be of one mind in an house." (Ps. 68:6, P. B. vers.) Unity is a vital growth. It is not merely that God by the working of His Spirit within makes men peaceable, over-rules their dispositions, brings good out of evil in us. There is much more than this in the Divine origin and growth of unity. Is it not in the revelation of Himself, which God has given us in His Son Jesus Christ, a revelation of grace and truth, that the foundations are laid? In our survey of "spiritual fact," so long as we look at ourselves only, we note our divisions equally with our agreements,

we classify our disagreements in the hope of reducing their number, we try to find some least common denominator in which we may approach God together. But is it not more helpful to enlarge our vision of "spiritual fact," and begin to contemplate more deeply "the great things" that God hath done? It is not man that moves towards God alone. It is God who in His whole Being has moved towards us. It is His action not ours, that lifts us to a state of Grace, that begets in us a new Life, that nourishes and renews, that enables and enriches, that illuminates and adorns, that kindles and inspires, that binds us together in a new unity of faith, of worship, of praise, of thanksgiving, of devotion and of charity. "God setteth the solitary in families." (Ps. 68:6, A. V.)

The Incarnation is the outstanding spiritual fact of our world and of this age,—and it is revealed to us as an eternal purpose, and as leading to a consummation in which all creation finds its unity in the perfect surrender of all to God in Christ, and the perfect possession of all by God's indwelling. We must look up and out, rather than in upon ourselves, to find our springs of unity. The spiritual experience, whose affirmations will avail us, will be that of those who have found the truth, rather than of those who are "in quest of truth." The unity, on which we shall begin to build our edifice of co-operation, will be the common religious experience of those who have found the fulfilment in Jesus Christ of all that elsewhere, the wide world of human hearts all over, was groped after, dimly foreshadowed, painfully, constantly, ever failingly pursued. When we begin to live more truly in the light of a God-given Faith, we shall be able to work together with a "God-given power."

In this country this method is not popular. The American nation is ever out for results. Its triumphs are in applied science. A new experiment is its joy. We are impatient of delay, of debate, of dependence

upon any one. The problem of irreligion arises; let the religious bodies get together, and get busy. The plain man wants something he can understand. Why have rival businesses, when one can accommodate the trade? Sunday is neglected; let everyone go to church once on one Sunday, it matters not where. Fix the day, and we will all wear a button and go to church. Missions are right. They help civilization. But there is waste of money and men in the same fields. Business methods demand co-operation on the Mission Field. Organize, advertise, unify, push things through. If objection should be taken that this is a very worldly proposition for attaining spiritual results, there are certainly many who would see no great harm in that, who conceive that the twentieth century demands a new version of Christianity, who claim that problems of faith have had their day, who would change now even our Lord's own test of discipleship. It is no longer "Whom do ye say that I am?", but "What do ye say that I am?" The Kingdom of Heaven must find its realization on earth. Social betterment is the Gospel. There is little wonder that reunion at any price for practical purposes is the temptation of the hour. And the method is—Co-operate that you may find unity. In practice this means that convictions of faith are kept for private edification. We are forced to act, when we act together in spiritual affairs, on what are common beliefs, and the wider the circle of co-operation the narrower are the borders of common faith,—until the Christian Creed itself is too broad to be taken in.

This basis of unity, demanded for its practical usefulness, is a very different suggestion from that offered in Mr. Glover's article, though it seems to me not unconnected with it. The appeal is a real one in either case, however little really hopeful. Cannot they who share a common religious experience, and seek God with the same desire, co-operate? Cannot they who are intensely

interested in the practical diffusion and working out of the Gospel in human life co-operate? I am not contending that either union in prayer, or co-operation in many spheres of the practical application of the Gospel to human needs, is impossible without unity of faith in its completeness. But I do desire to urge that unity of faith, and of life in Christ, is the true basis of a co-operation which would cover the full and glorious object of "working together at the redemption of the world for Jesus Christ and in Him."

Jesus Christ—what is the spiritual fact connoted by these two familiar words? They tell of a human name, and of a divine office; but Who is it that bears them? It must make a profound difference to ourselves and to others, to our Gospel and our methods, to our judgment of spiritual realities, to our religious experience, if we are able to confess that it is the human name of God the Son, and that the prophet, priest, and king of men is God the Son made man. Here is a spiritual fact that creates faith, and hope, and love. God has come near to us. We are taken out of ourselves.

The revelation of God which we associate with Jesus Christ, takes on a new meaning when we rise to faith in the Godhead of our Lord. It is true that the teachings and the life of our Lord revealed God as He had never been revealed before. But the true revelation of God, that gives life, and light in deepest human darkness, is just the fact that He came. "God gave His only begotten Son." It is the presence of God in the Person of the Son in our nature, His embrace of us in such love, His humiliation and His death, which reveals God. Is not this the only answer which we can adequately make to the passionate, often despairing cry—sometimes agonized into scoffing, but in the last analysis justifiably insistent—Where is God? Why does He not help us in sorrow, shield us from harm, temper the forces of nature to our blessing, save us from man's cruelty to man?

The Incarnation is the divine antitype of that profoundly real utterance of Divine Compassion, in the wilderness of Horeb, from the midst of the Burning Bush; "I have surely seen the affliction of my people which are in Egypt, and have heard their cry by reason of their task-masters; for I know their sorrows; and I am come down to deliver them." (Exod. 3:7, 8.) God has lived our life, and in our nature fought our conflict, suffered with our sorrows, borne our sins, and carried us in His Sacred Heart. The reconciliation of finite and infinite in the Incarnate Son, the nature of the union between the human and the divine in the One Person, by the very terms themselves of the truths we thus state, pass our comprehension. But this does not hinder the life, and renewal of faith and hope, and joy springing from His Countenance, which follow from faith in the Spiritual Fact, which faith thus apprehends. We may fail to be able to analyze the air we breathe on the sea shore. But we are refreshed.

But faith in the Divinity of our Lord, in the sense of Godhead, not only sustains our faith in God, or rather is our apprehension of the revelation of God, but it brings marvellously within our reach the glories of His manhood. We are grateful for the example, and inspiring presence, of those better than ourselves. But sometimes they are our despair. The better they are, the further they seem from us, the more utterly out of reach. We excuse ourselves from effort, and our excuse is easy; it is my nature that is to blame.

But in the God-man the human perfection is the fruit of the Divine Indwelling. There is a revelation of power, ready to be communicated to all those whom He is "not ashamed to call—and make—His brethren." We are not called to follow in our own strength, under the inspiration only of His words and of His example. We are even to be made "partakers of the Divine Nature" in Him. We tread in His steps, as partakers of His

God-filled life. He recreates our nature, He fills it and renews it with the Divine Life first in Himself, then in us His members. "Behold I make all things new." "Behold I, and the children whom God hath given me." (Rev. 21:5; Hebr. 2:13.) Is not this spiritual fact of surpassing wonder, and an essential factor of unity?

Faith in the Divinity of our Lord has verily a most uniting influence on those who believe it, and a most divisive power towards those who reject it, in regard to every act that He wrought in the flesh, and the life that He now lives in Heaven. Our conception of the Atonement that He has effected for us, and of the Intercession whereby He keeps His own, must wholly depend on our faith in His Person. But we cannot have the unity which springs from such a faith, without the division which at once springs into being also. So bright a light has so deep a shadow.

And is not our conception of the Church equally affected also? If, now that He is exalted, He is "Head over all things to the Church, which is His body, the fulfilment of Him who is being fulfilled in all respects in all people and things" (Eph. 1:22, 23)—probably we strive vainly to translate in this passage a phrase, which is true in every conceivable rendering—yet He is the very same who in the days of His humiliation spoke of His Church, gathered its foundations, led steadily to definiteness of faith, ordered its institutions, instructed in its life, and after forty days of Risen Life wherein He appeared from time to time "speaking of the things pertaining to the kingdom of God," finally parted from the assembled company of His Apostles, leaving them the charge, "to make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them into the Name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, and teaching them to observe all things, whatsoever I have commanded you." (St. Matt. 28:19, 20.)

We may not assume that the ways of God are always those which commend themselves to our judgments,

as natural and fitting; and we must remember that our Lord promised the Holy Spirit as a sufficient Guide to His Apostles, and that this should be the very token of His own perpetual presence and Lordship. But it is difficult to believe, in view of what has just been recited, that our Lord had no plans for the development of that Church of which He had said—"On this rock I will build my Church." Dr. Hamilton in his review of the origins of the Christian Ministry, in the second volume of his treatise, *The People of God*, again and again forces on our attention the thesis, that the Apostles had no plan of church organization, or of church extension, but met each situation as it arose, coming to it with unformed minds. (*e.g.* Vol. II. pp. 76ff, 122ff.) The argument no doubt is possible that we are to trace the operation of the Holy Spirit working through the Apostles, and so find the truth which St. Paul so importunately affirms in Eph. 4:11 "καὶ αὐτὸς ἔδωκε—and He it is that gave—some, apostles; some, prophets; some, evangelists; and some, pastors and teachers, for the perfecting (the full equipment for their life's journey) of the saints, for the work of ministry, for the edifying of the Body of Christ, till we all come into the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ." Whether Dr. Hamilton's difficult thesis is the correct one or not, the frame-work of the Church to St. Paul was of divine institution. We have to learn to distinguish no doubt between what is of divine institution, and what is of human devising to meet a situation, even though under the Spirit's guidance; between what is temporary, and what is eternal. But faith in the Divinity of our Lord makes those things which He has commanded us, whatever they may be, spiritual fact of the first importance, and essential to unity in His following, and in His service. Convictions here cannot be compromised.

The perfection of Our Lord's Humanity, and its abiding permanence in its integrity in Him in Heaven, is the second consideration which I desire to urge as part of the foundation of unity. It is the link whereby He binds us to Himself, even as He condescended to be thus bound Himself forever to us. It is the Sacred Humanity which is the instrument of our redemption now, as when He was on earth. In it He is "manifested in the Presence of God for us"; through it He "brings us to God" ever. As the Word of God, the Eternal Son was the Mediator of all creation, its life and its light. But it is the Word made Flesh who is the Mediator of the new creation, full of grace and truth. The one Mediator between God and man is "the man Christ Jesus."

In the article, to which reference has been frequently made, Mr. Glover seeking to find unity in spiritual experience, naturally faced the question of sacramental grace, and reached the tentative conclusion that in the Sacrament "it is not Christ who does something different (from what He does *e.g.* in prayer), but we; and He, only as we let Him." Why, on any ground, should we so conceive? There are different elements of spiritual nourishment, health, and life. In the body we breathe in at times, as meat and drink, a cool breeze off the sea in summer. But that kind of refreshment, most real as it is, does not take the place of, or do the same work as, food and drink. We rise physically refreshed from both, or either, but the nourishment received is different. Does not the comparison hold with the spiritual refreshment gained by sacraments, and by prayer? How is it that we confuse the two, save that we do not apprehend the relationship of the Sacred Humanity to us aright? To many it seems as if our Lord had no further use to make of His human nature in relation to our salvation. He died in it, for our redemption; He lives in it, a guarantee of His sympathy; but our salvation is wholly wrought by the Spirit now acting separately, or distinctly, on our

spirits, and using the manifestation in the flesh on earth only as the instrument of our conversion, or of our edification. But if the Church be His Body, and we His very members, "of His flesh and of His bones," if our bodies are "the members of Christ," if His Body is the cleansing of ours and His Blood the washing of our souls, if He be our second Adam, and "His flesh our meat indeed and His blood our drink indeed," His Humanity is not only the glorious robe of His own Person at the right hand of God, but the life of ours, the hope of our glory, the power of our resurrection. Is it not precisely this which makes sacraments intelligible as subjects of divine institution, and means of grace? We judge them not by our experience of them; rather sacraments judge us. We judge them by their divine origin, and declared purpose. We seek to rise in our experience to the appreciation of the divine gifts.

Indeed happily we are taught "to feed on Him in our hearts by faith with thanksgiving." We obey and seek Him, whose grace and gifts apart from Himself would die out from us, if only from our inability to keep or use them. But a personal presence, even amongst ourselves, does not always mean the same thing, and the difference does not lie only in our receptivity. A friend may be present for purposes of his own, or with gifts of his own pleasure; his presence will be a joy at any time, but what he brings with him will be at his own disposal, and will be our blessing. Will it not be another sphere of spiritual fact of the first consequence again, if we learn to recognize our eternal Friend, giving by His own appointment His diverse gifts of grace for our salvation, in diverse manners? If, in other words, we recognize the Sacred Humanity as the source of sacramental grace, and the spring of our new life, even as the Holy Spirit by His own direct action within our souls quickens us to realize, and to profit by, that which we thus receive.

I pass here all but the reminder how intensely practical

the doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body of Christ is in this connection. It is not all one to us whether the Sacred Body rose from the dead, or went the way of all flesh. It could only be so on the supposition that nothing is important but the spirit. Morally, the history of the Church has proved too many times, and too overwhelmingly sadly, the ruinous consequences of such teaching. Spiritually, it robs us of our finest hope, as of our most powerful assistance, in the life of sanctification. The redemption of the whole of our nature in Christ is that to which St. Paul pointed as the very crown of our hope, and in some sense the hope of all creation. The communion of the Body and of the Blood of Christ is the very power of incorruption, which "bringeth to the Kingdom." How shall we work at the world's Redemption apart from this truth?

One further consideration I wish to offer. We have not merely to bear witness to certain truths as providing for us a foundation of unity, even though those truths be truths of such life-giving power as we have seen them to be. They will not commend themselves merely by themselves, necessary and satisfying as they may be to our reason. They must be presented in living colours. Our Lord did not merely take our nature, and in it work for our salvation. He took it after a certain fashion, and presented Himself thus to men. "He humbled Himself, and took upon Him the form of a servant." What was essentially a slave's state, He made His own. He came to live a life of dependence, of poverty and of obedience, of single and devoted attachment to Him whose will He must do, and He would have nothing of His own. The claims on that voluntary poverty, obedience, and chastity of spirit advanced, as His life wrought out ever more perfectly the purpose of His coming. The medium at last of the revelation of His Godhead, as of the Father's glory, and of His accomplishment of our salvation, was the perfect Sacrifice of the

Cross. The poor man of Nazareth had become the outcast, the victim, of Calvary. The naked, nailed body was the visible emblem of the surrendered, devoted, wholly loving soul. Here was the spiritual fact which shone out in the darkness, and overcame it. "Truly this man was the Son of God", was the confession that resulted.

It is this presentation of Jesus today, which must not only win afresh faith in God, and joy in a divine yet human Saviour, in the world, but which will provide an atmosphere for such a vision of Him in His Church as shall draw us out of our prejudices and errors, our self-esteem and self-seeking, our isolation and our coldness; and in the purification of our hearts make way for the light of truth, binding us together in a common worship.

Perhaps the word "presentation" of Jesus is hardly the right one. We cannot present Him by our words alone. We cannot even present Him apart from ourselves. We draw our best pictures of Him; but they are dead. We kill them by our conduct. It is a living Jesus who must be His own testimony, reproducing Himself in the essential principles of His own incarnate life, in us. Is not this the supreme function of the Religious Life in our midst? And is there not here possible a contribution to the cause of unity? Is not this also spiritual fact on which we do well to concentrate, until it forces its message once more upon us?

No one class, as no one age, of men can claim a monopoly of sacrifice for Christ's sake, or has laid upon it the sole responsibility of witnessing for Christ in such manner that He becomes visibly present before men's eyes again. But the Religious Life in its technical sense, the life of dedication to God under lifelong surrender in voluntary poverty, chastity, and obedience has this as its peculiar privilege and responsibility (would God we might rise to it more simply and more wholly!), that it seeks to be conformed to the principles of the life of Jesus upon

earth and to His sacrifice, in deed and truth. Of service we hear much in these days. It is beneficent, it is attractive; it may minister to our content, or even to our pride. There is need in the world of all the service anyone can render, under whatever motive. But the service rendered by our Lord was the outcome of His sacrifice of Himself to the Father. There was the measure of its completeness, the power of its endurance, the secret of its perfection. The highest service we shall be able to render to men now, within or without His Church, is the completeness with which we are enabled to give ourselves in sacrifice to God. When we do this in Christ, inspired by His love, seeking His glory, lifting Him up once again in mortified lives that have become dead to self and to the world, because wholly alive to Him and to His kingdom, He will draw all men to Himself as surely as in the days that are past.

And those that are sundered one from another now, though all in His following and in His keeping, will learn as in no other way will be possible, to recognize in their separated brethren the lineaments of that well-known Character, the shining of that well-loved Face, the splendour of His Presence; and recognizing they will fall down and worship. Those that believe in Him will grow thus into union, for they have its principles within them; and the prayer was that "those who believe in Me" may be one. It is the unity of a full faith, and a perfect knowledge—a knowledge gained in the experience of an accepted revelation.

Here I happily close with a real approximation, even an identity of ideal, with Mr. Glover's own deepest desire, for the expression of which at the close of his article I heartily thank him.

This article was written before the June number of THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY was in my hands. Otherwise I should have felt bound to make some reference to the article by Dr. King on "The Confession of Christ," which may be described as occupying

an intermediate place between Mr. Glover's article and my own, and as being closely allied to both. In reading it, the feeling deepens that it is very necessary to define the terms we use, and to make sure of them. There is, for instance, a "unity of spirit" which unites all those who confess loyalty to Christ, as "the supreme personality of history" (p. 254), who yet are animated by very different sentiments towards Him. Many, who would make this confession, would yet solely regard Him as the supreme achievement of human nature, reaching upwards to God. His "personality" would mean to them His character. His divinity would be His likeness to God in character. The "unity of the Spirit," which unites those who confess in Christ "God manifest in the flesh," is of a different, a deeper, an intenser nature. Admiration, enthusiasm, or personal devotion, has passed into adoration. His "personality" would mean to them His Divine Being. His divinity is His Godhead.

Similarly is there not some confusion in respect of the word "creed," its purpose and value? If it is true that we can "better state our real creed" at the end of our life's experience than at its beginning (p. 259), yet is it not just then that we may be realizing the inadequacy and poverty of the creed we have lived by? Is it not rather true that our life's experience would be far otherwise than it often is, if we had built it on other, and better, foundations of faith? Is not the Christian creed as expressed in the great Catholic Creeds the basis of life, the foundation rather than the expression of experience? And are not the facts of the Christian creed, in terms of life, that "unalterable doctrine" which, it is suggested, is "impossible"? (p. 259.)

"The life which I now live in the flesh I live in faith, the faith of the Son of God who loved me and gave Himself for me." St. Paul doubtless knew the meaning of his creed better at the end of his life, than at its beginning. But his life was built upon his creed. It was a change of creed, following upon a great experience, which changed his life. And how definite a form that creed assumed we find in that Epistle to the Philippians (II; 6 ff), which reveals more than any other his personal life.

And again the desire "to be loyal disciples of Christ" (p. 263), is indeed a most affecting, and uniting, reality in the realm of our spirits. But it does not, as a matter of fact, necessarily bind us in more than the fellowship of a common desire. St. Thomas, before he saw the risen Lord, was in fact separated from the living fellowship of the rest of the Eleven, in spite of their common desire to be loyal. But the unity that springs from a common realized faith in Him, who sets our life on a new basis in Himself, is a unity which creates a fellowship of life in all its aspects. It binds in one every activity of our whole nature in ourselves. It gathers all who possess it into its common joy, and into the splendid obligation of mutual love and service. Is not this the "really existing unity" of the Spirit, the Revealer of the Lord, to the manifestation of which we must ever aspire, and with less than which we can never be content?

Nonconformity: Its Ideals and History

By Alfred E. Garvie, M.A., D.D.,
Principal, New College, Hampstead, London.

As the purpose of The Constructive Quarterly is to draw more closely together the members of different denominations, and as mutual knowledge is the best means of mutual respect, I desire to present my conception of the Nonconformist ideal, and my estimate of its history, in order to emphasize not any aggressive or exclusive aspect which it may at some periods have presented, but rather the conciliatory and truly catholic element which I find in it, and on account of which it has my loyal and devoted adhesion. I shall offer my contribution to the laudable object of common understanding among Christians in discussing and expressing my agreement with, or dissent from, the presentation of Nonconformity in Dr. H. W. Clark's *History of English Nonconformity*; and this course seems to me desirable for two reasons: (1) this work itself is one which should be known widely by those who desire to understand and be just to Nonconformity; and (2) I can bring out the distinctive position of Nonconformity, as I understand it, the more clearly, by showing that in my judgment Dr. Clark's view is not confirmed by the history as he himself presents it.

I

(1) "The Nonconformist spirit," says Dr. Clark, "is the spirit which holds that life must make organization, that organization is valueless unless it is thus made by life, that organization ought to be the

natural and automatic producing, by the existing life, of a system which that existing life finds necessary and helpful for its own health, and which, precisely because it is thus produced by life, becomes, one must not say the product, but the deepener and intensifier of life in its turn."[1]

While maintaining that "the Nonconformist churches had started their career under the inspiration of that ideal"[2] in the Separatists, yet he asserts again and again that often the vision of it grew dim, and other subordinate, even if derived interests pushed themselves into the foreground. Even in the nineteenth century he holds the ideal has not been fully recovered. Refusing to mention any of the great names of Nonconformity in the last century, as it would be impossible to mention all, he makes one exception

"for the reason that it is the name of a man in whom the Nonconformist spirit attained for once that fulness of expression for which we have seen it vainly anxious so often and so long. . . . Dale of Birmingham stands out above all others as the man who knew and preached what Nonconformity in its ultimate essence stood for, and who contended earnestly for the faith once delivered to the Nonconformist pioneers. . . . To Dale Nonconformity stood for the positive idea that the Church was to be wholly made of men and women in whom Christ and the Christ life were operative and energizing; and that all the Church was and did—in its self-government, in the construction of all its apparatus of discipline and doctrine and its subsequent use of the apparatus so constructed, in its working upon and influence over the outside world—was to be the out-pressing of that inwardly operative and energizing life."[3]

In this tribute to Dale I most heartily join, and his idea of the Church I most thoroughly accept. Whether it can be claimed, however, as the exclusively Nonconformist possession is a question to which we must return on completing the statement of Dr. Clark's position. He commands my entire assent when he insists that this ideal is "bound up with faith in the special Deity of Christ." "A Church which owns a supernatural Christ-

[1]Vol. I, p. 11. Vol. II, pp. 120-121.

[2]Vol. II, p. 383.

[3]Pp. 380-381.

life as its energizing power" must believe in a Christ supernatural, divine enough to be its source. He rightly infers that he who gives up faith in the divine supernatural Christ has abandoned this Church-idea.

(2) Among tendencies which have diverted Nonconformity from the pursuit of this ideal he mentions the idea of "democracy applied to Church affairs," an idea partly due to the political associations of Nonconformity and partly in turn giving a religious sanction to these associations. This idea has been more or less operative in the development of Nonconformity generally, but it has been especially prominent in Congregationalism.

> "With Congregationalism, bent upon that freedom which is democracy's ideal, and with Congregationalism already democratic to the outward eye, the idea that Congregationalism stood for the democratic method applied to Church affairs found its chance and slipped quickly and easily in as at an open and unguarded gate."[4]

But the various schisms in Methodism, due to the claims of the laity to a larger share in the government of the churches, have also illustrated this tendency. Whether democracy in the Church is, or is not, a necessary and legitimate inference from the Church-idea assigned to Nonconformity is a question which must be held over; but meanwhile I do assent to Dr. Clark's judgment that the prominence given to this idea has been a disadvantage.

(3) The position of Nonconformity has compelled it to wage a warfare, not yet ended, for religious liberty, for the removal of legal disabilities. The fight for complete toleration has been persistently and, within the last century, for the most part victoriously carried on. However necessary and legitimate that quest was, it might be pursued and was pursued without any regard to the ideal, and tended even to divert attention from the ideal. Men believed themselves contending for Nonconformity, when they were simply contending for its opportunity to realize itself unhindered by legal

[4] P. 127.

disabilities. What was only a means often took the place of the end. This same failure to rise to the ideal Dr. Clark finds in the present attitude of Nonconformity to the next stage of the same conflict—the vindication of religious equality for all citizens in disestablishment. It is often advocated from the standpoint of citizen *rights;* he maintains that the objection to the establishment by the State of any Church is the Christian's duty.

"To a view of religion and the Church which makes religion and the Church begin wholly in inward spiritualities and work themselves out from there, which makes the interior self-identification of the soul's life with the indwelling life of Christ the only true formative and constructive force behind whatever religious organization may come into being, to such a view of religion and the Church the assumption by the State of right or power to direct, control, legislate for, a Christian Church implies a dishonour to religion which ought not for an instant to be brooked; and the declaration by the State that some particular church is to be imposed upon the nation and to claim support from the nation in the mass implies that an organization already in existence can order an inward life, if not to make that organization, at any rate to maintain it when it has been made."[5]

(4) The Nonconformist ideal has been also obscured by what Dr. Clark very aptly describes as *particularist* Nonconformity. A *particularist* Nonconformist is one who lays special, it may be exclusive, emphasis on particular points of doctrine or practice as essential to the Church. A Nonconformist by outward position, he is really a Conformist by inward spirit, as he insists on a rigid conformity to the articles of belief or methods of worship, to which he attaches importance. Baptists are particularists in so far as they exalt the ordinance of baptism, and their view as regards the method and the subjects of it, into a ground of separation from other Christians. The term more fitly applies, however, to Brethren, Swedenborgians, Christadelphians, etc. This particularism reacts on Nonconformity generally, for as the particularist sects lay emphasis on what distinguish-

[5]P. 409.

es them from other churches, these churches in their turn are apt to lay emphasis on what is distinctive of them, rather than on the common Christian ideal, which really dominates their life more than their special differences. Accordingly the forms of polity adopted may be put in a primary instead of being kept in a secondary position.

II

(1) The presentation of the Nonconformist ideal by Dr. Clark deserves careful consideration, as a writer who has made himself so familiar with the history may be expected to have grasped its ideal. And yet as one reads the narrative, one cannot but feel that the ideal is imposed on rather than derived from the history. If the writer has rightly described the Nonconformist spirit, few Nonconformists indeed have known what manner of spirit they were of. With the Church-idea here expounded I am entirely in accord. The inward life must produce the outward body. Creeds, order, rituals, polities must be the embodiment of human faith, receptive of spiritual life from divine grace. Here we may apply Paul's principle, "Whatever is not of faith, is sin." Wherever there is this life, there is the possibility of, and the responsibility for, such embodiment as may best subserve that life. With Dr. Dale and the writer, this Church-idea leads me to maintain that Congregationalism in its ideal of Christ Himself, present, interested and active in every congregation of believers to realize His purpose, most simply and directly expresses this Church-idea. What I find in the New Testament is a present, potent, and general inspiration, but not a rigid, uniform, exclusive organization; and if the Church today is to be of the same spirit as the Apostolic Church it will be ready to unmake or make organization as the Spirit who dwells and works in it listeth, regardless of tradition, convention, precedent. Dr. Clark has done

good service, then, in calling attention to the pre-eminence of Spirit over organization.

(2) It seems, however, a mistake to identify this Church-idea with Nonconformity, although Nonconformity may justify itself by this Church-idea. Is the claim that Nonconformity alone stands for this position entirely fair to Conformity? May not a Catholic, Roman or Anglican, plausibly argue that as there is but one Spirit of God, so there can be but one embodiment of that Spirit which gives adequate and accurate expression to His mind and will? Is not His Spirit a Spirit of order and not confusion? The individual believer in conforming to the demands of one ecclesiastical organization may be convinced that he is submitting himself in so doing to the Spirit of truth and grace. It will not do to identify Nonconformity with the worship of the Spirit, and Conformity with the service of the letter. Again is the distinctive feature of Nonconformity as such brought out in this Church-idea? Not to insist that the definition takes no account of the etymology, Dr. Clark's constant censure of Nonconformists for not understanding their own principles may make us pause in accepting his view as final. I believe with all my heart that this Church-idea may be given as the ultimate reason for Nonconformity; but in dealing with history it is often advantageous to stop short at the proximate cause. Nonconformity is a response to, a reaction against Conformity; and this difference is due not to an entirely different Church-idea, but to a fundamental difference as to the way in which the ideal of the Christian church is to be realized in history; and it is on this difference the emphasis should be laid.

(3) What is the difference, then? To me it seems to be this: Conformity assumes that there must be, and ought to be, Uniformity in the outward organization corresponding to the Unity of the inward spirit; Nonconformity maintains that there may be variety and

variation, that no temporal or local embodiment can finally and perfectly express the eternal and infinite life of God in man by His Spirit. It can surely claim apostolic warrant in the words: "Now there are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit. And there are differences of administrations, but the same Lord. And there are diversities of operations, but it is the same God which worketh all in all."[6] But it would be inconsistent with its distinctive character to rely merely on apostolic precept or precedents, even although modern scholarship is confirming the view that in the apostolic churches there was not uniformity of organization, but adaptation to existing needs, associations, and circumstances. The Spirit makes the organization—on that surely all Christians may be held to be agreed; what divides Conformist and Nonconformist is whether the Unity of Spirit must be expressed in uniformity of organization. It is true that, as we follow the history of Nonconformity as told by Dr. Clark, it may appear as if many Nonconformists contradicted this conception of Nonconformity just as much as that advocated by him. But we are entitled to make the distinction between those who are Nonconformists by historical necessity and those who are Nonconformists by religious principle. As he points out, Presbyterianism till 1662 was conformist; it had the will, had it only had the power, to enforce its own distinctive policy on the whole nation. It learned the principle of toleration only as it felt the need of it for itself. Particularist Nonconformity also is nonconformist accidentally, not essentially. While it would not seek to enforce uniformity by the agency of the State, in asserting for its particular doctrines or practices exclusive validity, it denies the variety of the Spirit's operations. This conformist aspect of Nonconformity can be traced back to one cause, the misconception of the character of

[6] I Cor. 12: 4-6.

the inspiration of the Scriptures, and consequently of their authority for faith and duty. Presbyterianism assumed that the presbyterial form of government was that enjoined in the Bible. Each of the particularist sects will quote proof-texts for its special views. Scottish Congregationalism in its early days tried to restore the doctrine and practice of the Apostolic Churches: in so far as it aimed at imitation it was in the bondage of the letter, and not the freedom of the Spirit. While making this admission, I venture to think that in my view Nonconformity does not need to be represented as so constantly and extensively regardless of its own ideal as Dr. Clark in his history is forced to represent it as being. The emphasis on this idea of the variety of the operations of the one Spirit is also desirable in the interests of charity of judgment and generosity of sentiment.

(4) If the one Spirit be a spirit diverse in His operations, we can then do full justice to the individual liberty of the believer. If a man is united by faith to Christ, he may expect such enlightening of his reason and such quickening of his conscience, as will guide him aright as regards both faith and duty. The one Spirit of God will not contradict Himself; and accordingly we need not expect that the exercise of private judgment will result in intellectual chaos or moral anarchy[7]; but differences may be borne with, both because differences are not necessarily contradictions, and because out of the charitable comparison of differences a richer unity may be looked for. There are limitations to the expressions of private opinions which can be accepted as due to the one Spirit. "No man speaking by the Spirit of God calleth Jesus accursed, and no man can say that Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy Ghost."[8] But spiritual

[7]There is more essential unity among the Free Churches of England than in the Church of England.

[8]I Cor. 12:3.

things can be spiritually discerned, and the spiritual man judgeth. Spirituality, life in the one Spirit of God, is the only real safeguard against the dangers of liberty in private opinions. Religious liberty is an immediate deduction from the recognition of the variety of the Spirit's operations. As regards the relation of the Christian believer to the State, liberty means, and can but mean equality. No advantage that law can confer, or disadvantage that law can inflict, must bring any outward restraint or constraint on the exercise of this liberty, which is submission to the Spirit's operation. In its long continued struggle for religious liberty and equality Nonconformity has been maintaining its distinctive principle. In advocating disestablishment it can also be true to its ideal; an alien authority, such as the State here is, must not be suffered to restrain the Spirit in His varied operations. Protestant as I am, I am Nonconformist enough to have no sympathy with the Low Churchman, who wants to keep the Church of England Protestant by its subjection to the State, and to have much sympathy with the High Churchman, who wants to see it free. Such in relation to the State does the necessary position of Nonconformity seem to me to be.

(5) While "democracy applied to church affairs," in so far as the term is defined by political associations, does seem to me, with Dr. Clark, an obscuration of the Nonconformist ideal, yet it does appear to me also that the rule of the church should be vested in the Christian people as the proper organ of the sovereign activity of Christ Himself. If He dwell and if He work by His Spirit in all believers, then it is to silence His voice, not to suffer them to speak except through one class or order. Office does not necessarily confer a richer dower of His wisdom and His grace; but it is according to faith that He imparts His gifts; and it therefore follows that if the organization is to express the life, all who share that life should be free and even bound to shape that

organization. The movement of the last century to admit the laity to a fuller share in the management of the affairs of the Church is a realization of this ideal.

(6) As a Congregationalist Nonconformist I hold that the justification of the independence of the local congregation is that Christ's presence with and in those so gathered together in His name for witness, worship or work, makes that congregation the local manifestation of the whole Church, and so makes it competent for the fulfilment of all the functions which belong to the Church. Its sufficiency is not, however, in itself, but in the present Lord. This does not exclude, but rather invites to, its association for common ends with other such congregations, for as these gather in the same Name, they may no less rely on the same Presence. If any congregation insists on isolation, and asserts independence, it forfeits its sole warrant to call itself the local manifestation of the one Church, for whosoever has not the Spirit of Christ is none of His. The Congregationalist Nonconformist has an inclusive and not an exclusive ideal; for he welcomes and rejoices in the same Presence in any and every gathering of believers, by whatever denominational name they may choose to call themselves. But if that Presence be excluded by man's blindness or selfishness, no human devices of creed, or code, ritual or polity, can compensate for the absence of the Lord, and can make an organization relying on these Christian. And there is ever the danger that reliance on these should hide the necessity of this constant and entire dependence on the Presence of the Head of the Church. Hence it is in the interests of all the Churches that the emphasis of Congregationalism is maintained.

(7) The history of Nonconformity enforces the worth of its ideal. Attempts at enforcing unconformity have failed, and have led only to embittered division, where there might have been loving difference. Even a convinced and devoted Churchman must read with sorrow

and shame the record of intolerance and persecution unfolded in the pages of any history of Nonconformity. Surely few could be found today who would desire to defend the policy which was adopted for so many generations towards Nonconformists. But should not the abandonment of the means suggest at last a consideration of the end? Even if uniformity were possible, is it desirable? There are such differences of individual talent, temperament, character, and influences; there are such variations of racial characteristics, national associations, and temporal conditions; the problems of thought and life are so varied in different lands and ages; and there is such fulness of truth and grace with the Spirit of God to meet the manifold needs of man, that we cannot demand or expect uniformity, but unity amid diversity. The lesson of the past for the future is surely this, that by mutual respect, affection, service, and co-operation the different Churches will best realize the common life in God, and not by attempts to force that common life into one body of doctrine or practice. This lesson the ideal of Nonconformity enjoins and the history of Nonconformity enforces.

"Outside the Church No Salvation"

By Jean Rivière,
Professor in the Grand Séminaire, Albi.

Few formulas have the property of being so ill understood and, consequently, arousing so many prejudices as the classic adage, "Outside the Church no salvation." The Church is accused of putting forth, in uttering this expression, an exorbitant claim, as if any society here below could attribute to itself the exclusive monopoly of divine gifts. More than this, a hardness at once absurd and cruel is imputed to it, on the pretext that it would condemn to eternal damnation all men who have had the misfortune of not knowing it. Unbelievers, in short, think to find in this affirmation a significant fact with which to set a mark on the intemperate dogmatism of the Faith, and thereby to brand it with ignominy.

All these reproaches come from the fact that the controversial spirit has too often disfigured the authentic teaching of the Church. As theology understands it, the aphorism in dispute, on the contrary, not only escapes all the troublesome consequences which it is sought to deduce from it, but it expresses one of the profoundest and most touching truths of revelation. This is very well shown by the recent work of Père Bainvel, a professor in the Catholic Institute of Paris.[1] While powerfully thought out, and bearing the mark of a very original mind, the work is addressed to the general public, thus giving assurance that it exactly reflects the common

[1] J.-V. Bainvel, *Hors de l'Eglise pas de salut* (VIII, 62 pages, *Paris*, 1913).

teaching. All through, in fact, the distinguished professor incessantly leans upon declarations of the Sovereign Pontiffs and the best theologians. There is no better-authorized guide for setting in full relief the principles which rule in the question of salvation, as also for furnishing the means of organizing them into a coherent conception of the supernatural Providence.

I

Two complementary truths, the one as certain as the other, and calculated to throw light on each other because they both proceed from divine revelation, must first of all be affirmed. The first is expressed by the well-known maxim, "Outside the Church no salvation"; the second—which is more forgotten by our adversaries, though not less firmly fixed among believers—is that every man must have, and in fact has, sufficient means for his own salvation.

That the Church is given as the only means of salvation willed by God for the whole of humanity, is an incontestable fact; the Church affirms it in official documents and with perfect clearness. In the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) the following proposition is defined against the Albigensians: "There is but one Universal Church of the faithful, outside of which absolutely no one is saved." In the decree for the Jacobites, which follows the Council of Florence, we may read this profession of faith: "The Sacrosanct Roman Church . . . firmly believes, professes and proclaims that none of those who are not in the Catholic Church—not only pagans, but also neither Jews, nor heretics, nor schismatics—can have any portion in eternal life . . . if they are not incorporated into it before the end of their life." Against modern indifferentism in the matter of religion, recent Sovereign Pontiffs have many times insisted upon the same doctrine; Pius IX speaks formally on this point of Catholic dogma, and a

definition in this sense was proposed at the Vatican Council.

In proclaiming this doctrine, the Church only adheres faithfully to the most ancient Christian tradition. St. Augustine, preaching to the people of Caesarea, said of the Donatist Bishop Emeritus: "Outside the Catholic Church he can have everything except salvation. He can have the [episcopal] dignity, he can have the sacrament, he can chant *Alleluia*, he can answer *Amen*, he can read the Gospel, he can possess and preach the faith in Father, Son and Holy Ghost; but nowhere except in the Catholic Church can he find salvation" (Augustine, *Serm. ad eccl. Caes.*, 6). A council of Cirta (412) declares in its synodal letter, which was no doubt drawn up by the Bishop of Hippo: "If anyone has separated himself from the Catholic Church, although he imagine himself to be thereafter leading an upright life, by that crime alone, which keeps him afar from the unity of Christ, he shall not have life; but the wrath of God dwells in him" (Works of Augustine, *Epistola CXLI*, 5).

Not to multiply texts, certain comparisons are classic among the Fathers. The terrestrial paradise, within the limits of which flows the fountain of life; Noah's ark, without which the deluge swallowed up all men; the house of Rahab, whose inhabitants alone were spared at the taking of Jericho—so many types whereby they delight in setting forth the image of the Church. To biblical analogies they add some from the natural order: the Christian could not have life outside of the Church any more than the ray could exist apart from the sun, the brook cut off from its source, the branch detached from the tree which bears it. All these images are already developed by St. Cyprian in his celebrated treatise, *De unitate ecclesiae*, and here it is that we find the aphorism so often quoted since: "He cannot have God for his Father who has not the Church for his Mother" (Cyprian, *De unitate ecclesiae*, 6). Before this St. Iren-

aeus was inspired by a like thought, when he declared, on meeting with Gnostic individualism: "Where the Church is, there is the Spirit of God; and where the Spirit of God is, there is the Church and all grace" (Irenaeus, *Contra haereses*, III, 24, I).

This constant doctrine of the Church, moreover, rests on the solid foundation of Scripture. Speaking of the Church, St. Peter evokes the significant memory of Noah's ark, and we know how abundantly St. Paul has multiplied expressions signifying the union which ought to prevail between believers. Indeed it is not of individuals separately, but of the whole body of the Church that he is thinking when he speaks of the wild slip grafted upon the trunk of the olive, or again of the edifice built upon the sole foundation of Christ; still more when he describes that mystical body of which Christ is the head, and we all ought to be members. Is it necessary to say that a member which lives outside of the body is inconceivable, or a stone which keeps outside of the building? Thus this doctrine of the Apostle, which directly aims at the organic unity of the faithful, implies the vital and profound necessity of the Church. Père Bainvel very well says, "Incorporation in Jesus Christ and incorporation in His mystical body, which is the Church,—it is all the same thing for the Apostles and the first faithful" (Bainvel, p. 9).

At the base of this conviction we find the teaching of the Master Himself. In fact it was to His Apostles, united to Peter, their chief, that Christ entrusted the "keys of the Kingdom," which is the same as saying that men must receive the gift of grace and of truth through their intermediation alone. "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved"; but evidently he alone. Jesus is the vine: to live and bear fruit, the shoot must remain united to the trunk. There is only one spiritual sheepfold, outside of which the poor souls are the prey of wolves; and it is of this fold that Jesus is the door.

There are so many images which announce the "mystical body", of which St. Paul is to speak, and which amount to saying that we find in the Church alone that union with Christ which is necessary to assure life.

Such are the traditional bases of the adage, "Outside the Church no salvation." It signifies in short that, in the present order of Providence, Jesus and the Church are two inseparable realities. "Jesus, in instituting His Church, instituted it to be thenceforward the only economy of salvation. In the same way as no one is saved but by Him, so no one is saved but by forming part of His mystical body. Not only has He placed in the hands of the Church, or more exactly, deposited in its social conscience, the sum of the verities which must be believed; not only has He made it the depositary of the sacramental graces; He has also willed that the mysterious action of His Spirit in souls should exert itself only in His mystical body, and should reach souls in so far as they form part, in some sort, of that mystical body—the Church. It is in His Church and by His Church that Jesus sanctifies here below the souls purchased by His blood. To take part in the life of God, it is necessary to belong, in the sight of God, to the mystical body of Christ" (Bainvel, pp. 34, 35).

This is why, and in what sense, we must maintain, in its inflexible rigidity, the formula, "Outside the Church no salvation." In repeating it we are only affirming the sovereign rights of divine revelation, the imprescriptible truth of Christianity. Who would be willing to maintain that it is a matter of indifference in the sight of God whether we are in the truth or in error, adhere to His holy word or treat it with scorn, adore and serve Jesus Christ as our Redeemer or contemn Him?

For this reason a strict duty is imposed upon every man's conscience: to seek after divine truth and to embrace it, once it is known. Whoever should refuse

to fulfil this double duty must only incur the gravest responsibilities and cast himself, by his own fault outside of salvation. And it is to be seen that we are not dealing with an arbitrary demand or an artificial precept: it is an indispensable means of salvation founded upon the essential laws of Providence. Now divine truth is found whole and entire, and exclusively, in Christ and in His Church: no Christian could have the least doubt of that. Whence the obligation for every man—and divine grace is there to help him in it—to do what depends on him towards finding this source of eternal life and towards slaking his thirst at it. It was thus that the first Apostles preached Jesus Christ to their contemporaries, saying: "There is no salvation except in Him. For there is no other name given unto men whereby they may be saved." The heir of Jesus, of His promises and of His powers, the Church cannot, without betraying its mission, dispense with carrying the same divine message to the modern world.

II

It is as necessary, on the faith of revelation, to maintain the privilege of the Church, as it is important to show that this dogma has not for its effect to render the paths of salvation more strait, even inaccessible, to some. Here is the second principle which Père Bainvel sets in a clear light in regard to the first.

"It is the teaching of St. Paul," he says, "that God wills the salvation of the whole world. It is a certain doctrine in the Church that no one is lost but by his own fault; that no one is answerable before Him for a duty which invincible ignorance has prevented him from accomplishing. More than this. No Catholic denies, or can deny, without placing himself in contradiction with the teaching of the Church, that one may be saved, and that there are of the elect among Protestants, among schismatics, among pagans."

"Without doubt," the author continues, "this second series of truths does not seem to have always been clearly recognized, nor as clearly professed by the faithful, as the doctrine of the necessity of the Church. We can even cite educated Catholics who have credited the Church with an opposite doctrine. Nevertheless this divine intention to save the whole world has never been misunderstood in the Church, or the doctrine that some graces of salvation were reserved for souls of good will; it has never been admissible that anyone has been damned except by his own fault" (Bainvel, pp. 15-17). And it is very true that the Fathers have preferred to insist upon the privilege of Christians, but never exclusively. In the same way they commonly show severity towards heretics and pagans, and are less disposed than we nowadays are to take into account the question of their good faith; but we nowhere find that they condemn them in principle. "An evolution has taken place, but much less in the speculative than in the psychologic order. It can be summed up in two words: hardly perceptible advances in theological formulas—they were sufficiently wide,—but a notable softening in the sentiments of those who apply them; no widening of principles and theoretical teaching, but a larger benevolence in the judgment of facts."[2]

And when the Church has found itself confronted with rigorist sectaries who would confine the benefit of redemption to a small number of the predestined, or would reserve the gift of grace for the children of the Church only, it has invariably condemned them. Against Gottschalk the Council of Quiercy (853) teaches that "God wishes to save all men without exception"; the Council of Trent recalls, after St. Paul, that Christ died for all, and Innocent X, at a later date, formally took up the defence of this doctrine against Jansenius, who

[2]L. Caperan, *Le problème du salut des infidèles*, an historical essay, Paris, 1912, p. 806.

accused him of Semipelagianism (1653). From these principles the Church has drawn the chief applications. St. Pius V (1567) censured the following propositions of Baius: "All the works of Infidels are sins" (Prop. 25); "The mere absence of faith in those who have not known Christ is a fault" (Prop. 68). Still more, it is false to say that "pagans, Jews, heretics and others of the same kind receive no influence from Jesus Christ." Thus does Alexander VIII decide against the Jansenists (1690), and some years later, one of the errors censured in Quesnel by the celebrated bull *Unigenitus* (1713) is this: "Outside of the Church no grace is granted" (Prop. 29). Under various forms all these teachings tend to the assertion that neither in justice nor in fact are infidels and heretics withdrawn from God's supernatural action, that quite the contrary, they receive their sufficient share of graces. Whence it evidently follows that one may be saved outside of the Church as in the Church, provided that one is faithful to those divine aids which are not refused to anyone here below.

The recent Pontiffs who have most strongly affirmed the necessity of the Church for salvation have not forgotten this other aspect of the traditional teaching. In the encyclical of 10 August, 1863, Pius IX expressed it in these terms: "Everyone knows that those who are afflicted with an invincible ignorance in regard to our holy religion, but who observe the natural law, the precepts of which are in the heart of all men, who are ready to obey God, and lead an honest and upright life, these can, by the action of the divine light and the power of grace, attain to eternal life. God, in fact, who sees the inmost recesses, who searches the minds and hearts, the thoughts and dispositions of all, will not, in His goodness and sovereign clemency, suffer anyone to be punished with everlasting punishments who is not guilty of a voluntary fault." Developing a like theme some years before (allocution of 9 December,

1854), the same Pope added: "We must hold as certain that ignorance of the true religion, when it is invincible, excuses from all fault in the eyes of the Lord. And who would now dare arrogate to himself the right of determining the limits of that ignorance, given the variety of peoples and countries, of minds and of so many other circumstances?"

We are therefore in the straightest furrow of Catholic tradition when we say with Père Bainvel: "Every soul which ought to live the life of God, in living the life of Jesus, must consequently do its best to enter into the Church, where alone that current of life circulates. But for many souls that real entry into the Church is impossible. . . . Will they be answerable for their invincible ignorance? God might have allowed them to be deprived of supernatural goods without their own personal fault: those goods are gratuitously given. . . . But we know that it is not so. . . . There is, according to the thought of St. Augustine, for each particular soul a supernatural Providence, graces which reach the soul independently of all the ordinary channels. If they are faithful to those graces they will infallibly attain, apart from all visible communication with the Church and with Christian preaching, to the sum of the supernatural truths necessary to make the acts of faith and charity by which they will be saved" (Bainvel, pp. 35, 36).

Would not these principles be sufficient to supply the apologist with an effectual defence of his faith? The adversaries without who attack the adage, "Outside the Church no salvation," and the pusillanimous believers who are scandalized by it, are wrong to ignore or forget that it represents only one aspect of revelation, that is to say, a partial truth and one which, like all truths, becomes an error as soon as we attempt to take it for a total truth. To have the Catholic teaching in its integrity we must say: Outside the Church no salvation, that is, for those who, having been on the way to know it,

are morally responsible for not having entered it; but those who are in good faith ignorant of it receive outside of it the graces necessary for their salvation. In one word, no one is saved but by divine grace; but again, no one is lost but by his own fault. Is not a doctrine thus presented irreproachable in the eyes of reason as of faith?

However, after having looked at these two principles which together form one whole, we may undertake a synthesis of them. Here begins the part of speculative theology, which, not content with affirming dogmas as so many divine facts laid down by revelation, tries to obtain in their light a glimpse of that higher economy of the supernatural order, of which each one forms only a portion.

III

Since it is equally true to say both that there is no salvation outside of the Church and that nevertheless one may be saved without belonging to it, are we not facing an antinomy? The classic solution of the apologists consists in distinguishing between the body and the soul of the Church, only the latter being considered necessary. But this distinction is insufficient; for the aphorism, "Outside the Church no salvation," in its literal and traditional sense signifies that we must belong to the hierarchical and visible Church, which continues the work of Christ upon earth. Could we not, in the same way, be content with saying that we are here dealing with a simple precept, a purely positive command which loses all its binding force by the mere fact that it is unknown? More essential and more profound is the necessity required by faith: it is beyond doubt that, in the existing order of Providence, the Church alone controls the means of salvation. How, consequently, can we understand that we may be saved outside of it?

"Two answers are possible," Père Bainvel very well says, "and moreover they are not mutually opposed. In uniting them we have the theological solution of the problem which satisfies all the data" (Bainvel, p. 36).

We can first, as St. Augustine does, distinguish two providential economies of salvation. "God in fact," says the Bishop of Hippo, "not only provides for the needs of every man individually by, so to speak, private ways, but also for those of the human race by a sort of public ordinance. What is done for individuals is known to God and those who benefit by it; but what has reference to the whole of the human race He has been pleased to make known to us by history and prophecy (Augustine, *De vera religione*, c. XXV, n. 46). The axiom "Outside the Church no salvation" ought to be understood in this last sense only: it would thence explain the general and regular law, but without excluding the hypothesis of individual exceptions.

Everyone knows that lawmakers are wont to lay down general principles, without trying to bring all the particular cases into conformity with them indiscriminately, when other considerations may legitimately make a difference. There are in all tribunals what the School calls the *per se* and the *per accidens*. Divine revelation proceeds in this way, and so does the Church, which guards it. In sending His Son into the world, God has decreed that men should thenceforward be saved only by Him and by His Church: such is the law, the normal means of salvation. And as we have to do here with a lawgiver no less powerful than supremely wise, it cannot be supposed for an instant that He has enacted a law without troubling himself about the conditions which would make it capable of realization. This is why, besides the intimate appeals of His grace, God has multiplied the outward signs which indicate to the eyes of all, and justify, His will. The Church, in the terms of the Vatican Council, equally remarkable by its spread

and its holiness, by its fruitful action among all orders and its vitality superior to all obstacles, is "a great and perpetual motive of credibility," "like a standard set up among the nations" to call them all to it and to God.

But it entered into the divine plan to utilize the concurrence of second causes. Must not account, therefore, be taken of the inexhaustible resources of blindness and prejudice at the disposal of human nature, of the probable slacknesses of the apostolate, and also of the inevitable faults which, among the best, would sometimes compromise its success? This is why it must happen that the divine light does not strike all eyes, or at least not in such a manner as to impose itself upon them. And yet God does not abandon these souls, more unfortunate, after all, than culpable, and while maintaining the rule laid down by Him, He finds in the treasures of His mercy exceptional means of succouring their distress. The Church still remains the normal path of safety, where the action of grace is regularly exerted; but, apart from that, why should not the door be open to the initiatives which love does not fail to suggest to the common Father of souls?

We may here recall the noble and ingenious words of Mgr. d'Hulst. "If there are many mansions in the house of the Father, that means not only many degrees of recompense, but many ways of reaching them. The only way is Jesus Christ; but if there is one fashion which is official and willed by God to find Jesus Christ, no one, I think, will refuse Him the right to put Himself in relation with souls by other means. Kings give audiences, but they would not be kings if they did not command ways of making visits *incognito*. We admit this for upright souls living in the darkness of paganism; but who does not see that nowadays the atmosphere of free thought may gather around a cultivated mind, in the full light of a Christian country, shadows thicker, more difficult to penetrate, than those of downright ignor-

ance?" (Mgr. d'Hulst, *Lettres de direction*, Paris, 1905, p. 51.)

The distinction once made in this way between ordinary and extraordinary ways of Providence, between the official organization of salvation and the supplementary aids which it admits in cases of *force majeure*, the formula, "Outside the Church no salvation," preserves, for the theologian, all its truth without compromising or sacrificing in anything the rights of the divine mercy. "The axiom would be understood of what is *per se*, not of what is *per accidens*; of the general economy in the world of souls, not of the particular economy with each soul." Consequently, adds Père Bainvel, the Church in preaching it remains within her part and within her right, because she alone is "essentially the society of salvation," "the mistress of truth and distributor of grace." Then "she can in her official teaching, she even ought to, in some sort, insist upon this Providential economy: must she not preach Jesus, advertise the means of salvation established by Him? She ought to do it all the more because she must shake the indifferent, and react against the perfectly natural tendency of man to make his own religion and choose at will among the religions which dispute among themselves for the possession of the world. After all, what she thus preaches is the truth, seen in God's own intention, so to speak, and in the revelation that He has made of his will" (Bainvel, pp. 38-40).

Though this conception of two different and complementary economies might, strictly speaking, seem sufficient, it is possible to take a step further: instead of this duality, a more profound theology gives us a glimpse of the real unity of the divine plan.

It is suggested *a priori* by the fundamental dogma of Redemption, in virtue of which all the graces actually spread abroad in the world come to us by the merits of Our Lord Jesus Christ. Christ is normally insepar-

able from His mystical body; the Church, then, ought to be the means and medium of all His spiritual action. What faith permits us to affirm as probable, should it not be attainable by experience? Père Bainvel thinks so, and we must surely hold as the most suggestive pages of his work those in which he sketches, with strokes as firm as delicate, this history and psychology of the religious world. If at a superficial glance one is struck—and perhaps disturbed—by the consideration of the great number of those who remain strangers to the Church, deeper reflection does not fail to show us that these external facts are far from exhausting all the reality of its influence.

"How many, in fact, live on the Church and by the Church, on the truth which it teaches and the grace of which it is the depository, without suspecting what they owe it?" Such, to begin with, is the case with the heretics and schismatics, kept by age long prejudices in the bond of dissident sects. The Christ they venerate and the Gospel they meditate, have they not taken them from the Mother Church? And the sacraments they receive, are they not always, according to the beautiful doctrine of St. Augustine, the work of Christ and of His Church? "All the baptized are, so to speak, baptized Catholics. . . . Thus baptized, the heretic or the schismatic, so long as he has not fallen short of his light, will continue to owe to the true Church the graces which God shall be pleased to give him on account of the teaching which he will receive. . . . This teaching, indeed, in what it retains of supernatural truth, is the teaching of the true Church. . . . Passing through channels made by man . . . it no longer comes in its integrity, it is mingled with falsehood; but what is received of it, what remains pure, comes from the divine fountainhead, and comes thence through the Church. The same must be said, proportionately, of the liturgical life and the sacraments" (Bainvel, pp. 41, 42).

Less visible, but not less real, is the action of the Church upon unbelievers. "Is not the whole world saturated with Christian ideas, filled, so to speak, with the spirit which animates the Church and which, from the mystic body of Christ, causes to be felt the mysterious breath from on high, while souls know not either whence it cometh or whither it goeth?" It cannot be doubted in regard to our older Christian countries, the pretended conquests of which most often consist, as has been said, in "secularizing" the Gospel. And as much must be said of the pagan countries in proportion as they are opened to the Christian propaganda or only to Western civilization. Science is beginning to demonstrate that the least part of the solar activity is that which falls beneath our senses: thus the Church has its invisible radiation, the importance of which we ought to appreciate all the more, the less we perceive its extent. Lastly, it is proper to add that these graces, coming from Christ and His Church, have a tendency to bring back to this centre of unity and of life those who prove faithful to them.

"Thus the more we go into the reality of things, the more we see attaching themselves to the Church souls who at first sight would seem to have nothing in common with it. We need only continue the induction to arrive in all truth at the conclusion that not only is the Church here below the only society of salvation, but also that, according to the providential order and manifest intentions of God, every soul that is saved belongs in some fashion to the Church and is not saved but by being connected with it " (Bainvel, pp. 41-44).

An illustrious author who is neither an apologist nor a Christian recently wrote: "These antichristians live in a society all formed of Catholicism; they are themselves understood and interpreted by a Catholic society; they benefit by the atmosphere, and receive from the Church itself their moral nobility, which superficial observers would be tempted to take for a natural quality."

(Maurice Barrès, *La grande pitié des églises de France*, Paris, 1914, p. 358.)

In a word, there is the visible manner of belonging to the Church, and this is assuredly the most perfect. But souls in good faith who are deprived of this happiness still belong to it in an invisible manner; and though less apparent, this union is not less real. A little psychological and moral analysis will complete the task of showing us how.

IV

Among the moralists of all times a classical distinction is that between the intention and the action, the desire and the fact. This distinction has its place equally in speculative theology, and this it is which will supply us the solution of the present problem.

From the moment when the Christian teachers taught, after the Gospel, the necessity of baptism, they were necessarily led to dealing with the case of those who should be prevented from receiving it. As soon as it was stated, the question was resolved as it had to be: when there is no voluntary fault, good will supplies in the sight of God the reception of the sacrament. Among the first, St. Ambrose explains himself on the point in connection with the tragic death of Valentinian: without hesitation he recalls the case of the martyrs, and affirms that the young Emperor was purified by his pious desires just as they were baptized in their own blood (Ambrose, *De obitu Valentiniani*, n° 51-53). "What more logical," says St. Bernard in his turn, "than that good will should count for the deed when the deed is prevented by some necessity?" (Bernard, *De Baptismo*, c. II, n° 8.) In a word, the idea of a baptism of desire is classical in theology.

By analogy, the same doctrine should be applied to the problem of the Church; in point of fact it was so, without opposition and without difficulty. "The appli-

cation has long since become current," writes Père Bainvel. "We say, then, that it is necessary to belong to the Church to be saved; but that it is not necessary to belong to it in fact, it is enough to belong to it in desire, by heart, *voto*" (Bainvel, p. 49). Equivalent formulas are found in all our manuals.

Such being the principles, some explanations are not out of place to show their concrete realization and true bearing. Two principal questions present themselves to the mind: How can these ignorant souls, whose lot we are trying to explain, desire the Church? How can we say that this desire is equivalent to the reality?—Père Bainvel studies both with a very well informed appreciation of the moral and religious life.

When we are dealing with catechumens or Christians supposed enlightened by any means whatever on the subject of the true Church and its rights, we can rightly demand of them, as conditions of salvation, an explicit and formal desire, because they are in a condition to form such a desire. Quite evidently, the same rule could not be applied to the souls which, by hypothesis, are in invincible ignorance with respect to the Church: "*Ignoti nulla cupido.*" This is why theology demands of them only an implicit desire, that is to say, that minimum which is included in habitual docility to the service of God and the eventual disposition to follow His good pleasure in all things. Given that this divine will, in the present state of things, implies belonging to the Church, it is therefore towards the Church that, without knowing it, the confused but generous impetus of this honest soul is tending.

"Under God's influence, the soul unites its intelligence to the divine truth by adhering to what is manifest to it; it unites its will to the divine will to will what God wills, to do what He commands, to act, in short, according to the lights of its conscience. These lights are very imperfect, but the will goes farther than the intelli-

gence: in willing what God wills, it fully enters by that union of will with Him, into all His views and all His designs. It has but one desire: to know the will of God so as to fulfil it. . . . It implicitly wishes, then, to belong to the body of the Church. . . . There is in this implicit desire all the reality which there would be in the explicit desire itself, since the limits of the one, like those of the other, are determined only by the divine will and the adhesion of the soul to that will" (Bainvel, pp. 49-51).

Is there not something truly grandiose, and at the same time very real, in this view of the spiritual world which faith reveals to our reason? God is the only centre of it; and not the abstract God of philosophy, but the God manifested in Jesus Christ, who is in turn continued by the Church. Towards Him, without knowing it or even so much as suspecting it, those candid souls are turned who are occupied in serving Him with all their hearts, and He, who is the author of this desire, determines its direction towards what ought to be, if they knew it, its normal terminus—the one and only Church of the Saviour, Christ. Thus all the stars of this world gravitate around a common centre, and each one, while remaining fixed in its orbit, nevertheless participates in the motion of the whole; thus does the plant shut up in a cellar stretch all its branches towards the wretched little window whence the light comes to it; and in so doing is it not the sun that it seeks as, meanwhile, it is his rays that it sees?

But we may still ask ourselves how a desire so remote can rightly be taken as the equivalent of the reality. It is a current principle in morals that the intention is as good as the action; and by this we mean to say that the effective realization of the act, though having its normal part in the complete morality of it, does not constitute the essential element. We also conceive that it may be imperfect, or even absent, without there being any sub-

stantial modification in the moral reality of the act and of the agent. Intentions alone are hidden from us; and this is why our judgment is always defective, if not altogether unjust: on the contrary, they are known to God.

"While men necessarily halt at the exterior of things, and can judge only after appearances, the divine sight sees what is: it sees hearts, it sees souls . . . For God, souls are what they are within, what they are by intimate disposition and by will. The outward act itself, while counting for much in His eyes, nevertheless counts only through the will and intention which animate it through whatever of heart and of soul is found in it. We understand, then, that to belong or not belong by visible ties, by external communion, to the Church of Christ is for Him a secondary matter, if we may so express it. The distinction of visible and invisible is valid only in relation to us; to Him, all is visible" (Bainvel, pp. 52, 53). And this is why, in His eyes, they are already in the true Church of Christ, all these souls unknown to us whom circumstances stronger than their will keep far away from the ecclesiastical body, but who in reality are joined to it by the imperceptible bonds of the heart.

Thus may we, with our Fathers in the Faith, repeat the ancient formula: "Outside the Church no salvation." For we know that beyond the narrow boundaries of the society which in this world holds Christ's faithful in one group, there stretches the vaster and fairer Church of souls. The contemplation of this unity, which is withheld from our mortal view, will no doubt be one of the joys of our heavenly fatherland. Meanwhile, we can only hasten by our prayers and our exertions the day when that "building of Christ's body" shall be accomplished in which we shall all meet each other again "in one and the same faith and in the knowledge of the Son of God," where "there shall be but one flock and one shepherd."

A United Christendom and Islam

By S. M. Zwemer, D.D.,
Editor of The Moslem World.

In a Calcutta vernacular paper "Muhammadi," dated February 28th, 1914, there appeared a long article entitled "Immense Preparations against Islam." It spoke of all the Christian sects as arousing themselves to united action and worldwide effort. There were references to the Conference at Kikuyu, to work of the World's Sunday School Association for Moslem childhood, and then the paper appealed to its readers as follows:

"Where is the spirit that existed in our forefathers when they withstood so boldly the crusades of the Christians? Then Muslims were united and with great self-sacrifice and for the glory of Islam fought and conquered, 'stamping the Christians beneath their feet.' But now the Christians are attempting to rise. They are everywhere sinking their sectarian differences with the one aim to destroy our faith. They are not marching on us to-day with unsheathed sword to shed streams of blood, but with peaceable methods, which are a thousand times more deadly. First of all they are urging the need for Christian Unity. Conferences have often been held at which it has been confessed that missions have utterly failed to arrest the progress of Islam. Now the Christians maintain that only a united Christian Church can overcome Islam.

"Surely when Christians are planning such a huge campaign it is an evil day for Islam. Will you not bestir yourselves? If you spend one rupee where Christians spend a thousand then the victory of Islam is sure and not a Christian will be able to remain in Asia.

"The fact is, Christians are becoming more united, while in Islam, alas! we are all divided. We spend our time watering the poisonous trees of domestic and social quarrels, when we should be starting missions everywhere to check the inroads of the Christian faith. . . . ."

The Cairo Press has sounded forth similar warnings for the last year or two giving its readers an exaggerated idea of the wonderful unity of purpose and the worldwide

co-operation in Christendom for the winning of the Moslem World. When we think, however, of present-day conditions in the Near East, of the sad divisions and dissensions in the Oriental churches; of the scattered and under-manned mission stations in North Africa, and the ineffectual attempts to stem the tide of Moslem propagandism even South of the Equator, we might well hope that our Moslem brethren will prove true prophets and seers as regards the future.

The present situation throughout the entire Moslem world is an unprecedented one, and is a challenge not only to a dauntless faith, but is a distinct call to unite all of our forces in the coming struggle. The defeat of Turkey on the battlefield, and her loss of territory in Europe was the result of the Union of the Allies. Their dissensions, mutual suspicions and final open hostility was Turkey's opportunity to retrieve at least a part of her losses and re-occupy Adrianople. These events are certainly not without significance. They may well form a warning in the spiritual conflict with spiritual weapons for the victory over Islam.

Islam arose as a world religion and grew strong because of the divisions and dissensions in the Christian field. The weakness of the Oriental churches and their corrupt state, were, one might almost say, a preparation for the spread of Islam. The Moslems presented a united front, Christendom was divided. The preaching of the apostles of Islam was earnest and demanded as unconditional a surrender as did their weapons. The thunder of their cavalry was not more terrible to the enemy than the clamour of their short, sharp creed in the ears of an idolatrous and divided Christendom: "La-ilaha illa Allah! Allahu Akbar."

The whole story of the early spread of Islam in Persia, Syria, Egypt and North Africa is tragic because of the light it throws on the real condition of the Christian churches during that period. What a sad fate overtook

Christianity! The body of religion torn and bleeding, its soul dying, while sect and faction were fighting about the hem of its garments. But we thank God that the power of Christianity is reviving in the Orient. The old churches by their unfaithfulness were the occasion of the great apostasy, the falling away to Islam. Surely we may say that their requickening is a pledge of its downfall.

The history of the Armenian church (faithful unto death during persecution), the present-day reforms in the Coptic church, and the growing sense of responsibility among the younger leaders in all the Oriental churches for the evangelization of Moslems, are full of encouragement. We are too apt to under-estimate the spiritual forces that remain vital throughout all the Moslem lands of the East. They are both many and mighty, with latent power.

"Among all the peoples in Western Asia," says Viscount Bryce, "the Armenians are unquestionably the strongest; and what I have seen of them both in their own country and in America, where many of them have sought refuge and secured prosperity, leads me to believe them to be, in point of industry, intellect and energy, the equals of any of the European races. The fullest proof of their constancy and courage was given when, in the massacres of 1895 and 1896, thousands died as martyrs rather than save their lives by accepting Islam."

This testimony is confirmed by all those who have made a sympathetic study of the Armenian problem.

One of the most startling visual proofs of the present-day strength of Christianity in the Ottoman Empire, as well as of its sad divisions, is found in a map recently published. It was prepared by Major R. Huber, formerly Professor in the Imperial Ottoman War School and chief engineer in the Lebanon Province. The map shows on large scale, the proportionate population of Moslems, Catholics, Armenians, Greek Orthodox, Syrians, Jacobites, Nestorians, and Protestants in every Province. It also gives the number and location of the various patriarchates, bishoprics, cathedrals, churches, convents,

schools, orphanages and hospitals, each division of the Christian church being represented by a different colour. The map is literally dotted with Christian institutions and mission centres, but the colour-scheme is as perplexing and discouraging as that of the "Rainbow Bible" to one who believes in the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch!

If anything can unite these forces of Christendom in the Ottoman Empire, it surely is the unprecedented opportunity *now*, under the new conditions of government, economic development, and freedom to evangelize the Moslem population. Everything calls for a united Church.

If the opportunity in the Near East is so urgent, it is equally so, and on a much larger scale in India. The total Moslem population of India, according to the last census, is 67,871,767. This is the largest single unit of Moslem population in the world, with open doors, absolute freedom, wonderful accessibility and a responsiveness not met elsewhere. Here also there have been remarkable results.

On the other hand, the Moslems in India are active in the spread of *their* faith and are gaining many converts from among the low castes, especially in those very regions where there are mass movements towards Christianity. Bishop Whitehead of Madras, speaking at a Missionary meeting in London, referred to these conditions when he said:

"I cannot sit down before I say one more word. It is that these urgent needs and necessities, this great crisis coming upon us in India, do constitute a great call not merely to the members of the Church Missionary Society, and not merely to the members of the Church of England, but to all Christians here in the homeland, to promote unity and co-operation. When I first went to India thirty years ago, I was strongly opposed to co-operation with bodies who are outside the Church of England. Thirty years' experience has made me a complete convert. You are enthusiastic for co-operation and unity here; but I do not think that you can realize how intensely we long for it in the Mission field. The work here in England has been built up largely upon the basis of competition

between different religious bodies. Now, in the Mission field, competition is absolutely fatal to us. If we are to do the work as God calls us to do it, we must have co-operation now; and God grant that we may have unity at no distant time. Not merely for the sake of a theory, but in the name of those millions of souls who, through our divisions, are being kept outside the Christian Church, kept apart from the saving truth of the Gospel of Christ, I appeal to you all here in England to study the things that make for peace and make for unity."

Although he spoke specially of his experience in Southern India, his words are equally true of the necessity for closer co-operation in Bengal and the Punjab if we would win among the Moslems.

And what shall we say of Africa? If ever there was a missionary situation that called for the closest possible co-operation, and a situation on which the whole church and not a fraction or faction should concentrate attention and effort, it is that of the threatening advance of Islam in Africa. In the words of the Edinburgh Conference finding, "It presents to the Church of Christ the decisive question whether the Dark Continent shall become Mohammedan or Christian in the present generation."

It needs only a glance at the present distribution of Protestant and Roman Catholic missionary forces in the Dark Continent, to make perfectly evident this fact: face to face with Islam there must be no rivalry or overlapping of territory or of energies. The issues at stake are too vital, the urgency too great for anything save united effort. We need the help of all. No single denomination can adequately cope with the situation.

A few years ago, Canon Sell wrote from Madras, India:

"There are times when it is very difficult to balance the competing claims of various parts of the Mission field. I see no difficulty now. . . . Certain parts of Africa form now, in military language, the objective, and are the strategical positions of the great Mission field. . . . Parts of Africa in which the Moslem advance is imminent have for the present a pre-eminent claim. The absorption of Pagan races into Islam is so rapid and continuous that in a few years' time some may be quite lost to us."

Roman Catholic missionaries, and those of Protestant Societies are entirely agreed as to the character of Islam in Africa and its present-day peril. At the German Colonial Congress held in 1910 at Hamburg the subject was presented by Inspector Axenfeld, representing Protestant Missions, Dr. Hansen, representing the Roman Catholics, and Professor Becker, one of the keenest students of Islam from a secular point of view. A strong resolution was then adopted by the whole Congress which read:

"Since the progress of Islam in our Colonies is accompanied by grave perils, this Colonial Congress recommends a thorough study of Moslem propagandism. The Congress is thoroughly convinced that everything which favours the progress of Islam and hinders the progress of Christianity should be avoided and especially commends the cultural efforts of missionary education and hospital-work to the support of the Colonial Government. We also recognize in the Moslem peril an urgent challenge to German Christianity to occupy the regions threatened by Islam with missionary effort."

If a Colonial Congress could unite in so strong a resolution, what should be the response of the Christian Church? The situation in Africa is unique. Out of the total Moslem population of 42,039,349, all are under the rule of Western Christian Governments with the exception of 780,000 Moslems in Abyssinia and Liberia. The situation in the former country is alarming, as Dr. Enno Littmann has shown (in *Der Islam*, Volume I, No. I) that whole Christian tribes have gone over into Islam within the last two decades.

That the present situation of the whole Moslem world demands united action and a united front on the part of Christendom, is incontrovertible, but how and where is such united action possible? Are there indications that the churches of Christendom are drawing closer together: that there is mutual understanding, where formerly there was only suspicion: that it is possible to sink some of our differences face to face with such a peril and opportunity?

My desire is to indicate certain lines on which Protes-

tant Christendom at least may take the initiative towards this consummation.

I. *We must recognize unity in scholarship in the study of this problem.* As Dr. Francis Brown pointed out so ably in the June number of THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY, the guild of scholarship offers opportunities for religious fellowship in which our very diversities lead to enrichment and do not tend to separation, but to mutual understanding. What he indicated as true for Christian scholarship in general, applies also, and in a special way, to the study of Islam, both as a religious system and in its modern development as a missionary problem. No student of the subject can help acknowledging the magnificent contribution already made by the various branches of the Christian church, and by many outside of its bounds, for a thorough understanding of the history and character of this great non-Christian faith. Surely we may see in this work of preparation a special providence of God. Others have laboured in this field of scholarship, and the missionary has entered into their labours. Not to speak of the great Semitic scholars of the eighteenth century and the earlier half of the nineteenth century, how much we owe to living leaders in the world of thought on Islam such as Nöldeke, Goldziher, Snouck-Hurgronje, Hartmann, Becker, MacDonald, Margoliouth, Prince Caetani, Lammens, Cheikho, Le Chatelier, Houtsma, Arnold, Seligsohn, Casanova, Schaade, Grimme, Sayous, Montet and Massignon, not to mention others.

Many of the scholars mentioned belong to the Roman Catholic Church, whose missions to Moslems bear no comparison with those of Protestant Societies either in extent or efficiency, they themselves being judges. But Protestant Christendom owes a large debt to Roman Catholic scholarship for the critical study of Islam. The splendid work done at Beirut by the Jesuit fathers of the Faculté Orientale by publishing the Arabic Pre-Islamic Christian poetry, and by the investigation of the

sources of Islam is only a single example of the possibilities of scholarly co-operation. Prince Leone Caetani and Henri Lammens working at Rome are placing at the disposal of every student of Islam all the early sources with critical care; the former in his massive work *Annali Dell' Islam* in fifteen quarto volumes, the latter in his *Le Berceau de l'Islam* equally ambitious and thorough. When we note how Lammens employs the higher critical method to sift Moslem tradition and to set the Koran and Mohammed before us in their real character, we not only welcome his co-operation, but are glad to see on the title page vignette: "*Verbum Domini Manet in Aeternam.*" We must compel educated Moslems to go back to the sources of their spurious revelation that they may accept that Word of God from us and with us.

Students of Islam are learning to recognize the missionary work done among Moslems long before the days of Henry Martyn and long before the Reformation. God left not Himself without a witness. When two biographies of Raymond Lull appeared from the press almost simultaneously in New York (1902) and in London (1903), both the Protestant writers seemed to be in ignorance that the one published in the series of lives of the saints at Paris in 1900, *Le Bienheureux Raymond Lull par Marius Andre* was already in its second edition. So attention was directed from three quarters to that first missionary among Moslems of the thirteenth century whom Dr. Eugene Stock designates as the greatest, and who still lives on. But the devotees of Lull might well turn to Denmark and in the perusal of Dr. Christian H. Kalkar's *Kirken Virksomhed blandt Muhammedanerne indtil Constantinoples Frohering* (Copenhagen 1884), learn that Lull was not a pioneer only but an apostolic successor to many who came long before.

It is this common forum of thought, this unity of scholarship which will deliver us from provincialism and sectarianism in facing the Moslem problem. We have

much to learn from the past and from each other. The missionary to Moslems who remains in ignorance of this great common literary heritage impoverishes himself.

II. *Our common faith is assailed by Islam and needs our united defence.* Most of the great common creeds of Christendom were in existence before Islam arose. The opposition of the Moslem mind and heart is directed chiefly against that on which all the churches, East and West, agree. The very character of the conflict, therefore, calls for unity. The one supreme and final revelation of God in our common Scriptures over against the Koran: one Lord, one Faith, one Baptism, one God and Father,—over against Mohammed and his teaching. The issues that unite us are so fundamental that those which divide us seem at times almost secondary. There is hardly an important fact concerning the person, life and work of Our Saviour which is not ignored, perverted or denied by Islam. In spite of all that can be said against any of the Oriental churches in regard to errors of doctrine, Meredith's simile applies, and

"Sharp as a sickle is the edge of shade and shine"

between them and Islam.

When in Africa or Asia the true disciples of Christ face Islam and fight for the faith once for all delivered to the saints they are all Christians, Churchmen and Catholics in the deepest sense of those words. Christians because they follow Christ, not Mohammed; Churchmen because they are incorporated into His mystical body and not into the earthly fellowship of a Moslem brotherhood; Catholics because they belong to that church which existed before the Hegira and will exist even after Islam is forgotten in Arabia, the cradle of its birth. It strengthens one's faith and love to confess in strategic centres like Cairo and Constantinople: "*I believe in the Holy Catholic Church.*" In conflict

with Islam the Church will gain a stronger grip on the great fundamentals of the Christian faith. The doctrine of the Incarnation, the Atonement, and the Trinity will become more and more the subject of special study as we preach to Moslems. In reading the Gospel with and to Moslems, it becomes evident more and more to every missionary that the death of Christ, which is denied in Islam, occupies the supreme place in the Gospels and in the Epistles as the very heart of God's revelation to man. The same is true in regard to the nature and evidences of the resurrection of Jesus Christ, and our faith in the character of the Godhead, as compared with the barren monotheism of Islam.

In the second place, the Christian Church Catholic will be forced to work out her theology and creeds experientially in contact and conflict with unitarian, deistic Islam. In this respect the Mohammedan problem may possibly be as life from the dead to the Oriental churches when they face its real and spiritual issues, and become conscious of the duty of evangelism. The doctrine of the Incarnation and of the Holy Spirit are not pieces of polished armoury to be kept on exhibition in proof of our orthodoxy, but are vital to the very life of the Christian.

In view of all this, would it not be wise for the Protestant churches in facing the Moslem problem to recognize more than we have yet done our unity of faith with each other and with other churches—churches that withstood the terrific impact of Islam before the Reformation, and bore witness to the truth, sealing it by the life-blood of countless martyrs.

III. *We can show a united front by a strategic survey and occupation of the field.*

The unoccupied mission fields in Asia and Africa were largely occupied or are being pre-occupied now by Islam. There are no Protestant Missions among the twenty million Moslems of the Russian Empire; but when

we remember the splendid work done by Nicolas Swanowitch Ilminsky, who died December 27th, 1891, we cannot help hoping that the Orthodox church of Russia will continue and extend what he so nobly began.

Bokhara, Chinese Turkistan, Afghanistan and other regions in Central Asia still await pioneer effort among Moslems. Surely, in the occupation of these territories, there is abundant room for the exercise of the laws of charity and comity so that the Moslem world may not witness the spectacle of sectarian division or mere proselytism!

The same holds true of the great island world of Malaysia, with its thirty-five million Moslem population. And if the new survey now being attempted by the Edinburgh Continuation Committee of the actual distribution and present-day spread of Islam in the Dark Continent is to have a practical value, this at least should be one of its results, namely, a recognition of territory occupied by Roman Catholic missions among pagan races on the border-marches of Islam.

Surely in our attempt to stem the tide of Islam we must reckon with such enterprises as those conducted by the "White Fathers" at Timbuctoo, and in the French Sahara. There are indications that the Roman Catholic church is willing to co-operate in such division of territory and to follow the laws of comity where they concern the winning of pagan races in territory threatened by Islam. The urgency of the situation demands emphasis of this principle, for the unoccupied fields of the world have a claim of peculiar weight upon the church in this twentieth century. By far the largest proportion of the wholly untouched areas and populations in Africa are Moslem. Indeed, as the Edinburgh Report says: "The greater part of the Mohammedan world is practically unoccupied" (Vol. 1, p. 366).

Has not every part of Christendom a responsibility toward this world today? Can that responsibility

be met except by mutual agreement, wholehearted sympathy and a recognition of God's Providence in the present political division of Moslem territory in Africa among the powers of Europe? The Crucifix and the Cross never have so much in common as when you compare them with the Crescent. Has not the mantle of Raymond Lull fallen also on the "White Fathers"?

I will close with two personal experiences of the possibility of closer fellowship.

A Roman Catholic friend of mine and of the work among Mohammedans writes from Paris this past month:

"There is a word 'prayer' in your letter very dear to my heart. Though bound by temporal bands to the French Board of Education I wait with patient and silent hope the hour when I shall more freely and more openly work for what I pray for since many years every day—'Thy Kingdom come.' I know you spend all your strength and life for the Lord Jesus, and I pray Him in the Holy Communion of the Church that He may give you for ever the theological trinity of supernatural virtues, Faith, Hope and Love, that syndrome of blessings which make the canonized saints of the triumphant Church. I am happy that you were engaged about the life of Beatus R. Lullius—he was a great lover of the Passion and he gained the crowning glory of martyrdom, the 29th of June; it will be next year his 600th anniversary. . . . As for prayer, the Catholic Church has taught me to say the *Pater Noster* for all my brethren and that is the best in which I can help you."

Does not such a letter show the possibilities of real union in a life of prayer for the Moslem world?

And I also remember with peculiar pleasure a visit made to the University of Munich in company with Pastor Friedrich Würz, of Basel, last year, and our delightful interview with Professor Herbert Grimme, a leading student of Islam. His knowledge of the real heart of the Moslem missionary problem, his sympathy with Protestant efforts and his advocacy of closer co-operation, especially in Africa, were a delightful surprise to us both.

I can not help, even at the risk of inviting criticism, quoting the words of Bishop Brent of the Philippine Islands, spoken at the Edinburgh Missionary Conference; they apply also to the Moslem problem:

"I want to speak of an extremely difficult thing. There is a wonderful, and great, and venerable Church sitting apart today in an aloofness that is more pathetic than it is splendid. It is not co-operating with us as we can compel it to co-operate, that is, if we set our minds upon it. Shall we wait for the Roman Catholic Church to lead us, or shall you and I take the lead and compel the Roman Catholic Church to come to us? They will never come to us until we go to them. I have learned the lesson of aloofness. I was one who at a certain period of my life did sit aloof, and I was poor and maimed as long as I did it. I thank God that the Anglican Communion is coming into such close union with the rest of Christian workers. I can bear testimony to the fact that it is possible for us in a really practicable way to co-operate with the Roman Catholic Church, and remember that the Roman Catholic Church does not mean the Vatican or the various hierarchies, but the great mass of devout people we are constantly in touch with. We can affect them, we can so melt their minds as to affect the central body. You know what the coppersmith does when he wants to buckle a plate. He hits everywhere but the centre and at last the centre responds. So let it be with us in our relation to the Roman Catholic Church."

When we consider the degradation of Islam in lands like Morocco, its disintegration in Persia, its stagnation in Arabia, its attempted reformation in Egypt and India, its neglect in China, and the encroachment of Islam on all the pagan tribes of Africa—shall we not pray and labour for a closer co-operation of all the forces of Christianity and for a united Christendom in its mission to Islam?

CAIRO, EGYPT.

Orthodox Ritual in the Divine Service of the West

By Archpriest Leonid Turkevich,
Rector of the Russian Ecclesiastical Seminary, Tenafly, New Jersey.

Though it is customary to speak of the differences between the fragments of once united Christendom, it would be unjust to say that the differences between Christians of different confessions have altogether swallowed up the oneness of their original foundation. The names of the Lord Jesus and the Virgin Mary, of the Holy City, of Zion, of Golgotha, and the like, are truly sacred for every Christian of whatever denomination and in all countries. The fundamental dogmas are so fervently guarded in all Christian lands that even in Berlin the police concern themselves with prohibiting the too realistic kinematograph illustrations of Klopstock's *Messiah*. The symbols of the cross, the chalice, the lamb, the dove, the star, and the monogram of Christ the Saviour are very widely in use among Christians, are understood by all and are piously preserved on church walls, windows, books, vestments and letters. And likewise certain minor details of the church ritual, evidently derived by modern Christians from the greatest antiquity, are preserved in separated Churches with a touching faithfulness to tradition.

We must not forget these details, for, though small they be, they awake the tenderest chords of brotherly love in our souls. It is true that as details these ritualistic traditions are not so highly valued and consequently are

more likely to be lost, especially if it be the purpose of a definite system to destroy ancient tradition even in the externals of divine worship. But it would be unjust to disregard these details where they do exist. More than this, we should dwell on them with every attention, with a true tenderness in our hearts, discerning in them the proof of our former brotherhood. We are similarly impressed by the small things preserved from the remote days spent in the common shelter of our father's home. The brothers have moved away from each other along the tortuous paths of life. To all appearance they have nothing in common. Their everyday surroundings, their ways and manners are all marked by the difference of their present views and the problems of their lives. The brothers themselves cannot help acknowledging that the kinship between them has been almost removed into the region of the "unconscious." But lo! some little thing, a portrait, a letter, a breastpin or some souvenir noticed by one brother in the house of the other, cause a true outburst of memories of the most vivid, the sweetest, the most heart-stirring images. The cold wall of indifference and estrangement between the brothers melts away, and gazing intently at each other, under the influence of their resurrected familiar past, they suddenly recognize that they are brothers, dearest and most beloved.

And indeed, is it not gratifying to learn that as recently as a century or two ago in the West all the Churches were built with their altars towards the East? How well this coincides with the custom of the whole Eastern Catholic Church. The Garden of Eden was in the East; our salvation was achieved in the East. The Lord giving life to everything is called the East in the Old Testament, or the Dayspring from on High (Luke 1: 78), or the Sun of Righteousness (Malachi 4:2). And, in the words of St. Basil the Great, antiquity commands us "to turn towards the East when praying as the Scripture taught

us" (Rules, 30). Of course, this is but a detail. But taking into consideration that, contemplating the East, we all become nearer to each other, united in the centre of the motion of our hearts, this detail also becomes valuable.

Or let us consider some other details. Everywhere the dead are buried before sunset and the deceased is placed facing the East; reverence for holy water obtains even among the more conservative Protestants; pilgrimage to the Holy Land is the object of an almost ineradicable longing for Christians of all countries; and, as a minor detail, officiating in churches, people universally wear ample vestments. Is not all this characteristic? We need not even mention bowing our heads when in prayer, kneeling down, making the sign of the cross over the heads of the living and the dead, or merely moving our hands, kissing the Bible when it is read either in churches or homes, and taking the oath on the Holy Book, either the Gospels or the whole Bible.

The greatest difference between Christians consists in the fact that a great branch of them rejects the use of the holy images,which are called icons by the Orthodox. But when we see in Protestant Churches, on books and other things appealing to the religious sense of Christians, all kinds of symbols which immediately suggest Christ and His great work of redemption, we cannot help thinking of the edict of the so-called Seventh Ecumenical Council, so often condemned by the West. This edict means exactly the satisfying of the wish ever present in the hearts of human beings to have something close to them, something to remind them in an intimate and vivid way of that which they prize above everything in the world. Why are the images of the sphinx, the fish, the peacock and the anchor, in use among the Orthodox and the Roman Catholics as well as among the Protestants, though the character of this use varies

among them; the two former seek a more palpable, a more vivid way of being reminded of the Lord, and consequently use icons and even statues; the latter restrain themselves, limiting the reminder to the bare symbols.

Of course, all these are mere details, yet by the use of them we Christians cannot fail to be distinguished from Jews or Buddhists, for instance, from non-Christian people. But should not these details be precious and sacred in our eyes, bringing us close to each other, even without our knowledge?

Some details, however, obviously testify to the descent of the rituals of different Churches from one common source. At the beginning Eastern preachers spread Christianity in the West. The ritual of the West also came from the East. Investigation shows a striking likeness between the liturgies of Asia Minor, Syria and Egypt, and those of Gaul, Spain, Upper and Lower Italy, and Great Britain. Rome was a kind of island in the middle of the general transmission of the Eastern heritage from one nation to another. Yet even the customary service of Rome was not exempt from borrowings from the Churches of the East, especially from the Church of Constantinople. The history of Pope Leo the Great shows this very clearly, as well as the activity of Gregory the Great.

Whence, if not from the East, these frequent repetitions of *Hallelujah*, *Hosannah*, and *Amen*? Are not the *Kyrie Eleison*, the *Christe Eleison* and even the custom of saying the prayer *Holy God* in Greek in the Roman services on Good Friday from the same source? And does it not sound familiar to the ears of the Christians of the East when in the most central passage of the prayers for the faithful children of the Church the Roman Catholic service book establishes that Roman Catholic priests should apply to them no other name but that of "Orthodox Christians"? Roman theologians may en-

deavour to interpret this passage as referring to the Christians of Greece, Russia and other countries of the East who are out of communion with the See of Rome, but an unprejudiced reader sees clearly that the composer of the Roman Liturgy applied the word "Orthodox" to none other than the actual members of his own Roman Church.[1]

It can even be said in some instances that the Eastern imprint on the divine services was better preserved in the West than in the East. For example, the Roman custom of sprinkling ashes on people's heads at the beginning of Lent, what a hoary, patriarchal tradition of the East stamps this custom, like a whiff of the times of Jeremiah, the mourner of antiquity. Or the Passion Week singing of verses from the same prophet after the Hebrew alphabet—*aleph*, *beth*, *gimel*, *daleth*, etc.; salt in the mouth of the baptized, according to the Roman rite, and the preservation of the Great Entrance at the liturgy of the Presanctified Gifts on the Good Friday, are equally remnants of Eastern customs, though Rome limits the use of the latter to a single day in the whole year.

In spite of the disapproval with which the representatives of Protestantism regard prayers for the dead, which are in such universal use in the East, one's soul is cheered by reading the following statement of Martin Luther:

"I am entirely convinced of the lawfulness of good words for the repose of the dead, of prayers and masses for them. The arguments of heretics are no proof to me, because already more than a thousand years ago St. Augustine prayed for his mother in his *Confession* and asked others to pray for her; and his righteous mother expressed the wish on her deathbed that she should be remembered at the altar of the Lord. St. Augustine testifies to the same concerning St. Ambrosius."

It would seem that only the weakening religious sense developed in the West of Europe the fear to display

[1] *History of the Mass and Its Ceremonies in the Eastern and the Western Church*, by Rev. John O'Brien, 15th Edition, pp. 303-304.

in the presence of brethren at a public service the inner motion of the loving soul, which is still on earth, towards another loving soul, which lives the everlasting life with God in the regions beyond. We cannot understand otherwise the heart-stirring addition in the Lutheran Apology, Division 24, after the rejection of the Eucharistic Sacrifice: "*Scimus, veteres loqui de oratione pro mortuis, quam nos prohibemus.*"

In the Anglo-American Church there is no rule and no custom enjoining public prayer for the dead, though private prayer is not forbidden. Yet when I recall the almost mystical awe which spread over this country at the time so great a number of Christians perished on the unhappy "Titanic," I cannot but say that in this case the fear and trembling before the all-powerful hand of the Lord could be best relieved in the most natural way, not by the private isolated prayer of this or that person, but by the collective prayer of the faithful of the nation, in churches, for their brethren who perished in so tragic a manner.

I cannot find any corresponding passage in the American Evangelical prayer books, but I read the following prayer for humanity in the abbreviated prayer book of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, published in 1906 in the city of Moscow:

> "I pray before Thy face for my fathers, confessors, teachers, children, brothers and sisters, friends and benefactors, who died blissfully in faith and are resting with Thee. If only my humble prayer is agreeable to Thee, for the sake of Jesus Christ, transmit to them my gratitude and love, in as far as it is possible."

Here we go beyond the limits of ritual in our discussion, and express the conviction that there exists a common Christian basis, evident in itself, and at times lacking only adequate expression in order that the Orthodox should feel himself at home even in Protestant surroundings. On the other hand, doubtless, it seems that as the universal Christian feeling for the loved departed tries

to seek an adequate expression it will find it possible, as did some communities in England, to make use of the ritual of the Orthodox Church and sing over the dead the Orthodox,—"With the saints, O Christ, give peace to the souls of thy departed slaves," and this without fearing the disapproval of the other members of their Church.

However, it is true that the modern practice of Christians of the West is far removed from the traditions of the East. But even the Roman Catholics, who try to adapt theories, in all the branches of their religious life, to justify certain of their beliefs and practices, are beginning to be penetrated by the consciousness of discrepancies between them and the Ancient Undivided Church, and, with it, between them and the Orthodox Church. All the Orthodox greatly rejoiced when the present Pope, Pius X, ordered that children should be brought to take the Holy Communion at as early an age as possible. To those used to the modern custom of sending children to their first Communion at the age of twelve to sixteen the order of the Archbishop of Rome sounded like a painful "innovation." It created great discontent in France and embarrassed the Latin clergy a good deal. Yet the return to the ancient Eastern ritual is quite obvious in this order. The papal decree that the readings from the Psalter should be increased in the Western Church was similarly a return to the custom of the past. To what extent this wish of the Pope has influenced the life of the people remains so far unknown.

A similarly natural return to the ritual of the Undivided Church and, therefore, to the practice of the East would be: the exchange of wafers for leavened bread; allowing all Christians equally to partake of the Holy Communion in both kinds; the introduction of married clergy; holding the Latin language not absolutely necessary for divine service; the exchange of instrumental music for vocal, and a few other changes.

Beyond any doubt "innovations" of this kind would be of the greatest benefit to Christians, helping to re-establish among them the consciousness of their indubitable kinship in blood and in spirit. Yet it is certainly most important that the wished for return to the holy past should proceed under the guidance of exact investigations in the regions of Christian antiquity. Then only, the great alteration of the present in the name of the past would become intelligible to the greatest majority. On the other hand, it is perfectly necessary that the intellectual symbolical linings, so to speak, of divine service should be properly worked out. If the ideas towards which the consciousness and feeling of a Christian are reaching were expressed in the simplest and most complete way in the early years of the rise and growth of the Church of Christ, it would be most unwise for us to diverge from the wealth of the church ritualism of antiquity. It is equally important that the symbolism should proceed in harmony with the imagery of Holy Scripture.

The Spirit and the Future of Catholic Liturgy

By D. Germain Morin, O.S.B., Litt.D., F.R.S.L.

Catholic liturgy, in the widest acceptation, comprises all the acts of public worship by which the Church fulfils her sacerdotal mission as mediatrix between heaven and earth: first and chiefly, the Eucharistic Sacrifice, or the Liturgy properly so called; next, the Divine Office, or sacrifice of praise; lastly, the administration of the Sacraments and the other external functions which have the sanctification of the faithful for their object.

To form an exact idea of the spirit of this liturgy—that is to say, of its sense, of its meaning, of that which forms its soul—the only means is, to learn what the Catholic Church herself is; for at all times its most salient characteristic has been a luminous precision and a perfect sincerity, so much so that, according to the famous words of a document framed at Rome under Xystus III by the future Pope Leo the Great, it expresses in a plenary manner all that enters into the belief of the Church: "*Ut legem credendi lex statuat supplicandi.*"[1] And it is this which at once distinguishes it from the liturgies of other Christian communions. For the most part, the latter are hardly more than portions of the ritual in use prior to the foundation of the different sects; what has been added to them, in the way of rites and forms, is almost always inspired by what has been, or

[1] *Sedis apostolicae episcoporum auctoritates de gratia Dei*, c. xi n. 12 (Migne 50, 585 B).

is supposed to have been, the Christian thought of all ages. There are very few cases where the explicit affirmation of a belief opposed to that of the Catholic Church comes to light; the process is rather by modifications, by suppressions—modifications and suppressions to which their authors have attached an importance unquestionable from the point of view of dogma, and yet rather a negative importance. In the ritual prayers properly so called, they have taken care not to discard this or that belief in particular; they have been content to eliminate the expressions, the ceremonies, the outward signs which affirm it. What has resulted from this can be accepted, in general, by Christians of every shade. Thus, for example, we see in the Anglican Church the official service of the Book of Common Prayer followed uniformly among those whose opinions differ most widely on the doctrine of the Eucharist and the other sacraments, from the Cowley Fathers to the most extreme of the Low Church. And where ecclesiastical authority does not from motives of prudence forbid it, even Catholics will be able to find matter of edification in assisting, as mere spectators, at the offices of communities foreign to their own religion.

It is not so with a Protestant essaying to take part in a religious function of the Catholic Church: he will there see and hear, at every moment, things that will go counter to his convictions. Before him there develops, and acts, a whole hierarchy of ministers, from the simplest clerics to the priest and the bishop, each with their rank and their powers clearly determined in the formulary of ordination; and everywhere, even to the ends of the earth, commemoration will be made at the altar "of the Lord Pope who reigns over the Apostolic See."[2] In the presence of such a spectacle, of such affirmations, what will be the attitude of one who belongs

[2] "*Ut nomen domni papae, quicumque sedi apostolicae praefuerit, in nostris ecclesiis recitetur*" (*Concil. Vasen.*, an. 529, can. 4).

to a religion which perhaps excludes even the idea of any priesthood whatever—which in any case regards the power attributed to the Bishop of Rome over the whole Church as a usurpation? And so, too, for the sacrifice of the Mass, for the cult of the Virgin and the saints, for the existence of a Purgatory—in short, so many other beliefs which the Catholic Church alone, or almost alone, still admits.

Thus, Catholic liturgy is the ritual expression, the complete affirmation, of what the Catholic Church is and what she believes; the liturgies of the other communions differ from it only by what they have less than it. No one, I think, will find any fault with this first characteristic: whatever attitude towards Catholicism may be taken, there is nothing but what is honourable and lovable in this sincerity, this perfect loyalty, of which Catholic worship so pre-eminently bears the stamp.

Another characteristic of Catholic liturgy is that, while remaining the same in its essential lineaments, it ceases not to modify, adapt, and develop itself, according to the needs and legitimate aspirations of the different epochs. By this it reflects an indispensable condition of the Church's life, that of ceaselessly renewing itself while remaining in substance what it was at the beginning; of suffering no particle of the original deposit of the Faith to be lost, but at the same time not systematically holding aloof from the bringing into a strong light the development of certain aspects of revealed truth which were at first not so clearly seen. Thence comes, on the one hand, that almost excessively conservative character with which Catholic liturgy has been reproached, and on the other hand, the perfect ease with which it admits new feasts, rites which had previously had no reason for being, and devotions undreamed of in former ages, but in which is manifested the action of the Holy Spirit, "who sanctifieth and governeth the whole body of the

Church."[3] Not only has the Canon of the Mass, and all the heritage of august formulas handed down from the first Christian generations, been preserved intact with jealous care, not only would it be impossible to cite a single mutilation betraying the abandonment of a belief previously admitted, but we shall find in our ritual books more than one feature which has, seemingly, lost all reason for its existence, ceremonies long since out of use, such as the reconciliation of penitents, the coronation of the Emperors, the creation of knights, etc. On the other hand, too, we shall find there a number of solemnities introduced in the course of various centuries, such as All Saints, Trinity Sunday, Corpus Christi, the Immaculate Conception, without mentioning the multitude of new saints who have come to fill in the squares of the Calendar down to our own times.

In this respect, likewise, our liturgy differs from all the others. The latter have either remained fixed in their immobility, like the liturgy of the Orthodox Church, or, if they undergo any change with time, that change will consist in little beyond new curtailments, the abandonment of some rite, the mutilation of some venerable formula[4] the sacrifice of which is demanded by contemporary opinion; it will never, or almost never, consist in an effective accretion evidencing the persistence of vitality or any progress whatever.

A third distinctive trait of Catholic worship is the external solemnity, the magnificent pomp, with which it loves to surround itself. The use of candles and of incense, the place of honour given to the cross, to relics

[3] "*Omnipotens sempiterne Deus, cuius spiritu totum corpus ecclesiae sanctificatur et regitur. . . .* "—the third of the three solemn prayers for Good Friday, the same which St. Leo especially has in view in the formula which I have cited above.

[4] One recalls the campaign lately carried on in England against the use of the *Quicumque*, or Symbol of Athanasius, prescribed by the Prayer Book.

and images, the number of sacred ministers, their hieratic gestures and complicated movements, the richness and antique form of their vestments, the large part taken by music and chanting—all this is in contrast to the systematic and intentional simplicity of the Christian sects born since the sixteenth century, and all this, too, constitutes one of the principal grievances—perhaps the principal—ordinarily charged against Catholic liturgy.

The accusation is not new. Since the fourth century, when the Church, after having triumphed over the persecutions and the great Arian heresy, wished to organize her worship in a manner corresponding at once to the greatness of the Divine Majesty and to the aspirations of the Christian people, there was no lack of censors to blame, as at least superfluous, if not detrimental to true piety, many of the exterior marks of solemnity which were beginning to be introduced. We know the abortive attempt of the priest Vigilantius, and how Jerome seized upon so good an opportunity to pour out his pitiless invective. Others were more discreet, and limited themselves to criticizing the chanting of the psalms and hymns; they would have preferred something more austere, something in which the soul almost alone should have participated. They, too, were overcome: Basil and Ambrose took up the defence of the new developments introduced by them in the domain of the sacred chant; Augustine, in spite of the beautiful scruples which at times came to him on this subject, confesses that psalmody, even ornate, such as was in use at Milan, had exercised an unforgettable influence over him at the beginning of his conversion; the old missionary bishop of Dacia, Nicetas of Remesiana, writes a special treatise in reply to the adversaries of the ecclesiastical chant, and shows them that the practise they disapprove is authorized by a host of examples in the Old as in the New Testament.

Without doubt there is a measure to be observed in

these matters, and one may relish the superabundance of means admitted in principle by Catholic liturgy more or less, according to the diversity of temperaments and environments. Nevertheless, everyone will agree in this: Catholic liturgy, with all its display of external pomp, still occupies, all things considered, a fair mean between the poverty of most reformed cults and the splendid profusion, the extreme mysticism, of the Orthodox Church. This is the remark more than once made to me by an Anglican friend—very anti-Roman, however, and very fond of the Russian and Oriental liturgy: "All things considered," he said, "the Roman Mass is still, among all the liturgies, the most discreet, the most harmonious, the best worked-out; it has not the prolongations or the tiresome repetitions of the Byzantine Mass, it is also more sober in the matter of gestures and evolutions; on the other hand, it has preserved infinitely more of the traditional foundation, and has known how to perfect that foundation more skilfully than any of the other rites in use in the West."

Neither must we lose sight of the fact that the exterior development of Catholic liturgy has been effected not under the sway of philosophical theories, or even of doctrinal preoccupations, but rather in response to historical and practical necessities. At Rome, for example, where paganism had for centuries habituated the people to a whole programme of festivals, processions, purificatory rites, of a character which was, after all, very imposing, it was in the nature of things that the Church should take up the task of substituting for all this something as fine and as grandiose, under pain of producing on the masses a regrettable impression of poverty and feebleness. The Church understood this, and almost at her going forth from the catacombs knew how to exhibit herself, too, as full of majesty in the eyes of the recently converted populations; but while having recourse to this external

splendour, she succeeded in keeping within the sobriety dictated by good taste, for she was Roman. With time, evidently, circumstances changed: the final ruin of the Empire, the invasion of Europe by the barbarous hordes of Germany and Scandinavia, the formation of the new Christian nations, which now constitute the civilized world, all this soon created for the Church new preoccupations, new duties; and yet she did not think fit to change anything in her liturgy. Why? Just because that liturgy, through its Roman origin, supplied a civilizing element of the first order. It was impossible to practise the liturgy properly without being obliged at the same time to become initiated in a multitude of lores, to acquire a taste for poetry and the fine arts, to cultivate architecture, sculpture, painting, above all music, which is so efficacious for developing the most delicate faculties of the soul, and lastly to acquire an exquisite sense of the dignity of a Christian and of the respect due to each one according to the rank which he occupies in the religious or civil order. Whatever may have been written to the contrary of late, it is undeniable that this mysterious and beneficent influence of the liturgy has represented a great part in the rapidity and the permanency of the success obtained by the evangelizing action of the Church. There is one country especially where, thanks to the manifold sources of information at our disposal, the fact is imposed upon every impartial observer, and that country is England. Its definitive conversion dates from the day when a procession of forty monks from Rome penetrates there, the standard of the Cross preceding them, while they sing the same anthems the melody of which has so often resounded in the streets of the Eternal City; that conversion is continued and consolidated through a whole glorious line of men, one of whose chief cares is to implant the liturgical life in its plenitude in the heart of the English people—men like Theodore of Canterbury, like Benet Biscop,

Ceolfrid, Bede, Wilfrid, Dunstan; and the flow of Christian sap thus produced is of such potency that it flows back again to the Continent with the Anglo-Saxons, Willibrord, Boniface, Alcuin, the last of whom was to become the right hand of Charlemagne for the codification of the liturgy as well as for the revival of letters. Who can tell what part this thorough liturgical education had in forming those exceptional qualities of which the English people has given proof even to our own days, exceptional among all the nations that were Christianized solely by the resources of the Church after the fall of the Roman Empire? Must not such a training have left an indestructible fund of vitality, when this people, even after its enforced separation from Rome in the sixteenth century, has preserved such an intensity of liturgical life, so lively an interest in all that concerns the origins and history of Christian worship, and when many of its children find themselves insensibly brought back to the belief of their fathers by the kind of nostalgia which they experience for the liturgy of the first centuries?

Some will, perhaps, take the view that, at least in our days, when life is so crowded with work, when more refined methods permit us to condense more interior acts of spirituality in less time, the traditional liturgy of the Church has lost some of its *raison d'être*, and might with advantage be replaced, among the simple, by devotions more within popular reach; and among the intellectual, by a larger share of meditation and the other exercises of individual piety.

Those who speak thus lose sight, I fear, of several principles of the highest importance: for example, that man is not a pure spirit, but a being composed of soul and of matter, and that the external senses are the ordinary channel through which even the most immaterial truths reach him; secondly, that the invariable tendency of the Christian Church, from its earliest days, has been to

accustom the faithful to the great collective prayer, in preference to even the most praiseworthy acts of private devotion; lastly, that nothing will ever equal the impression produced upon the masses by the functions of Catholic worship, when these are carried out with all the propriety and majesty which becomes them.

May I be permitted to speak here from experience?—The obscure corner of Lower Normandy where my childhood was spent was, perhaps, until towards the end of the nineteenth century, one of the countries of the world where liturgical traditions remained most deeply rooted. Even in the smallest villages one could see a whole apparatus for public worship the like of which is nowadays unknown in the churches of most large cities: there the whole congregation used to sing not only at High Mass, Vespers and Compline on Sundays and feast days, but also at the long offices of Holy Week, Matins and Lauds of Christmas Eve, including the Benedictine use of the Genealogy—and all this without so much as a thought of omitting one note or one syllable. We used to take so much pleasure in it that of an evening, through the woods and valleys, we would often repeat, in lightness of heart, the melody of the Sequence for the day or some other piece that had especially struck us. Little by little, without being at the cost of exceptional religious instruction, we became truly learned in the things of the Church, living in unison with her life, and sharing the emotions naturally begotten in our souls by the succession of yearly offices. What will hardly be believed—and yet I can vouch for it,—such had been the efficacy of this participation from infancy in what was done and what was sung in church, that I reached the age of seventeen knowing by heart even the most complicated pieces of the Antiphonary and the Gradual, without ever having had in my possession the two great volumes which contained the text and music. It will be said that this was a *tour de force*, the result of a particularly for-

tunate memory. For me it was more than that: thanks to such a training, I soon felt that, throughout the storms of life, in spite of the trials to which every Christian soul is exposed, "never would it be possible for me," to speak with a Christian author of the early ages, "to forget my God entirely"[5] and to separate myself from His Church.

I soon passed into another country. There was at that time no sign of the great movement of liturgical restoration which has since been accomplished there. In many dioceses Vespers were completely in abeyance; the Rosary, the Way of the Cross, Benediction had been substituted for them; the question had even been raised, in a Catholic Congress, of eliminating High Masses, or at least making them much less frequent, the Low Mass amply sufficing, besides presenting the advantage of recollection and brevity. In our old Norman cathedral ordinations used to occupy the whole of a morning, and a considerable number of priests would come from all parts, desirous of participating in the touching ceremony of the laying-on of hands; it was truly the *impositio manuum presbyterii.* And what an ineffaceable impression would such a spectacle produce upon us younger ones, and upon all the faithful people who thronged within the edifice and, afterwards, when the procession went out, all along the streets and squares! Some years after, I was myself ordained, in a foreign land. —Alas, when I think of it!—At five o'clock, in winter, in the cold and the night, at a side altar; some old women here and there in the shadows of the pillars; just the two priests required to associate themselves in the action of the bishop. And I can still see him—a holy man, however, and the best of men—I can still see him turning round sharply, with a look of surprise and reproval,

[5] "*Ut . . . abire nos quoquo modo a sui recordatione non sineret, cum eius beneficia non solum loqui, sed et canere delectaret*" (*Consultationes Zacchaei et Apollonii*, l. 3, c. 6. Migne, 20, 1158 B).

when one of the clerics present permitted himself, in a moment of admirable zeal, to chant one of the chief portions of the ordination ritual, instead of reciting it as was usual.

As I penetrated farther towards the east of Europe, my experiences constantly proceeded from bad to worse. I remember sojourning in, among others, one country which was Catholic by tradition, but where liturgy was no longer represented to any great extent except by way of caricature. At the end of the choir, the stalls of which were generally empty even on Sundays, two or three ecclesiastics vested in a grotesque fashion went through evolutions, while not one of them was capable of intoning an antiphon or singing an *Ite, missa est.* As for the *jube*, that defied all description; it would have required a Huysmans to characterize its artistic value. And what did they sing there? Masses without any Introit or Communion, with simulacra of a Gradual and an Offertory which often had no connection with the solemnity of the day, with a Credo amputated in all directions, even when they did not substitute the Apostles' Creed for it, so as to get along faster. It was there that it fell to my lot, on a Holy Saturday, to hear the Litany of the Saints despatched in two minutes; it was there that I was present at Vespers when a certain psalm, reduced to one verse and a half, was a downright piece of mockery to anyone who could understand the Latin. And yet this was one of the most renowned cities of the world for artistic culture. What was the result of this situation? The bulk of the population, simple and good as they were, held to their religion by force of habit; on Sundays, men and women performed their duty in the morning, although a certain number, in perfect good faith, contented themselves with reading their "Mass" or their "Litany of St. Aloysius Gonzaga" in their books of piety, and then withdrawing, even if the priest had only got so far as the Offertory of the

High Mass. In the afternoon, there were Vespers, of which we had better not say anything, in one or two of the churches; in others there was some "devotion" or the Rosary, for the more pious souls; the effect was one of deathly dulness. Need we be astonished that most of the intellectuals formed but a mediocre estimate of a Church that presented itself to them in a guise so unattractive? If I asked some student, "Are you a Catholic?" the answer was, in most cases, "My parents are Catholics, but I myself do not meddle with religion; the thing does not interest me."—This, please observe, in an environment where the modern system of "aliturgical" religious life had had, since the sixteenth century, every facility for fashioning souls and showing what it is capable of.

Well, let no one be offended at my frankness, but I confess that, had I found myself in the same circumstances as the young people of whom I have just been speaking, had my previous experiences not taught me to distinguish between the true life of the Church and the heartrending spectacle which they and I have had set before our eyes, then I ask myself, where would my faith be today? and could it have resisted a trial of this kind?

No, assuredly, I do not believe that the present state of society in any way justifies new curtailments of, new attacks upon, the little that remains to us in the way of liturgical life. Bishop Dupanloup, in his first address to the National Assembly, exclaimed, "You complain that religion is threatening you; no, it is failing you!" We too suffer from the lack rather than from the excess of liturgical life. And for my part, one of the most powerful factors of religious renovation would, in my opinion, be the creation and maintenance here and there of ecclesiastical centres where the solemn worship of the Church should be practised in as complete and artistic a

way as possible. Of course the cathedrals and monasteries would seem plainly indicated for this purpose; but then, in the condition to which they are nearly everywhere reduced, most of them would be unequal to it. The fact must not be disguised, it is an illusion to fancy that a few aged canons, even calling to their assistance some prebendaries or *heuriers* meagrely salaried, will ever succeed in celebrating the Divine Office with the dignity it demands. Only the co-operation either of a seminary or, better still, of a regularly founded choir of singing men and boys, as in the cathedrals and colleges of England, will permit the attainment of this object. Even within religious corporations and monastic churches, the most efficacious means of insuring the perpetuation of a certain musical and liturgical ideal against any offensive return of barbarism will always be that to which Gregory the Great had recourse: the reintroduction, under a form adapted to modern needs, of the *Schola* which was formerly the normal complement of every ecclesiastical establishment of any importance.

Then would the masses of the people be able to form a just idea of the majesty of the Catholic Church and of its worship; then would that Church, to use the language of an African bishop of the fifth century, present "those august and beneficent spectacles" which have for their effect the charming of minds while "preserving the Faith."[6] Why, after all, should we allow so much artistic effort to be devoted exclusively to the profane, to be expended in the service of fiction, when the religious idea, with its poignant and sublime realities, would afford them an incomparably nobler field of action, an entirely sacred mission—that of possessing the whole man to lift him up to God? The ancient mystics asserted that a

[6] "*Exhibet uobis sancta mater ecclesia ueneranda ac salubria spectacula, quae et mentes uestras oblectent sua delectatione, et in uobis non corrumpant, sed custodiant fidem*" (*De symbolo sermo ad catechumenos*, c. 2, n. 3. Migne, 40, 638).

kind of sacramental virtue proceeded from the mere sound of the words of the Bible: it might be maintained without paradox, that a marvellous efficacy attaches to every one of the acts, every one of the forms, even the purely external framing of the Church's liturgy. I remember having once witnessed a conversion to Catholicism the first and almost unconscious origin of which was the almost overwhelming impression produced upon the soul of a mathematician by the admirable cathedral of Westminster, in those first days when it was all naked bricks, where no detail of ornamentation as yet distracted from the puissant effect of the grand lines.

There will be a temptation to think some of the ideas thus far expounded rather mediaeval; here are some others which, I fear, certain readers will judge too modern.

I believe, in the first place, that, while remaining the same in substance, Catholic liturgy, if it would be understood and appreciated in our days, must adapt itself in the largest possible measure to the particular needs of different environments.

The legitimacy of this principle and the desire of seeing it more realized have again and again shown themselves, particularly during the last two or three centuries; but almost insurmountable difficulties had arisen on every occasion when serious action was taken to bring this desire to effect. In practice the old liturgical edifice was still, three or four years ago, what the popes and the monks of the fourth to the ninth century had made it; and we asked ourselves, with a sort of religious terror, who first would dare to lay a destructive hand on it. Among churchmen the most pious repelled the idea with indignation; the learned, like Benedict XIV, ended by giving it up, not seeing any way of reconciling respect for tradition with modern exigencies. At Rome only the saintly and learned Cardinal Tommasi

and in France a choice body of men, who, after all, lacked neither learning nor zeal for religious things, ventured to outline a programme of reforms—reforms which, in more than one respect, constituted simply a return to antiquity. But the putting of these reforms into practice was limited to a number of purely local experiments, at which Roman authority at first winked, until the sometimes well founded charge of Jansenism and Gallicanism seemed a sufficient reason for reproving them and insisting upon their cessation. So that, half a century after the return of the dioceses in a body to the Roman liturgy, that liturgy seemed farther than ever from a reform, the need of which, nevertheless, made itself more and more felt every day.

With his direct simplicity and his energy which nothing checks, Pius X in a few days overcame both the religious scruples and the scholarly hesitations which had brought whole centuries to a standstill. These are the two fundamental principles upon which his reform is based:

1. The Psalter forms the essential foundation of the Church's traditional prayer: its weekly recitation must first of all, therefore, be reintroduced and insured. But, as the distribution of the psalms has heretofore given occasion to offices of very unequal length, the longest of these offices coinciding with just those days on which the clergy are most overwhelmed with duties, it has been necessary to proceed to a new partition, to obviate this inconvenience, taking as inspiration the example of St. Benedict in the sixth century, and dividing the exceptionally long Psalms and Canticles into several parts. This is the reform of the Psalter.

2. The Proper of the Seasons, especially the Offices of the Sundays and of Lent, being the most venerable, the most beautiful, and also the most instructive of the liturgical cycle, it is right that they should be given an honourable position by restoring them to precedence over the feasts of the saints, which had in the course of

time come to be an encumbrance of the Calendar, entailing the constant repetition of the same Psalms, the same texts of Scripture, the same hymns, antiphons and responses, and almost constantly usurping the place of the Proper of the Season. Therefore, in what concerns the feasts of saints, only those will be retained which have some genuine reason for their existence, whether for the whole Church or for the several localities; and again, they must habitually give place to the Office of the Season and of the principal Ferias, and must not interfere with the weekly recitation of the Psalter or the annual series of readings from the Bible. This is the reform of the Calendar.

It is not for me to pronounce here upon the question as to whether this body of radical modifications has been as happy, as complete, as one might have wished. Those who have had a hand in the reform are, indeed, the first to confess that much still remains to be done — among other things, the revision of Bible texts, the correction of the Martyrologium and the legends of the saints, the improvement of the selection of homiletic readings. It will be no easy business. I personally would take it on myself to express, in addition, two or three very modest wishes:—an entire recasting of the Hymnal, which is too often lamentably jejune and insignificant; the restoration of a just proportion between the feasts; and that we may be left those short traditional antiphons from the Psalter which the whole Christian people used to know and say by heart, without inflicting on us prolongations or substitutions prompted by a purely subjective view of the matter.

These are a few *desiderata* such as there will always be in a case like this. On the whole, however, it will be admitted that the reform accomplished by Pius X has been, in more than one respect, a great and beautiful work. It answers to a whole world of aspirations which have been timidly peeping forth for some time

past; it comes at a moment when liturgical studies are an object of intense interest and fruitful research, particularly under Benedictine influence, and it has benefited by that circumstance to a degree which could not have been expected a quarter of a century ago; it has sanctioned and adopted certain innovations which may appear somewhat modern, and yet without sacrificing anything of the traditional Roman repertory of Damasus and Leo, Gelasius and Gregory, Adrian and Pius V.

Lastly, and above all, it has been a courageous work, one of those audacities which only the Catholic Church dare venture, and which witness her astonishing vitality. To be sure, the Oriental liturgies must be still more in need of reform than the Roman, because they are still more archaic, still less retouched in the course of ages, and especially because they are of an interminable length —each one obviating this last difficulty as he can, by means of arbitrary abbreviations. To perform the Divine Service according to the rules, every priest of the Oriental Rite would have to drag about with him an immense library; and the monks, who endeavour to be more exact in their fidelity, are almost incapacitated for any other kind of activity. Here too, then, a complete recasting, a codification adapted to the needs of our age, would be demanded. This is what His All-Holiness, the late Patriarch Joachim, not long ago confessed in private conversation with a learned German friend of mine. "But," he added, "attempt to touch the least tittle in a thing of this kind, and there would be a cry of sacrilege from all sides; they would declare that the Orthodox Religion was done for."

The reform of the Breviary is already something, assuredly, and the clergy will not be the only ones to profit by it: the faithful, too, will gain by it in the power of joining more habitually in the admirable Offices of the Sundays and the different liturgical seasons. But

the Breviary chiefly interests ecclesiastics, and even when all the improvements possible have been made in it, much will still remain to be done to put the liturgy within the reach of the whole Christian people. For what I one day heard from the mouth of a high Anglican dignitary is unhappily only too true: "From day to day the Book of Common Prayer becomes more dear and more familiar to the believing members of the Established Church; and on the contrary, the Roman Breviary from day to day constantly tends to become more of a closed and uncomprehended book for the immense majority of the Catholic faithful."

Whence does this arise? Principally, I am convinced, from the exclusive use of Latin in the official functions of the Church. The thing seems beyond question: for where are the practise of, and the taste for the liturgy best maintained even to our days, if not in the countries of Latin origin, the countries using a language sprung from the Latin? Without the tradition that remained so lively in France, what would have become, for instance, of that admirable Gregorian music—a Graeco-Latin music, after all—the revival of which and its restoration to honour have constituted another of the great works of the present pontificate? And even after all the decrees, after all the energetic measures taken by Pius X, what are, definitively, the countries where the promulgation of the new regulations, the publication of books of the traditional chant, have been followed by some results? Only, or almost only, the countries of Latin race—and still not by any means all of them. In other lands, even those most attached to the Catholic Faith, the progress, if any there exist, defies observation. I could cite one large city, of more than half a million Catholics, where, outside of one modest chapel, one would have difficulty in finding altogether half a dozen copies of the official chant which is obligatory in the Church; they are still relegated to

the libraries of amateurs, and are not in practical use. The fact is quite palpable as soon as one passes from France or Belgium into Germany. In Alsace-Lorraine and the Rhineland, the understanding and the love of the true traditions of public worship of the Church still exist, sometimes even to an intense degree, because Roman culture has made itself felt there for a longer time. But as we advance eastward, the decline is accentuated, and it soon exceeds all limit. Whether they linger among the old extravagancies of concert and opera music or push on with good will to the point of tolerating some fragment of sacred chant borrowed from a mutilated edition, the result in both cases is equally intolerable, equally unworthy of the Church. One thing alone is beautiful, and that is the part which the whole congregation still takes, from time to time, in singing the office in their own language; then—particularly if we have to do with a race that is not too heavy—if the movement is not excessively slow—then the impression may become grandiose, something like that which Augustine felt beneath the vault of the Milanese basilica. It is because here the people understand what they are singing, and consequently put into it all their soul, all their artistic and religious sensibility. But let some Latin piece come next—a simple *Tantum ergo* to end a function,—and straightway the colorless accents reappear, the unintelligent sounds, all sorts of *rigodons* calculated to inspire disgust.

I am one of those, then, who think that the Church, if she wishes her liturgy to be once more accessible to the people, will find herself obliged, in time, to give a larger or smaller share of it to the language of the people. Any action in this sense would be the more justified because, through the general decline of classical studies, the knowledge and familiar handling of Latin are becoming more and more uncommon, even among ecclesiastics. Many a time, in certain regions, I have been

able to note the annoyance and something like terror which have been caused in a priest by the mere request, made by a foreigner, to be allowed to make a confession in Latin. If this is so with clerics, how can we expect laymen to set themselves as a body to learning Latin so as to follow the liturgy and take an interest in it?

It will be said that there are translations, and that these translations partly remedy the ignorance of the language spoken by the Church. No doubt. But this is only a makeshift; and we may ask ourselves whether, in spite of everything, Dom Guéranger was not correct in his apparently paradoxical judgment,[7] that "translations of the liturgy end by cutting off the faithful from public prayer." No one could find any objection if these translations were used as aids, apart from the Office itself; but in the church, the faithful should be all eyes, to watch the august spectacle presented to them; all ears, to hear the sounds of the Divine praise; all voice, too, if possible, to join effectively in those praises. The sight of a Christian who, during High Mass, is absorbed in the reading of a book, even if that book is the best of prayerbooks with or without translation, always gives me the impression of a sort of individual schism: one is isolated, becomes for the moment foreign to the life of the community, he makes himself his own ambo and his own altar—I might almost say, his own temple; —in short, one is far removed from the aim and concept of the great collective prayer of the Church.

Shall I be allowed to set forth here, on my own personal responsibility, and with all the reserve which is proper in dealing with so delicate a subject, the only solution I have ever been able to see for this difficult problem of the participation of the faithful in the Church's public worship? It consists in this. There is evidently no ques-

[7] "Few would be found to subscribe to it in our days," Dom. M. Festugière lately affirmed, in his remarkable synthesis *La liturgie catholique* (Maredsous, 1913), p. 39, note 1.

tion of giving up the employment of Latin to substitute a liturgy in the vulgar tongue: the Roman language, that marvellous instrument of civilizing power, would retain all its essential rights, and the effort would be made even to reassert and consolidate those rights wherever they might seem to be threatened with loss of ground; to maintain them where, by a happy exception, they have still remained in honour. But could we not, little by little, arrive at the establishment of a legitimate distinction between the different elements which constitute our liturgical formularies? It is plain, for example, that from the point of view of antiquity, of *raison d'être*, of dogmatic bearing, the Canon of the Mass and the other formulas of the Sacramentary—that book, *par excellence*, of the pontiff and the priest—belong to an order of things altogether different from the Introit, the Offertory, the Communion, the Kyrie and other portions of the Ordinary of the Mass, which were originated chiefly with the view of occupying and affording satisfaction to the whole assembly of the faithful, by permitting them to join, through the singing of the Divine praises, in the mystery being wrought at the altar. And hence, what harm would there be, while keeping Latin for the Collects, the Preface and all the priest's part, in tolerating—even encouraging,—where circumstances demand it, the employment of the only language intelligible to the people in those portions of the office in which the people are called upon to take a leading part?

But let me, I beg, be thoroughly understood: there would be no question, in this case, of causing the faithful to sing just any words, even if those words referred strictly to the function of the day. No, what I would have would be a collection of sacred odes, conspicuous for their literary merit, into which the different texts, assigned to the several Offices of the year by Rome's age-long tradition, should be brought over not by way of a mere translation, but by extracting all the marrow and

all the doctrine which they contain. It certainly would not be an easy matter; but the end is so noble and elevated that there would be ample material to inspire the genius of sacred writers.

The powerful opposition often made heretofore to the translation of liturgical formulas into a vernacular, even for private use, arose almost exclusively from two causes: the fear of thereby taking away something from the veneration and respect with which the faithful should be penetrated in regard to the mysteries of religion; there was also the fear, on the part of the translators, of inexactnesses of expression or even of doctrine. The former reason, to tell the truth, was never worth much, for it is certain that in the beginning, and for a long time, the liturgy was meant to be understood, and was in fact understood, by the great bulk of the faithful; moreover, in practice, no account is any longer made of this argument. As to the second reason, it unquestionably had a solid foundation at the period when communications between Rome and the rest of the Catholic world were subject to all sorts of delays, hampered by a thousand obstacles, and when, consequently, it was more difficult to regulate orthodoxy and prevent the infiltration of error. But today, with the numberless facilities resulting from modern discoveries, with extreme centralization becoming accentuated every day in the Church even more, perhaps, than in secular society, the slightest trouble of this nature would hardly have time to arise before the Roman authority would be informed of it. For the rest, it would only be for that authority to watch over and officially approve such a sacred hymnody in the vulgar tongue, just as it has lately begun to publish official translations of its decrees and encyclicals, just as tomorrow it will be able to demand that the catechisms in use in the different countries shall be submitted to its revision and express approbation.

I am no prophet, but it appears to me that the Church would be presenting a great and beautiful spectacle to the world if such a combination as this could some day be realized; that it would then be more Catholic than ever, speaking, as on the Day of Pentecost, the tongues of all the peoples of the world; that it would also be more One, not only in faith and charity, but even in the voice of its people resounding once more, full of life and understanding, to "glorify with one heart and one mouth God, the Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ."[8]

[8]Rom. 15: 6.

The Departure of Archbishop Platon

By Charles Johnston.

The great ceremonial service on Whitmonday, June the first, at the Russian Cathedral of Saint Nicholas in New York, when the Russian Church in North America bade farewell to Archbishop Platon, on his translation to the See of Kishineff, marks the completion of an epoch in that Church's history. The ceremony was solemn and momentous. The high-domed Cathedral, so Russian in character, with holy icons of the Saviour, the apostles and the saints in brilliant colors and Byzantine gold adorning the walls and the high altar-screen, now decked with palms and evergreens, held a congregation such as had never been gathered there before. It was a congregation notable not only because so many dignitaries and priests of the Russian Church were present, to bid farewell to their chief pastor, but even more, perhaps, because of the presence of a body of dignitaries and representative men of the American Episcopal Church. They wished, in doing honour to Archbishop Platon, to show their cordial regard and fraternal love for the great Church and the still greater communion which Archbishop Platon represents, the national Church of Russia and the whole body of Eastern Catholics. It was a memorable meeting between two Churches; rather, between two branches of the one Church of Christ.

The character of the congregation, if regarded with knowledge and understanding, revealed the history of the Russian Orthodox Church in the New World. That Church was first established in Alaska, as a natural extension of the Russian colonies in Eastern Siberia and

Kamchatka. There, it was very largely a missionary Church, with many converts, many remote and almost inaccessible religious settlements, along the coasts of Alaska, and in the Aleutian Islands, which stretch like a chaplet across those icy seas. When Alaska was purchased by the United States Government shortly after the Civil War, in the beginning of the reign of the Emperor Alexander II, the Russian Church in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands came under the civil rule of the United States, though remaining ecclesiastically under the Holy Synod of Russia, with the status of a mission Church. This first stage of the growth of the Russian Orthodox congregations in the New World was marked at the farewell service for Archbishop Platon, by the presence of Father Kostromitinoff of Alaska, who was a Russian colonist in the days of the Alaskan purchase, and who thereby became a citizen of the United States, serving at one time, before his ordination, on the staff of the Governor of Alaska. A still earlier epoch in the history of the Orthodox Church in Alaska was symbolized by an ancient icon, carved by an early Russian missionary, and preserved for generations in one of the Aleutian Islands. This icon was presented to Archbishop Platon by Father Kostromitinoff as a farewell gift.

From Alaska and the Islands the Russian Church, following small but steadily increasing groups of Russian colonists, made its way down the Pacific coast as far as San Francisco, which became the second headquarters of the Russian Orthodox congregations in the New World, as Sitka was the first. A number of priests present at the Cathedral of Saint Nicholas on Whitmonday, to bid farewell to Archbishop Platon, were ordained at San Francisco, when it was the see of the Russian Orthodox bishop.

Toward the close of that period the Russian Church in New York had a humble dwelling in a private house in Second Avenue at Eighteenth Street, the first floor

being fitted up as a Church. Here Father Hotovitzky began his work, in 1896, with a gathering of only a few worshippers. But his view of the future was prophetic. He foresaw the great Cathedral, too small, though, for its worshippers, of today, and, on a missionary tour through Russia, he collected the funds to begin building, on the spacious lot in West Ninety-seventh Street, which was then almost empty space.

The building of the Cathedral, with the steady influx of Russian immigrants across the Atlantic—no longer across the Pacific as in the old days—meant the transfer of the center of gravity of the Russian Church from the West Coast to the East, and the transfer of the see from San Francisco to New York. In course of time that see was elevated into an Archbishopric, to which, in succession to the Most Reverend Tikhon, Archbishop Platon was transferred from Kieff seven years ago.

Archbishop Platon came from Russia with a great reputation, the reputation of a statesman as well as of a great Churchman. He had been a member of the Duma. He had been head of the Kieff Academy of Theology, as well as Professor of Ethics and Moral Philosophy. With the great gifts which these distinctions gained by so young a man—Archbishop Platon was just forty when he came to America—implied, Archbishop Platon set to work, in what is, perhaps, the largest archiepiscopal province in the world, stretching east and west for six or seven thousand miles, and containing six or seven millions square miles in area—little short of the size of the Russian Empire.

Russian congregations within that area, whether in the coal fields of Pennsylvania, the wheat-fields of Canada or the gold-fields of Alaska, grew rapidly, and the problems of administration grew in complication and difficulty with them. The statesmanship of Archbishop Platon showed itself in the growing power with which he grasped and solved all these problems, leaving his

greatly increased and expanded Church, from the Aleutian Islands to the logging camps of New England, more effectively organized, and in better running order, than the much smaller body which he found on his arrival.

Archbishop Platon has been gradually transforming the Mission Church of former days into an American National Church, even though the official title of Mission be still retained.

But the details of this eventful history must be written by the annalists of the Russian Orthodox Church in America. They alone can do them justice. Another aspect of Archbishop Platon's work is at once more accessible to us, and, in its way, more significant for us. When Archbishop Platon came to this country, the Russian Orthodox Church was, in a sense, a closed community, shut in by the difficulties of language, by the strangeness of its ritual, by a certain aloofness of attitude, the fruit, perhaps, of the long seclusion of the Eastern Orthodox Church. This closed community Archbishop Platon has opened up to the world, with a spiritual energy, a warmth of heart, a gift of religious sympathy which give his work a significance that will endure. The bridges which he built, the windows which he opened, will remain open; the sympathetic understanding which he founded and cherished will grow ever stronger, and it will be recorded of him that he has done effectual work in breaking down the partition wall, so that the twain may be one.

This part of Archbishop Platon's work was symbolized and made manifest at the Whitmonday service, by the presence of such distinguished and representative Episcopal Churchmen of New York as Bishop Courtney, Bishop Lloyd, President of the Board of Missions, and Dr. Manning, the Rector of Trinity Church; the newer phases of Anglican monachism were represented by Father Field, of the Cowley Fathers, while Bishop Darlington of Harrisburg, Penn., spoke for a region

which, perhaps, contains more Russian congregations than any other in the New World. Each one of these divines bore tribute to Archbishop Platon's wonderful gift for friendship, sympathy, brotherly love; each one bore testimony also to the great work he has done in making the Eastern Church more accessible to the West, in opening the door of passage between the Orthodox and the Anglican Communions.

It was eminently fitting that the religious world of America should, beside these eloquent voices, find a spokesman in Mr. Silas McBee, whose position made it possible for him to supply Archbishop Platon with a channel for one of the most important parts of this work of interpretation and intermediation. Mr. McBee spoke of Archbishop Platon's very effectual help, noting specially an article, full of profound scholarship, which Archbishop Platon had obtained from his old friend and teacher, Professor Glubokovsky, seeking to define "Orthodoxy in its Essence." Mr. McBee added, in words which should be quoted in full: "Just here Your Grace opened wider still the door of opportunity, and appeared as the frank critic of your beloved professor and this acknowledged scholar. For, while Glubokovsky presented Orthodoxy in an eirenic spirit, he gave no word of encouragement for the possibility of unity with other Churches. Your exclamation after reading his paper, 'Nevertheless unity is possible!' was sustained by you in an article with that title in THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY which was one of the boldest, most believing, and at once one of the most uncompromising statements of our modern history. Thus Your Grace has brought Orthodoxy into co-operation with other Christian Churches for a better understanding. You and your fellows in Russia have secured the ear of scholars in all Churches throughout the world, and you and your associates are lending your ears to what scholars of other Churches have to say. Your loyalty to conviction and your allegiance to Orthodoxy are not impaired by such a course, but rather are

they strengthened by sublime faith in the power of God to unite His people."

The image of Archbishop Platon will remain in all memories as he stood, toward the close of that long and solemn service, which had been enriched by the superb singing of the Cathedral Choir, strengthened and deepened by the trained voices of so many Russian priests, both those who officiated with Archbishop Platon in the service, and those who formed so large a part of the congregation in the Cathedral. Archbishop Platon stood on the steps ascending to the altar, with the Royal Doors of the altar-screen, enriched by icons adorned with brilliant colors and gold; like the officiating priests who were grouped about him, with Bishop Alexander and Bishop Raphael close to him, Archbishop Platon wore vestments of red and gold, for the great *Te Deum* service; wearing the domed Oriental mitre adorned with jewels and gold, a reminder, with the brilliant colors of vestments and icons, of the Byzantine origin of the Russian Church. Archbishop Platon leaned upon his crozier, somewhat weary after the long and exacting ceremonial of the previous days, deeply moved by the parting from his beloved flock and friends. Addresses were brought to him, from near and distant churches, from the institutions which he had founded, from the Brotherhoods of Russian parishioners, many of whom brought also tokens and offerings of love. Nothing in all his work, perhaps, showed more truly the secret of Archbishop Platon's power than the deep sympathy with which he heard the long series of addresses to the end, a sympathy instantly finding expression in each case in his reply: words deeply felt and memorable, to be treasured for years in the hearts of those who would see him no more; no mere form of words but a message apt and personal, full of the qualities of the heart.

I cannot better end this brief record of an epoch-marking event than by quoting the reply of Archbishop

Platon to the distinguished American Churchmen who had greeted and bade him farewell:

"I thank you, I cordially thank you. Your appearing here at this hour when I bid farewell to my flock, and your sympathies for me, so eloquently expressed, move me so profoundly that I am afraid I cannot even in a small degree express that which I would like to say at this moment. With all the powers of my soul I have been devoted to this my simple Orthodox flock who have a pure and sincere belief in Christ, and you understand how hard it is for me to part with those who love me, listen to my voice and hear my call. I would rather undergo a very dangerous physical operation than this spiritual one, for I am not only conscious, but I feel, that I am bidding an eternal farewell to that which was the very best in my life, the greatest and dearest to me.

"But you give me somewhat of consolation because I can turn to you with a request that you transfer your good friendliness from me to my flock who entirely deserve it. My flock is not an aristocratic part of the Russian people, whose refinement in culture would amaze you, but the lower classes where there is not so much culture in the accepted sense of the word, but where religious sentiment and good qualities of the human heart pour forth abundantly. If you will acquaint yourselves with our Russian labourer, and succeed in planting gratitude to you in his heart, you will do much toward solving the question of Christian Unity, the hopes of which keep many of you alive and inspire you more than you can even imagine. Christianity is life, and brotherly relations of Christians among themselves are solved not with ink on paper but through kindness in life and good relations with one another. I thank you for your good sympathies for me and I would be still more thankful to you for the same sympathies for my flock, simple, sincere, believing, and who can respond only with good to good. I thank you, Sirs, I cordially thank you."

The Votaries of Personality

By Rev. W. R. Thomson, B. D.,
The United Free Church, Bellshill, Scotland.

The title is taken from Mr. Bosanquet's first series of Gifford lectures—from the profound chapter entitled "Ourselves and the Absolute"—and its significance from the point of view of this paper is that one detects in it a certain accent of reproach. The suggestion would seem to be that the votaries of personality are those who halt in what Mr. Bosanquet would call the Pilgrim's Progress of philosophy, who shrink from the arduous "Pathway to Reality," and would linger in the shade of experiences that are agreeable only because they are incomplete. But the white, sun-beaten road ever challenges the philosopher. For him the Celestial City does not lie in the valley of the *Vorstellung* but on the heights of the *Begriff*. On those heights he wins his soul. Mr. Bosanquet is the most impressive of our present-day philosophers. One does not feel regarding him, as one can hardly help at times feeling about Mr. Bradley, that he is a brilliant cross examiner who puts life and the universe into the witness box and extracts damaging admissions. For his object is, as he tells us, to communicate a "grave experience," to discover what lies hid in the heart of the obvious, to induce us to take certain truths, that we are all apt to accept lightly, in "bitter earnest." Further, it is noteworthy that when Mr. Bosanquet states the thesis he is concerned to develop and defend, he does not use the word thesis. Rather, in a series of propositions he puts before us what he calls "the burning issues" of his "contention."

Obviously we have here an attitude and language that cannot fail to attract the attention of the theologian. To receive the communication of a grave experience, to be called upon to take certain truths in bitter earnest, and to be invited to consider propositions aglow with burning issues is surely to hear a challenge that is essentially religious. Thus have the prophets always spoken. The significance, then, of Mr. Bosanquet's mature message to his generation lies in the fact that, beneath all its subtleties and technicalities, there is the purpose to give guidance. From the highest point of view the universe is the place of "soul making," the scene of "the moulding of souls," and it is in achieving insight into this process that philosophy crowns its service to mankind. A true philosophy is the maximum of insight into religious experience, into the nature of that consciousness in which the saint attains to wealth and completeness of being. To attain even an approximately adequate insight into such an experience—into an experience like Dante's *e.g.*—is to get a glimpse of what the theologian would call Revelation, what philosophy would describe as self-transcendence under the influence of the Spirit of the Whole. To such an experience various elements contribute. There is the consciousness of harmony with the divine will, the sense of triumph and at the same time the strain of conflict; there is the exaltation of the artist, through the vision of the world as a divine order, and there is the satisfaction of the theoretic interest. On the heights of religious intensity there is this unifying of the main interests of life, in an experience unique, no doubt, yet presenting the standard and ideal of experience. We may take Dante as a pilgrim who has attained, to whose beatific vision the horrors of the Inferno and the toils of the Purgatorio have contributed. He has come through great tribulation and if his robes are washed, so that they become of dazzling whiteness, they are made white in the blood of the Lamb. It is not,

we believe, unfitting to illustrate Mr. Bosanquet's contention by this reference to the language of early Christian idealism. For he makes no more characteristic plea than this, that we must not seek to exclude the element of "tension," of strain and sacrifice, from perfection. The idea of a heaven where all activity suddenly collapses into a rest that can hardly be conceived otherwise than in sensuous terms is to him intolerable. So distasteful indeed is it, that it induces him to regard almost with approval the grotesque notion that the pains of hell must contribute in some occult fashion to the bliss of paradise. There, at least, we have an effort to rescue the highest experience from abstraction. Mr. Bosanquet, then, will have none of the view that regards pain and struggle as leading up to a happiness from which they are excluded. There is no satisfaction without tension. The Celestial City has its problems. The object of the soul's quest is not happiness, but, as Carlyle told his generation so often, blessedness. The optimism which a true philosophy justifies is not that which shuns the evil, but which seeks the best in a universe which contains both good and evil.

Enough, perhaps, has been said to show the high seriousness with which present day idealism, in the hands of a master like Mr. Bosanquet, approaches the task of understanding man's life and destiny. Its object is to express "the reasonable faith of resolute and open-eyed men." A Christian theology, aiming at being constructive, could not express its ambition in more fitting terms. May such a theology, then, regard idealism as a sure and steadfast ally? May idealism be relied on to furnish an apologetic from which the theologian can set out in good heart on his doctrinal task? There was a time when such questions would have been regarded as strange indeed. Was not idealism the champion of Christianity, its fully articulated justification and defence? But, from Lotze to James, distrust of idealism deepened; theology

was warned that it was being lured from its true path, until at last pragmatism stood forth as the friend who could be depended on to secure the practical interests of religion. But the pragmatist doctrine of a "finite God" gave a great shock to theology, notwithstanding James's almost boisterous assurances that pluralism is friendly to religion, that the pluralistic universe has more life and colour than the monistic, that it makes a more strenuous ethical appeal and presents a more inspiring challenge. The idea of God as a splendid if somewhat weary Titan, engaged in a conflict with evil in which He needs man's help, is not one in which theology can rest. On the other hand, if the only alternative to this be what James called a "static, timeless Absolute," "stagnating in the felicity of its own perfections," the outlook for theology is indeed dark. One must hope that the situation is not so desperate. It is to be remembered that the Absolute that stirred James's derision was Mr. Bradley's "metaphysical monster," and that idealism in some of its leading representatives has been no less eager to offer weighty if less vivacious criticism of the doctrine. Professor Watson, *e.g.*, protests against "Idealism being wrongly identified with Absolutism," and Professor Pringle Pattison roundly declares that "if every aspect of finite existence cease or disappear as such in the Absolute, then the Absolute . . . is as good as nothing at all." Philosophy, like adversity, makes strange bedfellows. James's criticism of Theism, *e.g.*, amounts very much to Mr. Bradley's, while Mr. Bradley —if we are to take his recent volume of Essays as our guide —appears to have decided that he is, after all, the one true pragmatist. "I have seen," he writes, "far too much of metaphysics to think of staking vital issues on the result of speculative enquiry. And for practical purposes I hold in reserve a belief, in common, I imagine, with an increasing number of persons, a belief, the advantages of which pragmatism would, it seems, like to appropriate

surreptitiously. According to this practical creed there is in the end no truth for us save that of working ideas. Whatever idea is wanted to satisfy a genuine human need is true, and truth in the end has no other meaning. Our sense of value, and, in the end, for every man, his own sense of value, is ultimate and final." Even more significant are some of the remarks in the essay entitled "God and the Absolute." Here we have a description of a genuine human need in the sphere of religion—the need *viz.* "to affirm the real presence of God's will in mine." So necessary is the satisfaction of this need, that if we have to formulate a doctrine of the Divine Personality—no matter at what risk of theoretic inconsistency—in order to support it, we are entitled to do so. "Whatever ideas really are required in practice by the highest religion are true." Those who have followed with admiration Mr. Bradley's long polemic against pragmatism may be tempted to cry out, "But what is this but pragmatism?" They will find that Mr. Bradley is not concerned to deny it. He will assure them that he is a "less one-sided pragmatist" than many who bear the name, and that, if they but suffer him to relieve pragmatism of its "ambiguities," there will emerge a true pragmatism which has been all the while implicit in Mr. Bradley's philosophy.

We thus see how difficult the present position is for theology. A God who is "appearance," a God who is awarded a high degree of reality, but not the highest, since He is not the All, the Universe—"Nothing to me," says Mr. Bradley, "is real except the universe as a Whole"—or a God who is limited by the resisting evil, and engaged in a struggle the outcome of which may be defeat, is not the living God that theology demands. It will not take comfort from the assurance that religion "can still persist," even with this "lowering of the Deity," or that there may be "practical devotion to an object that may be taken with all its defects to be at a

level far above our own." With an idealism such as this theology is no better off than with pluralism. Professor Ward has pointed out that pluralism at the best can give us only a "*primus inter pares*," not a Supreme, a kingdom of spirits without a king. It is on this account that Ward feels driven, on theoretic and practical grounds, to round off his pluralism with Theism. If the theistic position can be maintained, Ward holds that it gives the pluralistic universe the unity it lacks, and invests it with a profoundly deeper significance. It is true that Ward surrenders the "proofs" to the Kantian criticism. But he does not conclude that the theistic idea is therefore theoretically discredited. The idea of God is one of the "regulative" ideas of reason, and, while we may not prove the theistic position, we may yet feel that we cannot get on without it. In the theistic ideal we have one yielding not only the maximum of religious and ethical inspiration, but harmonizing with our rational demands. It is noteworthy that Ward does not permit us to speak of God as merely a "practical postulate." The idea has real significance for the theoretic reason. There is a theoretic demand for a ground of the world, as well as a practical demand for the good.

Ward has remarked that the problem philosophy must face in the twentieth century is the relation of God to the Absolute. Is God the All, or is He exalted as Head over all? The question is a cardinal and crucial one for theology. The issue is well put by Mr. G. F. Barbour in his *Ethical Approach to Theism.* The "chief characteristic" of theism is that it must "find the final Reality in the Good rather than in the Whole." The point of view must be teleological, and that not merely at the bidding of a "practical postulate" but because it yields "a true insight into reality." Here again we have Theism refusing to rely exclusively on pragmatist support, and boldly asserting, in Ward's words, that it "is rational to believe in the best." Now it may be said

that the question of the relation of God to the Absolute is, in essence, the question of personality. If personality be a purely finite form—and Mr. Bradley tells us that a "person" to him must be "finite, or must cease to be a person"—then to speak of divine personality is either a contradiction in terms or an acceptance of God's approximate reality. He is seen over against the background of the All. Is personality, then, a category, a mode of experience, a form of life that cannot bear the searchlight of a metaphysic bent on the real? Are the "votaries of personality" bound to a metaphysic that is too "diffident," as Mr. Bosanquet suggests, to appeal to our best experience, and to face all that is involved in the fact of self transcendence? Are they afraid to give themselves to a tide of an irresistible logic that would bear them beyond personality to individuality, and beyond the God of Theism to the Absolute? One of Mr. Bosanquet's "burning issues" is that what matters most is the level and fulness of mind attained, and that the destiny and conservation of particular minds are of inferior importance. The theologian, as a votary of personality, will want to know with some precision where such a statement is likely to carry him. It may be that in expressing this anxiety he is revealing his "naiveté"—as Mr. Bosanquet gently suggests even as regards "so wise and accomplished a philosopher as Professor Pringle Pattison"—but undoubtedly he will subscribe to some of the questions that Mr. Bosanquet, with his admirable candour, puts into his mouth. What is meant by the attainment of a general level and fulness of mind, apart from the conservation of particular centres of experience? Does it mean that the particular centres become less "particular," *i.e.* become richer in content, or that we cease to have such centres at all? One would hesitate to say the latter, in view of many balanced and carefully worded statements found on page after page of Mr. Bosanquet's volumes, yet the general impression received

makes one hesitate. Are we supplied with material calculated to enrich apologetic by opening up new ways of theoretic advance, or are the conclusions depressing and even prohibitory?

To illustrate the difficulty. "You say," remarks Mr. Bosanquet, addressing, one supposes, the votaries of personality, "you do not want an Absolute in which you would not recognize yourself." And the votary may well reply, "Yes, I say that." Christian theology has never said anything else. Inclusion in the Absolute has always meant for it communion with God, a level of experience where personality found liberation and enfranchisement. But, Mr. Bosanquet goes on, "think of the attitude demanded of one by a masterpiece of art. . . you scarcely recognize yourself, when, for a moment, Shakespeare or Beethoven has laid his spell on you." And he adds that this is one of the truths we have to take "in bitter earnest." Let us try to take it so. We "scarcely" recognize ourselves under the spell of Shakespeare or Beethoven—one need not enquire too carefully into the exact significance of the adverb. But may it not be said that it is precisely under such a spell, in face of the challenge of great art, of great moral ardour, of saintliness, that a man does come to self recognition? Wagner said that under the spell of Beethoven he felt that his soul was purged of guilt. Surely the effect of great art, of great personalities, is to stimulate personality. A man, we say, becomes a new man in Shakespeare's world, but it is because he becomes more himself, not less. His horizons widen: he is delivered from ignorance, from the narrow mind, from poverty of emotion. He becomes conscious of an intenser, richer life. And he finds himself in this deepening of experience. If there be the annexation of new territories of experience, through the opulence of the larger life under whose spell he has come, the man does not lose but gains the secret of sovereignty. He becomes more significant for the uni-

verse. May not one say, that, if we try to take this truth in bitter earnest, we are face to face with the miracle of personality? Into Shakespeare's world countless men may enter and find themselves. To explore it is to discover its inexhaustible wealth, and to find that its treasures may be shared without diminution of the stock. "There is that scattereth and yet increaseth." Indeed, may it not be said that a really great man reveals his greatness in nothing more than this, that he enables men to recognize themselves. The truest disciples are not anaemic replicas of the master, repeating his phrases. Rather, each one is set up in the great business of life on his own account, enriched with an intellectual and emotional capital which he feels he must augment through the commerce of souls. All this, as is well known, can be stated in terms of religious experience. It is an essential part of Mr. Bosanquet's argument that there is no breach of continuity as we sound the depths or scale the heights of experience. The spell of the Absolute is not fundamentally different from the spell of Beethoven, for the spell of Beethoven is but the influence of the "Spirit of the Whole." May it not be urged, then, that to come under the spell of the Absolute will furnish the supreme example of self recognition, that, in short, personality is at its richest in the religious consciousness? Is it not as a man knows that God is working in him, that he works out his own salvation with that tense awareness which Paul called "fear and trembling"?

It is not suggested that considerations such as these are absent from Mr. Bosanquet's mind. No aspect of his subject is neglected. The suggestion is, rather, that in criticizing the votaries of personality he is attacking a view of the self which none of them would be concerned to defend, and which is constantly attacked by serious Christian thinking in the interests of religion. We are constantly told that the "exclusive" self, the

"repellent" self, the "impervious" self, the "legal" personality is a self that cannot stand metaphysical analysis. The very spirit of life, the logic of life, carries us beyond it. But neither can it stand examination in the light of Christian ideas. The spirit of love carries us beyond it. What, for Idealistic metaphysic is the "spirit of the whole," at war with inadequate forms of experience, is, for Christian theology, the spirit of God at war with selfishness. The inner logic of religion is the making of a richer self. The puzzling feature of Mr. Bosanquet's treatment is that when he comes face to face with the issue he seems to feel it his duty to put in various caveats. It is admitted *e.g.* that experience involves being "lived" by some one. Yet it is immediately added that this must not be taken in the sense that finite persons are ultimate values. And the question at once arises, Does this mean that all experiences are destined to be merged in an Absolute experience, that they crown and consummate their contribution to life by losing their significance? If it meant that, idealism, in Mr. Bosanquet's hands, would have no message for theology. But at once we are set on other lines of reflection that do not seem to converge on that conclusion. Man, we are told, is only a trustee. What he cares for above all is making most of his trust. If suffering and hardship be part of that trust—and they are—man at his best accepts them loyally, and would make them contribute to his total service of life. A true man's chief concern, in short, is to be found faithful. He does not value himself as a "detached and self identical subject." His ideal is not the maintenance of "bare" personality, but completeness of experience. Here again we have a conception of man's life which religion as an experience exemplifies, and which is justified by reflection. Love is the finest expression of this loyalty. Love merges its life in that of another, while its central demand is that its object shall have "particular

being." This is love's demand for immortality. But, at this point, Mr. Bosanquet asks us if there is not something of selfishness in this demand, if this yearning of love for the endurance of its object is not an element that must be "burnt away" before the real greatness of the experience can be displayed. Love, he says, takes us out of self. Yes, out of the "repellent" self, the "exclusive" self, the "impervious" self, but not, surely, if language is to have any weight, out of the richer personality of which love is the very essence and meaning. The main thing, says Mr. Bosanquet, is the "level of mind" attained, not the "destiny of particular centres." If theology is to maintain itself it must reply that the one involves the other. Certainly, an enlightened Christian theology is not concerned to contend for the perpetuating of "centres" that are abodes of meagre exclusiveness, but it must contend that a "level of mind" apart from "centres" would be for it a dead level.

It may be said, then, that while idealism, as expounded by Mr. Bosanquet, offers points of view and yields insights that are of the highest value to theology, it suggests lines of enquiry the prospect of which cannot but fill theology with misgiving. It must be granted that Mr. Bosanquet is alive to the danger. The Pilgrim's Progress of philosophy, he warns us, is "adventurous." But he holds that it is "inevitable." We must set out from the City of Destruction, where we are content with what is merely "given," and we must seek to realize what experience involves. And on this adventure logic must be our guide, our Virgil and Beatrice in one, our Interpreter. How far on this quest for reality may theology proceed without feeling that it is losing hold of reality altogether, or that the religious interest is threatened?

The call is to be loyal to logic. And if the word "logic" should arouse the suspicion of those who distrust an "intellectualist" view of life, let it be said that Mr.

Bosanquet's conception of logic is a large and noble one. Logic is "the spirit of the whole," the "spirit of Value." It is the *élan vital* that drives life to the heights. "The spirit of logic must carry us to the whole." When Mr. Bosanquet puts the great question, What is the nature of the inference that carries us beyond ourselves to affirm the Absolute being?, it is not a purely intellectual process he has in view, not the "logic chopping" against which Carlyle was wont to fulminate. It is the whole rich process of life with all its gathered wealth of aesthetic, ethical and religious experience. The nature of the inference is to be sought not in man's reason alone, but in all he has felt, and hoped, and suffered. Always, through the veil of Mr. Bosanquet's abstract treatment we discern the light of this noble conception of logic. There is a logic of the will and of the emotions, of art and religion. The inference that would carry us to affirm the Absolute takes spoil from all the fields of experience. For, if we regard experience as the pilgrim whose progress we have to observe, then, as we follow the wonderful traveller on its toilsome way, the one fact that stands out, and, as it stands out, ever eludes us, is that of self transcendence. At no stage can we say that we have captured or arrested the pilgrim by a definition. For experience is a pilgrim of eternity. At any given moment it is "appearance," *i.e.* it is incomplete. Yet Reality is never far away. The word is nigh it, even in its mouth. It is the Spirit of the Whole that urges experience forward to richer content. The progress or process is one of "logical determination." But, as we have seen, there is nothing formal in this process. It lifts life to new levels and affords wider outlooks. The process of logic is a living process by which in the conclusion the premisses gain significance and certainty. To deny this, to deny that the conclusion may transcend the premisses, is, according to Mr. Bosanquet, to abandon the central position of metaphysics. And this holds true in the region of will

and feeling, no less than in that of knowledge. Viewed abstractly, the principle at work in experience is that of non-contradiction; viewed positively and concretely, life is seen striving ever towards greater richness and harmony of content. Indeed, "logical determination," as Mr. Bosanquet uses the phrase, suggests the theological term sanctification. It is the process by which man grows in knowledge, in ethical purposiveness, in fineness and complexity of emotion. It is the very essence of experience, the very spirit of life, and, even in resisting it, we pay it tribute. Our negations are affirmations. Mr. Bosanquet says that this principle of non-contradiction "forces us to the Absolute," just as a religious teacher might say that what is deepest in our life, the yearning for harmony, for reconciliation, drives us to God. There is no effort made to describe the form of the higher experiences to which the logic of life urges us forward. Mythology is the danger here. All that is said is that these experiences will be more stable, more coherent, more harmonious. It doth not yet appear what experience shall be, and, of course, it is not claimed that we can have an idea of an absolute experience. But it is claimed that along this line of inference, determined by a logic which is all the more austerely authoritative because it carries in its bosom the secret of freedom, the masters of idealistic thought have gone, since Plato led the way. Following the star of non-contradiction they have drawn nearer to the secret of Reality and Value.

Now, it cannot be doubted that here philosophy, in discussing the nature of the inference that carries us to affirm an Absolute Being, is presenting material of great value to theology. Unless we are prepared to put all theoretic considerations to the ban, and fall back on practical postulates, this effort to discover what is logically involved in experience is of great significance. It is in our higher experiences—taken in their fulness of range—that we seek the clue to the highest. And when

Mr. Bosanquet goes on to tell us that we must not acquiesce in inadequate conceptions of ourselves, that we must not take the individual at the minimum, and that "the fuller self is the truer self," there is ready response. Theology is as much concerned as idealism to contest the claims of the "exclusive self," or the "repellent self consciousness," to represent experience. And when it is argued that the self through union with others becomes "more itself," that in religious experience freedom and spontaneity reach a climax, because the self, ceasing to stand on its own rights, goes out of itself in a service that is at the same time perfect freedom, it would seem as if theology and idealism might join hands in a sure alliance. It is all in the interests of theology to grant that the height of individuality is reached when the sense of identity with man, nature and God is at its greatest, that the individual taken at his best is a very different being from the individual on the average level of his life, or that the formal separateness of individuals is of far less significance than their essential identity of content. With a sharp eye on the term "identity," and a due reminder that it is a term lacking significance apart from the fact of difference, theology might freely say that here we have described, though, no doubt, in language somewhat abstract, the Christian view of the self. Apart from life and service in the kingdom of God there is no wealth of content for the individual. Indeed, it is only in the large life of the kingdom that individuality becomes ours. The least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he who stands apart in never so splendid isolation. It is, however, when we come to consider the relation of the higher experiences to the absolute experience that difficulties emerge. Mr. Bosanquet claims that considerations of the self such as we have just touched on, give us a new lead on this important matter. But it may fairly be doubted if the lead is one that theology is warranted in

following. For the position taken seems to be this, that the Absolute experience includes and absorbs the higher experiences, and that "without reproducing them in their separate distinctness." This is a hard saying for theology. If this is the mode of inclusion in the Absolute experience the votaries of personality may well acknowledge themselves to have been under a delusion. Mr. Bosanquet himself admits the "fundamental difficulty," and feels that we may well doubt the possibility of conceiving how our experiences can be "fused," "absorbed" or "transcended" in a single experience. But he thinks that the difficulty can be removed in principle. Our less complete attitudes are transcended by our more complete. In an intense religious experience like Dante's, as we have seen, the various elements, ethical, aesthetic and the rest, are fused. But it must be urged that Dante was never more completely himself than in that supreme moment.

We are here at the crucial point of this philosophy, and the author is quite alive to the fact. He knows that he may be charged with "volatilizing" the individual into a "logical progression of ideas." He replies by warning us against "logical pessimism," *i.e.* against the mood in which we despair of the power of the One to include and transcend the Many. Well, a constructive theology cannot afford either to despair of logic or to despise it, and, as we have seen, Mr. Bosanquet's conception of logic is so delivered from barrenness and formality that it may be a valuable apologetic aid. But may not theology be led to enquire, in its very anxiety to be loyal to this nobly conceived logic, if the relation of the various elements in an experience like Dante's really casts light on the relation of various centres of experience to an absolute experience? In Dante's experience we have the ethical, aesthetic and theoretic elements all held in thrall, so to speak, by the dominant religious interest. But these various elements are as-

pects, or phases, or activities of a total experience or self we call Dante. His religion fused them and gave them unity, compelling them to contribute to the one dominant interest. But no one of these aspects was in itself a centre of experience. Now, it seems impossible to think of the relation of different centres of experience as we think of the relation of various aspects or activities of one experience. A self is never just an aspect of another self. In so far as it is so, its value is diminished. The central, and, it may be, the inexplicable fact of life is this, that in so far as one life influences, penetrates, and possesses another, that other is neither "fused" nor "absorbed" but liberated, and exhibited in its true selfhood. The difficulty appears again when Mr. Bosanquet deals with Theism in his second course of lectures. There, the position taken seems to be this, that the God of Theism is only an aspect of the Absolute, an appearance of a deeper Reality of which the term "personality" is an inadequate description. This position seems to be regarded as unassailable in view of the fact of immanence. Modern theism lays stress on immanence. But, says Mr. Bosanquet, in effect, if you make good the fact of immanence you destroy Theism. It seems to be regarded as inconceivable that a Personality can be awarded the supreme place in the universe. Now, theology will not seek to deny that here it faces its supreme problem, and that the theoretic difficulties are tremendous. But, as regards immanence, it is entitled to urge something like the following. Our notion of immanence seems to be derived solely from what we know of personal influence. The artist is immanent in his work, the writer in his book, the master in his disciple. The word immanence would seem to have no other meaning for us than this, that a power we cannot think of otherwise than as personal reveals itself in creative activity. Idealism sometimes speaks as if the idea of creation were totally inadequate to do justice to the

relation between the One and the Many. But theology can find no other idea so satisfying. It is in creation that personality reveals its freedom. The expenditure of the artist is not his impoverishment, but the revelation of his wealth. If God creates the will, says Mr. Bosanquet, it is not free. But must not theology reply that that is the very reason why it is free. It is free-born, and enters into its heritage through submission to the supreme will. If a man, it is said, is a channel of divine grace he is not free. But theology must take heart and reply that a man is free only as he is a channel of divine grace—though the word "channel," it must be granted, is not a happy choice. And theology is emboldened to make these affirmations because it cannot think of personality as a mere aspect of life, a highly curious and interesting phase of existence, but as central and of inexhaustible significance. It does not appear as if anything were gained by investing the term "individuality" with a dignity denied to personality. The individual, grants Mr. Bosanquet, must "at least" be a person. Can we think of the individual as more, without finding ourselves in a misty region where even Mr. Bosanquet's logic fails as a guide, because the very road has disappeared?

The sharp strictures on Theism, to which reference has just been made, create a great difficulty for theology. If Theism "makes freedom and morality unintelligible," then, indeed, it is high time for theology to cement an alliance with idealism. But it is to be noticed that the criticism of Theism is akin to that offered, on almost every other page, of personality. It seems to be a crude anthropomorphism that Mr. Bosanquet has before his mind in the one case, just as it is the idea of a bare, meagre personality, standing aggressively on what it calls its rights, in the other. But such an anthropomorphism is as much the foe of theology as of philosophy. "The conception which finds God," writes Mr. Bosan-

quet, "in the greater self recognized by us as present within the finite spirit, and as one with it in love and will, assigns him a higher reality than any view which stakes everything on finding him to exist as a separate being after the model of a man." But surely this is the theistic conception, with its insistence on personality and immanence—"the greater self recognized by us as present within the finite spirit." Surely Theism does not, as is implied in the latter part of the passage quoted, seek to construe God through experience at its lowest and barest. Nay, may it not be said, that, for Theism the wonder of personality is this, that, even in its barest form, it does not exist separately, and that on higher levels every personality becomes a "greater self" to some others, thus revealing to us the very experience through which we seek to understand God and His relation to man? It may be said with some justice that Theism is not taken seriously enough by a philosophy such as Mr. Bosanquet's. And the explanation would seem to be that the term "personality" is viewed with what it is hardly an exaggeration to call unvarying suspicion. The word seems to suggest something almost mean—exclusiveness, antagonism, the clash of interests and wills, meagreness of content, the din and confusion of the "world of claims and counter claims." And, as regards God, it suggests the tyranny of a despot. Theology must insist on taking the term more nobly, and therefore more truly. Personality may be mean and offensive, as we all know, but, on the other hand, apart from it there is nothing for us worthy, or beautiful, or excellent. And, as we have ventured to suggest, it is our one clue to immanence. It is unfair to make Theism responsible for the crudities and vulgarities with which the idea of God has been treated, in the name, too, of religion, and even of Christianity. Mean men will handle high things meanly. There is a sense, of course, in which Theism must be anthropomorphic, since experience in the abstract means nothing.

But there need be nothing crude or exclusive in the anthropomorphism. The contention is simply this, that as experience rises from level to level, or extends its margins, or augments its content, it never divests itself of personal character. On the loftiest heights conceivable by us, experience is still seen, not as something diffused and general, but as structural content, and capable of further enrichment through a process that we have no language to describe unless we call it personal surrender.

Having complained of the somewhat summary treatment of Theism, it is only fair to add, that, at a later stage of the discussion, certain considerations are urged which, it is claimed, help us "to recover something of the unity and concentration that are aimed at in Theism." These considerations have to do with the practical nature and aims of religion. Religion must think practically, and at the same time symbolically, of God as a moral being, who stands to finite minds in the relation of Father and Creator. It must, so to speak, concentrate on an aspect of the Absolute, and its God must be "rather the representative of the universe when considered as overcoming evil by good, than the universe in its totality which absorbs good and evil in perfection." "The conclusion therefore is, in a word, that the God of religion is an appearance of Reality." This would seem to mean that we recover the concentration of Theism by discovering that the Absolute is practically meaningless for religion. But if the Absolute has no significance for religion, has it any for ethics, or aesthetics? Does it serve any of the great purposes, or minister to any of the great interests of life? If the answer to these questions be in the negative, then, surely, Theism may take heart, and, instead of speaking of the God of religion as "an appearance of Reality" may speak of the Divine Personality as the supreme revelation of the Real. For theology can never regard faith in God as a sort of compromise with a second best.

But, while idealism raises certain perplexing issues for the theologian, it is not to be denied that it presents theology with valuable apologetic material. As against a materialistic or naturalistic view of the world, a philosophy like Mr. Bosanquet's is a massive and splendid protest. And the points of contact with Christian doctrine are of great significance, notwithstanding an undercurrent of critical comment on certain popular religious notions that runs steadily through the discussion. When Mr. Bosanquet asks us to accept a view "in bitter earnest," the reference is usually to some interpretation of Christian experience. This impressive phrase is used *e.g.* in maintaining that self sacrifice belongs to "the fundamental structure of reality" and that "the burden of the finite is inherently a part of the completeness of the infinite." The bearing of such a view on the Christian doctrine of Atonement is obvious. The same line of thought is followed in dealing with such a question as the following: "Was the Fall itself part of the scheme of salvation, and is a world with sin and atonement better than one without them?" In Mr. Bosanquet's opinion a Christianity "with the courage of its convictions" would answer these questions in the affirmative. For a "reflective orthodoxy" could hardly think of "anything so deep rooted as the connection of the doctrine of the Trinity with the Incarnation and Atonement as . . . an arrangement contrived in time to remedy an incidental aberration." Without entering on the theological bearings of this view, it is sufficient to note, that, here, at any rate, idealism seems bent on facing the fact of evil, and of bringing it into redemptive relation to the divine purpose. Other points of contact with Christian doctrine might be exhibited, but it will be enough, in closing, to quote a passage on the Atonement of more than ordinary interest, since it has the autobiographic touch. "When certain ideas directed against current orthodox Christianity first made an impression

on my mind, it was more than anything else the doctrine of vicarious atonement, literally construed, that seemed shocking and unjust. And it was with some interest, and not without surprise, that, taking stock of one's convictions after a long development, one found that what was obviously the intention of the doctrine in question, so far from remaining the great stumbling block to Christianity, had become pretty nearly its sole attractive feature. One had passed, I suppose, from an individualistic rationalism to an appreciation of the world of spiritual membership."

Professor Ward has noted the tendency of Theism to pass over into Absolutism, and has accounted for it in a highly instructive way. It is due partly to the "besetting sin of speculative thinking"—the sin *i.e.* of "hypostatizing abstractions"—and partly to the presence of "a religious spirit of self abasement." This latter remark is of special interest. The history of religion frequently shows us mysticism straining at the leash of a hard theistic philosophy, that has seemed to set a "legal" personality over against a judicial God. But, as we have sought to show, Theism may transcend this point of view without falling into the besetting sin that Ward condemns. In so far as it succeeds in doing so it appeals to the "votaries of personality" and affords theology a basis on which constructive work may be done.

A Study in Anthropomorphism

By David H. Greer, D. D.,
Bishop of New York.

When Frederick William IV visited upon one occasion the University of Oxford, he is reported to have said to the assembled students there, "Gentlemen, in your university everything that is new is old, and everything that is old is new." Something like that sense of historical continuity, which, in connection with that famous seat of learning, the Prussian King experienced, is what we also experience when, standing today in the presence of a learned unbelief, we listen to what it has to say concerning religious faith. Its newest phase of thought, when analysed, is old. Its oldest phase of thought, when scrutinized, is new. And the well-instructed scribe in modern unbelief is seen to be in touch with the well-instructed scribe of ancient unbelief, and to bring out from his treasure house things both new and old.

Especially is that the case in regard to one indictment which unbelief has made against religious faith. Anthropomorphism is a big word and formidable, or so it seems and sounds; but it is not new. The latest critic picks it up and flings it at religion, and in doing so he only does what the earliest critic did. Matthew Arnold but repeats what Zenophanes said, and what in all the critics in that historical succession of a learned unbelief from then till now we hear, that the story of religion is but the story of man here upon the earth, his island home in space, imputing what he finds in himself to God, his weakness and his strength, his vengeance and his wrath, his human love and hate; or, like "a sprawling Caliban," his own

capricious thought, and thinking that his Setebos is such a one as himself.

That is the picture, so it is said, which religion gives of God, or which theology gives, and which it has always given; not the picture of God's God as in Himself He is, but the picture of man's God, as in Himself He is not, but made in the image of man; of a wise perhaps and enlightened man, great, high and good, some cultivated Caliban, not sensuous but spiritual, a Plato or a Paul, and yet the image of man, human and not Divine, an anthropomorphic God.

That is the way in which He has been apprehended. That is the way in which we apprehend Him now, through the medium of ourselves. And therefore, so it is said—what a leap that "therefore" often is, not always crossing the chasm, but landing at times in the ditch—and therefore, so it is said, our apprehension of Him however good, is bad, and cannot be regarded as adequate and real; not revealing Him, but adumbrating us, and showing what we think, if indeed there be a God, what kind of a God He ought to be, and not with any assurance what kind of a God He is.

That is the indictment, new yet old, the standing indictment of long standing, and still standing, which religion today encounters and which it has always encountered. And how does religion meet it? What answer does it give? Part of it at least it quashes by acknowledging, by confessing, that it is true; and when, in pleading his case, the objecting plaintiff says that the picture of God which religion gives is a human picture of Him, and therefore is not real, the answer made is, "Yes, the premise is allowed, but the conclusion is disputed."

It is a *human* picture which religion gives of God, and therefore it is *real;* not every picture of Him which human fancy sketches, or human passion paints, but some picture of Him which is really human, and the

more really human it is, disclosing and expressing the real human thought, the real human life, the more really Divine it is, touching Divine reality, proving Divine reality, setting forth and showing both that it is and what it is, and certifying to it.

When, therefore, it is said, as we often hear it said, that a lion or a horse, if it should possess the faculty of man to fashion or picture God, would fashion God as a lion or picture God as a horse, the answer is returned, "So perhaps it would; and so, too, if it possessed that faculty of man with which to picture God, its picture might not after all be so far astray; its picture might be true. For then indeed it would be, not a leonine picture merely, nor an equine picture merely, but to some extent at least a human picture of God." Thus the illustration instead of being an argument, is not even an illustration, and, to use Mr. Mallock's phrase, assassinates itself. For an illustration in order to illustrate must continue as it begins; and the lion or the horse in this case does not continue as it begins. It becomes something else, and also something more, very much more. It approaches the likeness of man, with the faculty in it of man, and with that faculty in it of man it finds and fashions God. And that is what precisely, so religion claims, that faculty can do.

I am reminded in this connection of a similar answer made by Dr. Martineau to Mr. Herbert Spencer's use of that other famous simile in theological controversy, namely, the simile of the watch. "If," says Mr. Spencer, "we make the grotesque supposition that the tickings and other movements of a watch constituted a kind of consciousness, and that a watch possessed of such a consciousness insisted on regarding the watchmaker's actions as determined like its own, by springs and escapements, we should simply complete a parallel of which religious teachers think much; and were we to suppose that a watch not only formulated the cause of its exist-

ence in these mechanical terms, but held that other watches were bound out of reverence so to formulate this cause, and even vituperated as atheistic any watches that did not venture so to formulate it, we should merely illustrate the presumption of theologians by carrying their own argument a step further." To which Dr. Martineau replies, "Standing as it does for a theologian, this of course is meant to be a great fool of a watch. Yet until it gets excited and begins to vituperate, its first experiments in thinking do not seem so much amiss. Give the springs and escapements their grotesque change of meaning and function; let them cease to be mechanical and become vital and mental, and then, when it guesses its own origin from a being similarly gifted, does it not pitch upon the fact,—Had it not a watch-maker? Was he not furnished with just those conscious faculties which had been newly awakened within itself? The endowments by which he made it, are they not like those by which it found him out? To us we must confess the springs and escapements of our author's satire are a little out of order, and the logical tickings of the watch less at fault than the reasoning which makes fun of them."

Whatever then the simile, whether animal or mechanical, a lion or a watch, which unbelief employs for the purpose of casting the case of religion out of court, we find that, in order to make the simile work, it must first be humanized; and that the picture which it gives of God is thus seen to be a human picture of Him. And if that be the charge which is made against religion, then, as has been said, it is an admitted charge, and the case is still in court.

Religion is anthropomorphic. That is allowed. And not only allowed but claimed, and God is apprehended through the medium of man. But what then? Is it not a true and valid apprehension? Let us see. What is it we apprehend through the medium of man?

We apprehend first of all our own personal selves. What is involved in that apprehension of ourselves, what its content is, or what we apprehend in apprehending ourselves, we will presently consider. But before doing that, let us note here the fact that this apprehension or knowledge of ourselves is as Dr. Caird remarks the prius of all knowledge. This is our start-point, this is where we begin, with the knowledge of ourselves, or rather with the consciousness of ourselves; and then are conscious of other things, the sea, the land, the stars, the furniture in a room, the printed page of a book, as related to ourselves. But the consciousness of ourselves, that is unrelated; the only kind of consciousness or the only kind of knowledge that is unrelated. Ourselves we know, directly; it is first-hand knowledge. Things and objects beyond ourselves we know indirectly; it is second-hand knowledge, or inferential knowledge, which can only become knowledge as we make it knowledge. We must first take it in and analyse and dissect it, and particularize and generalize and classify and arrange it, and clothe it in the terms of our human thought. This then is the basis on which knowledge is built. This is the foundation on which our knowledge rests; and whatever the superstructure which we build upon it—wood, hay, stubble, or the precious things of truth—it must stand on this foundation. It must be, in other words, an anthropomorphic structure, fashioned and put together and thus made secure by the categories of the human thought in us. And what we find in ourselves we must use in building it, otherwise we cannot build it, and *it* cannot be.

If that be true, then not only is theological knowledge anthropomorphic, *all* knowledge is anthropomorphic, all scientific knowledge, all philosophical knowledge, and all the terminology in which it is expressed, whether the universal substance of Spinoza, with its humanized attributes of *res cogitans* and *res extensa*; or the universal

self-consciousness of Hegel, or the universal reason of Kant, or the universal will of Schopenhauer, or the universal mind-stuff of Clifford. These are one and all anthropomorphic terms; and the skepticism which would undermine theological knowledge because it is anthropomorphic, in order to be consistent, must be, as Mr. Illingworth says, "a universal skepticism," and undermine all knowledge. For all knowledge is anthropomorphic. Such universal skepticism, however, is impossible. It contradicts itself. We cannot deny the reality of all knowledge without at the same time affirming the reality of some knowledge, without affirming the reality of the knowledge of ourselves. That knowledge at least we possess, and that knowledge is true knowledge. If we say that it is not true knowledge, and that there is no such thing as truth, why then there is, and what we say is true—that there is no such thing as truth. And that is the vicious circle in which we have to move, in denying the reality of anthropomorphic knowledge, coming round to the starting point and affirming what we question.

The only way, therefore, in which we can escape from anthropomorphic knowledge is by taking refuge in that universal skepticism which denies the reality of all knowledge; for all knowledge is anthropomorphic. But neither is that an escape, for skepticism itself is anthropomorphic, and the doubter goes with his doubt, and anthropomorphism still remains. Yes, and will remain, in science, in philosophy, in theology and in skepticism as well.

If, then, we cannot get rid of anthropomorphism, and anthropomorphism be a legitimate canon of knowledge, let us see what it is, what its content is, what it involves and implies; or what is involved, in other words, in the consciousness of ourselves. We find upon reflection that something like what Principal Caird calls a "potential infinitude" is involved in it—no, not something

like it, but something rather that *is* it; and that all those finite terms of thought which in ourselves we find, by which we seek to interpret and understand ourselves and through ourselves to interpret and understand the world, have in every case an implication in them which reaches beyond ourselves. We know ourselves as finite, but how can we know ourselves as finite unless there be in our thought, not patent there, yet there, something that is not finite, something that is infinite, as comprehending the finite and giving meaning to it? How otherwise can we use the word? How otherwise indeed can we even coin the word? For the finite implies the infinite, as the part implies the whole or the centre implies the circumference. The consciousness of one is the consciousness of both. The two are joined together in a vital bond of union, and no matter how hard we try we cannot put them asunder.

Or, putting it another way which yet is not another, we know ourselves again as limited and conditioned. And yet, what meaning do they have, what meaning can they have, the limited or the conditioned, without the consciousness in us, more or less distinct, of the unlimited and the unconditioned? Or how can we have the consciousness of the temporal without the consciousness of the eternal, or the consciousness of the mortal without the consciousness of the immortal, or the consciousness of the immanent without the consciousness of the transcendant, or the consciousness of the relative without the consciousness of the absolute, unless, in manufacturing these finite terms of thought, we adopt the Hibernian method for manufacturing guns, of putting solid metal round an empty hole? The method is ingenious; but in mechanics, at least as far as I am aware, it has not yet been attempted, and even air guns are not made from holes. Neither are the finite terms of human thought. They are not made out of nothing, they are not made out of air; they are made out of the infinite terms of human

thought; and while those infinite terms from which they are derived may seem to some to be "trifles light as air," yet if the finite terms are themselves substantial, so too are the infinite terms from which they are derived. For from nothing, nothing comes; and if what comes be something, then from something does it come.

If it should be said that this is after all but a fantastic play on words, and that to make the consciousness of the finite imply the consciousness of the Infinite is like making the consciousness of something imply the consciousness of nothing, which is of course absurd, our answer is that the true antithesis of something is not nothing, but something else, and the true antithesis of the consciousness of something is the consciousness of something else. And the something else of which we are conscious in the consciousness of the finite is something else which is Infinite. That is what the consciousness of the finite something involves. And when we know that the something which we apprehend is relative and partial, we have already transcended the relative with the consciousness of the absolute, and gone beyond the partial with the consciousness of the whole.

When, therefore, we examine that consciousness of ourselves which is the basis of all knowledge, with a view to ascertaining what its content is, we find that its content is the consciousness of the Infinite, the Absolute and the Whole. And the consciousness of the Infinite, the Absolute and the Whole is not a negative consciousness, the consciousness of nothing—that is meaningless; but a positive consciousness, the consciousness of something, and the consciousness of something which, by its very terms, is not less than we are but incomparably greater and more. The content, in other words, of the consciousness of ourselves is the consciousness of God. That is what we apprehend in apprehending ourselves. And if the knowledge of ourselves be veritable and true, so is the knowledge of God; for the knowledge of our-

selves involves the knowledge of God. We do not search *for* Him, we search *with* Him; we cannot search without Him; we cannot think without Him; we cannot know without Him. For unless we know God, the Infinite, we cannot know ourselves, the finite; and unless we know ourselves we cannot know anything else. Unless, therefore, we know God we cannot know at all, and without the knowledge of God is not anything known that is known. Agnosticism is not only undesirable, it is impossible. Anthropomorphism is not only unavoidable, it is indubitable. For God is implicit in our human thought, and therefore it is possible for our human thought to apprehend God.

But let us examine still further the consciousness of ourselves with a view to ascertaining what its content is, and possibly by a different path we shall reach the same result. We are conscious of ourselves as possessing a moral sense. With the question of how we came to possess it we are not here concerned, but only with the fact that we do possess it. And what is the implication of that moral sense? What does it involve? Here too we find the Infinite involved. Through the exercise within us of the moral sense, we know ourselves as morally incomplete and wanting, as morally coming short of what we ought to be. But how can we know ourselves as coming short of something unless we also know what the something is of which we come short, unless it be already potentially existent in us? How can the child know that he is not yet a man unless he have within him some notion of a man? Crude perhaps, and faulty, yet after all a notion which is essentially true. How can the traveller know, in climbing up the mountain side, that he has not yet reached the mountain top, unless he have within him some notion of a mountain top? It may not be in all respects what he thinks it is, and he does not know it fully and accurately and well; and yet he knows it enough to be able at least

to think it, and he does think it, not as something fanciful but as something real, as something which exists. And thinking and knowing that, he has the courage to climb and to go on trying to reach it.

What is true of physical climbing is equally true of moral; and the knowledge that the "ought to be," though distant from us, *is*, gives a moral strength and inspiration to us, to cheer us, to help us, to keep us going on; or, blinded by the mountain mists and losing at times our way, it gives at least the power of a moral endurance to us.

> "It fortifies my soul to know
> That though I perish, Truth is so;
> That howsoe'er I stray and range,
> Whate'er I do Thou dost not change.
> I steadier step when I recall
> That if I slip Thou dost not fall."

Yes, the mountain top exists. That is what our consciousness of distance from it implies, and that is why we can still go on hoping and trying to reach it. Or why, if we cannot go on, we can continue to stand, and having done all, to stand; perplexed, but not in despair; persecuted, but not forsaken; cast down, but not destroyed.

It may be said, however, that while the consciousness in us of our own inferior life does involve the consciousness of some superior life, it is not of necessity the consciousness of an infinitely superior life, perfect and complete, without moral spot or blemish in it, but only indeed of a life that is morally better than ours and which we know is not a morally perfect life. But how do we know that it is not a morally perfect life unless we also know a morally perfect life with which we can compare it, or unless at least we know that such a life exists, not having ourselves reached it as yet, but having seen it afar off, and are persuaded of it, and have thus by faith embraced it and confessed allegiance to it? How can we know, in other words, that any moral life, our own or that of others, is not a perfect life, without some perfect standard to which we can refer it in order thus to

determine its relative value and worth? How in short can we know it without the knowledge of God in Whom the moral life in perfect form exists? That knowledge first of all must be implicit in us. And whatever may have been the origin of the moral sense, or the way in which it has come, it is only through the knowledge of God that the moral sense can work. In His light we see light; we cannot see without it, without the light of Him that lighteth every man that cometh into the world.

Every man has in him that perfect moral light; not of course in the sense that it is perfectly shining in him, but in the sense that it is the perfect light that shines. Just as the light that shines through the window or the door or the little crack in the wall into the otherwise darkened room is the perfect light of the sun, which in the open heaven in perfect beauty shines. Even so is the light which shines in every man the perfect light of God, and through its shining in him he sees the moral defects and imperfections in himself. And the progress which he has made and still makes and will continue to make in moral knowledge and growth is simply the coming out, with an ever-increasing and brightening manifestation, of that perfect moral light or perfect truth within him. And Browning is more than a poet, when, in his well known lines, he says,

> "There is an inmost centre in us all
> Where Truth abides in fulness; and round
> Wall upon wall, the gross flesh hems it in. . .
> And to know, rather consists in opening out a way
> Whence the imprisoned splendour may escape,
> Than in effecting entry for a light
> Supposed to be without."

When, therefore, we examine the moral sense within us of which we are conscious in the consciousness of ourselves, we find not only a sense of the Infinite involved, but a sense of the Infinite in us; and that God is as real as we are, Whom ethically we predicate and ontologically affirm. Whither can we go to escape Him? Whither

can we flee from His presence? If we climb up to heaven, if we make our bed in hell, if we take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, behold He is there, because *we* are there!

If then it be true that God can be expressed in terms of human thought, and that such an expression of Him is a true and valid expression, where are we to find such an expression of Him, both divine and human, divine because human? Not only in the postulates of philosophy do we find it, in history we find it, in the story of Jesus Christ we find it. And as we read that wonderful yet well attested story, touching and awakening in us the consciousness of God, we are prepared to believe what the implications of our human thinking and our moral being had taught us to expect, that it is the story of God manifest in the flesh, that it is the story of the God-Man. And standing and gazing upon it, we are moved to say, as someone else has said, "that the Absolute was born at Bethlehem, the Perfect died on Calvary, the Omnipotent rose at Easter, the Infinite ascended at Bethany, and the Eternal came down at Pentecost," when, like a mighty rushing wind His spirit came and entered into human life, and has been there ever since, as the inspirational force for the development of human life, and to enable it thus to reach the measure of the stature of the fulness of itself. Not yet has it reached that stature, for human life is not human life as yet.

> "Man is not Man as yet:
> Nor shall I deem his object served, his end
> Attained, his genuine strength put fairly forth,
> While only here and there a star dispels
> The darkness, here and there a towering mind
> O'erlooks its prostrate fellows: when the host
> Is out at once to the despair of night,
> When all mankind alike is perfected,
> Equal in full-blown powers—then, not till then,"

shall we see and know what man is; when He who came once into human life shall have come again, and when all human life together shall be the incarnation of God.

The Scriptures as a Bond of Co-operation

By John H. Ritson, M.A.,
Secretary of the British and Foreign Bible Society.

The Bible has given rise to more controversy than any other book in the world. What were the *ipsissima verba* of its original writers? Who were those writers, and how and when did they commit the Scriptures to writing? In what manner were the divine and the human interrelated when these "men spake from God, being moved by the Holy Ghost"? Such questions and a thousand more arising in the realm of dogmatic interpretation have divided men through centuries, and they are divisive still. And yet the centripetal forces that gather around this Book are greater than the centrifugal. The words of our Lord concerning Himself "I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto Me" are true of the Bible which reveals Him, and true because it reveals Him. Universal experience of its supernatural power has led Christian men to give the Bible a central position; as they have turned to it from points of view very far asunder, they have looked one another in the face, and as they have searched for the hidden meaning of its deepest truths, they have been unconsciously drawn together in the bonds of a spiritual brotherhood.

Nowhere is the unifying power of the Scriptures more clearly demonstrated than in the work of the Bible Societies, and especially of the three great societies—the British and Foreign Bible Society, which is the oldest, the American Bible Society, and the National Bible

Society of Scotland. The sole object of these institutions is to secure the translation of the "eternal Gospel" into the spoken languages of men, and then through the printed page to publish it without note or comment "unto them that dwell on the earth, and unto every nation and tribe and tongue and people."

The House of the Parent Society is in the very heart of the City of London—symbolic of the place of the Bible itself in the civilization of English-speaking peoples. As we turn our backs upon the ceaseless roar of traffic in Queen Victoria Street and cross the threshold of this noble building we read the words, carved on the stone frieze round the entrance hall, "Heaven and earth shall pass away but My words shall not pass away." Within, there is an indefinable influence which makes the House a sanctuary, and when we ascend to the second floor and enter the quiet of the Library the influence deepens. We are surrounded by between twelve and thirteen thousand volumes, all different from each other, and printed in over six hundred languages and dialects. The descriptive catalogue of these editions fills two thousand two hundred and fifty pages of closely printed matter, and yet this is a Library of One Book. There is no place like it upon earth. In this room we seem to enter into fellowship with the noble army of men, who bestowed unspeakable labour, and often shed their blood in making versions of the Bible—scholars and saints; statesmen, princes and rulers; missionaries, confessors and martyrs. In their presence an eternal voice seems to speak to us: "Put off thy shoes from off they feet, for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground."

The story of Bible translation began more than two thousand years ago and it is not yet completed. Its first chapter records the making of the Septuagint, and its current chapter is found in the latest annual reports of the Bible Societies. The story is as intricate as it is long. We can but tell fragments of it, but upon what

principle are we to select them from the tangled mass of material? In the Bible House Library there is a stained glass window of striking design which suggests a possible line to take. The central figure is William Tindale whose name stands out pre-eminent in the annals of the English Bible. On the side lights are inscribed names to represent the most noteworthy translators of Holy Scriptures the world has known—Jerome, Cyril and Methodius, Luther, Eliot, Carey, Morrison, Martyn and Moffat. These names link together centuries, nations, and churches in one common task, and it will perhaps be sufficient for our purpose if we follow the history of the versions they suggest.

"Jerome" carries us back to the fourth century. A Latin Father ordained in Antioch, studying in Constantinople and toiling in Bethlehem, he by request of Pope Damasus in the year 382 A.D. set out to translate the Bible into Latin, making use of the old Latin versions of the second century, but basing his own on the foundation of Hebrew and Greek. Jerome's Vulgate version was made before Christendom was divided, and afterwards became the authorized Bible of the Latin Church. For a millenium it exercised a mighty influence in western Europe, and nourished the souls of countless saints. It was from the Vulgate that Caedmon and King Alfred rendered portions of the Scriptures into Anglo-Saxon, and Wyclif, the morning star of the Reformation, used it for the earliest version of the Bible in English. Many great national versions, too, on the continent of Europe, versions which preceded and gave the breath of life to the Reformation were based on the Vulgate, and are still read in French, German, Polish, Spanish and Portuguese, and still point out to multitudes the way into the Kingdom of God. Like Joseph the Vulgate has been "a fruitful bough even a fruitful bough by a well." The well has been preserved within the enclosure of the Roman Church, but the branches of the bough have "run over

the wall," and influenced all those Churches in the West which are no longer in communion with Rome.

We can scarcely pass from the period of the Latin Versions without reference to those in Syriac and Coptic. The former was probably begun in the second century for the Syrian Churches, and the latter in the third century for the Church in Egypt. The Scriptures in Latin, Syriac and Coptic are today living links not only with the early centuries, but between the Reformed Churches as co-operating in the Bible Societies, and the Roman and Eastern Churches. The British Society supplies to many Roman Catholic students not only Greek and Hebrew Testaments, but also the Vulgate New Testament in the scholarly edition of Wordsworth and White. The Syrian Christians draw supplies in ancient and modern Syriac from London and New York, while the Coptic Church has shown its gratitude for the provision of Arabic and Coptic Scriptures by forming "a Coptic auxiliary of the British and Foreign Bible Society."

"Cyril and Methodius" bring us to a later group of versions than those we have been considering. The Ethiopic version is traditionally ascribed to Frumentius, consecrated Bishop by Athanasius, and known as the Apostle of Ethiopia, in the fourth century. In Armenia early in the fifth century Miesrob invented a new set of characters and was chief among the translators who turned the Scriptures into Armenian for the Church founded by Gregory the Illuminator. A little later a version was made in Georgian for the Church in the Caucasus.

The outstanding translations of the group were those in Gothic and Slavonic. The Gothic version, which was the work of Ulfilas, a Christian apostle of the fourth century, made the Scriptures intelligible to the peoples of Moesia and Dacia and became the forerunner of the later Teutonic versions. The Slavonic version is associated with the twin names—Cyril and Methodius—and they

are worthy of the place they occupy on the Bible House window. In the ninth century Cyril adopted a new alphabet, drawn from Greek, Armenian and other characters, and with his brother Methodius translated the Scriptures into the language of the Slavs of Bulgaria, Pannonia and Moravia. Their work on the Bible laid the foundation of the language and literature of the Russian Empire, and did much to mould the deeply religious character of its people.

The Gothic version is no longer circulated, though its influence abides in the character of the Teutonic peoples. The other versions, however, referred to under this heading, still live. The British and Foreign Bible Society sends Scriptures to Abyssinia, in Ethiopic, the liturgical language, and in Amharic, the colloquial, and the Emperor of Abyssinia has more than once been its agent in distribution among his people. It has provided the Armenian Church with over a quarter of a million volumes in the ancient and modern forms of her mother tongue, and encouraged the production of Scriptures locally by the gift of a printing press at Etchmiadzin. It produces editions in Georgian for the use of the Georgian Church. This same Society, controlled and financed by the Churches of Reformed Christendom, issues Scriptures throughout the great Russian Empire, those in Russ and Slavonic being printed by the Presses of the Russian Holy Synod; it employs members of the Orthodox Church as its colporteurs, and in consequence of its freedom from complicity with ecclesiastical and political intrigue, it enjoys singular privileges from Church and State alike.

"Luther" is the next name on the window. The middle ages were almost sterile so far as versions are concerned but pioneer translators like Wyclif began to appear in the fourteenth century, and towards the close of the fifteenth century a new period of activity in translation opened up. When Muhammad the Conqueror

stormed and captured Constantinople in 1453, and Europe was shaken to its very foundations by the onrush of Islam, the manuscript relics of the Near East travelled West, and at about the same time the art of printing was invented. The Renaissance ensued and stimulated the making of versions in Polish, Bohemian, Italian, Portuguese, Dutch, French, German, English, Swedish, Danish, Icelandic, Hungarian and Finnish. Among the translators were Protestants like d'Almeida, de Valera and Diodati, and Romanists like Figureido, de Saci, and Scio—and all will be held in everlasting honour. Perhaps the most significant outcome of the Renaissance was the publication by Erasmus in 1516 of the Greek Testament—it was not the first printed, but the first available for wide use and exerted an immeasurable influence.

Luther was not the earliest translator in the group begotten of the great revival of learning. Fourteen different folio editions of the Bible in High German, and four in Low German had appeared before Luther issued his first New Testament in 1522. Nevertheless he stands out as a prince among translators, and his version did for the language and literature and religious life of Germans what Tindale's and Coverdale's did among the English, and as a unifying force it exerted extraordinary influence in the development of German nationality. In the German language alone the British and Foreign Bible Society has issued twenty-five million volumes, Bibles or portions, in a variety of versions. Further the Society made large grants of money in its early days in order to encourage the Churches in several countries on the Continent of Europe to form their own independent Bible Societies, and so take upon their own shoulders the responsibility of local publication and distribution.

"Eliot": John Eliot, the Apostle of the Indians, introduces us to translation work in the New World. Born in 1604 and educated at Cambridge he apparently

took orders in the Church of England and subsequently joined the Puritan exodus to America. He met with much success as a missionary among the Massachusetts Indians, and by "prayer and pains" learned their speech. In 1661-3 his translation of the Bible was printed in the Massachusetts' language, which has long ceased to be a spoken tongue. It was not until the nineteenth century had turned, that a considerable number of other Indian languages was added to the list of versions of the Holy Scriptures for the American Continent. Some of the editions, notably the Cree, are printed in a syllabary, invented in 1841 by a Wesleyan missionary, on the principle of using separate signs to represent syllables, instead of letters. This invention has greatly simplified the task of teaching the Indian to read, and been a boon to the missionaries of every denomination.

Eliot's Bible has one unique distinction. It was the first version of the Bible prepared by any Protestant missionary for a pagan people. Contemporaneously Dutch missionaries began work on the Malay version, but it was almost a century afterwards that other versions for the heathen were taken in hand. Ziegenbalg of the Danish Lutheran Mission toiled at the Tamil version early in the eighteenth century, and the Dutch again were at work on Sinhalese.

The founding of the great missionary societies in Great Britain at the end of the eighteenth century, and beginning of the nineteenth, opened up the era of modern missions and created a new demand for versions in the languages of the heathen and Muhammadan world. Synchronizing with this demand the British and Foreign Bible Society was established in 1804. The singleness of its aim and the breadth of its constitution afforded a sound basis for co-operation. Its executive committee consists of thirty-six laymen representing all the most important Protestant Christian Communions of England

and to some extent of the Continent, and so wide and far-reaching are its operations that it may fairly claim the title "the servant of the servants of God." Other Societies were started on similar lines and notably the American Bible Society in 1816, and in 1861 the National Bible Society of Scotland, formed by the amalgamation of the Scottish Auxiliaries of the B.F.B.S. which became independent in 1825.

The earlier versions published by these great Societies were largely made by pioneer missionaries, and in those days pioneers had generally to work alone or at most in twos or threes. The translations though produced in one communion were of necessity used by all the Churches in the language area they represented. The conditions of the mission field have gradually changed, and now through the Bible Societies the Churches are able to co-operate in the production of versions as well as in the use of them. By this co-operation not only is the best scholarship of each communion made available for all, but the mission field has been saved from the rivalry of denominational versions. Further economy and efficiency have been secured in the great task of publication, and a world-wide organization for distribution has been devised on a sound business-like basis.

The four remaining names on the Bible House window abundantly illustrate the place of the Bible in drawing together in one common task the divided forces of the Church. They stand for four different Christian communions in four fields of missionary enterprise. The great life-work of each missionary was the translation of the Holy Scriptures, and on that account mainly the Universal Church claims each for its own.

"Carey": William Carey was a Baptist, the pioneer of English missionaries in India, and the founder of the famous Serampore Press with its amazing output of missionary versions in many tongues. To the list of versions for India, which now total over seventy lan-

guages, many branches of the Church have contributed since the days of Carey, and there is no more important sphere of united action today than the revision of the many colloquial Scriptures. For instance, consider the version in Telugu, which is spoken by twenty millions of people in Southern India. The first portion of the New Testament printed in Telugu was translated by the missionaries of the London Missionary Society, and published at the Serampore Press through the British and Foreign Bible Society. Ultimately the whole Bible was completed, foremost among the translators being J. S. Wardlaw and John Hay, both of the L.M.S. In the work of revision many societies co-operated on a committee, which first met in 1873, and on which were represented the American Dutch Reformed Church, the American Baptist Missionary Union, the Church Missionary Society, the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, and the London Missionary Society.

"Morrison": Robert Morrison was a Presbyterian, sent out under the L.M.S., the first Protestant missionary to China. Though Marshman worked contemporaneously on a Chinese version published at Serampore, Morrison may perhaps be regarded as the father of the Chinese Bible, the forerunner of many versions in Wênli, Mandarin and twenty or more colloquials to meet the need of a quarter of the human race. At the 1890 Shanghai Conference it was decided to produce Union versions in High Wênli, Easy Wênli and Mandarin, and at the 1907 Conference when the three Union New Testaments were presented, it was decided to reduce them to two by combining the two literary forms of the language in Wênli into one. As in India, so in China the various Churches have taken their places side by side on the Boards of Translators, and each has given its best to benefit the whole. For instance in the production of the Union Version in Mandarin, which is current among three hundred millions of Chinese the following societies participated—the

American Presbyterian Mission, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, the London Missionary Society, the American Methodist Episcopal Mission, and the Wesleyan Missionary Society. Other societies took their place at the round table of translators at a later date, and throughout the three great Bible Societies have co-operated in bearing the burden of finance, publication and distribution. Episcopalians, Independents, Presbyterians, Methodists; Baptists and Paedobaptists; Americans and Europeans have combined to give China a standard Bible and perhaps it is the greatest contribution so far towards what the Chinese Christians yearn after—an undivided Church of Christ in China.

"Martyn": Henry Martyn was an Anglican, and by his scholarly and self-sacrificing work on the translation of the New Testament into Urdu and Persian, he made an outstanding contribution to the versions, which are the mightiest weapon in the hands of missionaries facing the Moslem world. It would be natural to give some account of the Arabic version in dealing with this group, and certainly it well illustrates the gathering together of divers forces around the Bible. Roman and Protestant, Episcopalian and non-Episcopalian, European and American have all contributed to the translations which have led up to that of Van Dyck, which is now adopted as the standard version by at least all Protestant missionaries.

The story of the Osmanli Turkish Bible is even more romantic than that of the Arabic, and as it discloses an interesting co-operation of a different type, it better elucidates our theme. The earliest translation had been made in the seventeenth century by Albertus Bobowsky, a Pole who was kidnapped by Tartar raiders, and sold into slavery at Constantinople. He became a great linguist, improved his social position, was converted to Muhammadanism and assumed the name Ali Bey. He was persuaded to translate the Bible into Turkish by

the Dutch Ambassador at the court of the Sultan. His manuscript was never printed but found its way to Leyden. In 1814 the British and Foreign Bible Society borrowed this manuscript, and Baron von Diez, who had been the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, began to revise it with a view to printing it in Berlin from type made in England. Before however he had proceeded far, Diez died, and the work was continued by Jean Daniel Kieffer, who was born at Strasburg and became a great linguist, and served as secretary to the French Legation at Constantinople. While lying in the prison of the Seven Towers through seven long years Kieffer acquired great proficiency in Osmanli. In May, 1819, at the annual meeting of the Bible Society in London, he presented the completed Bible and in the following year became the Society's agent in Paris.

This Osmanli Turkish Bible had to be printed in three kinds of characters in order that it might be read by Turks, Armenians and Greeks, and in the three Bibles were dialectic and other differences. In the labours which brought it into its present unified form missionaries of the American Board, the Church Missionary Society and the Bible Society have co-operated with a number of native scholars. The nations as well as the Churches seem to have united in the one endeavour to give Turkey the Book which reveals Him who spoke those words that still confront every worshipper entering Sancta Sophia, "I am the door: by Me if any man enter in, he shall be saved, and shall go in and out, and shall find pasture."

"Moffat": Robert Moffat stands for Africa. He was a Congregationalist working under the London Missionary Society and his chief monument is the Sechuana Bible. In its revision at the present time the London Missionary Society, the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society, the Berlin Mission, the Hermannsburg Mission, and the Church of the Province of South Africa are all engaged.

One of the great difficulties in the way of missions in Africa is the multiplicity of languages and dialects, but the unification of Bible versions is leading to the unification of forms of speech. For instance, varieties of the Ibo language are spoken by three-fourths of the population of Southern Nigeria where it is current in several dialects. In four of these portions of the Scriptures have been translated and published. The dialects are known as Isuama Ibo, Lower Ibo, Upper Ibo and Ungwana Ibo, but recently they have been replaced by one Union Ibo version which in due time will remove the barriers of linguistic variation which in the past have separated a number of kindred tribes, and which if perpetuated would have tended to isolate Churches.

If for a moment we leave Africa and cross the Atlantic we may see in Canada another pulling down of the language barriers set up at Babel. There the immigrants who speak one hundred and ten tongues are provided with diglot gospels or testaments, which give the English side by side with one of the following thirty-four different languages: Arabic, Armenian, Bohemian, Bulgarian, Cantonese, Dutch, French, Finnish, German, Greek, Gujarati, Hebrew, Hungarian, Italian, Japanese, Lithuanian, Malayalam, Mandarin, Marathi, Norwegian, Persian, Polish, Portuguese, Rumanian, Russian, Ruthenian, Servian, Spanish, Swedish, Tamil, Telugu, Turkish, Urdu, and Yiddish. Thus the Bible becomes the strongest bond of unity among the polyglot and heterogeneous peoples settling in the Dominion of Canada.

The window in the Bible House Library has so far suggested our course of thought. We have already said that its central figure is William Tindale, the outstanding type of those who have made it possible for the English-speaking to read "every man in his own language." Tindale and Coverdale are the real fathers of the English version of 1611, which is the common heritage of the Anglo-Saxon race the world over. It is

itself one of the greatest of union versions, taking the place of rival versions dear to the hearts of Episcopalians and non-Episcopalians and to some extent accentuating their differences. The personnel of the deputation which presented a copy of the "Authorized Version" to King George in 1911 at the tercentenary festival was such that the Archbishop of Canterbury described it to His Majesty as "so weighty in regard to the persons who compose it, so varied as regards the portions of Your Majesty's Empire which they represent, and so comprehensive in respect to the branches of the Christian Church in which they hold office, that it is a gathering almost, if not quite, without parallel in our annals, religious or secular." And the one bond between the members of that deputation was the Bible.

Beneath the representation of Tindale on the window, there is a panel-picture of a printing press with the inscription, "The Word of God grew and multiplied." It reminds us of a sphere of co-operation upon which we have not touched, that of publication and distribution, a sphere in which the united action of Churches and nations is not a whit less remarkable than in the work of translation. Further the effort to raise funds for the prosecution of the work of the Bible Societies has provided for over a hundred years a common platform upon which Christians with widely divergent views have been able to sit side by side without the sacrifice of ecclesiastical principle or theological conviction.

We are only able in a single article to skim over the surface of a great subject, touching at a few points indicated by a stained window. But again we look round the Library itself. On the shelves are versions in over six hundred different languages. The distribution of these languages through the world is illustrated by an analysis of the four hundred and fifty on the list of the British and Foreign Bible Society. In European languages there are 78, in American languages 33, in Asiatic

162, in African 112, and in the languages of Oceania 65. In each centre where these versions are used, in a greater or less degree they have drawn men together into true Christian fellowship, as have those versions to which we have made definite and specific reference.

The thousands of volumes in this sacred room speak to us of unity. In the Church militant here on earth we are sundered politically, socially, nationally, racially, theologically, ecclesiastically; our unity around the Bible is largely hidden, and the only thing that looms big is the fact that it is a broken unity. But in the stillness of the Bible House Library, away from storm and conflict, we recall those men who through the centuries have been translating the Holy Scriptures, and as we see the fruits of their toil, standing side by side, proclaiming the One Gospel in so many tongues, we realize that theirs was a common task, and we instinctively think of them not as men who differed, but men who in the perfect unity of the Church triumphant are swelling the one "great multitude which no man can number, out of every nation, and of all tribes and peoples and tongues." Before the throne and before the Lamb they speak but one language.

In the beautiful study of modern church life in Lorraine, entitled *La Colline Inspirée*, by Maurice Barrès, the first chapter bears this heading: "There are places where the Spirit breathes." In none is the air ampler and purer than in the Library of the One Book.

The Church of England in Relation to Other Reformed Communions

By W. H. Griffith Thomas, D.D.,
Professor of Old Testament Literature, Wycliffe College, Toronto.

One of the most welcome features of the present movement towards Christian unity is the way in which each Church is endeavouring to state its own position in order that its attitude may be understood and its contribution to the sum total of Christian thought and life realized. As a help in this direction it is proposed to inquire into the precise relation of the Church of England to other sections of Reformed Christendom from the sixteenth century to the opening of the nineteenth. What was the general attitude and spirit of the English Church towards non-episcopal Reformed Churches? For this purpose a consideration of the views of representative Churchmen, from Archbishop Cranmer onwards, is important, and it has the advantage of not involving any discussion of documents or differences of interpretation, but of simply deriving as far as possible the views of the men from their own words and actions.

It is well known that in the reign of Edward VI Cranmer endeavoured to bring about a union of all the Protestant Churches, and in 1548 he proposed to Bullinger, Calvin, and Melanchthon, that a Synod of the leading divines should be held in England at which a common Confession of Faith might be drawn up. The project was warmly endorsed by those to whom the Archbishop

wrote, but the political and other troubles of the time prevented the scheme from being realized.

The same spirit was seen in the reception given to refugees from foreign Protestant communities. They were welcomed as men holding the same common faith as members of the English Church. Edward VI granted Letters Patent to the Low-German Congregation under John A'Lasco, and this included permission to have a Church in London where they might worship after their own forms. In addition to this Congregation, similar assemblies of High-Germans, Italians, Walloons, and French were established in various parts of the country and treated by the Government and the Archbishop with thorough kindness.

Still more important was the way in which certain foreign Protestant divines were invited to England and used in positions of importance. Through the influence of Cranmer, Peter Martyr was appointed to the Regius Professorship at Oxford, and Martin Bucer to the corresponding position at Cambridge. Not only were the two most important appointments thus filled, but Cranmer frequently consulted both men in regard to the progress of the English Reformation. As to Peter Martyr, Cranmer's biographer, Strype, says: "There was not only an acquaintance between him and our Archbishop, but a great and cordial intimacy and friendship, for of him he made particular use in the steps he took in our Reformation." And when the time came for the reformation of ecclesiastical laws Peter Martyr was nominated as one of the Commission to undertake this duty. On Peter Martyr's death, at the close of 1551, Parker, afterwards Archbishop of Canterbury, preached his funeral sermon and praised him particularly for the soundness and excellence of his doctrine. So, later on, Archbishop Whitgift, speaks of Martyr as "so reverent, so learned, so painful, so sound a father." In Elizabeth's reign we find the same feeling manifested. Con-

vocation in 1563 voted a subsidy to the Queen to aid in the expenses incurred in sending troops into Normandy for the protection of Protestants there. The wording of the grant speaks of "the professors of God's holy Gospel and true religion," language of particular interest as used by the bishops and clergy of the English Church assembled in Convocation.

Correspondence was maintained by leading divines of our Church at this time with the divines of Continental Protestant Churches. A large number of these letters still remain, of which a considerable selection was published by the Parker Society under the name of the *Zurich Letters*. In these letters leading men of the Church of England wrote to Bullinger and others in terms of warm friendship as fellow-ministers of Christ, and as ministers of Churches with which they were essentially in agreement. Even Archbishop Whitgift who, in matters of discipline, was a somewhat severe and stiff Churchman, wrote to Beza as "his most dear brother in Christ," and addressed his letter to his "Most dear Brother and Colleague in Christ." To the same effect, was the letter of Jewel, who expressed to Peter Martyr the Queen's desire that he should come again to England, "that as you formerly *tilled*, as it were, the University by your lectures, so you might again *water* it by the same." Whitgift's words on Church government are particularly interesting: "that any one kind of government is so necessary that . . . it might not be altered into some other kind thought to be more expedient, I utterly deny . . . I find no one certain and perfect kind of government prescribed or commanded in the Scriptures to the Church of Christ."

The Act of 13 Elizabeth was recognized at the time as admitting the validity of the position of Incumbents who were without episcopal ordination. Keble in his edition of Hooker says, that "nearly up to the time that he wrote numbers had been admitted to the ministry

of the Church of England with no better than Presbyterian Ordination, and it appears by Travers' Supplication to the Council that such was the construction not uncommonly put upon the Statute of the 13 Elizabeth." Keble goes on to say that the Elizabethan Bishops did not take any strict and severe view of episcopacy. "It is enough with them to show that government by Archbishops and Bishops is ancient and allowable; they never ventured to urge its exclusive claim or to connect the succession with the validity of the Holy Sacraments."[1] This is all the more remarkable because of the extreme views of certain Puritan Presbyterians in regard to an absolutely scriptural and theocratic foundation for their position. Lord Bacon seems to have held this view of Elizabeth's Act, arguing that he could not find anything in Scripture to warrant the insistence upon one form of discipline in all Churches imposed by Divine commandment. "I for my part do confess that in revolving the Scriptures I could never find any such thing; but that God had left a like liberty to the Church government as He had done to the Civil government, to be varied according to time and place and accidents, which nevertheless His High and Divine providence doth order and dispose. Some indiscreet persons have been bold in open preaching to use dishonourable and derogatory speeches and censure of the Churches abroad; and that so far, as some of our men, as I have heard, ordained in foreign parts have been pronounced to be no lawful ministers."

The question of Hooker's friend, Saravia, has often been discussed, and although he took very high ground in regard to episcopacy, he maintained the validity of the Orders of foreign Protestant Churches, that they were not bound to seek to obtain Bishops from some Reformed Episcopal Church. Referring to some who

[1]Keble's Preface to Hooker, pp. lix; lxxvi.

had been ordained in the Reformed Churches, he says, that "none of them ought to have been ashamed of his Ordination"; and that "orthodox Presbyters can in any case of necessity ordain a Presbyter." Many other similar testimonies can be adduced from this period.

In regard to doctrine, several leading English Churchmen testified to the essential oneness between the Reformed Churches and the Continent. Jewel, writing to Peter Martyr in 1562, just after the Articles had been passed in Convocation, said: "We do not differ from your doctrine by a nail's breadth." Archbishop Grindal, writing to Bullinger in 1566, said: "We most fully agree with your Churches." Bishop Horn, writing to Bullinger, 1563, said: "We have throughout England the same ecclesiastical doctrine as yourselves." And on the other hand, Beza, writing to Grindal in 1566, said: "We consider that your Churches agree with us in all points of doctrine." In the same way Peter du Moulin, of the French Reformed Church, writing in the early part of the seventeenth century, said: "We assemble with the Englishmen in their Churches, we participate together in the Holy Supper of our Lord, the doctrine of their Confessions is most agreeable unto ours."

Perhaps the strongest testimony of all is found in the two earliest Commentaries on the Articles. The first, by Rogers, Chaplain to Archbishop Bancroft, was published in 1607, and was ordered by the Archbishop to be placed in all the parishes of his province. Rogers continually refers to the Confessions of Continental Protestant Churches in such terms as these: "Hereunto do the Churches of God subscribe"—"So testify with us the true Churches elsewhere in the world." Later on, Bishop Burnet wrote as follows: "We are very sure that not only those who penned the Articles, but the Body of this Church for about half an age after, did notwithstanding those irregularities, acknowledge the for-

eign Churches so constituted to be true Churches as to all the essentials of a Church."

Archbishop Sandys, while strongly disputing the fact of the Ordination of Dean Whittingham, because it was not clear to him whether the latter had had any Ordination at all, yet wrote to Lord Burghley to explain that this did not involve any denial of the validity of the Orders of foreign Protestant Churches: "Verily, my Lord, that Church is not touched."[2]

At this point it seems necessary to call attention to Canon 55 of 1603-04, where the clergy are required in the Bidding Prayer to pray for the Church of Scotland as part of "Christ's Holy Catholic Church." It is a simple matter of historical fact that the mediaeval episcopal succession had entirely ceased and that the "Tulchan" Bishops, appointed first by the Regent and then by the King, were not in the succession, and indeed, had no episcopal consecration at all. It was only in 1610 that James I., by summoning Spottiswoode, Hamilton, and Lamb to London, restored episcopacy in Scotland. It is clear, therefore, that the Church of Scotland at the time when the Canon was passed was Presbyterian. But there is still stronger evidence from the practice of the Church of England from 1552 to 1662, during which time ministers of Scottish and foreign Churches were admitted to the cure of souls in the Church of England without any fresh Ordination. In 1582 a licence was granted by the Vicar General of Archbishop Grindal to a minister, named John Morrison, who had only Scottish orders, and the wording recognized his Ordination "according to the laudable form and right of the Reformed Church of Scotland," and the permission was granted without any further Ordination "to celebrate Divine offices, to minister the Sacraments, etc."

Writers in the seventeenth century adopted a similar

[2]Strype, *Annals*, II. ii. 620.

position. Bishop Hall in 1641, said: "The sticking at the admission of our brethren, returning from Reformed Churches was not in any case of Ordination, but of Institution. They had been acknowledged ministers of Christ without any other hands laid upon them . . . I know those, more than one, that by virtue only of that Ordination which they have brought with them from other Reformed Churches have enjoyed spiritual promotions and livings without any exception against the lawfulness of their calling." Bishop Hall was one of the four delegates sent by James I. to the Presbyterian Synod of Dort, and, preaching there, he said: "We are one Body, let us be of one mind." Later on, when preaching to his own clergy, these words occur: "Blessed be God; there is no difference in any essential matter betwixt the Church of England and her sisters of the Reformation." In 1638 four letters were published on this subject, the first three of which were by Morton, Bishop of Durham; Davenant, Bishop of Salisbury; and Hall, Bishop of Exeter. Morton's letter expresses his opinion of the blessing of union among Protestant Churches including both the Reformed and the Lutheran. Davenant advocated brotherly union between the foreign Protestant Churches, and said that "we acknowledge them as brethren in Christ and protest that we have a brotherly and holy communion with them." And he followed up this letter by publishing in 1640 an exhortation to the restoration of brotherly union, including in the term "Evangelical Churches" both Lutheran and Reformed.

It is noteworthy that one of the charges brought against the Church of England by the Archbishop of Spalato was that the English Church was in communion with the foreign Reformed Churches, and Dr. Crakanthorp, in defending our Church, admitted the fact and justified it on the ground that "in doctrine and the profession of the orthodox faith there is no difference between us."

The great Archbishop Ussher, while expressing his opinion that Churches without Bishops are very defective in their government, yet "for the testifying my communion with these Churches (which I do love and honour as true members of the Church Universal), I do profess that with like affection I should receive the blessed sacrament at the hands of the Dutch ministers if I were in Holland, as I should do at the hands of the French ministers if I were in Charentone." In 1641, Mason, the author of *The Vindication of the Church of England*, wrote a defence of the validity of the Ordination of ministers of the Reformed Churches in which after a full discussion he thus concludes: "Thus much concerning the ministers of other Reformed Churches wherein, if you will not believe us, disputing for the lawfulness of their calling, yet you must give us leave to believe God Himself from heaven approving their ministry by pouring down a blessing on their labours." And White, Bishop of Carlisle, a somewhat High Churchman in his day, writing in 1624, definitely defended the position that the foreign Protestant Churches are at unity with the Church of England in all essentials.

One of the most important witnesses is Bishop Cosin, who not only communicated with the Reformed Church at Charentone in France, but affords evidence of the meaning of the Act of 13 Elizabeth, mentioned above. "If at any time a minister so ordained in these French Churches came to incorporate himself in ours and to receive a public charge or cure of souls among us in the Church of England (as I have known some of them to have so done of late, and can instance in many others before my time), our Bishops did not re-ordain him before they admitted him to his charge, as they must have done if his former Ordination here in France had been void. Nor do our laws require more of him than to declare his public consent to the religion received amongst us, and to subscribe the Articles established."

Cosin, as Chaplain to Bishop Overal, testified that the latter held similar views. When De Laune came to England Bishop Overal asked him whether he had his Orders, and on being told that he had been ordained at Leiden the Bishop advised him to obtain Counsel's opinion whether by the laws of England he was capable of a benefice without being ordained by a Bishop. De Laune replied that he thought the Bishop would be unwilling to re-ordain him if his Counsel should say that he was not otherwise capable of the living by law. The Bishop replied: "Re-ordination we must not admit no more than a Rebaptization, but in case you find it doubtful whether you be a priest capable to receive a benefice among us or no, I will do the same office for you if you desire it that I should do for the one who doubts of his baptism. But for my own part, if you will adventure the Orders that you have I will admit your presentation and give you institution into the living howsoever."

The same testimony is given by Bishop Fleetwood, who says that this was certainly the practice of the Church of England up to 1661. "We had many ministers from Scotland, from France, and the Low Countries, who were ordained by Presbyters only and not Bishops, and they were instituted into benefices with cure . . . and yet were never re-ordained, but only subscribed the Articles." Burnet bears the same testimony, that "those who came to England from the foreign Churches had not been required to be ordained among us."

It is true that there arose in the Church of England at the commencement of the seventeenth century a new school of men who questioned the validity of the Orders of foreign Reformed Churches. The remark already quoted from Lord Bacon is perhaps the earliest indication of their existence, and it is generally thought that Laud was the first to maintain that there could be no true Church without Diocesan Bishops. At any rate in 1604, he was rebuked publicly by Dr. Hol-

land, the then Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford, as "a seditious person, who would unchurch the foreign Protestant Churches beyond seas and sow division between us and them who are brethren, by this novel popish position." Before the time of Laud it was usual to recognize members of the Reformed Churches as holding the same religion as ourselves, when any Briefs or Letters Patent were issued, but in 1634 Laud was successful in getting a change of wording from the King and even interfered with the French and Dutch Churches long established in this country. That this was a definite change in the views and language of the period is noticed by the historian Hallam, who, speaking of Laud and others, said that they began to refer to non-episcopal Reformers "not as brethren of the same faith united in the same cause and distinguished only by differences little more material than those of political commonwealths (which had been the language of the Church ever since the Reformation), but as aliens to whom they were not at all related, and schismatics with whom they held no communion; nay, as wanting the very essence of a Christian Society." But even among the High Churchmen of that period this doctrine was not universally accepted, for Cosin, as we have seen, viewed the foreign non-episcopal Churches in a totally different light. During his exile he communicated with the French Protestant Church, and in his last will he spoke of Churches reckoned as Christian Churches, professing "the true ancient and Catholic religion and faith . . . which I wish especially to be understood of the Protestant and well Reformed Churches." It is also interesting to observe that the great divine of the French Reformed Church, Amyraldus, referred in 1662 to the way in which members of the French and English Churches were accustomed to receive the Communion reciprocally in each other's Churches: "That they may manifest their piety and the agreement of the two Churches with

one another." Bishop Fleetwood, 1712, adverting to the change made in the Preface to the Ordinal in 1662, says (the italics are his own): "She did not *condemn* all others not re-ordained, nor *exclude* them from exercising the functions of Presbyters even in the Church of *England*. The case is now somewhat altered: she now *excludes* them all, but she does not thereby *condemn*.

Notwithstanding the intense controversy of 1662 and the consequent change in the Preface to the Ordinal, Durel, afterwards Dean of Windsor, himself the apologist of the Restoration Settlement, actually claimed the approbation of foreign Protestants. While holding a high doctrine of episcopacy he everywhere assumed the essential oneness of the various national Reformed Churches, and nowhere does he suggest any exclusive spiritual validity for the episcopate although he is quite frank as to the superiority of episcopacy and its desirability on many grounds.

Attention has recently been specially called to the practice of Dean Grenville of Durham, Bishop Cosin's son-in-law, who, although an ardent supporter of the Restoration Settlement, did not hesitate to include the following among the questions asked of those who entered the English Church from the Church of Rome: "Do you believe the Reformed Churches of Christendom; the Churches of Christ; and parts of the Holy Catholic Church, wherein the purest doctrine is professed and the sacraments of our Lord are most duly ministered of any other Churches in the world?" *Ans.* "I do."

The next testimony is the remarkable one of the Nonjuror, Archbishop Sancroft, who, in 1688, exhorted the Bishops of his province "to join with us in daily fervent prayer to the God of peace for the universal blessed union of all Reformed Churches both at home and abroad." In 1702, Sharp, Archbishop of York, stated that "if he were abroad he would willingly communicate with the Protestant Churches where he should hap-

pen to be." And in the Debate on the Union with Scotland in 1707, Tenison, Archbishop of Canterbury, said he "thought the narrow notions of all Churches had been their ruin, and he believed the Church of Scotland to be as true a Protestant Church as the Church of England, though he could not say that it was as perfect."[3] The views of Archbishop Wake, 1715-37, are full of testimonies to his "beloved brethren" of the Reformed Churches of the Continent with whom he was in regular communication. "It may be affirmed that no Prelate since the Reformation had so extensive a correspondence with the Protestants abroad, and none could have a more friendly one." When the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel was founded in 1701 the Society's agents are soon found joining heartily with the Danish missionaries in India, and "an account of the success of the Danish missionaries, dedicated to the S. P. G., was published in 1719." The great Bishop Wilson of Sodor and Man, allowed Dissenters to attend his Communion Services, and even gave them liberty to sit or stand. Archbishop Secker, 1704, said that "our inclination is to live in friendship with all the Protestant Churches. We assist and protect those on the Continent of Europe as well as we are able to; we show our regard to that of Scotland as often as we have an opportunity." Many other similar testimonies could be added dealing with this period. One in particular may be mentioned: Bingham, the well known author of *The Antiquities of the Christian Church*, appealed to the French Protestants who flocked into England after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes not to become Dissenters but to conform to the Established Church on the ground that the French Church had one principle in common with the Church of England, that every national Church has power

[3]Several of the following testimonies are taken from *The English Church and Its Bishops*, by C. J. Abbey.

to decide what she thinks proper for her edification. He added that, following Bishop Andrewes and others, the French Church is allowed to have "all the necessary and essential Notes of a true Church, though episcopal government was never settled among them."

Still later the words of Bishop Tomline, referring to the case of the Protestant Churches, may be adduced: "I readily acknowledge that there is no precept in the New Testament which commands that every Church should be governed by Bishops. . . . It does not follow that all these things must be precisely the same in every Christian country." And in 1835, Archbishop Howley addressed a letter in the name of himself and his "brother Bishops" to "the Moderator of the Company of Pastors at Geneva," expressing their "high respect for the Protestant Churches on the Continent." And in 1841 the same Primate spoke of foreign Protestant non-episcopal Churches as "the less perfectly constituted Protestant Churches of Europe." It is also interesting to recall the fact that the earliest missionaries sent out as ordained ministers by the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel were for the most part only in Lutheran Orders.

From these testimonies the opinions of the great divines of the Church of England can be seen in regard to the non-episcopal Protestants of Scotland and the Continent, and it is obvious that they amply justify the following words of Dr. Sanday:

> "It should be distinctly borne in mind that the more sweeping refusal to recognize the non-episcopal Reformed Churches is not, and can never be made a doctrine of the Church of England. Too many of her representative men have not shared it. Hooker did not hold it; Andrewes expressly disclaimed it; Cosin freely communicated with the French Reformed Church during his exile. Indeed it is not until the last half of the 19th century that more than a relatively small minority of English Churchmen have been committed to it."[4]

[4] *The Conception of Priesthood*, p. 95.

Broad Churchmanship: A. D. 1500-1900

By J. E. Symes, M.A.,

Sometime Principal of University College, Nottingham.

The Church of England appeals to the authority of the Bible and of the Early Church; but Orthodoxy always demands adherence to traditional interpretations of these authorities. If we take such a matter as the Observance of Sunday, we see at once that the Fourth Commandment appoints Saturday as a day of complete rest. Yet the modern Sabbatarian finds no difficulty in evading the command. He substitutes Sunday for Saturday, and reduces the amount of work that he requires from his servants:—and pretends that he is obeying the Law. If he desires to shelter himself behind the authority of the Church, he has only the vaguest notion as to where that authority is to be sought, or how it should be interpreted. He has no intention of studying the attitude of the Primitive Church. He is not moved by such facts as that St. Paul appears to condemn all keeping of Sabbaths; or that the Creeds are silent on the subject; or that the New Testament nowhere inculcates Sunday rest. What he really bows down to, is tradition. Those who repudiate Sabbatarianism are, for the most part, in a similar case, except that their tradition is somewhat different. It may include or exclude card-playing, late dinner, or needlework; but its exclusions and inclusions are not based upon any more definite authority than that of parents, parsons, and other fallible guides.

In matters of doctrine there is a similar dependence

upon a vague tradition. The ordinary Protestant believes in a Day of Judgment, when all men will be judged by their faith or their works, or some combination of the two. But he also believes that the Dead are already judged. He assumes that those whom he himself has loved and lost are already in the abode of the Blessed. If he has attempted to correlate his beliefs, it is by means of some traditional reconciliation, in favour of which he can quote texts or possibly the *dicta* of some of the Fathers. At bottom he is merely accepting the traditional belief of some group or groups of Christians. The one thing he will not do is to think. He would indignantly repudiate the title of Rationalist.

On the other hand, the people loosely called Broad Churchmen, are consciously rationalistic. They are perpetually criticizing traditional interpretations, though they differ from one another in the amount of respect they pay to those interpretations, and in the extent to which their conclusions are in conformity with what, in their own age, is regarded as orthodox.

Among Broad Churchmen before the Reformation, More, Colet, and Erasmus are conspicuous. Their appeal to the New Testament, against the orthodoxy of their time, was in some respects like that of the early Protestants, an appeal against one authority to another. But in spirit it was rationalistic. "Since all Christians reverence the New Testament, let us try," they said in effect, "to get at what the New Testament really is. Let us compare one Greek manuscript with another; and refuse to rest contented with the traditional Latin text." This may seem to be mere obvious good sense; but it is a sort of good sense which annoys, and even enrages traditionalists. To most of these, the whole idea of Criticism is suspect; and dangerous to "simple faith." If the Rationalists of the Renaissance had, like the Protestant reformers, offered to the world a compact and complete system with some claim to infallibility,

the Man in the Street might have faced the alternative. But he could not tolerate people who offered him no new certainty in exchange for the old one; who urged him to think for himself; to work things out to a conclusion; to emancipate himself from formulae; to substitute the Search after Truth for what he had comfortably believed to be the Truth itself. The Renaissance Rationalists did however arouse a brief enthusiasm. At Oxford, the "Greeks" were sufficiently numerous to maintain a stout fight against the "Trojans." But the great English public soon settled down again into its usual three parties:—the Anglo-Catholics and the Puritans who persecuted one another, and the Moderates who were partly indifferent, and partly in favour of some compromise between Protestantism and Catholicism. There always have been and there still are these three great parties in the Church of England:—the High, the Low, and the Moderate, who, though differing in most things, are yet able to agree in their detestation of those rationalistic Broad Churchmen who have never been able to form a party; partly because they are usually individualistic in temper, but chiefly because the whole party system tends towards a sort of traditionalism, against which Broad Churchmanship exists to fight.

In the Reformation controversy, the Rationalists were impatiently silenced. Luther himself was at first in some sympathy with their attitude. Exalting the Bible, he could yet depreciate parts of it. But in the heat of controversy such facts were soon forgotten. Lutheranism became a system, and then a tradition, but it could hardly hold its own in England against its more coherent Protestant rival. Calvinism, abhorrent to the modern mind, proved for a time more attractive to English Protestants, largely no doubt, because it was so definite that those who accepted its tenets found themselves securely entrenched against criticism and uncertainty.

Gradually, however, the victory, within the Church of England, passed to the Moderates. Elizabeth, James and Charles all belonged to this party, though each of them took a few additional steps in hostility to the Puritans. Elizabeth disliked, but would not definitely repudiate, Calvinism. If the Calvinists would outwardly conform, they might keep their theology. James and Charles went further in their opposition to Puritanism; and for a time they broke up the nation into two fiercely contending factions. Then, from the time of the Restoration, Calvinism dwindled in the Church, with only short and temporary revivals.

From our present point of view, the noteworthy fact is the apparent eclipse of Christian Rationalism. So far as this continued to exist among Churchmen, it was pretty equally distributed among the rival parties. Hooker defended the Elizabethan Settlement on grounds that were partly rationalistic. Falkland, who disliked High Churchmanship, was still more hostile to Calvinism, which he regarded as the great enemy to freedom of thought. Jeremy Taylor took a similar line in his earlier and better days; but like many Rationalists he was driven by the intolerance of the Puritans into a High Churchmanship that was almost equally intolerant. The Low Church party, on the other hand, always possessed a latitudinarian section which kept up some sort of protest against the narrowness of Calvinists and Puritans. To a man zealous for political liberty and national self-government, the dangers of Stuart domination might well seem greater than those attendant upon Calvinistic ascendency. Burnet, for instance, had little love for theological subtleties, but much for political freedom. He therefore threw in his lot with the Low Churchmen, though his Latitudinarianism was such as to make him far from popular among them. Sir Thomas Browne, on the other hand, cared little for politics and greatly for freedom of intellectual speculation. His

eccentricities of opinion were of a nature to arouse more opposition among Calvinists than among Royalists. These are but two among many, whose lives illustrate the fact that Rationalism was not extinct. Each party was willing to allow considerable latitude to those whose Rationalism did not conflict with the political and ecclesiastical doctrines that chiefly called forth its own enthusiasms.

In the eighteenth century we have the short-lived triumph of a sort of moderate Rationalism. In the Deistic controversy, nothing is more noteworthy than the extent to which both parties appealed to Reason. The orthodox apologists brought forward their arguments with a studied air of impartiality. They tried the apostles for perjury and found them "not guilty." But unfortunately this eighteenth century Rationalism was somewhat superficial. It closed its eyes to many aspects of life and religion. Its historical and critical attainments were quite inadequate for the tasks it sought to perform; and it could give no real answer to the assaults of Hume, from the side of Agnosticism, and Butler,[1] from the side of Orthodoxy.

Above all, eighteenth century Rationalism failed utterly to make religion a practical force, and to provide an answer to the deeper demands and sadder emotions of the human soul. Methodism was soon attracting those whom Latitudinarianism had failed to touch. Then followed the French Revolution, and the subsequent reaction in English thought. The Revolutionists had set up their strange Goddess of Reason, and consequently the Reactionaries condemned Reason altogether. Authority became the keynote of religion and morality. Children and young people must not be allowed to think for themselves. Repression was the first duty of their

[1] Butler however may rank as a Rationalist, since he maintains that Reason can judge "not only of the meaning, but also of the morality and the evidence of Revelation." *Analogy* II: 3, 13.

elders; a duty, the neglect of which would assuredly lead to the guillotine and the Reign of Terror. Among the fruits of this reaction must be included the morals of the Regency, the revolts of Byron and Shelley, and that curious secularity of sentiment which we find, for instance, in the novels of Jane Austin. Such religion as remained was naturally of the narrowest sort, based chiefly upon a belief in the Infallibility of Scripture, Hell Fire, Sabbatarianism and a commercial or a forensic conception of the Atonement. The fervid Evangelicalism of Methodists and Simeonites relieved the aridity of the conventional Christianity, but contributed nothing towards its rationalization.

At length, however, towards the middle of the Nineteenth Century two great Movements began to disturb the stagnant waters of the Church. The Anglo-Catholics came preaching Authority, but they nevertheless shook that prevailing tradition which was, for the moment, the greatest enemy of original thought and progressive religion. For a time, the Tractarian movement was almost wholly beneficial. It appealed, within certain limits, to history and to criticism alike; and it aroused forces which Newman and Pusey found themselves unable to control. Its stimulus towards reverence, towards worship, and towards the spiritualizing of religion in England, have been abundantly recognized. We are here concerned with Tractarianism, only in so far as it was, for a time, the unconscious ally of Christian Rationalism.

The other movement concerns us more directly. Frederick Denison Maurice was ordained in 1834. He was a man of naturally Conservative instincts, with a quite unique power of believing himself orthodox; of finding tests and creeds educative; of discovering Maurician doctrines in the great philosophies and theologies of past ages, and still more, in Anglican formularies and institutions. At the present moment it is the positive

side of his teaching which counts; but in the forties and fifties, his great significance lay in his fundamental opposition to the then dominant tradition. The religious world instinctively felt this man to be the enemy, and stupidly assumed that his orthodoxy of language was due to a dishonest desire to conceal his heterodoxy. When it was proposed to deprive Maurice of the professorships which he held at King's College, Mr. Gladstone suggested that his writings should be reported upon by experts; but the plain men upon the Council, peers for the most part, distrusted experts. They felt instinctively that this man was antagonistic to the conventional theological point of view. He had to go. The volume of *Theological Essays* which led to this dismissal was published in 1853; and in that same year Colenso was appointed Bishop of Natal. He soon began to hammer at tradition in a very different fashion. To Maurice, Eternal Death was a spiritual condition, outside time and space. To Colenso, belief in Eternal Punishment was a calumny on the Divine Father. Maurice was more concerned with the Inspiration of the Bible writers than with their Fallibility. To Colenso, the immediate need was to prove that the Scriptures contained a number of misstatements. He would have admitted that, theoretically, this was not the most important fact about the Bible; but it was the fact which the religious world persistently denied or ignored; and the fact which a bishop was, for that very reason, especially bound to emphasize. Naturally Colenso's episcopal brethren in South Africa set themselves to depose him; but in this case, as in that of Maurice, there was no condemnation which the English Law Courts would acknowledge. The right of Anglican clergymen to hold the views of Colenso was vindicated in 1863 by the judgment in the *Essays and Reviews* cases. In one of these it was finally decided that a clergyman of the English Church might declare the Bible to be mistaken. There was of course nothing

original in the bare assertion of the Fallibility of Scripture. St. Paul had definitely proclaimed that some of his remarks were mere declarations of personal opinions, and did not come from the Lord. In the Second Century, Clement of Alexandria had boldly explained away much of the Old Testament, as an allegory. But the paramount tradition set the verdicts of apostle and saints at defiance; and the practical question was whether an Anglican clergyman had a right to deny what the religious world of his time considered to be an essential element of Christianity. Many of the clergy had made this particular denial, especially perhaps in the years immediately preceding the publication of *Essays and Reviews*; and the religious world had complacently accused them of heresy, though it did not bring this accusation to the test of the Law Courts. Now the highest Court of Appeal vindicated the accused; and although the orthodox continued to raise the cry of Heresy, their complacency was somewhat disturbed. Here and there, individuals threatened to leave the Church; but they could no longer maintain that their opponents had no right to remain within it. The other charges against the authors of *Essays and Reviews* were in a sense less important. The popular conceptions of the Atonement and of Eternal Punishment were chiefly defended by texts. If texts were no longer to be regarded as infallible, the chief weapon of the traditionalists had broken in their hands. The judgment of the Court as to Eternal Punishment made nevertheless an even greater impression on the public imagination; for most men had assumed that the traditional view, whether true or false, was the accepted doctrine of the Church.

Essays and Reviews had little claim to originality. Jowett, Baden Powell and others had been defending the same views for years. The chief importance of the volume grows out of the legal vindication of its authors. The orthodox tried to break the force of this vindication

by a clerical Declaration of the Infallibility of Scripture, and of Everlasting Torment. This document was signed by eleven thousand clergymen; but it is noteworthy that out of the sixty-nine clerical professors at Oxford and Cambridge, only ten would affix their names to this declaration, in spite of the very strong pressure brought to bear upon them.

In the meantime the accepted standpoint of the three great orthodox parties was being attacked, though less violently, by F. W. Robertson, by Charles Kingsley, Dean Stanley and a number of other parsons who, to modern readers, appear orthodox enough. The general acceptance of their views is in itself a measure of the degree of success with which they fought the religious prejudices of their day. That there were, however, limits to the comprehensiveness of the Church of England was proved by the expulsion of Mr. Voysey, a clergyman who definitely and aggressively rejected most of the distinctive doctrines of Christianity, excepting only a belief in God, and in Immortality.

Since 1870, the Rationalistic movement within the Anglican body has chiefly taken two forms:—an attack on Miracles, and a development of what is called the Higher Criticism. In both these matters, it seems necessary to distinguish between the moderate and the extreme view. That a clergyman is at liberty to reject many of the miraculous stories told in the Bible, can hardly be disputed; but it does not follow that he can reject all miracles, and yet legally retain his position in the ministry. Similarly he is plainly free to apply the methods of the Higher Criticism to both Old and New Testaments, yet in so doing, he may arrive at conclusions which can hardly be reconciled with the most liberal interpretation of the doctrines of the Church. In such cases there are evidently two courses open to him. He may resign his Orders, as Mr. Stopford Brooke resigned his; or he may take the line that it is for his

opponents to prove him guilty of some heresy which would lead to his deprivation. Both these courses appear consistent with honesty, provided always that he does not feel himself so alien in spirit to the Church that he has no right to retain his position within her confines. Of this each Broad Churchman must be himself the judge. Those who exercise patronage are bound to exercise it as a trust, and may legitimately decide whether a man's views are such as should debar him from preferment. Bishops must judge whether they are justified in refusing him their licence; but to say that such a man ought to resign his orders is plainly to substitute our conscience for his. In any case, the advanced Broad Churchman will probably find himself excluded from positions to which his learning, piety and ability would otherwise have entitled him. It is unreasonable to further handicap him by charges of dishonesty, because his standard of Churchmanship is not the same as that of his opponents. The history of the past reminds us that the beliefs of one age have constantly proved incredible to the next; and that Revelation is a gradual process which naturally involves continual variations. The Church, like individuals, has to recognize that in her infancy she thought as a child and believed as a child, but that as she grows, she must ever be putting away childish things.

An Experiment in Co-operation

By W. F. Lofthouse.

I

In one of those fertile generalizations which proclaim him even more a prophet than a scientific pioneer, Francis Bacon said, "great bodies move violently to their place, slowly in their place." Doubtless he was thinking of the birth-throes of the Reformation as much as of any convulsions of nature. And later centuries have not withheld illustrations of the law. Yet it is none the less far from being entirely true. Many of the greatest changes advance by slow degrees. The Kingdom of Heaven itself cometh not with observation. The daily miracle of the dawn reminds us that changes may take place while no one can say "Lo here or lo there." There are great seasons of progress when we might not know that anything noteworthy was happening, if we did not see that in some westward places, where we had not thought of looking, "the land is bright."

Ardent spirits do not love to be warned against hurry. If the object of our desire is so fair, why wait and consider? Why not go forward at once? It is unwelcome, but essential, to remember that admiration is not understanding; and that the very light which attracts us in the darkness may prevent us from seeing exactly where it is, or what is the contour of the path that leads to it. If a prize is to be won, it is worth while to pause, in order to decide just what it is that we want, lest we should achieve no more than a new problem and a harder task. Great bodies must move slowly to their place.

But all this is no excuse for slackness and inaction. The Lord's remembrancers must never keep silence. They must rather give Him no rest day nor night till He be gracious to them. Even though we must beware of hurrying on the Kingdom itself, the Lord will hasten it in His own time. Nor does this mean simply that it is our part to pray and God's to work. Prayer which is worth the name of prayer will never be content with being no more than prayer. The child, all eagerness for a romp with his father in the garden, knows that he must wait his father's time. But if opening the door or pulling his father's hand will be likely to draw him the more quickly from the study, who will blame the importunity of the child?

In matters of social progress, again, the state is apt to move slowly (so some persons think) and with more than due circumspection. It would never move at all if individuals simply requested and petitioned. But let private persons build schools, arrange for pensions, or construct schemes of insurance, and presently the state steps in and says, "I can do this very much better than you" (as we suspected all the time) "and I will take it over." What will be the actual forms assumed by international peace, or ecclesiastical re-union, when they arrive? Who can tell? Meanwhile, those who believe that prayer is also labour will make trial of the Spirit, and even, if the words may be allowed, pull at the guiding hand of God, until it deign itself to point out the way and lead to the place of revelation.

Some such feeling as this lies at the basis of the movement now to be described. For some years past, most of the larger religious bodies in England have possessed Unions for social service. At the head of the list, in point of time and of influence, comes the Christian Social Union, whose membership is drawn from communicants of the Church of England, and whose first president was Bishop Westcott. The Catholics have their Catholic

Social Guild. The Friends, the Unitarian Churches, the Wesleyans, the Primitive Methodists, the Congregationalists, the Presbyterians, the Baptists, and the United Methodists, all have similar organizations. With the exception of the Christian Social Union, these sprang up within a few years of each other; but with considerable mutual ignorance, and certainly, except in one or two cases, hardly influencing one another at all. The aims of the Friends' Social Union were hardly known to the members of the Wesleyan Methodist Union for Social Service, or the existence of the Catholic Social Guild to the Unitarian National Council.

On the other hand, the aims and methods of all are strikingly similar. Each has a central denominational organization, and confines its membership to members or adherents of its own body. Each attempts to found local groups or branches for study (some definite subject being generally fixed upon), to combine its members in some form of practical work or investigation, to prepare them for wider forms of social service thereby, and to influence the general feeling and attitude of the denomination. There is a corresponding similarity in the convictions which lie beneath these varying forms of action. These might be stated for all the societies in question in the words of the constitution of the Christian Social Union:—

"to claim for the Christian law the ultimate authority to rule social practice; to present Christ in practical life as the living Master and King, the enemy of wrong and selfishness, the power of righteousness and love."

In other words, the societies are all persuaded that the social problem is a religious problem; that obedience to Christ involves a definite attitude and purpose in industrial, commercial and social life, and that no association of Christians can endure its Master's judgment hereafter unless it faces the task of testing the pre-suppositions and practices of society by His laws. And this,

after all, is a sufficiently remarkable series of agreements.

These societies have already exerted a considerable influence within their communions. Their books and pamphlets have been widely read; their propaganda has been delivered on many different platforms with praiseworthy persistence; they have led to the passing of many resolutions on subjects on which formerly the church was wont to be disappointingly silent; they have afforded a rallying point for that social enthusiasm which is so marked a feature of the day; and they have called public as well as private attention to many admitted evils prospering in a so-called Christian society. The attitude of every church to "applied Christianity" is remarkably different from what it was ten years ago.

The adherents of these societies, however, will readily admit that they have not compassed the influence which all of them would claim and some of them expected. Their rolls of membership are small, and their message (save where some enthusiast gathers round him a band of disciples and fellow-workers) is often neglected. In the life of the denomination, denominational interests tend to swamp everything else. It is the paradox of political life over again. Measures which are opposed will be taken up, pressed on, carried through. Measures on which everyone is agreed will be postponed, pushed aside, forgotten. What concerns the prestige of the individual religious body—a great denominational scheme, or the defence of a traditional denominational principle—will attract universal enthusiasm. What concerns all denominations vitally, but will assist no single denominational fund or enterprise, tends inevitably, in the stress of modern church life, to be elbowed out.

Meanwhile, some four years ago, a movement began for bringing these Unions into touch with one another. The discovery of the close similarity between them, both in aims and methods, was made, and in response

to a letter asking for co-operation between them a meeting of representatives of all the Unions was held, with the present Bishop of Oxford in the chair, a member of the Friends' Social Union as the Secretary, and a Catholic as the Treasurer. Those who were present, with modest self-assurance, proceeded to constitute themselves into the "Conference of Social Service Unions"; they decided to confine their constituency to the recognized unions of religious denominations, while arranging at the same time to keep in touch with two inter-denominational bodies, the Student Christian Movement, and the Brotherhood Federation. And they at once began to discuss co-operation, general and local.

The necessity for a further step soon made itself felt. Ought not an opportunity to be given, not to the representatives only, but to the members as a whole, to meet in some conference or school, for the consideration of the great religious and social questions which were pressing upon them all? The idea, from the moment when it was first mentioned, was taken up with enthusiasm; and it became clear that such a conference would have a special character of its own. Separate Unions had already held conferences for social study, for their own members, with delegates from other Unions; this Conference was to be inter-denominational. Other Conventions (such as Keswick) had invited Christian people irrespective of the churches to which they belonged; to this Conference were to be invited the members of different denominations as such. Nor had a previous Conference of any kind announced that it was intended for the discussion of problems, in a religious spirit and on a religious basis, by Anglican and Congregationalist, Catholic and Unitarian.

To the surprise of some cautious friends, all the religious bodies were well represented among the 250 persons present at the School at Swanwick. The addresses at the various sessions were delivered by recognized

authorities, on subjects of pressing social importance; and the discussions by the members of the Conference revealed much expert knowledge and varied experience. As so often happens at such gatherings, however, the opportunities of personal and private intercourse proved to be of even more value, and it was even asserted that, in their zeal for forming new friendships, members of the same denomination were rarely seen talking to one another.

This practical and social inter-denominationalism had a very distinct result. The committee had wisely decided that there could be no common religious celebrations; and provision was therefore made for four separate religious services daily; the Catholic Mass, the Anglican Eucharist, a Friends' Meeting, and a simple devotional service for which the members of the Free Churches were primarily responsible. Nothing was to be done during the Conference of which any member, or any denominational authority, could disapprove. The result was that, differences being thus taken for granted, attention and emphasis naturally fell on what was common to all. Some members of the Conference, indeed, took opportunities for attending all four services; and were surprised to find how much appealed to them in each. There was no one who did not feel that these services, held at the same time, though in different places, bound the whole Conference together, and even constituted a mystical common worship of the one Lord.

The result was an unexpected warmth of enthusiasm and good-will, and a distinct Catholicity of sentiment. As it happened, the discussions centred to a very large extent round the necessity of a minimum wage; and as speaker after speaker emphasized this, the demand for the opportunity to live a decent life and to satisfy humane interests was felt to be no mere "chatter of social reformers," but something on its way to be a conviction of the mind of the church. This consciousness was

specially prominent in the Sunday afternoon meeting, addressed by an Anglican Bishop, a Catholic Monsignor, and an Ex-President of the Wesleyan Conference; and not less so, when the last session, presided over by a Unitarian, was closed by a few bars of solemn music and a short space of spontaneous but intense devotional silence. Only those who were actually present could appreciate the sense of a great duty laid upon the church as a whole, and to be discharged in common by all its members.

II

A duty laid upon the whole church; it was the achievement of just such a consciousness which made this gathering at Swanwick, with its successor in 1913[1], a unique experiment in co-operation. It was a Conference, held by members of all the chief religious bodies in England, not to discuss how best to adjust their points of difference, but to unite in a common obedience. Its object was co-operation, not in matters where differences of belief and practice are recognized as important (for example, a united communion service was never mentioned), but for purposes held by everyone present to be a vital concern of the church—to be essential to her existence, in fact, as the Body of Christ. No question of belief or ceremonial was raised. And if the church is indeed to be the Body of Christ, neither belief nor ceremonial can be a matter of final importance. She must be the vehicle for those great and redemptive activities which fill up the record of "all that Jesus began both to do and to teach." And for this reason, to all who are interested in the question of future re-union, however it is to come, this experiment will possess a significance of its own.

---

[1]Since this paper was written the third of the Summer Schools has been held, at the end of June, 1914. In its whole tone and spirit it was more significant than either of its predecessors.

Most gatherings intended to further *rapprochement* of this kind have fixed upon points of secondary importance for discussion—orders, sacraments, authority. To many, this will seem a hard saying. Can such matters as orders and sacraments be called secondary? Secondary does not mean unimportant, much less negligible. Yet is it not agreed by everyone that these are not, after all, final considerations? Let us admit that without orders there can be no valid ministry; without sacraments, no grace. Yet what is the ministry for? Why is grace needed? That the work of Christ may be done, and His commands obeyed. More fundamental than believing, receiving, experiencing, is doing; for without doing, none of these can be the least use. Instead of being means to the performance of a common function, they are as divisive as so many apples of strife.

Baron von Hügel, in his *Mystical Element in Religion*, has drawn attention to three functions of the religious life, the intellectual, institutional, and mystical. If we have not felt that there is a fourth, we need not be greatly surprised. We are not always conscious of the air we breathe. Yet can it be denied that our Saviour placed his chief stress on action? To love God and to love our neighbour; to heal the sick and cast out devils; to feed the hungry and clothe the naked; to attend Him in all the needs of human beings around us; to baptize all nations, and to teach them to observe all things whatsoever He commanded us; this is the burden of page after page in the Gospels. Not all the alleged eschatological import of the Christ's teaching can set aside the weight of ethical urgency in Luke 10 or Matt. 25. His followers are men who, like Himself, attack human misery and helplessness and sin with His weapons, and summon others to do the same, in a world in which, like this, human misery and helplessness and sin abound. And in the first decades after Christ's death, while St. Paul was working out his theory of law and faith, and ela-

borating his conception of the church, St. John was quietly insisting on the absolute importance of love, and the mass of plain Christian people were dwelling with wonder and reverence on the simple stories of Him who went about doing good.

Yet how little attention all this aspect of Christianity receives in the official life of our churches. We recognize that such obedience is the end of all our Christian life; and then we devote ourselves to our favourite means to the end. We have but to think of the familiar agenda of our denominational conferences and assemblies, and of the consequent narrowing of vision and sharpening of partisanship and jealousy. How can the true desire for reunion, for comprehensiveness, for forbearance, flourish in such an atmosphere? The leaders at the Conference just described were men and women of strong denominational interests and positions; they attached great importance to all these questions of orders and sacraments and the like. Had they fallen to arguing about them, the widest divergencies would have appeared. And yet, how far would those differences have cut? Deep down, but not to the bottom. "We must do Christ's work on earth, and without orders this cannot be rightly organized or carried through." "We must do Christ's work, and in this we cannot be limited to episcopal organization." Or, "We must do Christ's work, and how can we do it without sacramental grace?" "We must do Christ's work, and for this grace can be found, as it has been found, apart from Catholic rites." "Here are differences enough," urges the critic. True; but the unity comes first. The differences, deep as they cut, rest on our interpretations of Christ's words, of the church's history, and of our own experiences. The agreement rests on Christ's command; and were it not for the point on which we all agree, the differences would never have arisen.

The contention of the present writer is that this dis-

tinction is vital, and that if there is to be any healing of our "unhappy divisions," it must proceed from the position on which there is properly no disagreement at all. One of the chief reasons why this seems to be so far off at present, is that the church as a whole cares so little for her great sacrifice of obedience to God, and so much for other matters which are honestly intended to help that sacrifice but really hinder its due celebration. As the Headmaster of Repton has said, "It has been partly through forgetfulness of the immensity of its task, that the visible church has had so fatal a tendency to take its eyes off the oneness of the Spirit, and to quarrel about the diversity of gifts and methods, till it broke into little pieces." For "partly," it would not be unsafe to read "mainly."

Can this forgetfulness be denied? Read the denominational papers, the reports of church assemblies. Note the interest in distinctive denominational positions, the traditions of denominational history, "what the church stands for." These are emphasized and reiterated until we seem to assert, and are ready to believe that unless men recognize adult baptism, or the necessity of a conscious conversion, or episcopal orders, or the independence of separate congregations, or the supremacy of the Pope, they cannot be in communion with God or enjoy the love of Christ—propositions which we really know to be false. No wonder if we lament that men neither listen to the teachings of the church nor tremble at her rebukes.

Such is the nemesis that awaits our neglect of the heart of our religion. Not that these matters, so dear to our denominational loyalty, are to be expelled from our affections or allegiance. Let us be quite explicit on this point. It would be useless,—it ought to be useless—to ask any convinced Anglican or Presbyterian or Friend to surrender the distinctive note of his own religious body. To do this would argue as sorry an ignorance of history

as of psychology. Whatever has inspired men to courage and self-sacrifice and faith in the past has abiding worth, whether it be adult baptism, the doctrine of the inward witness, or the omission of the "*filioque.*" To question the value of what some man holds sacred is to deepen his reverence and sharpen his resolve to be true, at all costs, to the banner that is being flouted.

But after all the flag that we reverence is one thing, the position that we have to capture is another. We are not sent to preserve our denominational system intact, but to destroy the works of the devil. "Whatever it is of distinctive truth as we see it" (the words are Bishop Gore's), "which justifies to our conscience our existence in separate communities, it is this and nothing less than this that is to make us resolute to combat sweating and insist on better housing." Can we imagine a day when these distinctive messages will take their true place, in our counsels and schemes, as so many regimental orders and loyalties created for a greater purpose than their own existence, and limited by it alone—the redemption of the world by love?

We must go further. If we are to save our life, we must lose it. The price of life, that is, is self-denial, or rather, self-effacement. We agree, in theory, that this is true of individuals. How do we know that it is not also true of denominations and separate churches? To insist on our special portion of the truth of the gospel; to push it into the forefront; to command others to recognize it and bow down before it—is to cultivate the spirit of self-assertion which is fatal to the Christian character. No loyalty to the faith of our fathers can compensate for the sacrifice of humility. Let any religious body put its own traditional standards and war-cries before the salvation of the world, and it is lost. "*Que mon nom soit flêtri, mais que la France soit libre!*"

It is one thing, in fact, to emphasize the denominational principle; it is another thing to regard as of

primary importance the tenets of any one denomination. The Conference at Swanwick avoided the mistake of confusing the two. Like the Student Christian Movement, it recognized the denominations. And this recognition helped the feeling of comradeship instead of hindering it. If there is to be any future approach among the churches, it will not be by way of "pooling." At the Conference, Catholic and Quaker were actually the nearer because each had worshipped in his own fashion, at Mass or Meeting, in the beginning of the day. Any attempt to overcome this would simply have ministered to the very sense of disunion which was happily absent. Inclusiveness must be the rule if we are to approximate to a common point. We may in time come to welcome each others' presence, as fellow-Christians, and even as guides, at our meetings for worship and counsel; we shall be wise to respect the forms which those meetings, through the development of centuries, have slowly assumed.

Inclusiveness, however, is only possible if there is a bond of union, a single enthusiasm or aim. Such was supplied for the Conference; and it is equally needed by the church as a whole. Without it, opposing doctrines make any real alliance hopeless; with it, they become complementary principles. "I cannot give up the rite of absolution," says one. "I cannot cease insisting on the witness of the Spirit," says another. But let both fix their thoughts on the great mission of the church, and both will find, when allowed to keep these precious and holy things, that they can use all that is thus given for that splendid task, and feel that everyone else is the richer for it. The Unitarian needs all the confidence born of the sense of historical continuity which the Anglican can bring to the struggle against the common foe; and the Catholic needs all the resolution that springs in the heart of the man whose solemn and adult pledge to his Maker was sealed at his baptism.

The denominational deposit is now no longer a Shibboleth; it is a covenant.

III

The Social Service Unions of the various religious bodies are quite young. Only one of them is older than twenty, or even ten years. None of them possesses, or aspires to possess, the wide influence of the English Church Union or the Free Church Council, or of the great denominational Foreign Missionary Societies. The amount of actual work accomplished by them may seem inconsiderable. But they are a symptom, a sign of the times; and they are a symbol. They point to a department of the church's work which has often been forgotten, but which for the purposes of reunion may be of capital importance. The last ten years have seen great changes in the attitude of the churches to the social problem. The churches have discovered it, discussed it, decided that they have nothing to do with it, wondered whether they have to do with anything else; tried to put it in its place, patronized it, suspected it, made use of it, proclaimed it. The reason for this is partly no doubt that the problem has assumed a political and economic importance unknown hitherto. But it is also that the conviction has steadily grown, in spite of opposition and denial, that to grapple with the social problem is an integral part of the church's activity.

This does not mean that the "spiritual" vocation of the church is to be interpreted in terms of better drains and wider playing-fields. The church is not called to leave the ministry of the word and serve tables. She has been but too ready to do this in the past. Apart from the thousand and one schemes, efforts, and funds, which have filled up so much of our English religious life, not without ministering to some extent to our religious rivalries, the church has been the recognized almoner of society. This is a burden which at one time she could not refuse.

But she need bear it no longer. The support of the sick, the indigent and the aged is not the proper work of the church, much less of the clergy. The minister has the special skill neither of the doctor nor the relieving officer. He has no time to spend in doing badly what they can do well. The result of such a misinterpretation of his duties is that the growth of social evils far outstrips attempts at their alleviation.

But in these days a new conception of the attitude of the church to the world has been arising. It is hers to diagnose social evils and to criticize social aims and ideals; to hold up the Christian conception of society in a world which in its attitude to wealth, force and self-indulgence is still essentially heathen. She must be able to say, "Thou ailest here and here." She must show the application of the great moral and spiritual truths committed to her care;—the sovereignty of God, the incarnation and redemption of Christ, the invincibility of faith, the identity of life with obedience and love. "The churches should be fountains of religious emotion," as President Eliot has said, "and also steady sources of moral action on the part both of individuals and of society."

Such a conception of her vocation naturally leads to that united action without which no closer reunion is possible. In 1908, the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America (now representing thirty-one denominations and 17,000,000 members), issued a series of recommendations on the whole attitude of the Church to Labour, including the enforcement of the study of existing conditions as a religious duty, sympathetic and fraternal relations with working men, modification of its own equipment in the interest of larger social activity, and a steadier emphasis on the social application of the gospel, as disclosing the foundations of social order. In 1912, this same body formulated, in a "social creed," its definite demands for social advance. In the same year, chiefly as the result of the gathering at Swan-

wick already described, was formed a Council of Christian Witness, consisting of men and women belonging to all sections of the church, and of recognized positions both in the religious and the social world; its object being to put forward statements from time to time on great social and moral issues, from the standpoint of Christian faith and obedience. One such statement, on the Living Wage, has already appeared. Here is a further approach to that Catholicity of proclamation which is one of the great functions of the church.

These declarations, however, will be of comparatively little use by themselves. Great and significant texts as they are, they must be explained, illustrated, and pressed home, by the expository activity of the religious bodies as a whole. Every church—every religious organization—exists to preach deliverance to the captives and to bring conviction of sin to the world, the society, which it is able to touch. Every church is bound, therefore, to work for the purification of society, the cleansing of industrial and commercial life, the removal of temptation; and equally bound to summon her followers to prove, in such service, the diversity of their own gifts, and the unity of the Spirit, for the work of preaching Christ. Whether the field of these operations be her own neighbourhood or "heathen" countries, is all one. To forget herself, deny herself, in the service of the world, will force the church to search for ampler inspiration in all her denominational convictions and systems; it will rouse a fresh loyalty to the spirit of truth committed to the saints and revered by all sections of Christendom; it will add a new intensity to her passion for the conversion of individual souls. It will also fix her mind—and that is the burden of this paper—on the things that matter most, the mighty tasks and hopes that join all the churches to one another; and it will therefore inevitably prepare the way for the union of all her severed ranks in undivided allegiance to their Head.

The Decay and the Growth of Ethical and Religious Ideas among Industrial Workers in Germany

By Walter Classen.

According to an old legend, when the Goths crossed the Danube and invaded the Roman Empire there remained behind on the further bank tiny spirits uttering cries of lamentation. These were the household gods of the old home which had been left behind by the invaders. A similar fate was the portion of a great part of our population when they changed their abode from the farming country to the industrial centres of great cities. All the old convictions of the household, its religion, its morality, remained behind or, during the subsequent migrations, perished altogether.

Before we enter the metropolitan centres, we must clearly understand that in our agricultural population also a change took place in the second half of the nineteenth century, to a certain extent simplifying a loss of its old household gods. If we make inquiries in families or personally investigate conditions in the country, it will be everywhere apparent that something like two generations ago the custom of making furniture and clothes at home came to an end. What now has found its habitat in museums as peasant craftsmanship died out more than two generations ago and has become a lostart. What is the explanation of this? It is an evidence that the predominant domestic economic system of the

rural family has been transformed into occupations that are controlled by capitalistic industry. Up to this time peasants and farm labourers made their clothes and food from the products of the soil they tilled. Such a transformation in the life of our country folk is so unique that one can say that since the stone and bronze age no such change has affected this class of the population. It was accompanied naturally by a decided change in the spiritual life of our rural inhabitants.

After experiencing this shock at home the country workingman comes into the city. It is well enough to be reminded at this point that the spiritual change in the peasant village was far less intense than that in the economic sphere. The very fact that agricultural estates became an object of trade made it possible for their owners to be often changed. The country labouring population became, while remaining in the country, a member of the proletariat; with their families they have changed their habitat two or three times, with the result that they really no longer have a home in the country. It is no longer possible to talk of farms occupied under a long established ownership. From such an agricultural environment men have come into the cities.

What happened in the period from 1870-1890 was that men first of all lost contact with the old ecclesiastical, patriarchal point of view. Women kept longer attached to it, as they did to the home cooking receipts, and likewise to old-fashioned children's clothing and old methods of working. But once in the cities the mothers could not pass on to their daughters their inheritance as they had done in the country. In German industrial districts men soon joined the Social Democratic party in overwhelming numbers; this gave them their point of view in Berlin and Hamburg in the decade after 1890 and filled them with hope and energy. At this period, *i.e.* fourteen or fifteen years ago, one often found in the large cities of northern Germany workingmen who were

extraordinarily well acquainted with Marx's system and who had done even more reading; for example, they read the Bible and Becker's *Universal History*. With these men of fifty years or thereabouts one could have a pleasant talk, sitting on a sofa over which might be seen hanging in peaceful proximity portraits of Bebel, Lassalle and Kaiser Wilhelm; they are now dead or at least they are taking no part in active life but are sitting quietly at home in their own dwellings. This is the generation which built up the German Socialistic Party. In their thoughts they were aggressively revolutionary, in their character, thoroughly conservative. In their views as to the discipline of children they were strict; in regard to honour and truthfulness, they made great demands on their children. But this age has now come to its end. We have to do now with a new generation of the working class.

If we consider for a moment this city-born generation, belonging to the last twenty or twenty-five years, an observer familiar with it will meet very many men endowed with great intellectual energy, with physical power and talents. The reason for this is that their healthy parents were country-born and that they received from their schooling a variety of intellectual endowments. Wherever stock, closely allied in kinship, met in the city, people from Pomerania, Mecklenburg, Hanover, and contracted marriages, there issued a great advance in talents and in intensity of spiritual life. But we have no right to be deceived by this, for it is on the whole only a thin veneer—those who crowd to popular concerts and educational institutions. The great mass of our population are spiritually impoverished, and they are descending constantly to a lower spiritual and moral level, lower indeed than that of the country working population from 1870 on in Brandenburg and Holstein. We must concede this fact, and it is the migration of our people that is primarily responsible for this general loss.

Another reason affecting wide sections of the people must be added, due to the constantly increased intermingling by marriage; Poles, South Saxons from the moors of Luneburg, boatmen from the Danube, Pomeranians, Galicians, Czechs. From this combination comes no increase of spiritual power but irreparable disharmony and superficiality—human beings who in no respect are strong and intense. Here is one of the greatest dangers of the great city. In the East End of London one can see clearly the outcome. These people are essentially harmless, stupid, desperately commonplace. The situation will be much clearer when we realize that through insufficient food, malnutrition, syphilis and alcoholism, crowds of human beings grow up in the slums of great cities, who are of base metal, whose inner nature has no sound element. Not only in the cities, in the industrial villages too, there is much at low tension, much that is miserable, with no sound element contained in it. It is questionable whether it is possible to restore health to such degenerates. From many lads of this type seen in the gloomy streets of Hamburg, I have got the impression that they admire quickwittedness, that they are good fellows who would harm no one, but that there is something destroyed in them which no human art can restore; they can never be real men.

All this is necessary to explain why one can no longer really speak of a common system of thought, or a common outlook in the world in connection with the labouring masses. The inheritance of Christian family discipline is exhausted. we can no longer live on the inheritance of our fathers without creating a new one. Anyone who mixes much with the younger generation will notice they do not tussle, they are not rowdyish, but they are fearfully uncouth. This is expressed in the most distressing way in the fearful increase of deviousness in speech and action. They have no mothers to make them understand the Ten Commandments, not with reason

but with consecrated earnestness. To honour father and mother, to be upright, this tremendous element in the maternal training, is disappearing before our eyes. This is a melancholy trait in our people and is far worse than the much reviled Social Democracy. The first thing, therefore, to attend to is the collapse of the Christian family discipline.

The next point is the altogether extraordinary interest in technical matters, in externals. Coming into a group of young people it is difficult to talk to them of theoretical subjects. To Moses and Darwin, our gilded youth of the cities are entirely apathetic. Their interests are absorbed in what is technical, they are interested in airships and other kinds of ships. This, of course, is the element of wonder which they get out of their environment. There accompanies this, so it appears to me, a decline in the influence of the Marxian standpoint. Simply because our people of Lower Saxony are conservative, they will continue for twenty years more to vote the Socialist ticket. This does not represent their heart's desire, it is only a matter of habit, the giving of support to the Social Democracy; wages have been raised by it; still more profitable is the co-operative movement; everything is valued according to the technical point of view.

After presenting the condition of the younger generation, something else must be brought to our attention. It is hard for us to realize; we are through and through individualists, we read individualistic newspapers, etc. The best we have is the individualistic tradition from the times of classical political economy. This is not true of the people as a whole; among them is a constant pressure working on their souls. This pressure determines all their thinking, all their judgments. It is the fact that labour has absolutely become devoid of any ethical significance. The pastor in the country community may still preach as of old in the good Lutheran fashion

that work is God's service. Let him say it four years later to one he has previously confirmed, and who has since become an artisan, and the man is offended: "My work is no service of God." The same is true of the mechanic and tradesman who as such are at a fair intellectual level, but the man is everywhere reduced to the category of a number where he gives out only what he has learned. Under present-day organization he has no influence as to the kind of occupation he devotes himself to; the printer can not decide whether he will print obscene literature, the Bible, or the classics. The metal worker has no influence in the decision as to whether he will produce revolvers for brigands on Olympus or weapons for the German army. Perhaps it is better that he knows nothing about it, but in any case work is morally devitalized. It is true that there are to be found men who are interesting and original, but the workingman stands no longer in any relation to the end for which he is working. For this reason the Lutheran axiom, "Work is God's service," is an enigma.

The third impression is the feeling that working people are being swallowed whole by a system. The youth who works seems first of all to be having an agreeable time. An apprentice in some mechanical trade who is under a sensible master is the happiest man under the sun. The city has passed laws, insisting on certain hours free from labour, etc. But when men become older (*e.g.* construction workers), then comes the question of establishing a family. For a while a good deal of money is earned but after three years a strike comes or a boycott or an industrial crisis, and work stops. The danger of losing one's foothold is one of the things that must be confronted, then the hustling, the quick tension of life, this terrible turmoil and rush, all to get a job under any conditions, this limitless anxiety year in and year out presses down on a man like a weight. Then, too, there is the feeling that one's health

is being undermined and the realization that there is no protection against being swallowed up, of "coming up against it" at forty-five. This lies upon the whole population like a mass of iron. Thence comes the feeling of bitterness, stirred and fed by the labour press, because it gets its livelihood from it; but even without this increment bitterness is predominant. One can talk of all kinds of things in conversing with young men. It may be flower-growing, Hebbel or Chinese, but one always ends with recognizing a feeling of indignation. It all comes down to this; nothing but being a number, having no general ideas, always standing one only among the forty-five, fifty or sixty thousand.

Then, too, there are the constant migrations; every house has some defect. There is therefore no more sentiment about home. Human beings have no longer the belief that anything is worth while. Children in a large city after only a year forget the names of their former schoolmates; there are so many of them. In young men's clubs nobody pays any attention to the names; being introduced is superfluous and a bore, there are others always joining. Once I had the following experience. Two young men came too late to take part in an announced excursion; the pair of them went off together. I happened to ask one of them, some days after, who had been his companion; he did not know and yet they were together all day. A stupefying indifference has settled upon mankind. Through the existence of sects some life gets into the people who belong to them, and also new and old superstitions. One finds, too, active, talented people who fix everything under some kind of "ism." A pastor was telling of a circle of young people. "Among them are Monists, Atheists, Spiritualists and some Christians too." What is the way out of this chaos? At this moment no answer can be made. So and so predominates; to a certain degree it is chiefly Socialism, but this no longer produces

a prevailing system of thought, it brings no satisfaction. Are there anywhere leading principles of thought to be stirred into activity? Are there any able to act like the magnet on iron filings?

Yes, there are such thoughts. A few years ago I had the opportunity during a whole winter of discussing with a small number of young, alert workingmen the question of the value of organization. For an audience we had fifty or sixty young people who took part in the debates more with the heart than the head. It was during the Reichstag elections. The young people said: "Since we have had the organization, since we are members of co-operative stores and societies, we are giving up the old Christian view of loving your neighbour, which is no longer necessary. Not because the good God does not exist, but old-fashioned Christianity was love of one's neighbour, now we are turning everything into organization." Some held their heads higher and saw further, remarking: "No, you are mistaken. In Sweden they had the general strike; you say it is love of one's neighbour when we send money, as Christians do for missions; that's not true, it is only solidarity, federated unionism, self-love." I then put in a word myself: "Love of one's neighbour is more than that. If I tell you next Sunday we are going to make an excursion of seventy or eighty people, and I need ten leaders or guides—I can't do it alone—you reply, All right. You feel therefore responsible for looking after our children. This is Christianity! You see it does not end with our organization. You are responsible for your neighbour in the workshop to see that he does not become a wastrel."

In our internal development in Germany we are responsible for a great negligence in failing to understand how to deepen the thought of organization through Christian principles and the failure to affirm that we mean to go on and create something out of the struggles of competition by means of organization. Organization

specifically in the shape of co-operative consumers' societies can be characterized as a service to one's neighbours. If we look at the organization in this way, it receives a religious content. The same thought which caused the Hansa traders going to England and Holland to erect altars, which turned every guild even into a religious society can be made to work in a living way today. It is a great misfortune that we have neglected to inoculate the German working classes with this thought. When an English trades union congress takes place, they secure a famous preacher to open the affair with a religious service. Our workingmen do not believe in this, or they say: "No you don't; that would not be social democracy." Two young artisans wrote home from Switzerland that they celebrated the first of May in church. No one would credit it until a post card came, which showed the procession in the church.

Yet in Germany the young people are eagerly interested in the co-operative societies, not only on account of the cheaper bread, but also because they have created something that is not so terribly shortsighted a creation as the many works of capitalistic speculation but can endure for decades and centuries. This is a fine factor in union activity. Therefore, it can also be said this is service of mankind, this is religion, hold fast to it; you must believe in something higher. Putting the ideal in this way, it can only be derived from the conception of Christianity that man is not here for himself alone but is here to serve.

A further point now comes up. A civil engineer, a believing Christian, once said to me: "My friend, what you tell me in the liturgy in ceremonial language, that our sins are forgiven, I know is true as an individual and therefore to set myself straight with my conscience I am a Protestant. But in the community we have to do with the question: How do I get free from social guilt? I can not deal with this as I can with personal." In

this respect our patriarchal Church shows great weakness. No individual member of the working classes will hear anything of guilt; only the rich are guilty, we have no sins, it all comes from development, they say. But the moment one takes in the subject from the social standpoint and says: "Why are so many truckmen drinkers? Because of your morals and drinking habits; in this case the brewers are not responsible, but you;" or, "Why do you always go off in groups of three and four? If I, an old fellow as I am, still make pleasure trips with children, why don't you? Because you are too selfish to bring up the young generation. You won't make any sacrifice. This is *social guilt*," they understand. "Not the speculators in real estate only, no, you, too, are guilty of social offenses." In each individual case begin with *his* social guilt. The history of the world is so just that the correlation can be made; your prosperity is not merely the concern of the small circle of your own life, for in order to recognize yourself as a responsible member of the whole, you must suffer with the whole.

Here is the place for the third of the three great Christian social ideas! Change and help come only through sacrifice. Human beings must be ready to sacrifice themselves, and on the ground of social guilt. Now all are actively engaged in seeking to prove themselves innocent. But conscience is awakened. This is the way to make understandable to the working classes the conception of vicarious suffering, for they have seen the drunkard's wife enduring all things, giving up her life, to save her children. But we should not fault our people if they have lost the Christian religion in its integrity. It has been preached in an incomprehensible fashion, "Because of an historical event my sins are bound to be forgiven." This was barbaric; because of it the Church came to be detested. But when it is recognized that this is a law of human development, *i.e.* the

law of representative suffering, it will be understood by the people.

Can we not once for all get rid of the Jewish conception of sacrifice and ourselves have the courage of sacrifice? A great part of our young people, and not only those in High Schools, feel a longing, a desire to get away from their narrow sphere. They seek refreshment in nature, they grasp at a lyrical Pantheism which has not the strength permanently to hold men. Yes, there outside, they are seeking Almighty God as our forefathers believed in Him and our peasants and country folk have always believed, for all the theological development has gone over the heads of country people. They still today recognize the Almighty in storm and in sunshine; added to this is certainly the thought of service and the offering of sacrifice, as the customs of the people show. Today what concerns us is to have the industrial class see also that in the world's history reason bears sway. This insight they will only experience when they learn to serve in the sense declared by One from whom our people are really not cutting loose. If there is a sin it is this that the attempt is made to get rid of Jesus by discussion, by dialectical subtleties. With Wodan, we can not get away from industrial misery, but only through organization based on Christian principles, through recognition of social guilt, and through the courage to do substitutional sacrifice; in other words, and essentially, by following Jesus.

In conclusion I can only say this and nothing else. The decision depends on us. Whether the vitalizing ethical social ideas in our working classes can win the mastery depends on those endowed with education and far-seeing vision. Pioneers must by living out their ideas make themselves fellow citizens of the workers. To live and to serve the people, this after all is actually the only thing which gives an aristocracy the right to live—it is the highest Christian social ideal.

Madame Lucie Félix-Faure Goyau

By Léonce de Grandmaison,
Editor of Etudes, and Recherches de Science Religieuse.

The regrettably short life of Madame Goyau, outwardly so brilliant and so at one with itself, presents to one who can view it from within a touching, almost a tragic, contrast.

Fortunate in almost everything—born in a beautiful country, brought up by parents who loved her passionately,—she passes from an atmosphere of ample comfort to the quasi-royal receptions of a Palace. After accompanying her father in his travels at the time when Félix Faure, already a very exalted personage, Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies and a Minister, was on his way to supreme rank, she enters the Elysée with him at an age and endowed with a charm which make it seem natural to treat her somewhat as a princess: she might have been called "Princess Lucie," as in America people used to say "Princess Alice." During these years she is in the foreground of French official life. When the President's sudden death comes, overwhelming her filial love, Mademoiselle Lucie Faure is left in a very enviable position, rich, intellectual, cultured, having already accomplished literary work which has attracted attention. After a few years of retirement and of beautiful artistic labour carried on in the most favourable conditions, she marries a man whom she has honoured with her choice for his worth only, a man whom she loves, whom she renders happy, and who makes her happy. All their convictions are in common; their tastes are mutually complementary while remaining distinct. People visit

Madame Goyau, she is trusted, her books are appreciated by persons of good taste, her beautiful rooms in the Rue Pierre-Charron are filled with a select circle of friends. At last, before life reaches its decline, she dies a perfectly peaceful death, encompassed with the most loving care, admired, blessed, having attained the fulness of a woman's possible desires upon earth. In this picture of dazzling happiness, trials and griefs—the death of her father, the cruel doubts cast upon that beloved memory—physical sufferings and death itself appear but as the indispensable shadow in a picture which would otherwise have seemed too brilliant for truth.

Surely everything seemed to influence a life like this towards the light satisfaction of facile success, towards agreeable and futile superficiality. What plentiful food for vanity in those *fêtes*, those stately receptions, those associations with royalty—in the enviable friendships, the applause of the literary, the flattering notoriety of salons and clubs!

Well, we find on the contrary that, behind this brilliant scene, which makes us think of the sunny canvases of the eighteenth-century masters—Watteau or Lancret—there is unfolded a life the austerity of which reaches the point of the most meritorious self-abnegation; a life worthy, in its strong simplicity and its profound faith, of the times and the heroic women towards whom Madame Goyau's inclinations attracted her more and more. An ascent in the light towards greater light, such was this rare life, and, to sum it up, we can only borrow certain lines from her private notes. Better than any estimate, this admirable page defines what she who wrote it wished to be, and what, according to the measure of human power, she was:

"The human personality will never be annihilated: it has the promise of eternity. But it may be overwhelmed, invaded, submerged, just as a fragment of crystal is overwhelmed, invaded, submerged by the light. It

disappears, but it does not cease to exist; it is the glory of its purity to lose itself and let the pure and glorious light pass through it without hindrance.

"All its transparency will not annihilate it; it is given up to the light which penetrates without breaking it. Now it must be entirely given up if it is to be true to its mission; should it refuse anything to the light, it would then be wishing itself to carry darkness and would be fancying itself adding to its own existence by this love of the darkness, which would be the inordinate love of its own personality. To carry darkness, it must be smoke-begrimed, dusty, obscured, and must delight in its own smoke, dust and obscurity; it would believe itself happy in carrying a shadow in the sunlight. Thus the darkened and blinded soul believes itself to be enjoying what it refuses to God. Souls are like crystal: their true mission and their true joy is transparency to the light which is love."

Lucie Faure was born on the 4th of May, 1866, at Amboise in the Valley of the Loire, near the finest châteaux, amid the most touchingly beautiful landscapes of that Touraine which has been well called "the Garden of France." Through her mother the child was rooted in this rich soil. Her father, a Parisian of very modest origin, had raised himself by his intelligence and his grasp of affairs to a marriage of unhoped-for brilliancy. He had founded at Havre a prosperous shipping firm. Brought into prominence by his splendid behaviour at the time of the Franco-German War, decorated, made President of the Chamber of Commerce and Mayor of Havre, Félix Faure had soon engaged in general politics. Frank and open, ambitious and willing to be of service, with an innate gift for self-expression, the wealthy shipping merchant easily became a Deputy, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies and a Minister. Meanwhile his child grew up with her sister, very much

petted and beloved in that environment of *grands bourgeois* of the provinces.

Madame Goyau has returned with pleasure to the memories of her childhood. Her lively imagination broadened and deepened the necessarily limited impressions of her earliest years. The tremulous sensibility of the young girl, too, appears in these recollections. "I prayed God," she tells us, "to send my doll, Marie-Jeanne, a soul, that she might understand if only for one second, how much I loved her. Do not laugh: the grief of a full-grown person was passing through my heart—the heart of a child."

From that time a very careful education laid the foundation of a culture which, with nothing pedantic in it, was remarkably wide and solid. The study of ancient and modern languages held the first rank in it: a little Greek and German; Latin, Italian and English thoroughly mastered, enough to appreciate in the original, and to translate, Vergil, Dante and Newman; an exact knowledge of the history and literature, especially religious and artistic, of her own country and the other principal countries. Such a programme could not be that of an elementary education; but the taste and the perseverance demanded for its fulfilment, as it was in Madame Goyau, are explained and are even possible only through habits of study acquired from early youth.

Long journeys in the most beautiful countries of Europe and even in the Orient taught the girl what books alone do not teach. At the same time, a Christian life, all the more personal because it had comparatively little encouragement from without, was beginning to deepen in that soul spiritual aptitudes which the profane could little guess. This trait persisted to the end, and in her who (outside of a narrow circle of intimate friends) had been considered merely a pious and exemplary woman death alone revealed to many of her acquaintance one little short of a saint.

When Mademoiselle Faure, carried along in the rapid and brilliant career of her father, had to assist at official receptions, she did so without either timidity or stiffness, but with a characteristic reserve. She was by no means cold or distant, only too sincere and too profound to give herself up unguarded and without ready means of self-recovery to these superficial festivities. In some measure the words of St. Gregory might have been applied to her from that time on: "The world which flourished around her had already withered in her heart."[1]

Within the State where her father was Chief Magistrate, Lucie Faure very quickly carved out a State for herself: in the administration of the great Republic she reserved for herself, it has been said, "the Republic of the Disinherited." She founded and with great pains organized the "Fraternal League of the Children of France." In this league the rich children pay, as it is right they should, to provide fresh air, sunlight, a few weeks of rest, a little health and happiness for those who are poorer. Madame Goyau was to busy herself with works of charity all her life: she gave faithful assistance to the *Société de secours aux blessés militaires*, of which the Red Cross is the rallying emblem and in which so many noble acts of devotion find opportunities for their exercise, even in times of peace.[2] The social question, too, in its often undeserved reaction upon the fortunes of working girls of every kind, was one which found her as a young girl and young woman by no means indifferent: she spared not of her time and her influence towards the organization of the *Syndicats féminins* which were destined to be the effective opponents of individualistic selfishness and the horrors of the "sweating system."

---

[1] "*Et tamen cum in seipso floreret, iam in eorum cordibus* [speaking of the martyrs Nereus and Achilleus] *mundus aruerat.*" S. Gregorii Magni Homil. 28.

[2] See *La Croix-rouge de France*, by Andrée d' Alix, Paris, 1914: Preface by Georges Goyau.

Lastly, she possessed that supreme delicacy of soul which seeks to atone for one's own good fortune and success by helping those whom life has deceived and defeated, the failures, those to whom the French language applies a term impossible to translate—*les pauvres honteux*. To assist such unfortunates, to find places for, or to support, women of the world in reduced circumstances who are too proud to beg and too weak or too untrained to find remunerative occupation, this is the aim of one of Madame Goyau's favourite works, the *Adelphie*.

We here mention by name only those movements to which this generous woman gave the public support of her name and her authority. This is but a small portion of her charitable life: God knows the number of poor comforted, of miseries alleviated, of tears dried by her hands.

In this respect, however, she did no more than numbers of admirable women, her friends and rivals: it is enough eulogy to say of her that she equalled them. Not so of another apostolate, incomparably more delicate and difficult, which Madame Goyau exercised with a supreme tact that makes hers an original moral physiognomy among so many others: the apostolate of good counsel, the charity of the mind, the expansion of Christian truth. Early brought into contact with a large number of indifferent, unbelieving, even impious persons, the young girl conceived for them not hatred or repulsion, but a lively and profound pity. For her they were, as they really are, the truly poor, the poorest. Of such men and women there were hundreds and thousands about her to whom the words of the ancient Prophet were fully applicable: "Behold, the days come, saith the Lord God, that I will send a famine in the land: not a famine of bread, not a thirst for water, but of hearing the words of the Lord. And they shall wander from sea to sea, and from the north even to the east:

they shall run to and fro to seek the word of the Lord, and shall not find it."[3]

No one was there to speak these words of God; no one sought to satisfy this hunger. With that discretion which circumstances imposed upon her, the young girl began to speak the words to those about her. Later on, when age, position, and the increasing esteem in which she was held allowed her greater freedom, Madame Goyau dared speak louder. In recalling these matters we are, of course, obliged to maintain a considerable reserve; it is, nevertheless, necessary to insist upon the feature, on pain of leaving in shadow that which was most notable in this distinguished woman. She always had the feeling, and a sort of intuition, of the spiritual needs of souls. Very accessible, generous, far removed from all zealot bitterness, she was all the more persuasive when speaking of the benefits, the beauty, the security, of Catholic convictions. Not only tempted or tepid men, but even priests; not only her coreligionists, but Protestants and Israelites in numbers were thus touched, convinced and converted. On the day after Madame Goyau's death, among the few who, after an imposing, but very long and, by force of circumstances, very fatiguing ceremony, followed the corpse all the way to the Cemetery of Père-Lachaise, there appeared several Israelites who had been brought to the Catholic Faith by their friend.

Foreigners partook largely of this magnificent bounty. A Japanese who had come to Paris to study at the Sorbonne had remained in France. Poor and without resources, he found with M. and Madame Goyau the assistance he needed: not contented with finding him a situation, when she was already smitten with mortal sickness, she would act as a mother to her young friend from distant climes. When he was married, in 1912, she herself accompanied him to the altar, and it would

[3]Amos 8:11, 12.

have been a pleasure to us to be able to cite here the letter in which, after the death of his benefactress, he so touchingly expressed his gratitude.[4]

The secret of this great ascendency and this continual giving of herself must be sought in the deep religion of this chosen woman. Rarely has the virtue of the Catholic Faith made itself at once less remarked and better felt. Outwardly, without hiding her habits of faithful piety —attendance at the offices of the Church, very frequent Communion,—neither did Madame Goyau advertise them. But there, and only there, was her heart with her treasure. The wide hospitality, with nothing austere or morose in it, which she extended to strangers; the attention to her dress and surroundings, which were modest, but distinguished, attractive and never careless;[5] her lengthy visits and literary amusements—all these must not be misunderstood. It was all permitted and willed with a view to very lofty ends. No one was less

---

[4]This letter is given in full in the lecture of the Abbé A. Plazenet on Madame Georges Goyau, printed for private circulation only, Paris, 1914, pp. 11, 12.

[5]On this point I would wish to cite the testimony of a good judge, Madame Alphonse Daudet. The widow of the distinguished *romancier* thus describes her reception by her friend Madame Goyau, at her estate of Chanteloup, near Amboise in Touraine: "The carriage crunches the gravel of the driveway; we have traversed a vine-enclosure, passed before the farm and the tiny pond, and we arrive in front of the house, where green trellises support creeping plants. Here we are at the threshold; the door opens, and the mistress of the house appears. She looks big and handsome at the top of the steps, her features regular, hair already slightly grey, a tall figure, so like her father's on the stairs of the Elysée. The habit of appearing in public has made her careful to be always dressed and ready to receive, and the kindly smile in the fine eyes gives a stamp of rather majestic grace to her whole person.

"We enter our hostess's *cabinet de travail*; the table is overladen with books of all sizes and shapes and every colour; and the walls are covered with pictures, engravings, portraits of saints of either sex, and Italian sovereigns. Lucie Goyau speaks to us with emotion of St. Catherine of Genoa, whom she is just studying, and whom she reveals to us, so to speak. . . ." Madame Alphonse Daudet, *La Pensée Française*, for November, 1913, pp. 4, 5.

beguiled by fashionable life than this woman who was surrounded, sought after, constantly under the eyes of the world.

An allegory written for herself alone and found in her private papers admirably expresses the entirely conscious and deliberate contrast between what appeared outside and the hidden fire which animated that life:

"Let the approaches of the soul bloom with flowers, let them be embalmed with the divine perfume within and let strangers who walk there experience the charm of it. We can always surrender the approaches, talk of art, literature, philosophy, or even of indifferent matters; the perfume is there—it makes itself felt without expressing itself. Few discover the drawbridge of the mysterious moat behind which is entrenched in all its splendour the crystal castle where burns the perpetual lamp in the presence of the Divinity, for that crystal castle is a sanctuary. The light of the lamp sends its rays out as far as the approaches; the perfume of the sanctuary breathes out beyond the moat. Many come within the light and perceive the perfume. O my God, do they know the secret of the marvellous fire?"[6]

The *secret* which our confidant is telling us was the sense of the Christian verity carried to the point of the rarest humility; it was the love of Christ and of souls leading to self-immolation. In this connection Madame Goyau has given us her whole thought in the prayer she wrote "Before a Crucifix," which H. E. Cardinal Mercier has been pleased to approve and indulgence. This thoroughly intimate effusion contains an avowal which I take the liberty to italicize in the text, because it tells a great deal to those who knew the author's sincere humility. In the evening of her life Madame Goyau was not conscious of ever having grievously offended God, and the only faults at all worth noting that she can find

[6]Cited by A. Plazenet, in the lecture already referred to, pp. 18, 19.

to reproach herself with are neglected graces, lost opportunities of doing good.[7]

"Beholding thine arms held fast with nails, O Lord, I have felt that those arms wished to clasp the world . . . alas! they were held with nails! Then have I understood how Thou art crucified like this in the souls of those who receive Thee, and who, through the shackles of their wickednesses and their small passions, put obstacles in themselves to Thy divine liberty. Thy liberty is love and light. Love overflowing, illuminating light, O Lord, Lord, how often have we nailed in us Thy hands that were ready to bless and to heal, Thy feet ready to carry us whither we ought to go, beside them that groan and suffer; how often has the lance of our selfishness riven Thy side, pierced Thy radiant heart! *And it was not mortal sin; no, my God . . . it was the neglect of graces, virtues that sought to expand and were held, crushed back by a personal impulse.*

"Rise, O Lord, rise in our souls, as Thou didst rise in the darkness of the sepulchre where first Thy broken body rested here below! We shall see the dawn of the Paschal joy beginning to break—the pure dawn, the divine whiteness! And glorious and radiant Thou wilt appear in Thy serene divinity, clothed in glorified divinized humanity! Thou wilt appear in us, deep down in us, through and through us . . . Thou wilt teach, Thou wilt bless, Thou wilt heal.

"For this work, Lord, here are our souls. Thou dost wish for our souls, to manifest Thyself in them and through them. *In mine, O Jesus, I have crucified Thee. But love is stronger than death, and I hope to have escaped the true death of mortal sin.* Rise, my Master!

"Thou dost take possession of this soul in the divine Eucharist. Rise in Thy light, make it divine by Thy touch, and we shall be able to speak, to teach, to act

[7]This prayer has been published in the volume entitled "*Choses d'âme*," Paris, Perrin, 1914.

as we look upon Thee. Thou wilt speak. Thou wilt teach. Thou wilt act.

"Lord, Thy will be done, Thy kingdom come. Let Thy will accomplish our souls in the divine plan, and it shall be Thy kingdom come, the kingdom of Good upon the earth. Let Thy hands heal and bless, let Thy feet take us where we ought to be, let Thy heart love in us, by us, through and through us. Thou art Who is. Reign! Be!"

II

It is difficult to study Madame Goyau's literary work apart from her life. We are not dealing with a literary woman writing to earn her bread or to make a name for herself; or with a profession, or with the vanity of an author. Mademoiselle Lucie Faure first of all sought in writing a vent, a means of conversing and converting. Perhaps, too,—why not say it?—an agreeable pastime. A very sure instinct led her towards the subjects most in conformity with her talent: the description of, and commentary upon, the feminine soul, above all those upon which Christianity has set its imprint.

It is only her first work that is marked by a somewhat juvenile ambition, while it bears evidence of the author's taste for religious seriousness and sincerity. This treats of nothing less than "Newman, his Life and Works"! For a young girl, this is a theme which justifies a passing smile, inasmuch as, at the time the little book appeared, she had not the considerable and variously penetrating works which since then have been devoted to the great Cardinal in France, to serve as her guides. Madame Goyau was so well aware of this that she ceased to reprint this first effort. Not but what it contains, side by side with glaring faults and omissions, some just reflections and fine points of detail. One must, above all, be struck by the extraordinary attraction exerted over this mind still in the flowering stage by one of the most

"insular" and most profound authors of English literature. The double difficulty which results from these characteristics of Newman never interferes with the young author's admiration and rarely finds her perspicacity at fault.

We may mention, so as not to have to recur to them, an account of travels (*Méditerranée*, 1903) and a volume of poems (*La vie nuancée*, 1905). These contain some pleasant pages and fine verses, though probably not such as would have sufficed to establish the writer's fame.

It is otherwise with Madame Goyau's *Etudes d'âme féminine*. There she is on her own ground; all her gifts serve her, and it may be said that, since Arvède Barine,[8] no woman in France has better understood her sisters of bygone ages and has made them so well understood.

The first series of these studies bears upon *Les Femmes dans l'oeuvre de Dante* (1902). Here, together with the author's enthusiasm for the Divine Poet, her passionate fondness for Italy, its country, its tongue and its arts had free scope. Madame Goyau's erudition, which is by no means contemptible, adds little to the learned commentaries on the *Commedia*. The merit of the book is of a different sort, it lies in the general remarks and in certain *tableaux d'ensemble* in which sureness of drawing is united with vivid freshness of feeling. The plastic vigour and close grain of Dante's work have often—and how justly!—been magnified. Has anyone ever explained better than in the following page why that robust beauty is at the same time so touching and so spiritual?

"The Dantesque souls relate their lives, and each life

[8] Arvède Barine, by her true name Madame Cécile Vincens, was, as we know, a Protestant. It is equally well known that she could speak with respectful and intelligent sympathy of Catholic men and things, of St. Francis of Assisi, of St. Teresa and of St. Vincent de Paul.

marks a moral trait. In the very evocation of a landscape, the tender word, the moral comparison, are never wanting. Does Dante look at two rivers? They are like two friends 'slow to part.' The Po casts itself into the sea 'there to have its peace.' A single detail is sufficient, but the entire life of the subject in full adheres to it; it is the vital knot, the psychologic point; it becomes a soul; the interest, which is condensed rather than scattered, brought together rather than dispersed, seizes the human character or the view of natural scenery and realizes them in their individuality. The synthesis forms itself of its own accord about this single detail out of which the whole life springs. Analysis and description—a banal method which Dante does not employ; synthesis and evocation, that is his congenial process, the process which seems to him natural and familiar. When one can evoke, one need not describe."

Much more original, the most original of Madame Goyau's books, is the essay in literary history entitled *Vie et Mort des Fées* (1910). The subject, which borders on religion, literature, history, folk-lore, has furnished material for some substantial works stuffed with erudition. The little blue volume is no substitute for these collections. The writer, to be sure, does not neglect the researches of her predecessors. She has read them conscientiously and quotes them to the purpose; but out of all this heap of fables, glosses and hypotheses she draws one clear, lively résumé. She does much better. Very imaginative from early life, and further enriched in this respect by the necessity of living an official life from which she used to escape—through prayer, we have seen, but also sometimes by dreaming—Madame Goyau was particularly well fitted to unravel the origin and describe the light texture of these beliefs. They float between heaven and earth, between faith and superstition, history and fantasy, the infantile and the terrible. In the

great kingdom of legends and myths, the Fairies occupy the most vaporous, but not the least visited, province. Vivien and Morgana, Mab and Melusina, have occupied more dreams, have awakened and formed (or deformed) more young imaginations than a great many living persons. The author knows it and treats the Fairies like queens; about their genealogies, their resemblances, their pleasing qualities and their failings we are told all there is to be known. But a Christian note sounds, powerful and sweet, deepening the light concord of the good Fairies, dominating the hissing of the wicked. All of them have escaped suffering, and therefore they are not the instructors needed for childhood. Its amusement and its fancy, if you will; but not its aliment. Because they do not speak of God, and do not lead to Him, the Fairies, as teachers, are inferior "to the dullest of women."

With a volume of miscellanea, *Spectacles et reflets*, in which children and saints serve in turn as a mirror of things and souls, we have only to mention in addition, in order to complete a general view of a prematurely ended work, the two thin volumes which are the best of that work: *Vers la joie: âmes paiennes, âmes chrétiennes* (6th edition, 1913) and *Christianisme et Culture féminine*, printed since the author's death, essays collected by the loving hand of M. Georges Goyau and laid by him upon the tomb of an incomparable spouse. These two works really form a suite; they are devoted to describing, by contrast or directly, the serene beauty and the unfolding of the feminine soul when it has the happiness to be open and docile to Christian influence. In *Vers la joie* a triptych presents successively Christina Rossetti, Eugénie de Guérin and St. Catherine of Siena.

Let us linger a little more over the second work. Here it is that Madame Goyau has given us her last thought: only her most private notebooks—or what

may be published of them—will give us a more faithful image of her.

Is Christianity antagonistic to feminine culture? And if not, in what measure has it favoured, in what direction has it caused that culture to tend? We will first remark that the author has avoided raising, even in her title, the problem, or the problems, of "feminism." To tell the truth, there was no problem for her. All that would tend to make woman a wretched ape of man appeared to Madame Goyau a horrible chimera. On the other hand she claimed for her sisters all that, while keeping them in their place and making their duties as women easier for them, could enlarge, enrich, embellish and deepen their life. To the feminist illusions she opposed as an ideal the most solid and widest culture possible.

Searching in history for examples of this culture, the author finds them chiefly in the Christian centuries of the Middle Ages. Only one of the studies collected in the volume is devoted to the women of the Renaissance, and they do not receive "the treatment of the most favoured nation," to put it in diplomatic language; perhaps Madame Goyau intended to deal with them in another book. However that may be, she preferred to take her models of feminine culture from mediaeval cloisters: St.Radegonde in the Merovingian period, the great Benedictine nuns of Saxony—the two Gertrudes and the two Mechtildes,—and lastly the English recluse, Mother Juliana of Norwich. In rapid and yet carefully documented descriptions, where a note here and there reminds the reader that the writer is thoroughly acquainted with at least three literatures—French, English and Italian, without mentioning a few German memoirs,—the figures of women follow one another, various and at times unhappy, as in life. A certain current of joy, however, or at least of profound peace, bears them on; these women are Christians. When they weep, it is not "as those who have no hope."

Here, for instance, is Dame Juliana of Norwich,[9] in spite of her living during the darkest period of the Hundred Years' War:

"What echoes of the world—that troubled world—reached her through the barred window of her cell? What did she hear of that century which saw kings struggle and queens weep—the century in which Shakespeare places that gardener who caught a queen's tear on a rosemary plant? Surely she knew the stress of souls and said: 'All is for love.'

"Around her was a busy and rich city, famous for its commerce in wool; her church and her cell were set in what was then the finest quarter. Contemning material interests, she thought only of the spiritual interests, not only of her city, but of the universe.

" 'All is for love . . . all will end well.' That is what Juliana repeats, what she hears throughout her revelations. That is what she was to answer the sorrowful and dismayed pilgrims who presented themselves at her little barred window to question her: Love, confidence, repose in God. . . .

"What took place in that cell? A silent event, unknown to most men, but such an event that the little church, today exiled from Catholicism, has preserved the memory of it even in exile. That little church is the witness that this humble recluse was one of the glories of the fourteenth century.

"Juliana wished to begin a new life. No doubt she was a little more than thirty years old. She prayed God to send her a severe malady the recovery from which should be a sort of resurrection, of rebirth into this new life. All those who surrounded her believed that she was going to die. She had received the sacraments.

---

[9] *Revelations of Divine Love, recorded by Juliana, Anchoress at Norwich, A. D. 1373* (ed. G. Warrack, London, 1901). The first edition of the *Revelations* is that of Dom Serenus de Cressy, O.S.B., in 1670.

She was ready. They had laid her out, and she was sweetly looking up to the heaven whither her hope ascended. . . .

"Suddenly her sight failed. The whole room seemed dark to her. Only the crucifix, which the priest was holding up to her, remained luminous, and her eyes left the sweetness of heaven to be fixed thereafter only upon the crucifix. Then the mystery of divine love discovered itself before her. With all the energy of her soul and her heart, Juliana penetrated it. She brought back a sublime message, for men, glorious words; and they were soothing words; it was a message of peace."

This page affords us an idea of Madame Goyau's habitual manner—a manner which consists, we might say, in having no manner. Each of these studies is a conversation or a meditation, in some places slowly moving, with returns, resumptions, reflections. The great charm comes from the thoughts and images set here and there in the rather loose weft of the story. It comes from the sincerity, the limpidity of soul, reflected throughout. I have given one or two of these thoughts above. Here are some more, gleaned in the author's intimate notes, and which would not be out of keeping in the rarest of spiritual treasuries:

"Let us be hospitable to God's love, which desires to descend, and to man's love, which desires to ascend."

"Certain souls lighten the human edifice like illuminated windows. The dark and massive portions involuntarily fall under the radiating influence. Let us look from that side from which the light comes to us. It is the light of Christ: blessed are the souls that give passage to it."

"Through our baptism we are already risen. Through our Communions we share the risen life of Christ. Let us seek out, and enjoy the taste of, that which is from on high. This will even effect the union, the unity, of

souls, whether they dwell in heaven or on earth. As true Christians, we shall have our conversation in heaven. And the time of our earthly life will reflect eternity, as the water of pools surrounded by walls reflect the immensity of the heavens."

III

An admirable death crowned this noble life, revealing it to many. Towards the end of January, 1912, Madame Goyau had been obliged to undergo a surgical operation, which to her had been an opportunity for exercising patience, and to hers a very sad warning. This alarm once past, it might have been thought, for some time, that there would be no consequences. The convalescent had resumed her occupations, her active, pious and charitable life. It is from this time that the last article she wrote is dated, that on Dame Juliana of Norwich which I have just cited. But all was not over, and in May, 1913, it was necessary to have recourse to a second operation, a very painful one, which was complicated, on the 13th of June, by a pulmonary congestion. The exhausted constitution no longer had the power to resist a malady which had been regarded from the first as mortal. The patient, when warned, was as gentle towards death as she had been towards life. She followed to the letter the beautiful counsel she had once given: "Christians should try to strip death of its sombreness." More free thenceforward, no longer having to economize strength which she knew to be doomed, Madame Goyau gave a marvellous impulse to her love for God and for souls. Thus do great candles of pure wax give a bright light as they burn out.

The sacrifice of her life she made and renewed again and again, in full consciousness and joyfully. During the long agony of ten days and ten nights, it was remarked that the dying woman in moments of unconsciousness awoke when the name of Jesus was spoken

in the prayers that were being recited near her. An unbeliever, who witnessed this, was profoundly touched by it. "She responds to that name," he said, "as a soldier answers, 'Present,' at the call to battle." Even more than her effusions of piety and her tender devotion to the Eucharist, what chiefly struck those who were present was the *apostolic* character which that valiant soul could give to her last conversations and her last sufferings. She thought of others, forgot herself, in an hour when so many sufferers are absorbed in their own pain.

After a long night of sleeplessness (it was Monday, June 16, 1913, about half-past three in the morning) she noticed the first streaks of dawn. "O my God," she cried, enthusiastically, "here is the light of the day that is beginning. Nothing is so beautiful and sweet as the light. Thanks for this favour, my God. How good Thou art! This is for me the supreme day, my sweet Jesus; I pray Thee for the souls who at this moment are sustaining the same conflict as I. Receive them in pity and show them mercy."

Notwithstanding the injunctions of silence and the lacerated condition of her throat, Madame Goyau wished to see a certain number of people about her bed during these days: not only those of her intimate circle, but others as well—souls on their way towards the truth, friends whom some disquiet or temptation might remove far from God—all those to whom a last conversation might bring a little more satisfaction, a little more peace or light.

The last day came; and it was the morning of Sunday, the 22d of June, the feast of the Precursor, St. John the Baptist. Even to the last breath her serenity, her faith, her charity aroused the admiration of those who witnessed that long vigil, during which that Christian soul answered promptly to a word of sympathy and exhortation upon what she was suffering: "But, Father, I am not suffering enough."

Thus she died, if we can call it dying. The last line she wrote, borrowed from the recluse of Norwich, forms the most fitting commentary upon that end: "All ends well . . . all is for love."

Lucie Félix-Faure Goyau had just entered upon her forty-seventh year.

THE
CONSTRUCTIVE
QUARTERLY

On the Specific Genius and Capacities of Christianity, Studied in Connection With the Works of Professor Ernst Troeltsch

By Baron Friedrich von Hügel.

Reality of mind, sense of what really is and what really matters, insight into the actual, driving forces of this our difficult, rich human life and task and end: how rare are these entrancingly noble things! Perhaps my previous study has already given the reader some experience of such reality of mind, as it works, massively alive, in the *Fundamental Problems of Ethics* of Professor Troeltsch. Here I now want to penetrate into further, even more manysided, instances of such awakeness, whilst reserving for the penultimate division of this last Paper the consideration of a certain abstractive, attenuating temper and current that, perhaps everywhere,

more or less misfits and hampers this great soul's noble religious realism.

Only one point shall first be taken from the monograph *What is meant by "the Essence of Christianity"?* (1903; *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. II, 1913). And then five groups of questions shall be studied, partly in an order of my own, from the monumental work *The Social Doctrines of the Christian Churches and Groups*, 1912.

I

Among the six characters which Troeltsch finds to be involved in the idea and method of "the Essence of Christianity," that of "'the Essence' as Criticism" is particularly important when brought to the following application.

"As soon as we go beyond history of the purely empirical, inductive kind, and venture upon such high matters as the determination of the Essence, we cannot continue to cling to the ethically indifferent point of view of the mere understanding of the interconnections,—to the mere measuring of so many happenings by an immanental impulse of development. We have, at this point, to recognize that all the values which proceed within the human spirit from a feeling of their necessity, are everywhere more or less opposed by negation—by an isolating, disintegrating self-seeking, by crude, animal instincts, by a sloth and luxuriousness which refuse to be dislodged, by a dullness of apprehension which drags down all things to pettiness, or, at the least, by a commonness busy with turning them into coarse objects of sense. Whosoever combines, with the conception of the Essence in history, the conviction of a value and an end springing from an ideal necessitation, cannot fail simultaneously to admit the operative existence of radical evil. At all events, we cannot ignore this

evil when we come face to face with the great systems of ethico-religious life. Monism, whether of the more materialistic or of the more spiritualistic kind, is indeed sufficiently questionable also in other provinces of thought; but on the territory of history it is an incredible delusion, for it contradicts every unprejudiced impression of the actual working of life, and is directly refuted by that bit of history which each one of us knows well, since each one of us lives it—our own personal experience."

"The determination of the Essence thus involves a criticism of all that has proceeded from the dullness and vulgarity, the passion and shortsightedness, the stupidity and malice, the indifference and worldly cunning of mankind: theology cannot evade the reproach of a moralizing conception of history. Much as such a conception should be forbidden to touch the details, where a causal explanation of the various connections is in place—for the whole, and at the end, this ethical conception is simply unavoidable. Indeed, a general insight into the Essence is sought, after all, only in order to secure a sound judgment as to what is essential, whence we can, not only ignore what is unessential, but also condemn what is contrary to the Essence."

"And from hence light accrues to a conception which, in many ways, confuses the determination of the Essence —the conception of 'the necessary.' Necessity, in the psychological-causal sense, is one thing; necessity, in the teleological and ethical sense, is another thing. Psychological-causal necessity concerns empirical inductive history; and such 'necessity' never means more than the linking of an event to certain forces which lay at the back of it. The various possibilities with which man, whilst he is in action, reckons as with so many undeniable matters, have no place in such empirical inductive history, where the effect which actually occurred is attributed to the motives which have been proved the

strongest precisely by the result which they have here produced. Thus the psychological-causal 'necessity' reached by this explanation is not co-extensive with the teleological-ethical necessity which invites the decision of the man who deliberates, for his coming action, as to what is the consequence of an idea demanded by this idea itself. Only the latter kind of necessity is in debate when we speak of the 'necessary' development and elaboration of a principle; and, for the estimation of necessity in this sense, only an interior conviction and personal decision can furnish the test and solution" (*Ges. Schr.* II, pp. 409-411).

I take this distinction to be as important as its application is difficult. But I cannot help finding here two excesses in Troeltsch's own position.

When that virile thinker "Ideal" Ward reached his last earthly years, he came to see clearly, I remember, how, in his feeling and his writing, he had been too prone to "unspeakably," "incredibly," and the like. So here, as often with him when pressed back to his last entrenchments, Troeltsch, after his quiet, complex yet converging arguments and thinkings, appears finally reduced to a vehement judgment of an apparently quite subjective and inherently problematic kind. He thus, I think, does his actual convictions some real injustice, since I take him to hold that if such judgments inevitably contain an element of risk and daring, yet also the previous training, experience, insight are all necessary to it; and, again, that the risk and danger are, in reality, necessary here, only because, through our human sensible-rational, temporal-spatial conditions of apprehension and our many passions and self-involvements, we never can *hic et nunc* hold all our achieved, still less all our possible, experience and evidence fully present and luminous before us, at least not in far-reaching and deep-going questions such as these. We have thus, here and now (by an act rendered possible and rational

through all we possess and know and are), to exceed, and thus to complete, the evidence here and now before us—an evidence which, in itself and in the long run, is sufficient for these our convictions and decisions.

And, again, Troeltsch finds that such a critical judgment concerning the Essence of Christianity as is here propounded by himself, is possible only to Protestantism, with its strong appeal to the individual judgment and sincerity. I believe this would be true, were the judgment a "purely personal" affair, such as some of Troeltsch's words and antitheses suggest it to be. But if, intrinsically and at its best, we have here something "personal" rather in the sense of the deepest and most fruitful syntheses or hypotheses of Science, then Catholicism, at its deepest, not only is capable of such judgments, but it is, in some important respects, better furnished for the—in any case very difficult—task than is Protestantism. For these scientific syntheses or hypotheses as really require all the great facts, and a wide experience and generous appreciation of the facts that went before them, as they need intuition and courage fully to penetrate, indeed to exceed them, and thus to see more in them than ever before. And the Church-type at its best (*i.e.* Catholicism at its best) possesses a longer, wider and more many-sided experience of the religious facts and capabilities than does any other type or group. Only if all seeking after, and adhering to, methods and standards special to the several subject-matters to be studied, experienced, penetrated and awakened by the human mind and soul; only if all such dispositions, as is sometimes implied, were to be tabooed as "subjectivism" or "private judgment": only then would Catholicism be really debarred from the judgments concerning the "Essence" as (I submit) these judgments actually have to be. But then we are still a long way from such a Catholicism, which would, in very truth, become an Idol

in a desert,—a Church thus vigorous in the destruction of its own supports, stimulations and subject-matters.

II

It is not nothing to furnish some even slightly useful account and criticism of Troeltsch's *Soziallehren*, with its nearly thousand pages, its bewildering variety of topics, and the range and delicacy of competence it so strikingly reveals. And all this is here subservient to certain few, closely interdependent, central convictions and conclusions. And again these self-commitments are reached only across surging seas of strongest feeling and closest net-works of objective complication. And then, too, as I must attempt to show in my penultimate section, there is a relic, a shadow or echo, of Subjectivism frequently, perhaps always, haunting the outskirts of Troeltsch's convictions, or rather of their formulations, which—I believe more than anything else—prevents his religious reader from settling down with perfect peace and buoyancy under the influence and guidance of this large strong mind and soul.

I must regretfully ignore the instructive autobiographic Preface, and the dry but important Introduction, with its fruitful distinction between the *sociological* scheme and action developed by the three types of religion (Church, Sect, Mysticism) within their own organizations, and the *social* idea and attitude developed by them with respect to the other non-religious organizations of life. And even from the three gigantic Chapters composing the body of the work I can but take certain culminating points of the last two Chapters. The wonderfully close-knit and rich Conclusion shall furnish my final translations and suggestions.

1

The very great "Mediaeval Catholicism" Chapter is, in the first instance, busy with the full expression

of the Church-type; let us here fix upon three passages.

(1) As to the Problem, Troeltsch describes how "the ancient Church indeed organized itself with a full, firm sociological articulation; but its attitude towards the State and Society was a curiously mixed thing—partly a recognition, as sheltered by the Natural Law; partly a theocratic subjugation and utilization; partly a propping of the powers of the State, no more sufficient to itself; partly a rejection of the State and of Society in general, expressed in the theory of the sinfulness of everything founded by the relative Natural Law, and in the practise of the renunciation of the world. A Christian civilization possessed of an interior unity existed neither in fact nor in principle; the whole idea was foreign to antiquity. And the decisive difference between the Middle Ages and Antiquity consists precisely in the possession, by these ages, of such an ideal—in their practise and still more in theory; indeed even in official Catholicism of our own day this ideal, with some adaptations to the modern world, is still active in all its social doctrines" (pp. 178, 179).

And Troeltsch cogently insists:

"The significance of the question of how at all, and in what way, this ideal and solution could arise in the Middle Ages," and only then, "fails to be duly estimated by all those who ascribe already to the Ancient Church, or even to Christianity generally, such a striving after a unified Christian civilization." Yet, in reality "for Stoicism and Platonism, and still more for Christianity, a doctrine of society and civilization based upon the values of the free personality in its union with God and of the universal communion of mankind, offered the greatest difficulties; and Christianity, in particular, produced indeed a mighty, purely religious organization, and ordered within it the conditions of its members' lives in tolerable conformity with its own principles,

but in this its organization it was hostile to the world at large—it failed to discover any bond and link between itself and the complexes outside. The Middle Ages, however, lived to see the development of the Church to a social entity inclusive both of the sociological circle of religion itself, and of the politico-social formations also, and which thus realized, in its own way, what had haunted Plato, in his "Republic," as the true end of a single state—the rule of the wise and of the friends of God over an organic, many-levelled social entity, and what the Stoic cosmopolis had sought—the share of all men in an ethical universal kingdom" (pp. 181, 182).

(2) As to the contrast between the Ancient Christian and the Mediaeval Christian positions concerning man's nature, place, destination Troeltsch is deeply instructive.

"The decisive point here is the conception, peculiar to the Middle Ages, of what is Christian as supernatural, or rather the full elaboration of the consequences involved in the idea of the Supernatural. The Supernatural here is not only present in the miracle of the God-Man, of the Church and of the Sacraments,—in the great" complex "miracle of man's redemption from out of the world corrupted by original sin; it has no longer, as in the Ancient Church, an essentially apologetic significance. But the Supernatural now unfolds itself as an autonomous logical, religious and ethical principle. The creature, even the perfect creature, is only natural—possessed of natural laws and ends; God alone is supernatural. And accordingly, the essence of Christian supernaturalism consists in its elevation of the creature, above this creature's co-natural limitations, to God's own supernature, to participation in His nature. The mediation necessary here lies thus, no longer, as in the Ancient Church, between two kinds (respectively perfect and relative) of the one sole Natural Law, but between Natural Law in general and Supernature generally;

and especially all Ethics and Social Philosophy now rest, in the last resort, upon the mediation between Nature (perfect or imperfect) and Supernature. The Decalogue, in reality, is not yet the Christian Ethic; and the Natural Law, identical with the Decalogue, stands, to the specifically Christian Ethic, to the *nova lex*, as near and as far as precisely does the Decalogue. 'Biblical' now means revealed, but not necessarily Christian; for the Bible represents, for Aquinas, a process of development moving through universal history and possessed of varying stages. The Decalogue remains contained in the legislation of Christ, but as a stage preliminary to the Christian Ethic and as an instruction in the exterior application of the new motives of this Ethic. The formula, on the other hand, for the specifically Christian Moral Law is the Augustinian formula of the love of God, as the highest and absolute, the entirely simple, moral end,—an end which contains the demand of the love of God in the stricter sense (through self-sanctification, self-denial and contemplation), and the demand of the love of our neighbour (through the active relating of all to God, the active inter-connecting of all in God, and the most intimate mutual self-sacrifice for God). We have thus a self-love in God, which loves not the natural self, but the self united to God; and a brotherly love in God, which loves not the natural fellow-man, but the brother in God. This Ethic (a mystical interpretation of the Evangelical preaching) forms an unmistakably strong contrast to the this-world Ethic of the Natural Law, Aristotle, the Decalogue and natural prosperity; but this cannot fail to be the case, given the entire fundamental character of the Christian Ethic. This same contrast indeed appeared also, clearly enough, in the life of mediaeval society,—in the relations between Church and State, between laymen, monks and priests; and was still at work within the ethical demands made upon even the simplest layman" (pp. 263-265).

Has Aquinas, on the ample questions here discussed, been anywhere penetrated as delicately and deeply, as generously and justly, as is done here, in these noble sections of a truly great book?

2

And yet the culmination of interest and power is reached by the *Soziallehren* where also the Sect-type, and later on where the third and last type, the Mystical, appear at their fullest on the stage of history, and, with their contrasting strengths and defects and their tough vitality and far-reaching operation and use, bring into full relief the abiding truth and meaning of the Church-type, together with the character and range of their own significance. Let us attend first to the Sect-type.

(1) The main historical origins and stages of this Sect-type appear to be as follows. Paulinism already prepared the orientation of Christianity towards conservatism; yet already alongside of Paulinism there existed a radicalism indifferent, or even hostile, to the world, in the communism of love of the primitive community, and in the chiliastic-apocalyptic rejection of the world. Similarly, alongside of the social development of the ancient Church which continued Paulinism, the radicalism persisted in the Montanist and Donatist sects and (at least as regards extension and importance) especially in Monasticism—the latter influencing various Fathers of the Fourth Century in their teaching as to an original communism and equality (p. 359). The first clear emergence of the problem is in A.D. 393-420, in the conflict between St. Augustine's sacramental hierarchical conception of the Church and the Donatists; but its decisive appearance follows only upon the completion of the Church concept in the reform of Pope Gregory VII, A.D. 1073-1085, although, here especially, the antagonistic popular excitement was largely pushed into the formation of separate sects by the intensely

rigorous Church authorities themselves—so especially with the Waldensians (pp. 367; 388, 389; 403n).

(2) The all-important point for Troeltsch here is that "both the Church-type and the Sect-type lie in the consequence of the Gospel, and only conjointly do they exhaust the range of its sociological effects and social consequences. The Church, assuredly, is not a simple defection from the Gospel, however much it may (at first sight) appear to be so in the contrast between its hierarchy and sacraments and the preaching of Jesus. For where the Gospel is, in the first instance, apprehended as a gift, a grace, where, in the picture which faith forms of Christ, it appears as a divine institution, where the interior liberty of the spirit (distinct from all human making and organizing) is experienced as the meaning of Jesus, and His grand indifference to worldly things is correspondingly apprehended as an interior independence from, together with an exterior use of, these things: there men will consider the establishment of the Church as the normal continuation and transformation of the Gospel. At the same time, the Church, by its emphatic universalism, preserves the fundamental impulse of the evangelical preaching; but that preaching had committed all detailed questions, concerning the possibility and execution of the mission, to the wonderful coming of the Kingdom, whereas a Church, working in the duration of the world, had to organize and order, and so to make its compromises."

"Nevertheless, the Sect also is not simply a defection—a mere lopsided, crippling misgrowth of the elements of religious life already exhaustively furnished by the Church; but it is an immediate continuation of certain evangelical convictions. The radical individualism and love reaches its full recognition only in the Sect; only the Sect instinctively construes the entire community from thence, and attains, precisely through this radicalism of love, an immense firmness in its subjective-interior

bond, in lieu of any merely external appurtenance to an institution. Thus the Sect clings to the original radicalism of the ideal and to its sharp contrast to the world, and abides by the demand of personal performance as persistently fundamental. This performance the Sect also can apprehend as the work of grace; but in this grace, it emphasizes the subjective realization and effect, not the objective assuredness and presence."

"The preaching of Jesus, which looks forward to the coming end and the Kingdom, which collects and unites determined confessors, and which bids the brusquest adieu to the world and its children, goes in the direction of the Sect. The faith of the apostles, which looks back upon the miracle of redemption and of the person of Christ and which lives in the powers of its heavenly master: this faith which leans upon something achieved and objective, in which it unites its faithful and allows them to rest, proceeds in the direction of the Church. Thus the New Testament aids in the formation both of the Church and of the Sect; it has done so from the first. But the Church had the start and the great mission into the wide world. And only when the objectification of the Church had" under Hildebrand "been severely completed, did the tendency which forms Sects react once again, and more closely knit and persistent than ever before, against this excessive objectification" (pp. 375-377).

(3) The wide-ranging effects of this Sect-reaction are finely felt by Troeltsch.

"The Sect's institution of the absolute law of God and Nature as the sole authority, and the consequent removal of the entire conception of steps and development, involve the most far-reaching consequences, as to which the (mostly very simple) theology of the Sects gave itself no account. God's intention and law is expressed, without a shadow of ambiguity, in the Bible and the voice of pure Nature alone; there is no need for any

complicated doctrine as to this law. The moral demand proceeds to all men alike; there is no need of a graduation of perfection according to various vocations. Creation does not descend through various stages down to materiality, thence again to mount through steps, as though a great work of art, from Nature to Grace and Supernature. But it places mankind immediately before the task of the realization of its ideal, and this ideal loses the character of a mystical supernature, of the elevation of man's essence above itself. . . . And since such mystical beatitude, as crown of the system of stages, falls all but entirely away for the Sects, the conception of law" (which, in the Catholic system, was but one of the two determinations for God, alongside with that of substance) "now takes up an all-dominating position. God's being and will are His natural and revealed law; the Bible is the law-book of revelation, identical with the law-book of Nature. Thus, in lieu of the institution of Grace and Redemption, the conception of Law becomes the centre of the Sect theology" (pp. 380-382).

(4) To these deeply stimulating analyses and positions I would attach three criticisms of my own.

My first regret has been already expressed in connection with Troeltsch's earlier and shorter *Grundprobleme*, but recurs again here with respect to his later, very long work, and concerns his non-perception of sensible contacts, vehicles and symbols, of the principle and rudiments of sacraments, in the spirit and practice of Jesus. I will return to this objection presently in conjunction with my third dissatisfaction, a dissatisfaction so fundamental and general as to be better reserved for discussion till just before the end and my last expression of deep gratitude for all that Troeltsch has brought us.

But my second objection is specially in place just here. I find, then, that even the very generous measure in which Troeltsch recognizes already within the preaching of Jesus conceptions and impulses making for the Church, does

not, in the greater part of his book, reach to the fulness of the facts. For it is now thoroughly acknowledged by all the best historical workers that the direct central subject of Jesus's preaching was the kingdom, and its proximate coming. This kingdom was here emphatically presented as a pure gift, a sheer *opus operatum* of God; men can prepare themselves for it, and can determine the character of its effect upon themselves; but they do not produce it, they do not constitute it. —And again, neither Jesus Himself nor His Apostles are, it is true, of priestly families, and there is no marked formal ordination of them; yet it is Jesus, in His humanity, who calls and trains and sends out these special twelve,—not any and everyone is treated as free to put himself forward to preach on the strength of some purely interior call. In these two fundamental points, then, the teaching and practice of Jesus demonstrably initiate the objectivity of the Church and the special calls to the clerical office; we have here sheer historical facts and not interpretations (however legitimate and part-constitutive of religion) such as, for the most part at least, Troeltsch takes these points to be. Thus the chief characteristic of the central doctrine of Jesus emphasizes Givenness, Object, Church, not Activity, Subject, Sect; and the prominent feature of the organizing action of Jesus is certainly not simply an acceptance of spirits all equally and secretly inspired, but a calling of some few men, by Him, Man, from out of the crowd of mankind, even the crowd of believers.

3

Troeltsch has most effectively located the detailed studies of his three types of Christianity: that of the Church, in the High Middle Ages; that of the Sect, in the first instance immediately after, still in those Middle Ages; and that of Mysticism, after the Protestant Churches and Sects. For he thus examines each type at the time of its

own fullest articulation and strongest influence, and of its most vivid contrast with the other types. It is the part which, in this book thus late, for the first time studies fully the Mystical type,—the great pages 850-877—that we must consider here.

(1) "Mysticism, in the widest sense, is nothing but the insistence upon immediacy, interiority, presence of religious experience. It presupposes the objectification of religious life in Rites, Myths or Dogmas, and is either a reaction against such objectifications which it attempts to put back into the living process, or a supplementation of the traditional cults by a personal and vital excitation. Mysticism is thus always something secondary and intentionally reflective, although this deliberately produced condition is conjoined with a quite contrary immediacy of the feeling itself. It thus always contains some degree of paradox, an antithesis to the masses and their average. The primitive religious act and life, therefore, for which the event and its expression are simply identical, is never mystical. But the liveliness of the religious sense, when face to face with objectified religion, easily and often assumes mystical characteristics,—enthusiastic or even orgiastic exaltation, vision or hallucination, religious subjectivism and spiritualism, concentration upon the purely interior and only emotionally apprehensible. Such visions, indeed, are almost always only expansions and interpretations of the common faith, as with the pneumatic gifts of the early Christians and with the countless visions and prophecies of mediaeval recluses and saints. But this mystical sense can also create a passionate realism of intercourse with the Godhead, where the erotic side of human nature often plays a great rôle. And again such immediacy of feeling loves to fly beyond the sensible-finite world by a spiritualism which treats it as indifferent or ignores it, or which by ascetical mortification moves it away into the distance. Thus Mysticism is open to the incursions

both of a spiritualistic Pantheism and of a radical Dualism of flesh and spirit, of time and eternity; and, in connection therewith, to the suggestions of an Asceticism destructive of all things finite or of a Libertinism treating them all as indifferent."

(2) "Now Mysticism, in these various forms, is a phenomenon general in all the religious territories, and is (or was) highly developed especially in India and Persia, in Greece, Asia Minor, Syria. And, naturally, it did not remain foreign to the primitive Christian movement, but in part sprang also from it, in part was brought into it from without and eagerly appropriated there."

"To this Mysticism belong the so-called enthusiasm of the primitive Christians, a large part of the gifts of the Spirit, the speaking with tongues, exorcism, the pneumatic activity. But especially does also Paul himself belong to it—Paul in his mystical orientation which stood in a continuous tension (not, however, experienced by himself as such) with his Church conviction. Paul took over the Christ-cultus of the primitive community as already objectified in its outlines in worship and organization. But he gave further aliveness to this religion by means of a profound and passionate mysticism, which consequently also utilizes the ancient terminology of the heathen mysteries. Here alone lay his religious originality as against the primitive community, and thus only did his anti-Jewish universalism become a workable, effective enterprise. Thus the Lord's Supper, the centre of the new Cultus, became with him a mystical union of substances, Baptism became a real dying and arising with Christ. Thus Christ became for him a new life-sphere of a supersensible kind, in which the believer lives, feels, and thinks, and becomes a new, pneumatic creature. Thus all mere ceremonial and tradition became an element of this world, and Christ after the flesh was known no more. And thus the Israelitish history of redemption was allegorized into a drama immediately

applicable to the Christian believers, and the Christian community became the spiritual body of Christ."

"Here, in the primitive Christian enthusiasm and in the Pauline Mysticism as to Christ, lie the inexhaustible sources of a Christian Mysticism. In the Fourth Gospel this Mysticism has already become self-possessed and adjusted to the historical and objective; yet here especially it has produced or found its characteristic terms—flesh, spirit; darkness, light; allegory, letter. And thus, through the New Testament, Mysticism (of the pneumatic and Pauline kind) has become a permanent power which always anew awakens and articulates similar needs, especially in periods of criticism of tradition, of religious lassitude and of religious reform."

(3) "In primitive Christianity, in the New Testament itself, then, lie the germs of the Church, given with the conception of Grace, of the completed institution for the salvation of the world. And in it lie the germs of the Sect, which reveres its Master's Sermon on the Mount as its moral law, continues His expectation of the Kingdom about to descend upon earth, and collects the pure and holy into a community tarrying for Christ's return. But in it lie also the germs of a Mysticism for which all that passes is but a symbol; all that is sensible-earthly, but a limitation; all cultus, but a means of substantial union; all faith, but an immediate transplantation into the invisible life of God and Christ" (pp. 850-852).

(4) We cannot here follow Troeltsch in all his fine study of "Mysticism in the narrower, technical sense of the word, where it becomes a religious philosophy," and where, unlike its New Testament kinds, it can take up a position of deliberate independence, of open denial, or of allegorizing evaporation of concrete religion. Yet also this technical kind can still require and serve historical, institutional religion, as in the Dominican cognitive Mysticism, in the Franciscan Mysticism of the affections and the will, and in the more generally philo-

sophical Mysticism of the theologians of the Ancient Church. All these more or less require Christian history, and more or less maintain ethical personality. Especially is he moved by the conception of the indwelling of Christ: "Thus was the cleavage overcome between Past and Present, Doctrine and Practice; thus did mediaeval devotion to Christ strike the water of life from out of the rock of the Byzantine dogma" (pp. 856-858).

(5) As to the Sociological peculiarities of Mysticism, where (as in the various forms of Christian Spiritualism) it is more or other than sheer enthusiasm, and grounds itself upon the permanent, equable divine spark in the human soul, we learn:

"Mysticism is a radical individualism very different from that of the Sect. The Sect differentiates individuals against the world, by conscious contrast and ethical rigorism; unites them in a community resting upon a willed association and growing under disciplinary control; binds them to the example and authority of Christ; and intensifies the individualism precisely through its inclusion within such a community and cultus. But Mysticism insists upon a relation, not between man and man, but of man to God; and reduces everything historical, authoritative, cultual to a mere stimulant, which (in strictness) it can do without. As long as such a Mysticism or Spiritualism remains Christian, the Bible and the historical figure of Christ still play an important rôle, yet never with a power sufficient to produce a firmly-knit community. Thus not, as in the sect, do we have here an active and confessing community, continuously reconstituted from the interaction of the individual wills, but a parallelism of religious spontaneities conjoined only by the divine life-ground from which they spring, by the common disposition of love, and by the union in the free, invisible work of the divine spirit. In the foundation of faith and feeling upon themselves alone, the individualism even of the most individualistic

of the sects is here exceeded; but in the tendency to a quietude and abandonment and to the exercise of works of love only from case to case, this individualism, again, is much weaker than is that of those sects" (pp. 864, 865).

And as to their social aims, "where such Mystics form groups they do not intend them, sect-like, to replace the great invisible Church or to interfere with God's own work of spreading the spirit, but simply as familiar circles for the edification of souls. The Mystics have thus not nearly as much inclination to separate from the Church as have the sects" (p. 868). "Of themselves they cultivate only the individual and his soul's interests; and though they simultaneously believe, and sometimes strongly emphasize, the universal communion of spirits and of love, yet Church and religious organization" are for them "concessions to human weakness, without interior necessity and divinity." And "towards politics and economics the indifference and helplessness are complete; only sexual and family ethics are here studied, and indeed with great penetration" (pp. 940, 941; 864).

I will take my criticisms of Troeltsch on the Mystical Type in connection with the most fundamental and general of my dissatisfactions in the following separate section.

4

The translations given in these papers from Troeltsch have deliberately softened or omitted one paradoxical peculiarity which, like a contrary surface-current, runs along much of his thinking and feeling, since, in such mere extracts, I could not otherwise sufficiently render what I am confident is his fundamental vision and volition. For the same Troeltsch who so persistently emphasizes the need and the reality of certain historical facts, of community, cultus, organization, and who, still deeper down, so vividly sees and describes religion as an experience and affirmation of trans-subjective, more-than-

human fact and reality, as metaphysical and ontological or nothing, is also strangely brainy, abstract, hypothetic, indeed subjectivist in many of his favourite terms and connotations. "Thought," "thoughts," "thinking," "the mind's spontaneity," "mental creations"; "the Christian legend," "the religious myth": I have mostly translated the former terms with "apprehension," "conviction," "perceptions," etc., and have hardly given a passage containing the latter expressions.

(1) Now Troeltsch, rightly I believe, considers Protestantism to have been, in the first instance, "a reduction" of all religion "to what alone can be an object of faith, trust, disposition,—*viz.* a thought—the thought of God, derived from the Apostolic presentation of Christ, as the holy gracious will which forgives us our sins and thus lifts us to a higher life. And to this thought there belongs further only what can render it certain for the sinner,—the insight into God's self-revelation in the Logos," as "the assurance afforded to us men of God's sin-remitting love" (pp. 439, 440).

And when, much later on in history, Kant appears, I believe Troeltsch, with practically all historians, is right in finding in him very specially "the philosopher of Protestantism"—a Protestantism, however, representing a much greater retreat of religion upon thought and the subject than was that of Luther.

(2) Now doubtless not only Luther but Kant also intended thus to find certainty concerning God within their own souls, and thus to escape that lapse into doubt and self-delusion which they considered to attach to all seeking of such assurance in social traditions and external proofs and practices. Yet the modern idealist philosophy, as first clearly formulated by Descartes, was so eager to make sure of this kind of interiority and sincerity, that it started, not from the concrete mind, *viz.* a mind thinking *something*, and from the analysis of this ultimate trinity in unity, but from that pure ab-

straction—thinking, or thought, or a thinking of a thought; and, from this unreal starting-point, it strove to reach that now quite problematical thing, the object. Hume had no difficulty, from such premises, to conclude to the purest Scepticism. And although Kant, the greatest of Hume's opponents, profoundly advanced Ethics and Epistemology, especially in his formulations of the problems, and though his intention was throughout to ground Theism upon unshakable foundations, yet his actual influence, especially in the Neo-Kantian interpretation, has been, upon the whole, hardly less agnostic than that of Hume himself. For take Kant, not from his moral but from his epistemological side, not from the two last *Critiques* but from the first, not in this or that of his (at least three) different theories of knowledge, but according to his predominant mood, or along the line of least resistance, and you will find that man knows nothing really of the real nature of anything, although (strangely enough) he *does* know that the reality of everything is always utterly different from what it appears to him to be.

(3) No man alive has so well as Troeltsch described, analysed, defended the reality, givenness, otherness—the ontological witness of religion. But just because of this his vivid, massive religious sense, he lets us keenly feel the dissonance produced here, between this sense and its philosophical formulation, through his clinging, after all, to a more or less Kantian Idealism as, at its best, almost an abiding new stage of Christianity. For thus he continually propels and warms us religiously and, at the same time, withdraws and chills us philosophically. Religion here requires history; and indeed Christianity retains an important, unimpaired nucleus of critically established happenings. Yet we find, at the end, for all that, only the Christian "legend," indeed the Christian "myth." Christianity possesses its finest and furthest-reaching influence as a special kind of Mysticism. Yet all Mysticism is not only dependent upon, and secondary

to, the original religious fact and experience (which is always quite unmystical), but it does not distil from out of that fact and experience the meaning and virtue latent there—it is simply a "creation of the religious spontaneity." The original, unmystical religious fact and experience arises, in all its greatest, world-moving instances, amongst the socially small and educationally elementary classes and individuals, thus bidding us see "power perfected in infirmity". Yet these classes and individuals are not thus simply discovered to possess and to exercise finer, fuller insight into what really *is* than do the other, more subtle and sceptical mortals, but they thus merely approve themselves specially rich in myth-constructive capacity. And finally, man always possesses the ineradicable impression of a direct impingement and penetration by various realities not himself, but thus really known to him; and of his entire nature being thus, and thus alone awakened—sense stimulating reason and soul; and all this again calls into life a consciousness of the painful finitude and contingency of it all, a sense of a contrasting Other, Infinite, Intrinsic and Abiding. Yet our own mind is what alone we incontestably start with, and any reality, distinct from the mind's consciousness of it, is but an inference of this mind which requires further proof as to its trans-subjective validity; the belief in the need of sense-stimulation for the mind's and soul's awakening is, in religion, sheer "magic-mongering"; and the instinct of the Contrasting Other comes late and reflectively, in mystical reaction against the naive, childlike anthropomorphism of the Heavenly Father. Thus here, everywhere, religion proclaims and demands trans-subjective, more than human Reality; and here, everywhere, philosophy never gets clearly beyond the limits of a subjectivism incapable of consistent certainty even as regards the minimum on which all human conviction and action is demonstrably built.

It is thus Troeltsch himself who, more even by his

intensely alive religious sense than by his many acute criticisms of Kantianism, makes us thirst for a fully thought-out, self-consistent Critical Realism. Everywhere with such a Realism would be the assumption or announcement that thought, primarily and normally, never stands alone, and never is thought of thought, but always thought of a reality distinct from this thinking of it; that the activity of the human mind and soul, as known to us in this life, always more or less requires sense-stimulation, and that superstition here lies as truly in denying as in exaggerating this need; that our knowledge is always incomplete but of reality—since the objects really reveal, in various degrees, their real nature; that the primary qualities of material objects are trans-subjectively real, and that the instinctive recognition of this reality plays an important part also in the religious habits and certainties of the soul; that the mystical type of religion is indeed secondary and reflective insofar as it seeks and sees *all things* as immediately present, but that the original religious fact and experience of religion already always contains *an element* of immediacy. Thus, for our Lord's consciousness, God was immediately present; God's Kingdom, its advent upon earth, was proximate, but not simply present.

With some such a philosophy would disappear, from out of Troeltsch's noble writings, that disturbing, numbing counter-current certainly present in them now.

And such a philosophy need, in no sense or degree, contravene Troeltsch's most precious resolve "not to recognize any specially theological, still less any specially Christian, methods of study" (*Soziallehren*, p. IX). For such a philosophy would be adopted only because it had been found more adequate to the analysis and elucidation of the facts of human consciousness and knowledge, of physical science, and of religion; and because philosophy, to remain truly such, has to be the sensitively docile interpreter of actual life and reality, not their

harshly doctrinaire explainer-away. And such a philosophy, once adopted, would have carefully to guard against any wholesale conclusions, and any niggardliness of admiration and docility towards the profound gains in method, perception, facts brought us by the Critical Idealism. Careful research, severe criticism, daring hypothesis, independence from aught but the laws and tests found to be obstinately intrinsic to the respective ranges and levels of study, will be as needful as ever; but all will now move within a frank recognition of Givenness, of Otherness, of Reality. Our minds will now range from the Givenness of the pebble and the star to the Givenness of the lichen, of the bee and bird, on to the immensely greater Givenness of the human spirit, and (contrasting with, yet sustaining, all such Givennesses and their numberless given, real inter-relations) the primary, absolute Givenness and Reality of God.

5

But let us get back to learn some final lessons from Troeltsch in his rousing summary of some of his rich gains, and finish this very imperfect study of Troeltsch's conceptions of Christianity, its specific Genius and Capacities, with some analysis of the conclusion to his *Sozial-lehren*, probably the most reasoned and best balanced piece in the entire great work. We thus can end on a nobly prophetic, splendidly sober, ideally realist, humanely Christian, unconquered and unconquerable note of faith in the perennial need, because truth and fact, of religion, and of its great Origin, Object and End.

I will, here, concentrate upon the author's deeper, religious conclusions; upon his practical suggestions; and upon his final outlook (pp. 978-986).

(1) The religious conclusions strive to emphasize the abiding ethical values contained in the many-coloured Christian social doctrines: I do not see how they could be made more movingly deep and true. "The Christian

Ethos alone," as against many a more showy, more easy faith or fancy, "possesses, in virtue of its personalistic Theism, a conviction of personality and individuality rooted in a Metaphysic, and lifted above destruction from any and all the Naturalisms and Pessimisms. Only the personality which arises, out of man, to beyond him as a mere natural product, through a union of his will and deepest being with God—this alone is raised above the finite and alone can defy it. Without this support, every individualism evaporates into thin air."

"The Christian Ethos alone, in virtue of its conviction of a Divine Love turned to all souls and uniting them all, possesses a truly unshakable" sound "Socialism. Only in the medium of the Divine do those conflicts and exclusivenesses disappear, which belong to man as a natural product and which shape his natural existence; only here do the associations formed by coercion, physical need, sex-instinct, work, organization attain a connection superior to them all and indestructible, because now metaphysical."

"Only the Christian Ethos resolves the problem of equality and inequality, since it neither glorifies violence and accident, in the sense of a Nietzschian cult of breed, nor outrages the patent facts of life by a doctrinaire equalitarianism. It first recognizes the fundamental difference in the social positions, the powers and gifts of men, as a connection established by the inscrutable will of God, and then transforms it, by the interior upbuilding of the personality and the development of the sense of mutual obligation, into an ethical cosmos."

"The Christian Ethos, through its estimation of personality and its love, produces what no social organization, be it ever so just and rational, can ever entirely do without, since everywhere there always remain incalculable sufferings, needs and maladies—disinterested caritative help. This helpfulness has sprung from the Christian spirit, and only through this spirit can it persist."

And finally, "the Christian Ethos alone places a goal before the eyes of us all who have to live and struggle through our difficult social existence, which lies beyond all the relativities of the earthly life, and, compared with which, everything else represents only approximate values. The conviction of the Divine Kingdom of the future, which is but faith in the final realization of the Absolute, in whatever way we may conceive this realization, does not, as short-sighted opponents maintain, deprive the world, and the life in the world of their value; but it makes the soul strong, throughout its various stages of progression, in the certainty of a last absolute sense and aim for human toil. It thus raises above the world without denying it." Only through this, the deepest insight of all Christian asceticism, do "all social utopias become superfluous; and the impossibility, always preached anew by experience, of a full understanding and a full execution of the ideal, need not then throw back the seeker into that scepticism which so easily springs precisely from an earnest veracity, and which is everywhere invading the finer spirits of our times. The Beyond is, in very truth, the power of our Now and Here" (pp. 978, 979).

(2) And then he gives us four pregnant positions with regard to the propagation and organization of these religious forces. "The religious life, at the stage of spiritual religion, requires an organization distinct from the simply natural articulations of society. Without a community, organization and cultus, Christianity is incapable of propagation and fruitfulness."

"Amongst the forms of organization, the Church-type is superior to the Sect-type and to Mysticism. It is the Church that fully retains the characteristic of religion as essentially Salvation and Grace; that renders the presence of Grace independent of the performances of individuals; that is able to embrace the most diverse stages of spiritual ripeness and Christianization,

and that, hence, is alone fit to harbour a popular religion within the inevitable graduation of its members."

"The Church-type, precisely because of the tension within it between pure Christianity and adaptation to the world, has had a most varied history" and is, in these our times, in a condition of change and a situation of great perplexity. "Without compulsion, a lasting, uniform, indivisible Church body is inconceivable; and compulsion again is inconceivable without the aid of the state. And, indeed, in times of a general naïf belief, such a compulsion has no harmful or irreligious consequences."

"But," finally, "just because of its connection with the unbroken unity of the general life and outlook of large groups of peoples, the unbroken Church-type is interiorly appropriate to such times alone. For at other times, what is a matter of course for the general outlook tallies no more with what is a matter of course for the Church. Compulsion is then no longer the preservation of the whole from isolated disturbances, but a violation of the movements of the larger life as it actually is." And Troeltsch considers the future unification and cohesion of Protestantism as possible only "on the supposition that the Churches, created though they have been in part by state-enforced conformity, may become homes in which henceforth a variety of Christian spirits will find room to dwell and act." "What compulsion and unshrinking uniformitarianism constructed can thus be inhabited by finer, and especially by very various spirits, who then, it is true, will have carefully to guard a mutual toleration within certain wide limits." "The spirit of the Church-type would be here maintained in its great conviction of an historical substance of life common to all, which, in the various smaller religious communities and declarations, is only particularized and kept in motion. We retain thus the sense of a common faith and life and the consciousness of heredity as 'a minimum of the Church' " (pp. 980-983).

(3) And the valedictory warning is, surely, supremely impressive in its virile sobriety:

"If the present social situation is to be mastered by Christian principles, thoughts will be necessary which have not yet been thought and which will correspond to this new situation, as the older forms corresponded to the older situations. These thoughts will have to be drawn from the interior spontaneity of the Christian idea and not exclusively from the New Testament, as indeed has always been the case with the great Christian social forms of the past. And they will have the fate in store for all the creations of the religious-ethical idea: they will render indispensable services and will develop the profoundest forces; but they will never fully realize their specific ideal intention within the range of our terrestrial conflicts."

"As little as any power here in this our world will they create the Kingdom of God on earth, as a completed social ethical organism: every idea will still be met by brutal facts, every upward development by interior and exterior checks. There exists no absolute Christian Ethic, still awaiting its first discovery; but only an overcoming of the changing situations of the world, as also the earlier Christian Ethic was in its own way. There exists also no absolute ethical transformation of material nature or of human nature, but only a wrestling with them both. Only doctrinaire idealists or religious fanatics can fail to recognize these facts. Faith is indeed the very sinews of the battle of life, but life does in very deed remain a battle ever renewed along ever new fronts. For every threatening abyss that is closed a new one yawns before us. The old truth remains true: the Kingdom of God is within us. But we must let our light shine before men in confident and ceaseless labour, that they may see our works and may praise our heavenly Father. The final ends of all humanity lie hidden within His hands" (pp. 985, 986).

Entire peoples clash in arms, gigantic industrial struggles pulse across continents and oceans, immense physical discoveries and inventions almost annihilate time and space. Yet engrossing, and deeply important (also in their help or hindrance to our moral and spiritual upbuilding and faith) as are these wild, vast, fleeting things all around us, it is not they, but it is this upbuilding and faith, and the ultimate realities which they touch, which indeed penetrate and occasion them, that are the greater and the greatest things experienced by man. And even simply as the utterances of one who, amidst the amazing distractions of our times, steadily perceives and proclaims this abiding pre-eminence of religion, Troeltsch's writings stand amongst the most impressive, because most circumspect and veracious, testimonies to the indestructible need and conviction that the human mind and conscience, still, at bottom, can find rest alone in God, its home.

Generic Christianity

By Shailer Mathews, D.D.,
Dean of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago.

Whoever detaches himself from his sympathies and looks out upon Christianity from the point of view of the non-Christian will be impressed by the extraordinary variety in its expression. At the one extreme is the Greek orthodox church, and at the other the Holy Rollers. It seems almost impossible that such variants, together with all the other forms of religion bearing the name of Christ, can really belong to the same religious family. But the detached observer, especially if he has had sociological and historical training, will distinguish among all these communities of Christians a generic Christianity which distinguishes them as a group from the other great religions and families of religions.

If, however, such an observer were asked to name these generic qualities which bind together the divergent groups in one generic religion, he might find the question somewhat difficult to answer. Many of these groups recite the Apostles' creed, if not the Ecumenical creeds, and exhibit similarity in the exposition of these creeds as well as in other tenets. But generic Christianity will not be described by simply taking the utterances of different sects and classifying them in a systematized inventory of formulas. Such a method would imply that Christianity is static rather than constantly growing; more a philosophy than a religion. And Christianity is essentially a religion.

As a religion, it is a phase of the life process; an historical movement subject to the laws of individual experience and of social evolution. Its history is not merely that of a church or of a body of doctrines. It is that of the most complete religion the world has ever seen, rich in local variations and adjustments, with rites, moral doctrines, moral sanctions and inhibitions, art, orthodoxies and heresies, organizations, priesthoods, preachers and scholars, all interplaying within an ever expanding spiritual movement. Expressing itself in differing institutions and teachings, it yet advances in accordance with an inner directive tendency, breeding true to type and becoming unfruitful in the same proportion as any teaching becomes untrue to its characteristic vital impulse. Efforts to check this development have sometimes been successful, but its inner impulse has always found some egress from restrictions, to reproduce itself generically in variant groups.

The inner power of any genus is known in its fruits. The acorn and the apple may fall into precisely the same ground and yet, to the last generation of either, the apple never produces an oak nor the acorn an appletree. The generic characteristic of each form of vegetable life is something more than the appearance of the leaf and bark and fruit; it is an inner, vital, mysterious principle of life that is self-directive, propagating its kind relentlessly whenever it finds congenial environment.

Studied from the sociological and historical, rather than the dogmatic, point of view, generic Christianity reveals itself in its variant concrete species like churches or denominations as something permanent, self-consistent, always developing. Strictly speaking, there is no history of Christianity in itself; there is only a history of Christians. There is no history of Christian doctrine as such; there is only a history of people who hold doctrines. For Christianity as a religion is not an abstraction. It is concrete, existing in people's lives. As they develop,

it develops. Abstracted from human experience, it eludes us as the life of plants eludes us in a herbarium.

Christianity as we know it today springs from no single source but has gathered up within itself material from the various environments in which it has existed. Its elements are concrete—decisions of councils, theological treatises, rituals, orders, sacrifices, morals, customs, political adjustments, and above all the experience of actual men and women who built states, married, grew old, fought, loved, thought and acted.

In a certain sense, to be sure, the generic element of our religion has been expressed in propositions. But the propositions are not Christian reality. That lies in what propositions endeavour to express. Creeds and confessions are the product of the union of generic Christianity and culture. As they become the inheritance of successive centuries the distinction between form and life has often been overlooked because of ecclesiastical authority, but it none the less remains.

To discover the vital, generic principles of Christianity one must study the various historical conditions and social orders in which its formulas have developed, and discover the fundamental attitudes and beliefs which they express. The nineteen hundred years in which Christianity has shown itself an independent religion furnish the historian one infallible test by which he can judge what this essential force is: the power to propagate itself in the social orders which have determined the course of history. Why do certain doctrines live on, fruitful in new organizations and new life, and why do others grow sterile? The answer is to be discovered in the actual process of the development of our religion: such doctrines are the religion of Jesus functioning in dramatic terms furnished by and calculated to render satisfaction to the religious needs begotten of a dominant and creative social mind.

GENERIC CHRISTIANITY

I

Occidental civilization has resulted from the genetic succession of several creative social minds. These social minds have been the outcome of social experience of various sorts. Christianity, as a developing religion by which men of different grades of culture have sought to gain help from God in accord with the teaching and person of Jesus Christ, has appropriated and built into itself these dominant social minds, which in turn were expressions of creative social forces. As social experience varies, new intellectual concepts result. Doctrine-making, when analyzed, is the formulation or modification of inherited religious beliefs in accordance with these new concepts for the purpose of vindicating and directing religious self-expression. Generally such formulation gives birth to but one doctrine in an epoch.

To put the matter more distinctly, theology is the outgrowth of the needs of religion for intellectual expression. Wherever religion is practised it is forced to meet the needs set by the social life of those to whom it ministers. In the nature of the case, the satisfaction of these needs, as well as the needs themselves, are determined by the habits and thought and social activity of any given epoch. Religious doubts or religious controversies which have been the usual occasion of doctrinal growth have in general sprung from the failure of inherited religious formulas to meet needs set by the dominant social experiences. Thus the doctrines of Christianity have been religiously functional rather than absolute, and the development of Christianity has thus inevitably been a social process.

The fact that in the midst of these successive social minds Christianity has proceeded in a definite direction and has bred true to itself is an argument that generic Christianity is to be found by a study of the successive periods of creative theological thought, which in origin are the periods of that genetically related creative activity

on the part of successive social minds which has constituted the continuous stream of history. A nation without social development naturally has no developing theology.

The relation of doctrine to the evolving social mind from which both the new religious needs and their satisfaction spring is not quite as simple, however, as what has been said might imply. While a social mind has been shaping up the particular doctrine demanded by the same new creative social impulse, it has usually accepted and defended other doctrines which it has inherited from a long line of predecessors. Thus new doctrines appear only at what might be called the tension points of intellectual and social progress. These, however, are not, strictly speaking, inventions, but the organization of truths already held implicitly in the Christian religion much as elements of a developing civilization are implicit in its fundamental genius.

Quite as important is the fact that just as some persons have alternating personalities, so most epochs have more than one social mind. In fact, much of the progress of history is due to the conflict between these social minds, each of which tended to shape up some characteristic religious expression.

These counter social minds express the social experience of minorities unproductive of immediate historical development. When expressing themselves in theology, they have given rise to the opposition theologies which were sidetracked into the limbo of heresy. The fact that the developing system of Christian teaching which we call orthodoxy persisted was not due to any superficial causes like persecution or state support. These indeed were agents, but the fundamental explanation why one doctrine rather than another triumphed during moments of creative struggle is that it served better than the other the needs begotten by the continuously developing and dominant social experience. Could, for example,

true progress in social development any more than in theology ever have resulted from social minds which could have been satisfied with gnosticism or the essential polytheism of Arius or the atomistic philosophy of Pelagius? Counter theologies have been valuable because they each have recognized something not included in the theology which ministered directly to the dominant social mind; but, despite common belief regarding heresies, they have never become some future orthodoxy. These theologies failed to function directly in the actual course of development both of society and Christianity. At the best they were of influence only as contributing causes of new social minds.

These counter theologies or heresies have failed to function in two respects: They did not tend toward the increasing knowledge of reality; and however much influence they may have had in affecting the course of the development of orthodoxy, they have not satisfied the religious needs of the dominant social minds which constituted the main course of history.

Only those Christian conceptions for which the genetically connected dominant social minds of successive periods have shown affinity have given the real content to our growing religion. In them, as by a sort of Mendellian formula, the generic quality of Christianity is to be found. Dominant traits alone have persisted in vigour.

II

These creative social minds which have made Occidental history during this Christian era, are the Semitic which gave us the New Testament and the Messianic drama; the Hellenistic which gave us Ecumenical dogma; the Imperialistic which gave us the doctrine of sin and the Roman Church; the Feudal which gave us the first real theory of atonement; the National which gave us Protestantism; the *bourgeois* which gave us modern

Evangelicalism; and the Modern or Scientific-Democratic mind which must give us the theology of tomorrow. It is not without importance that each of these dominant social minds has had its particular place of birth. Syria, the Hellenistic territory, Western Europe, Germany, England, and America has each been the home of one of these social minds, which have resulted in doctrinal development. And it is not improbable that the Western movement of our civilization may yet add still another phase of social as well as doctrinal development,—the Cosmopolitan-Fraternal, which so far as the church is concerned will find its birthplace in Asia.

III

(1) Christianity in its original form was essentially without a theology. So far from being systematized around any philosophical conception, it was like all Semitic religions essentially dramatic. The early Christians believed that one act of the world drama was coming to a close. The Christ had appeared, only temporarily to withdraw to Heaven whence he was to come to introduce the second and eternal act of the drama. A study both of the New Testament and of the baptismal formulas of the patristic churches makes it clear that this belief was professed in a form which was germinantly the Apostles' Creed. In these formulas there is no philosophy or theology except the description of God the Father as creator. This answer to gnosticism, was however, not accompanied by any doctrinal development of the other dramatic statements relative to the birth, death or ascension of Jesus the Christ, or of the other beliefs which were involved in the extension to him of the Messianic hope. The Apostolic Fathers use an occasional metaphysical expression, but with them, as with the writers of the synoptic gospels, religion is a glorious hope by which they are to be saved. This scenario—if the term may be permitted—of the world

drama has shaped the development of the entire Christian religion. It by no means expresses the full content of Christianity as we know it today, but it has been carried along throughout the entire period of Church development and has always been able to fructify the dominant social minds to such an extent that the entire course of doctrinal development of Christianity might almost be described as the successive expression of the philosophical content and implication of its various elements. In fact, no significant item has ever been added to Christianity beyond the doctrines which have resulted from this union.

It might appear that generic Christianity is therefore identical with the Apostles' Creed; but that would certainly not be true to facts as we actually know them in Christian history. The vital impulse which expressed itself in the Messianic expectation formulated in the Apostles' Creed contained Semitic concepts brought over from Judaism. In its relation with the dominant social minds its literalness and its dramatic simplicity have increasingly been included in some more comprehensive conception. If Christianity were only the Messianism of the early church, it would never have become that which we see it today; but without this group of undeveloped hopes Christianity would have perished.

(2) When primitive Christianity entered into the Graeco-Roman world in the Eastern part of the Empire, it entered a world untrained in the Messianic hope. It was therefore forced to restate itself in such forms as would satisfy certain very definite religious needs on the part of perhaps the most complicated social mind which the world has ever seen prior to that of modern days.

The social mind of the Eastern or Hellenistic part of the Roman Empire was excluded from political and social expressions by the policy adopted by the Roman conquerors. While there were incidental reforms insti-

tuted in various cities of the Empire, the religious need of the Graeco-Roman life was essentially metaphysical and dramatically mystical. On the one side there was a need of an absolute God as over against idolatry; and on the other side there was the yearning for salvation through union or at least fellowship with this God. The former of these two needs appears everywhere in the philosophical writings, but most characteristically in the Stoic term Logos. The second of these needs is apparent in the rapid spread of the drama-mystery religions with their promise of salvation from evil and death through the union by worship with some god like Osiris or Mithra.

When the message of Christian salvation came to this Graeco-Roman world it was immediately found capable of satisfying these two dominant needs of the social mind. What the other religions promised, Christianity, through the course of several hundred years of bitter struggle and persecution, actually supplied to the satisfaction of both the metaphysician and the mystic. The form taken by this satisfaction was the Nicene formula of a God who is metaphysically and substantially one and yet in terms of experience has manifested Himself personally so as to come into vital relationship with sinful man. The later discussions of the nature and person of Christ were not superimposed upon the original Christian religion, but were the generic growth of the new exposition of the content of the new doctrine of God. The old conceptions persisted, but were interpreted through new carrying concepts. The Nicene theology, so far from being an addition to Christianity, was vital Christianity itself functioning in certain definite religious conditions and under the control of the Hellenistic social mind. Arianism failed not so much because it was finally outlawed as because it did not so express the elemental Christian impulse and belief as to satisfy the needs of the Graeco-Roman social mind. Meta-

physically, it prevented a Christian from believing that he had been saved by a real God; religiously, it forced him into a virtual polytheism. And both metaphysics and religion met in the dramatic conception of "begetting."

(3) As the Christian religion spread Westward it carried with itself not only the original Messianic conception but also these new formulas so full of religious power. It was not merely church authority which prevailed in their acceptance; it was a new intellectual and religious harmony. Anything less than a Christ possessed of the divine nature was repudiated by that Western social mind of which Augustine is the epitome and expression. The success of Arianism among certain German tribes simply makes the real progress of generic Christianity more obvious.

As all students of institutions would admit, it was really in the West that the Roman genius best expressed itself. It was in Italy, Gaul and Spain that by an epoch-making series of experiments the Roman world evolved the imperial idea. To the East this idea was carried in terms of officialism, but the ancient civilizations were too deeply bedded to be replaced by Roman methods, and remained a force against which the imperial idea struggled only to find itself transformed into likeness to Oriental despotism. In the Western world the imperial idea was really creative. It built up new civilizations and worked itself into the very tissues of a growing new world. Naturally it was in the Western world that the deep religious need was felt of administrative efficiency in religion akin to the political efficiency of the Empire. This was especially felt when the Empire itself began to weaken, and the only conservative or preservative force in the Western civilization was the church. It was natural, therefore, that Christianity should have still further developed itself in terms of contemporary social efficiency. The Roman Catholic

church was not the invention of this or that man; it was rather the outcome of the union of the vital impulses of Christianity, in part already recognized, with the social mind of the Western world. So thoroughly did it satisfy the need of the region in which the institutions of Rome persisted that to this day there is a well marked social and political—not to mention religious—distinction between the countries which had been thoroughly Romanized and those countries of Northern Europe where Roman influence had never triumphed, or where Roman institutions were destroyed by un-Romanized invaders.

But Christianity in Western Europe came in contact with another widespread social attitude, the pessimism and distrust of human nature so inevitable in a period when a civilization literally disintegrates before peoples' eyes. Almost paradoxically the great religious need which this terrible collapse of civilization engendered was some teaching that could raise men from trust in discredited human nature to trust in an eternal and supreme God. Augustine formulated and fixed this new phase in the Christian religion. His doctrine of sin is, of course, involved in the New Testament, but with him it was systematized in our religion. Christianity was not only organized in terms of liberation from the natural corruption of human nature, but was made to serve the purposes of faith in a God who was greater than His world and was not dependent upon human virtue to bring about His ends. The doctrine of original sin and of God's sovereignty were, therefore, by no means accretions, but the functioning expressions of the vital impulse of Christianity as it brought power and courage to the mind of Western Europe.

(4) The history of the Middle Ages gains unity as one sees imperialism expressed in the Holy Roman Empire, but so far as Christianity was concerned, this attempt at a social order administered by Jesus Christ through

his two vice-gerents, Emperor and Pope, expressed itself almost entirely within the development of the church itself. There was, however, another creative social mind which was to have powerful influence on the development of Christian thought—feudalism.

Feudalism as a creative conception of social relationships is not difficult to state, however much we may fail to understand its origin. It is the expression of life subject to definite economic conditions, temporary, it is true, but, wherever found, pervading all the thinking of its social order. Christianity came to the world of feudalism with its well developed message of a triune sovereign God, of a Saviour possessed of the divine nature, and of original sin. Anselm endeavoured to think these three together by systematizing the divine method of salvation according to the principles of feudalism. The significance of the death of Christ, though a part of the original message, had never been systematized with other Christian belief. It had been set forth dramatically as sacrifice or ransom. Such dramatic presentations had been carried over into the church services, as the mass; but minds dominated by the social conceptions of feudalism and the passion for system seen in scholasticism, could not be content to leave their religion with no connecting thought between salvation from sin and the all-perfect God. Such systematizing was accomplished by Anselm's extension of feudal concepts into the realm of theology. As a complement of the inherited doctrines, the death of Christ was shown by him to be the satisfaction of the honour of God, injured by man's sin. Thus Christianity found itself for the first time possessed of complete symmetry. While the Anselmic doctrine of the Atonement never became a part of official orthodoxy in any such sense as did the philosophy of substance and the belief in original sin, it did none the less give direction to the development of Christian thought. From his time Christianity has always seen

in the death of Christ something which has made plain to the world the ethical unity of a forgiving Sovereign.

(5) The period which followed feudalism was essentially a struggle between the imperialistic conception in Church and State and the new spirit of monarchy and individualism. The Reformation was far more than a mere theological or even church struggle. It rooted itself in a changing order with new economic, political and cultural forces. On its religious side it was an extension into theology of the same forces which were operative in the shaping of our modern state; and, conversely, an extension into the course of political development of those spiritual conceptions which give worth to personality.

But at this point we notice the practical completion of another religious development in terms of Roman Catholicism. Just as the Greek church has never markedly advanced beyond the theological development expressed in the Ecumenical creeds, so the Latin church stopped its development at the point reached by scholasticism, imperialism and feudalism. Individual dogmas, it is true, have been added by the Latin church, but they have been little more than formal ratifications of beliefs involved in ecclesiastical imperialism. The Roman Curia in its present struggle with Modernism is thoroughly consistent in its insistence that its theologians shall revert to the study of Thomas Aquinas, and this fact makes it plain that the Roman church as yet does not propose to be influenced constructively by the new social minds which have created periods since the sixteenth century.

Speaking generally, and with due regard for the apparently exceptional situation in France, in those nations which embraced the new monarchical conception born of the new conditions of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the development of Christianity has proceeded in terms of Protestantism. Conversely, Protestant theol-

ogy has been marked by an extension into theology of the monarchical idea as opposed to the imperialistic. This is less true in the case of Luther than in that of Calvin, but the change is obvious in the new interest shown by the sixteenth century in God's sovereignty and in the substitution of the satisfaction of His punitive (sovereign) justice for the satisfaction of His unsatisfied (feudal) honour. But such a development has been genetic. Protestantism, notwithstanding its laxity in some of its organizing concepts, has held true to the formulas of ecumenical orthodoxy.

The effort of Deism to build up a sort of cosmic constitutional monarchy similar to that which was being built up contemporaneously in England is a striking illustration of the impossibility for the social mind to shape up a permanent religious concept that does not embody the fundamental Christian concepts as to God. In its failure to perpetuate the belief that God is in actual control of His world, Deism was also an illustration of the fact that the elements of generic Christianity are to be recognized in their capacity so to unite with the dominant social minds as to produce doctrines which satisfy all succeeding social minds. A constitutionally limited God is a religious impossibility for the scientific mind. He must be absolute or He is not God.

(6) The eighteenth century might be described as the period in which the *bourgeois* mind became dominant in politics. It followed naturally, therefore, that its influence should be felt in all phases of social life. This can be seen in the rapid extension of commerce, the spread of a limited democracy, as well as in the establishment of our present capitalistic system. But quite as clearly it can be seen in the field of religion.

The *bourgeois* social mind had inherited the Protestant theology, with its emphasis upon metaphysical matters such as those of free will and foreordination. Its needs, however, were vastly more practical than those which

the professional theologians and the higher ecclesiastics could satisfy. There resulted, therefore, from the interplay of Christianity with this new spirit an emphasis on the Atonement largely in commercial terms, which was to have much the same influence in religion as the *bourgeois* movement had exercised in politics. For it is to this union that we owe Evangelicalism, that characteristic type of religious interest which was so evident among churchmen of all Christian bodies in the first half of the nineteenth century. Centering as it did around the substitutionary Atonement, it brought home afresh to a commercial age the vitalizing conception of a divine love that dared to suffer in order to serve. A great and sacrificial conception of God could not fail to find expression in the religious life of the church. However selfish and commercial certain forms of Evangelicalism may appear, however much it has failed to appreciate the inefficiency of aristocratic conceptions in morality, it can never be forgotten that to it are due the abolition of slavery, reforms in prisons and the care of the insane and of the poor, the establishment of Young Men's Christian Associations, Bible and Foreign Mission Societies, colleges and theological seminaries. Altogether Evangelicalism is to be credited with profoundly ethical sympathies.

This *bourgeois* attitude took two other very different theological directions. On the one side was Unitarianism, in which, like an insurgent *bourgeoisie*, a respectable humanity, sensitive to its natural rights in the sight of a sovereign God, rose up and repudiated belief in total depravity; and, in consequence, the orthodox conceptions of God and Christ. On the other side was Wesleyanism which became a training school of religious democracy, vital religious experience and aggressive but not excessively theological orthodoxy. The subsequent history of these two movements shows clearly which best represented generic Christianity in its relation with the

dominant social mind. Wesleyanism and its kindred nonconformist groups lives on, possessed of unchecked power of spiritual parentage. Unitarianism, with all its service to intellectual emancipation, has never succeeded in furnishing religious satisfaction except to certain types of minds, particularly those in revolt against genetic social and theological development.

(7) At this point we come to the modern world in which tendencies are as yet hardly sufficiently developed to be traced with precision. But the religious needs of the dominant social mind are at once apparent. Trained as we are in scientific thought and surrounded as we are by the forces of an adolescent democracy, it is inevitable that we should seek to satisfy religious needs in accordance with these dominant forces. In the light of the past, it is inevitable that these satisfactions will be gained only on the condition that, first, they include the vital propagating elements of Christianity, rather than some current philosophy; and, second, that the dominant social mind, rather than some counter or fractional or anachronistic social mind be permitted to shape up dramatically rather than metaphysically the formulas of our religious thinking. The latter demand is perhaps a little more clearly organized than the former. We can appreciate the demand of a scientific method and we can formulate with some precision the share which democracy must have in our religious development; but the religious thinkers of the day are not yet at one as to what elements of our inherited religion are essential to the continued efficiency of Christianity. It is this which, it is to be hoped, we may infer from this rapid survey of the Christianity of the past.

III

The one outstanding characteristic of the development of the Christian religion, from the days of the simple though inclusive teaching of Jesus to modern

days, is, as has been said, that it has been genetic and cumulative, seen only where some element of the original religious message of the New Testament has so satisfied the new religious needs of a new dominant social mind as to be capable of restatement in terms of that social mind. No such doctrine, however redefined, has ever been repudiated by a succeeding social mind of the same historical significance. Like the habits and motives of youth which have been so built into personality as to reappear in later years, they represent those vital religious realities which a developing social order needed and used.

At this point, however, it is necessary to make a sharp distinction between the uncritical acceptance of that which has satisfied preceding periods and that creative process which has built up some new doctrine from some undeveloped element of Christianity. Here again Christianity has moved along the ordinary course of life.

At least until our modern days inherited doctrines have not been subjected to close scrutiny, but, preserved by ecclesiastical authority as dogma, have been built bodily into the institutional life of Christians, as necessarily involved in an orthodox system. But this is after all only a superficial estimate of the attitude of each successive social mind to the doctrinal formulation of its predecessors. While it has accepted dogma, it has none the less recast the significance of dogma so that, while its words remain the same, they express truth symbolically rather than precisely. Take, for example, the doctrine of God. While the Nicene formula belongs to practically all Christian churches, the actual religious content of the doctrine of the Triune God has varied with place and time, although never in such a way as to violate the fundamental purpose of the formula that one God has made three personal revelations of Himself. The most striking illustration of a persistent religious reality back of doctrinal formulas, however, is to be seen in the case of the death of Christ. Every age has made

it a most vital matter of its religious teaching, and yet the particular forms in which the significance of Christ's death has been expressed have varied. On the other hand, there has not been any creative theological exposition of the Christian eschatology. Until our own day the social minds have left it in its literal form, just as certain of them had left other elements of the Messianic drama undeveloped.

When one evaluates doctrinal formulas historically he will discover in them both form and substance. The latter may have been recognized without reflection, throughout the history of the church, but the doctrine-making process at last brought it into consciousness and systematic perspective. It is this fact that explains how it is that Christianity has always attempted to reproduce Biblical materials. Such determination is not due merely to a belief in the inspiration of the Scriptures; it is really due to the essential nature of Christianity itself, for the teaching and person of Jesus have always been the ultimate criteria to which the church has reverted. The normative elements of our religion, however described, are always traceable to the relations of the church to its Founder. The successive developments of doctrine might be thus described as our religion functioning in the new situations set by dominant social minds for the purpose of making clear to successive generations the reality of that salvation which Jesus brings. Generic Christianity is, in fact, the Gospel as it has developed under new social influences.

It is thus not difficult to see, back of these successively organized doctrines, the elements which go to make up generic Christianity. Stated as far as possible without the doctrinal forms given them by successive social minds, they are as follows:

(1) Men are sinful and, if they are to avoid the outcome of sin, need salvation by God. (Sin, guilt, and the need of redemption.)

(2) The God of law is knowable as the God of love, who in threefold personal self-expression seeks reconciliation with men. (Trinity.)

(3) God has revealed Himself as Saviour in the historical person, Jesus. (Deity of Christ.)

(4) God comes into any human life that seeks Him, both directly and indirectly through social organizations like the church, transforming it and making it in moral quality like Himself. (The Holy Spirit as experienced in repentance and regeneration.)

(5) The death of Christ is the revelation of the moral unity of the love and law of God. (Atonement.)

(6) Those who accept Jesus as the divine Lord and Saviour constitute a community in special relationship with God. (The Church.)

(7) Such persons may look forward to triumph over death and entrance into the kingdom of God. (Resurrection and eternal life.)

These fundamentals of generic Christianity are not dependent upon the particular type of philosophy in which they have been accepted by the church. They are as old as the New Testament. Various social minds, in proportion as they have felt the need by the help one or all of them can give, have used their own vocabularies to express them, but even when the vocabularies themselves have in some cases grown unintelligible, the truth itself has continued to function.

In the light of these facts it seems inevitable, therefore, that if Christianity is to go on developing, these same fundamental conceptions must be brought into contact with the dominant social mind of today. The Christianity of tomorrow will not be a new religion, nor will it be a merely reiterated, uncritically accepted orthodoxy. It will be a genetic extension of the elements which have constituted historical orthodoxy. The particular formulas in which this generic theology has been expressed do not function well with modern men, but that which

they express—which is, after all, not only generic Christianity but the heart of orthodoxy—is possessed of religious value and power.

At one point we already see evidence of new doctrinal development. The religion of our modern world is already shaping up the social as well as the individual content of the eschatology of the original Gospel message, as yet so imperfectly evaluated and therefore so often literally presented. But this awaited doctrine of salvation, which our age, because of its new social passion is the first clearly to need, and, because of its more scientific understanding of man's nature and of its new social sympathies, is the first to grasp and attempt to organize in terms of life and society, will be genetically the outcome of the generic Christianity of the past. The modern man, when once he recovers from his temporary rebellion against ill-understood and dogmatic orthodoxy, will not be satisfied with any God who is less personal than the God of the Nicene creed; with any Christ who is less divine than the Christ of Chalcedon; with any conception of humanity that is less true to the atavistic tendencies which evolution has made known to us than is the Augustinian doctrine of original sin; with any forgiveness on the part of God that shall relate the reign of law in nature and the moral order with living service less than the cross of Christ; with any ethical conception of divine love that is less social than that of evangelicalism. The philosophies, terms, and carrying concepts, in which intellectual satisfaction will be given these needs, we may expect to differ from those of the past, but their function and their content will be essentially the same. Generic Christianity tomorrow as yesterday will prove itself capable of satisfying the religious needs of a dominant social mind in terms and concepts which are furnished by that social mind. But it will still be the genius of Christianity expressing itself in an enriched, genetically progressing and far-

reaching evangelicalism. Other foundation can no man lay than that which is laid, Jesus Christ our Lord. Any form of Christianity that is not in attitude and fundamental sympathies at one with the religious spirit of historical orthodoxy, however it may reject the philosophies or the dramatic pictures and analogies in which this spirit was expressed, will be ecclesiastically sterile.

IV

As one thus comes to see that there is a divine, vital Christianity at work in the world, morally fructifying social evolution, satisfying its religious needs, saving men's souls, and transforming social conditions, he will also see that the different Christian groups, despite differences in their doctrines or polity, possess this generic Christianity. Doctrinally developed in different degrees, they are effective in proportion as they embody and apply phases of this generic Christianity to their own environment. Such an observer will be filled with something nobler than tolerance. He will feel that as a Christian nothing Christian is foreign to him; that while he may believe certain forms of Christian thought and organization are less developed and even inferior to those which satisfy him, he will also believe that through them all is beating the gospel and the spirit of Jesus Christ. And, after all, is it not as true now as in the days of the apostles that creeds and sermons, organizations and holy days, are the shadow of Him who is the substance?

Inasmuch, then, as God has made of one gospel all varieties of Christians, we should not think that He is separated from those Christians whose church life differs from our own. We are one body, though differing severally. In full confidence in the common life which the history of our religion shows He has begotten in our souls through Jesus Christ, let us remember that the efficiency of Christianity is dependent, not on some

particular form of words, but upon the ability of each group of Christians to mediate generic Christianity to those who partake of different social minds and participate in different social experiences. Only thus can we see clearly that the chief antagonisms between the churches of Jesus Christ are set by social minds rather than by essential Christianity. As Christians we are possessed of the same Bible, the same Lord, the same essential, howbeit differently or imperfectly developed, faith. With this sense of brotherhood, we can pray for one another, share our best experiences with one another, bear one another's burdens, and so fulfil the law of Christ.

Personal Faith

By Professor Dr. H. Th. Obbink,
Utrecht, Holland.

Generally speaking, the Dutch have a mind disposed for dogmatic problems. In matters of religion that is their strength and also their weak side. The rank and file are interested in the most intricate dogmatic moot points, and the whole bulk of religion appears in the main in an intellectual form. That fact has given its very imprint even to our language. We say *geloof*, and in that word we include the common significations of the English words: creed, faith, belief and piety, but with a clear inclination to the meaning of creed and belief. From the pulpits every Sunday the believers can hear the warning that intellectual agreement is not the whole of God's demand, but the necessity of that incessant assurance evinces clearly the general tenor of the common spiritual life. And even the leading spirits have not yet found the harmony between the two—belief and faith—and the *shibboleth* distinguishing the two great parties of the religious community is till now: through the (intellectual) doctrine to the (personal) faith, and: through the (personal) faith to the (intellectual) doctrine. It may be that in one form or another also in other countries that controversy exists. In my opinion it is useful in any case to deal here with the subject by speaking of personal faith.

First, a word of that combination: personal faith. It seems to be a pleonasm. But the expression is in daily use. What is meant by that addition: personal? Faith

is to rely upon God, to live with God, to yield to God, and how can that be otherwise than personal? It is altogether the heart-felt *habitus* of the individual, incommunicable, unspeakable, not dependent, at least not entirely, on education and surroundings. Children, descended from one father living in one *milieu*, undergoing the same influences, will differentiate to a great extent in that respect. It will be existent in the one and lacking in the other, and nobody can say why. It lies so much at the depth of the human heart, that we even of ourselves in no wise know whence it came nor can we count up other than external causes of its originating and growing up. We cannot descend along the rungs of the ladder to the depths of our individuality to the place where personal faith dwells. Indeed, there is nothing so personal as faith, and the expression "personal faith" seems to be a pleonasm.

Meanwhile, faith has another side; it is always accompanied with some ideas and presentations, and these play the leading parts in such a way that they seem to have faith in the toils.

Now, these ideas and presentations are collected from the environing community and from the community only. Every child is born into a community, he learns to speak the language of that community, and in learning the language he acquires not only words but ideas and presentations, which are carried into the mind of the child unconsciously—the ideas of good and evil, God and eternity, all are introduced from without. And the child, when grown up, will not produce but reproduce what he has received from the community, and the community will decide whether the manifestation of the individual is normal or not. It will call normal all those manifestations that are in agreement with the community, and all that is in disagreement it will call abnormal, and when the disagreement is of a constant character, it will be named madness.

This does not concern only the intellectual presentations and ideas, it concerns also the whole state of mind as appears *e.g.* in the well known *visions*. In all religious communities Protestant, as well as Roman Catholic, visionists are met with, and what is more individual than a vision? Yet only a Roman Catholic believer will see saints in his visions, a Protestant believer will never see them. That means that utterances of the most individual religious life reproduce the mode of thought of the surrounding community. Every village-preacher knows how great the difference is between the one group of inhabitants of the country and the other. There are congregations where the gloomy aspects of the Gospel predominate; everyone is in fear of not being elect; every one lives and dies in darkness and awe of hell, and every child born in that community represents the same element even in his personal faith: it is dark, gloomy, melancholy, dejected. There are other groups, where the joyful aspects of the Gospel prevail in such a degree that the consciousness of sin is very weak, and God has in the main the function to forgive. And every child born into that community represents the same element even in his personal faith: it is joyful, gay, superficial and frivolous. Thus the personal faith is under the influence of the religious sphere to such a degree that one can suggest that the expression, "personal faith," far from being a pleonasm, is rather a contradiction, since the constitutive elements in faith have their origin in the community.

Each of these conclusions, however, that the expression "personal faith" is either a pleonasm or a contradiction, emerges from an incorrect supposition—the one that the individuality is absolute, the other that it exists only as a differentiation of the community. The unfolding of the individuality is, however, not the more complete, the less it is connected with the community, but the more it focusses and personifies the virtues of

the community. In Egyptian and Babylonian antiquity individuality was not discovered, the only individual was the King, all others belonged to the lump. Hence the possibility of the notion that for the sake of the King's sin many thousands of the people should be slaughtered. It was at first by the great prophets of Israel that the individual was discovered, and the development of the idea followed only very slowly.

What means, then, the due allowance for the individual? Certainly not the atomizing of the community, the denial of the coherence between the individual and the community. The great religious personalities, *e.g.* Luther, Fliedner, Zinzendorf, Thomas à Kempis, etc., are not to be understood apart from the community in which they lived. Either by reason of harmony or by reason of contradiction they are to be explained from their *milieu*. Notwithstanding, they have something peculiar, and their individuality consists of the mutual relation between that peculiarity and the virtues of the community.

This leads to the conclusion that personal faith, *i.e.* to rely upon God, to yield to God as a heart-felt *habitus*, can be quite the same whilst the utterance of it is quite different, the form of utterance being conditioned by the point of culture, the nature of the surroundings and the temper of the individual. Concerning the point of culture and surroundings, I take the instance of the sacrifice of Isaac, Abraham's son. That sacrifice was an utterance of Abraham's faith and could be that. Nowadays in our society such a sacrifice would not be an expression of faith but of madness. In different times the same thing needs different forms and the same forms in different times suggest necessarily different things. With respect to the temper it will be sufficient to take into account the fact that the spontaneous character of Luther and the speculative nature of Calvin on the same *agens* necessarily will react in a different way. Not

because the faith of the one is more or less intense than that of the other, but because it is the faith of different individualities. The same religious fact will be seen and reacted upon by different minds in different ways. St. Luke sees and speaks of the same events otherwise than St. John. That is a matter of course since the human soul is not like a camera giving the pure outlines of the thing; it acts rather as a painter reproducing not the simple outlines but the thing seen plus the idea expressed by it. The photograph will surely be correct in outlines, the picture does not pursue that but strives after giving an insight into the essence of the reproduced thing. The Gospels are not photographs, but paintings, and the vain endeavours to harmonize the details of the Gospels for which many apologists are drudging rely on a miscomprehension of the essence of the Gospels. They aim not only at a mere account of historical facts but they are the bringers of the Good News; they seek to be a fountain of bliss, or, as says St. John: "that which we have seen and heard declare we unto you. And these things write we unto you that your joy may be full." In other terms, the Gospels do not aim at giving an acquaintance with mere historical facts to enlarge the historical knowledge of the reader but they have in view the religious emotion; they do not enumerate what is *past* but they speak of Jesus Christ who is *present* in the hearts of the believers, *i.e.* the Gospel is not theory nor knowledge but practice. Otherwise it would belong to profane history; knowledge of the past. And St. Paul says that "the Gospel is the power of God unto salvation to everyone that believeth."

Now, it is clear why many people, serious and with much common sense, set little store by the preaching of the Good News. They hear it as a sequence of historical facts in the past, which do not touch them; moreover that history contains many incredible facts, at least incredible to what Kant calls "*die reine Vernunft.*" In

that aspect biblical history is behind profane history and less acceptable. The Christian world, striving after converting the mass to Christianity, cannot dispatch the matter by preaching the so-called "objective truth," while the non-Christian hearers—if such there are—will not look upon that as the truth; it does not touch them, unless it touches them as *a present reality*, that means, unless they see it at work in the present world, unless they see the power of the faith in the life and behaviour of the believers. The present world managed for practical purposes is always bent on all that which shows power and influence, and as soon as the present power of the Christian faith is recognized, people will count it worth while. The most effectual impediment to the spreading of the Good News is our supple Christianity.

These arguments do not prevail with all: many people's indolence of nature hinders their acceptance of the Gospel's truth, and also declares that they fear the call on their moral conscience. But I know by experience that it is not the moral appeal of the Gospel only, nor the indolence of nature which hinders the acceptance of the Gospel. It is, in the main, the intellectual form that the Churches have chosen to express their belief, it is the dogmatic formula imposed as a *conditio sine qua non* for the individual. From the dogmatic formula also differences spring up between the believers who are one in religious feeling and temper but differ greatly in formulating the intellectual content of their belief. Now, an intellectual formula is indispensable for the establishing of the Church; in foregoing the formula the Church is the cause of its own death. The individual, too, cannot do without formulating his intimate feelings and without accounting for the connection of his personal faith with the historical biblical facts. But this formulation is not the primary condition, the root that the personal faith springs from.

It is often said that the first condition to begin with is to take for granted the biblical facts and the dogmatic *formulae;* I hold that quite impossible since the biblical facts and the dogmatic *formulae* contain many elements only to be appreciated as religious, not as mere historical, truths; *e.g.* I think it quite impossible to believe the corporeal resurrection of Christ or His supernatural birth without having seen Him as a present reality. A certain religious atmosphere is required as a necessary condition to the acceptance of the gist of the Scripture: God giving His Son as a Saviour of the world. But when this is so, and I think it irrefutable, then it is inconsiderate to require intellectual agreement as a primary condition from one longing for bliss. One cannot acknowledge the Scripture as the Word of God before having heard out of the Scripture the voice of God, speaking to him. One cannot believe the supernatural birth of Christ before having felt the all-controlling power of His personality. One cannot consent to the biblical doctrine before having seen that it is a doctrine of salvation for his own soul.

Therefore the starting-point for personal faith is not agreement with historical facts, and the essential part of it is not the intellectual consent, though agreement and intellectual consent play a great part in the growth of personal faith. The dominating element is the individuality itself in making the historical biblical facts into religious facts, *i.e.* into facts promoting the individual religious life. The Gospel is the cathedral, the religious mind is the painter taking interest in that impressive architecture and copying it and rejoicing in it, while many profane minds see nothing of its splendour. The more one's religious mind is homogeneous with that of the biblical writers, the deeper will be his insight into their design of relating not only historical facts but of expressing what they have felt of the eternal truth focussing in the temporal appearance of Christ in this sinful world. That eternal truth, surrounding the

whole of humanity with all its endeavours reflects itself in the individual mind just as water takes the colour of the bed over which it runs. Certain minds are so disposed that the evangelical truth of salvation takes necessarily the strict and rigorous form of the Calvinistic system: that aspect is the only one suited to such minds, they see it so, or they see it not. In their consciousness, not only for the establishing of the Church but also for personal faith the formulated doctrine is the starting point. And so far as their faith is concerned they are in the right: *for them* it is really the starting-point. But for minds disposed otherwise it is not so at all. They seek in the Scripture bread of life, to their taste very partial and onesided indeed because very individual; but what they find is really bread of life *for them*. They do not trouble about any system in their religious experiences, they are careless of any gap in their religious ideas, they do not strive after mutual correlation of their religious notions. This personal faith in growing up will embrace a continually greater mental area and conquer by degrees the historical facts of the Gospel and the dogmatic doctrines of the Church by remoulding them into purely religious realities. And each religious mind will make this process in its own way. So the religious personality prescribes the idiosyncrasy of the personal faith. And it does so not by reason of caprice. Wherever faith is genuine and real, rooted as it is in the depth of the soul of the individual, there is no spark of caprice. To be aware of the necessarily manifold forms of personal faith is to defer also to the personal idiosyncrasy of that faith in all its forms, mystic as well as intellectual.

The genuineness of another's faith that expresses itself in a form deviating from ours, is in danger of not being acknowledged, and we lack deference for each other's spiritual individuality. We do not take offence at the peculiar countenance of each individual; just as manifold is the spiritual individuality of the inner life.

And that spiritual individuality claims full recognition. The spiritual life has its peculiar individuality or it is not.

Varibus ex radiis nascitur lux candida solis.

The sun of God's love shines in our hearts and reflects there in multicoloured beams His great and refreshing light.

Solo Verbo: Lutheranism and Mysticism

By Dr. Friedrich Loofs,
Professor of Church History in the University of Halle.

In the first number of this quarterly[1] I published an article regarding the shibboleth of Lutheran Christianity received by all evangelical Christians, *Sola Fide, i.e.* by faith alone. There is a second saving formula of equal significance for genuine Lutheranism, *Solo Verbo*, by the word alone. As Luther's writings show, both are closely connected. For example, in 1520, in the *De Libertate Christiana*, he says, "One thing, and that the only thing, is needed for Christian life, justice and liberty, that is, the holy word of God, the gospel of Christ; faith alone brings salvation and the efficacious use of the word of God therefore . . . alone justifies."[2] In this connection with *sola fide*, *solo verbo* means that no external work, no sacramental *opus operatum* can renew us, but only the word of God received in faith. But this meaning does not exhaust the significance of the term *solo verbo*. It has, indeed, a second and even a third meaning.

According to its second meaning it emphasizes that in religious matters there is no place for compulsion of any kind; the *Word alone* is decisive. The opposite to the thing implied in the third meaning of *solo verbo* is what Luther calls *Schwärmerei*, *i.e.* fanaticism or the unrestrained use of the imagination. He would hear nothing of an immediate revelation of God to man. The word of

[1]Vol. 1913, pp. 36-49.

[2]Weimar Ed. vii, 50, 33; 51, 17, 35f.

God, the word as preached and the word in the Sacraments were regarded by him as the sole means by which God or His Spirit works upon us. He uttered warnings against any one dreaming of a Holy Ghost which works either without the word or anticipates it.[3]

Even in its second significance *solo verbo* has an actual interest for the present time. For it is no less a question than that of authority and freedom with which the two words *solo verbo* so understood have to do. *Solo verbo* covers freedom of belief, and what man, at least what Protestant, does not take this to be a good thing? Yet any serious person without much reflection will understand that the matter is not so simple as it appears at first sight. For all education, not excepting religious, implies authority. And so the question is raised whether really *solo verbo* (by the word alone) can altogether lead a congregation, not to say a people, to a Christian life. I think a discussion of this question will not be uninteresting.

For the present, however, I must pass by this second meaning of the term because it is the third which has the greatest significance for all who are interesting themselves in the mutual understanding of Christian denominations. An immediate revelation of God to individuals is not only prized by Quakers; mystics of all ages exalt it. And in our time mysticism is praised in the most diverse quarters as the most efficient promoter of Christian unity. According to its principle of subjective devotion, souls are made immediately one with God, independently of divergent external forms of the Church, independently even of different dogmas. Mysticism is treated generally as the essential element in all religions, as the quintessence of piety in which all Christians, particularly religious souls of all forms of religion, can find a common basis.

---

[3]Kirchenpostille (Erlangen Ed. vol. 12, 2d half, p. 326).

For this opinion of mysticism apparently historical proofs can be adduced; *e.g.* the celebrated sentence from the first chapter of St. Augustine's *Confessions:* "Thou has made us for thyself and our heart is restless until it finds its rest in thee."[4] Is this not mysticism, and does not every trained Christian agree with it? The four books on the *Imitation of Christ* by Thomas à Kempis (*ob.* 1471) which certainly belong to mystical literature are treasured in the most widely separated Christian denominations and with the exception of the Bible there is no devotional work so widely circulated. The *Spiritual Guide* of the Roman Catholic mystic, Michael de Molinos (*ob.* 1697) was translated twelve years before his death by no less a person than Aug. Herm. Francke; the works of Louis Claude de St. Martin (*ob.* 1803), also based on Roman Catholic mysticism, found a translator in the Lutheran Matthias Claudius. The writings of another Roman Catholic mystic, Antoinette Boarignon (*ob.* 1680) were collected and published by a Reformed theologian, Peter Poiret (*ob.* 1719). As lately as one hundred to one hundred and twenty years ago there were circles in Germany in which Roman Catholics, Lutherans and Calvinists held themselves to be united in mystical devotion. Anna Schlaker, for example, a well known pietistic lady in Switzerland (*ob.* 1826) had many Roman Catholics correspondents, and among the friends of John Michael Sailer, who died in 1832 as Roman Catholic Bishop of Regensburg, were Protestants as well. In these cases mysticism was the common bond of both groups. Mystical piety was not restricted to the Christian world; even at present it is not so. There are many Monists who are enthusiastic mystics. We have in Germany an energetic publisher (Diederichs in Jena) who today supplies interested circles with editions and translations of mysti-

[4]Confessions i, 1, 1.

cal works of various times, nations, confessions and religions. The *Enneades* of the heathen Neo-Platonist Plotinus (*ob.* 269), translated into German by Otto Kiefer (2 vols. 1905); the works of Ekkehard (*ob.* 1327), translated by Hermann Buttner (2 vols. 1909; vol. 1, second edition, 1912), and his scholar, Heinrich Leuse (*ob.* 1336), translated by Walther Lehmann (2 vols. 1911); the *Sermons of John Tauler* (*ob.* 1361), translated by Walther Lehmann (2 vols. 1913); the *Cherubic Wanderer* of Angelus Silesius (*ob.* 1677), edited by W. Bölsche (1905); the *Twelve Spiritual Conversations of Madame Guyon* (*ob.* 1717), from the French by N. Hoffmann (1911), were lately issued, also a volume of *Ecstatic Confessions*, collected by Martin Buber (1909).

Moreover, there were mystics in the most widely different classes of society, and this is still the case. In Germany a shoemaker, Jacob Boehme, was one of their modern prophets, and one of the great German philosophers of the nineteenth century, F. S. J. von Schelling was strongly influenced by the writings of this artisan. The so-called Anabaptists of the sixteenth century who encouraged mysticism found their supporters in the middle and lower classes, and at the present day there are still simple pietists who contribute to the store of mysticism. On the other side, sympathy with mysticism is to be found in the works of Goethe, of Carlyle and in many later and more recent writers. From America I might name R. W. Emerson (*ob.* 1882) and R. W. Trine; in Germany the admirer and popularizer of Ernst Haeckel, Wilhelm Bölsche, and the theologians regarded as the most progressive among the Roman Catholics—the Modernists; among the Protestants the late Auguste Sabatier in Paris (*ob.* 1901), R. J. Campbell, in London, and Ernst Troeltsch in Heidelberg belong more or less to the mystic group.

Mysticism according to this appears to be the freest and broadest form of piety—the religion of the future.

We may ask, is the shibboleth of Lutheranism of which we are speaking an evidence in itself that Lutheranism is in contradiction with this great power, this favourite child of modern religious sentiment, mysticism? It is true that Lutheranism has often taken the favourable attitude towards mysticism which it still holds. Not to speak of Valentin Weigel (*ob.* 1588) and Jacob Boehme (*ob.* 1624), for neither of these are regarded as normal types of Lutheranism, Johann Arndt (*ob.* 1621) showed in his celebrated four books, *Of the True Christianity*, the influence of mysticism (1601-1609). At a later time the Pietistic movement, Romanticism and the idealistic philosophy sympathized with mysticism. Today there are not a few Lutherans who do so. Indeed, the latest religious encyclopaedia which liberal German Protestantism has produced, the *Dictionary* of F. M. Schiele (*ob.* 1913) and Zscharnack (*ob.* 1913).[5] maintains that it was only Albert Ritschl (*ob.* 1889) and various disciples of his who placed mysticism in sharp antagonism to the religion of the Reformation.

In spite of this the question what was Luther's attitude toward mysticism is not one that can be decided by personal sympathy, antipathy or by academic hypothesis. It is an historical question, and, although I as a follower of Albert Ritschl may lose credit with my readers on account of the criticism above referred to, I still believe that this question must be answered in a different way from that indicated by the statement in question. In any case it is a question not previously discussed whether the Lutheran shibboleth, *solo verbo*, implies a contradiction of mysticism or not.

If we wish to give a serious answer to the question it is first necessary to make clear the essence of mysticism. Is mysticism present when in opposition to external piety or cold orthodoxy, hearty belief, sincere,

[5]Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, 9 vols. (Tübingen, 1909-1913), vol. iv, col. 607.

burning love for God and tender and warm Christian feeling makes itself known? Are all those mystics who understood the words of Jesus "When thou prayest, go into thy chamber" (Matt. 6:6), or the words of St. Paul, "What I yet live in the flesh, that I live in the faith of the Son of God who loved me and gave himself for me" (Gal. 2:20), and, "Your life is hidden in Christ with God" (Col. 3:3). Are all of those mystics who are deeply convinced that there are mysteries in Christian experience?—mysteries in God's providence? Many people would answer this question affirmatively. By doing so they would only show that for them mysticism is a mystical thing *i.e.* something which can not be clearly and definitely defined.

My opinion is that the only way one can get a clear idea of mysticism is to consult that ancient ecclesiastical writer, who according to his own statement meant to teach mysticism and actually became the teacher of thousands after him. He is an unknown Greek theologian of the close of the fifth century who, under the name of Dionysius the Areopagite, St. Paul's convert (Acts 17:34), wrote a tract on mystical theology and three others whose titles have no special significance (*On Divine Names*, *On the Celestial Hierarchy*, *On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*),[6] and likewise some spurious letters. If anywhere, the essence of mysticism must be revealed in the Tract of Pseudo-Dionysius, *On Mystical Theology*.

At the very beginning of this treatise the author speaks to Timothy to whom it is dedicated, undoubtedly the well-known helper of the Apostle Paul: "But thou, my dear Timothy, in intense striving after the mystic contemplation leave behind thee all movement of the senses and all intellectual activity, even everything that is sensibly perceived and intellectually known, all not-Being and Being, and ascend as far as thou canst

[6]De divinis nominibus, De coelesti hierarchia, and De ecclesiastica hierarchia.

upwards without sensation to union with Him who is exalted above all Being and Knowledge. Then, seeing that thou, absolutely and unconditionally away from thyself and separated from all this, takest thy position, thou wilt, casting aside and released from everything, be conducted to the transcendent light of the divine darkness."[7]

The basis upon which these thoughts rest is the assumption that God is the highest unity from which all being proceeds and to which in a way belongs all that can be attributed to being,[8] but which at the same time is so exalted above all being that none of our conceptions, not even that of thought or of being or actually of unity itself, can suitably describe its essence. The soul indeed approaches Him through the knowledge of being, but it attains to Him, who is exalted above all that we can positively or negatively declare[9] (He can be called Darkness and Light at the same time), only when withdrawing itself from what is external to itself and by concentrating itself upon itself. By doing this, and becoming simply itself, it follows or pursues the highest beauty and good, the Eternal One.[10] Then the Highest One illuminates the soul and penetrates it, uniting it with Himself, drawing it within His own Being. Purification from all things external to us, the reduction to simple forms and illumination, bring about unity with the One from which the soul derives its own being.[11] The soul is absorbed then in God,[12] it is itself divine.[13] The highest that can be attained in our relation to God is

[7]De mystica theologia, i, 1 (Migne Patrologia graeca), iii, p. 997 ff.

[8]De divinis nominibus, 2, 11, p. 649 B, and De mystica theologia, 1, 2, p. 1000 B.

[9]Cf. De divinis nominibus, 1, 1, p. 588 A. and 2, 11, p. 649 C, and De mystica theologia, 1, 2, p. 1000 B.

[10]Cf. De divinis nominibus, 4, 9, p. 705 A.

[11]Cf. De divinis nominibus, 5, 8, p. 821 C D.

[12]De divinis nominibus, 7, 1, p. 868 A.

[13]De divinis nominibus, 4, 11, p. 708 B.

not to be attained by reflection and processes of reasoning and argument but in a condition that transcends all reflection and argument, indeed all consciousness. "As the capacity of perception belonging to the senses and everything material is unnecessary," says Pseudo-Dionysius, "when the Soul, with its power of thought, is directed to the intelligible, so likewise is this capacity of thought, when the soul, having become divine by means of the union abstracted from thought, opens itself with blind striving to the rays of the unapproachable Light.[14] It is then quite outside itself and is merged in God."[15]

This is mysticism according to Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. I have not considered how these thoughts are related to passages from the Bible and how worship is treated as the means or symbol of purification and illumination. All this is the husk; the kernel is found in the ideas developed above.

And these ideas are not the peculiar property of Pseudo-Dionysius. The same ideas and the same type of religious striving after unity with God are to be found in the Neo-Platonist Plotinus, in the philosophy and devotional system of the Brahmans in India, in John Scotus Erigena (*ob. circ* 890) in Ekkehard (*ob.* 1327) in Tauler, and in many other mystics. Even in Augustine, Bernard of Clairvaux (*ob.* 1153), Thomas à Kempis, and other more Christian mystics are these thoughts more or less in a Christian form to be identified. It is true neither Augustine nor Bernard, nor Thomas à Kempis speaks of an actual merging of the soul in God. Where the Pantheism of the Neo-Platonic tradition is omitted or at least softened down there is only room for absorption in God through love, or intuition, or by the suppression of the will (this type of mysticism I shall leave for later treatment). And where this kind of devotional expression, as in the case of Bernard of

[14]De divinis nominibus, 4, 11, p. 708 D.

[15]De divinis nominibus, 7, 1, p. 865 D.

Clairvaux, is directed to Jesus these ideas are only possible for those who through the humanity of Jesus allow themselves to be guided to the eternal word of God. In any case anyone who has really understood the mysticism of Pseudo-Dionysius can recognize mystical thoughts like those of the Areopagite, even when they are clothed in biblical language. Even when mystical thoughts so originating are actually combined with real Christian thought, it is possible to distinguish the two.

We are therefore justified, in determining the essence of mysticism, to regard as distinctive the complex of thoughts and devotional tendencies common to Pseudo-Dionysius and all others who are connected with his mysticism. Mysticism can therefore be defined as that form of devotional system which by an emancipation of the soul from its connection with this world strives after a substantial union with God; which union is attained by an immediate influence of God on the human soul, taking place when the soul concentrates itself on its innermost being *i.e.* at the point where its relationship with God can be experienced.

History shows that these ideas and devotional tendencies are capable of various characteristic forms. In one case, it is rational thinking which leads immediately to union with God in the region beyond all thought; in another case, the mystical process is introduced by contemplation *i.e.* through intuitive reflection different in kind from discursive reasoning; in the case of other mystics, the peculiarities of intellectual, contemplative or quietistic mysticism ultimately disappear in the love of the soul for the Bridegroom (God or Christ)—sometimes a languishing love and again, the love which has reached satisfaction, the expressions of which give in this case its peculiar colour to mysticism. Here the union appears directly as a merging into the divine substratum; again, there is revealed, as a middle term, union with the Logos in Christ accomplished by means

of the tender love experienced for the historical Christ. In this case the detachment from the world takes on a philosophical (metaphysical, pessimistic) colouring: in the former type, suffering with and dying with Christ give it its special tone. In the one case emphasis is placed on ecstatic conditions, even if they are exceptional, in which the act of union with God is brought about; in the other case, it is the dying of the old man which constitutes the condition of the birth of the divine in man. But in all of these various manifestations the fundamental ideas contained in the definition I have given above are recognizable. There are also manifold transitions between the different kinds of mysticism. Tauler, for example, though he has received decided stimulus from Ekkehard's intellectual mysticism, stands nearer in many respects to the mysticism of Pseudo-Dionysius, whom he often quotes, than does St. Bernard of Clairvaux and the later mystics. Yet he also introduces with an admiring comment a passage from the pagan Neo-Platonist Proclus (*ob.* 485), and he often follows the lines of the Jesus mysticism and Quietism. He is never tired of telling us that in the periods of being forsaken, which follow the unique culmination of the mystical merging into God, the isolated expectancy for God, the quiet sacrifice of self to His will is the duty of the devout soul. And in this quiet passivity of God there is also the being with Jesus. What comes out even stronger in Franciscan mysticism, the imitation of Jesus, is especially stressed by him—the suffering with Jesus as the duty of the highest type of devotion.

Now, after making clear what mysticism is we can turn to the question whether Luther really rejected mysticism. At first sight it does not seem so. For in the initial stage of his career he was himself strongly influenced, first, by the mysticism of Augustine, then, from 1515 to 1516, by Tauler's mysticism. When I carefully com-

pared, a short time ago (1908), his recently published lecture on Romans with Tauler's *Sermons* I was surprised how far the similarity of thought and points of view extended. It is well known how much he was then inclined to eulogize Tauler[16] and the author of the so-called German Theology,[17] who stands in such close personal relation to Tauler. Yet even at this time Luther was no mystic. The real mystical ideas he did not share, although as a theologian trained in Scholasticism he must have known them, and therefore they could hardly have escaped his notice in Tauler. He employed the mystical arguments and the mystical expressions to give voice to the feelings which filled his heart. To this extent Denifle is right in saying that Luther did not understand Tauler.[18] But one must add that Tauler himself very frequently transforms mystical thoughts into Christian phraseology. Later Luther rejected all real mysticism. As early as 1520, in his writing on the Babylonian captivity, after criticising what Pseudo-Dionysius taught about angels in his *De Coelesti Hierarchia*, he remarks about the author: "Indeed, in mystical theology which a certain very ignorant theologian so lauds to the skies, he is also most pernicious, more a follower of Plato than Christ, so that I am unwilling for a faithful soul to pay any attention at all to these books. In them you will not so learn Christ; even if you know them you will lose him. I speak as one who has tried it."[19] Seventeen years later he expressed his opinion more at length: "It is dangerous without Christ the Mediator to wish to examine and apprehend the bare Divinity as the sophists and monks have done. The Scripture saith, 'Man shall not see me and live.' And in order to avoid this danger there was given to us the Incarnate Word which

[16]Letter to Spalatin, 16th of December, 1516 (Enders Ed. Briefwechsel Luthers), I, 75.

[17]Cf. Luther's Preface (Weimar Ed.) I, 153, 378 ff.

[18]Weimar Ed. vi, 562-8 ff. Luther I, p. 534, note 1.

[19]Weimar Ed. vi, 562-8 ff.

was set in the manger and hung on the wood of the cross. This Word is the Wisdom and Son of the Father and He has delivered to us what is the will of the Father towards us. He who, leaving behind him the Son, follows his own thoughts and speculations is overturning the majesty of God, and perishes. To these speculations concerning the true majesty of God Dionysius has given occasion, with his mystical theology, and others, following him, have written many things concerning spiritual marriages, where they imagine God as the Bridegroom and the soul as the bride, and so have taught that men can converse and associate in this corrupt flesh with the inscrutable and eternal majesty of God without a mediator. And this doctrine of theirs has been received as the highest and divine wisdom, in which I also became entangled, not, however, without great damage to myself. I admonish you to detest as a plague that mystical theology of Dionysius and similar books, in which such foolishness is contained. For I am not ignorant that in time fanatical men will come who will bring such monsters again into the Church and so will obscure and altogether destroy sound doctrine. They are the delusions of Satan, which so fascinate the senses of men that they embrace such lies as the most certain truth and the highest wisdom, and think they feel a certain taste of future life and blessedness. The same foolishnesses are spread abroad among the common people by Münzer and the Anabaptists, who, leaving Christ, boast that they have revelations and meet and speak with the very God."[20]

These remarks, with which Luther establishes his criticism, are not uttered by accident. The thoughts here expressed about the limitations and the method of our knowledge of God are fundamental ideas of Luther.[21]

[20]Disputationen Dr. Martin Luthers, edited by P. Drews (Göttingen, 1895), p. 294 ff.

[21]Cf. J. Koestlin, Luthers Theologie, II, (Stuttgart, 1901), p. 55 ff.

There can be no doubt as to Luther's position towards mysticism. He warns against it and that, too, consciously. His "By the word alone" must be understood as a protest against mysticism.

Now we must ask, Is this opposition towards mysticism a peculiarity of genuine Lutheranism? A few remarks about the Catholic Churches and the other Reformers will enable us to reply to this question.

The Orthodox Church in all its branches (Greek, Russian, etc.), although its apprehension of Jesus Christ is no longer restricted to the narrow bounds of ancient Greek Christianity, has never ceased to value the Pseudo-Areopagite's mystical tradition. It demonstrates itself to be the Greek Catholic Church by permitting in its bosom the existence of this originally Greek form of religiosity.

The characteristic type of Western Catholicism goes back, it is known, to Augustine. His understanding of the human life of Christ, his appreciation of the humility of Christ, His suffering and His cross, and in connection with this his deepened valuation of the grace of God in Christ, created the initial demand for a remodeling of Christian devotion which should be less Hellenistic than Neo-Platonic mysticism. Yet can we wonder that Augustine's thought remained in close sympathy with the Neo-Platonic philosophy of his age, since it had been of so great significance for his personal development? Even he took over mysticism with him into Christianity. The fact that he distinguished between the grace of remission and the grace of inspiration, and that he also understood the latter as a secret absorption of supernatural power, namely the power producing love for God, made it possible for him and for the Western Church after him to combine his theory of Grace with mystical thoughts. Those who are purified by faith in that which Christ has done for us and are then by the grace of inspiration united with God in love, can in pro-

portion to their being rooted in the love of Christ, the incarnate Logos, advance to the eternal Logos, which in the beginning was God, and through Him to the Father Himself, who is one with Him, and in this way can be united so closely with God that nothing stands between Him and the soul.[22] In this way mysticism has its place assigned to it. But this place is no longer that given it by Pseudo-Dionysius, and mysticism itself in its essence did not remain unchanged. According to Pseudo-Dionysius, mysticism was the whole of correct piety, the non-mystical piety of the masses seemed only an incomplete substitute. If I may so express it, in this case mysticism appears as the first story, built on the foundation of the historical Christian faith and institutions. Both for Augustine and the Roman Catholic Church after him it only remained an abstract possibility that insofar as the faithful made themselves at home in the first story the history of redemption ceased to be their spiritual sustenance. For Augustine was convinced that no believer could live a single day without the Grace of Remission. And the Church of later times, whenever a mystic imagined that he had outgrown the historical belief and church traditions, condemned such mysticism. In this way the sphere of mysticism was different from that accorded it by Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. And in itself mysticism did not remain altogether the same. For union with God in love has in Augustine a more personal and a less intellectual colouring than the mystical union of Pseudo-Dionysius. It is perfectly true, then, that the intellectual heritage of the Greeks did not altogether disappear, for the unifying love, with Augustine, retained an intellectual element. This is found in intuition which may be compared to the Platonic Eros. But in this case one may say that the mystical thoughts are progressively

[22]Cf. my Dogmengeschichte, 4th ed. (1906), p. 406.

unfolded. Many uneducated people who are stirred by Augustine's devotional system become interested in his mystical love of God, without coming into any kind of relation with Neo-Platonic ideas.

As time went on, too, the progress of christianizing the mystical tradition made further progress. Bernard of Clairvaux in regard to both the lines of thought that appear in Augustine christianized mysticism in a still greater degree than Augustine had done. It is true, he distinguished between the religious effect of contrition and that of devotion, and defined the first as the faith which is concentrated on the humanity of Christ and His work of Redemption, while the second is described as the nuptial love for the divine Logos. But very often the Incarnate Saviour is retained also as the object of mystical love.[23] And this mystical love was, in Bernard, undoubtedly more personal and emotional than with Augustine, though even Bernard had not altogether given up its intellectual significance. Finally there arose, not for the first time in the sixteenth and seventeenth century forms but before in the Middle Ages (I will not go into the question of its exact chronology and environment), a new type of mysticism which departed altogether from the lines of Greek intellectualism in Quietism. This mysticism aimed at union with God, not by the help of discursive thought or sensational intuition; though it did prize contemplation, it recommended the way of relinquishment, that is, it maintained that men came into union with God by imposing silence on all acts of individual willing, on all wishes and all human desire.

In this way mysticism in the Roman Catholic Church was christianized to a greater degree than in the Oriental Orthodox Church. There have been, and are still, Roman Catholic mystics whose mystical principles,

[23]Cf. my Dogmengeschichte, 4th ed. (1906), p. 523 ff.

without losing altogether their connection with their Neo-Platonic origin, show a profound appreciation of New Testament religion. Such mysticism is the tenderest flower of Roman Catholic devotion, closely personal, spiritual, full of love, independent of all merely external formalities and formalisms. Yet, in spite of this, it must be allowed that mysticism has retained its place in the Roman Catholic Church. And for two reasons Roman Catholicism must maintain a friendly relation to mysticism. Its valuation of Grace as a communication of supernatural power and its conception of the contrast between the spiritual and the secular in their consequences (asceticism), both these constitute a point of contact for mysticism.

Zwingli and Calvin, and other leaders of the so-called Reformed Churches were also antagonists of the Roman Catholic traditions in respect to the two points just mentioned. Certainly neither of them was, properly speaking, a mystic. Yet, as they did not exclude an immediate influence of the Spirit of God upon men, independent of the Word, they left a door open to mystical ideas.[24] And it is known how strongly the mystical influence made itself felt in the religious movement of Cromwell's period, from which originate so many modern evangelical denominations. Quakerism, the most genuine type of devotionalism, which at that time filled the hearts of many Puritans, stands in the closest relation with mystical traditions.

The position of Luther and of those who abide in his path is therefore unique. No other denomination has come out so strongly against mysticism in the way that was the result of the Lutheran Shibboleth, *solo verbo*. Is this a defect of Lutheranism? It would be a defect if *solo verbo* were understood in a narrow and crude way. For then it would be maintained that God only works

[24]Cf. my Dogmengeschichte, 4th ed. (1906), p. 800, note 2; page 893, note 4.

upon us when we are reading or hearing selections from the Bible. This was not Luther's opinion. Most of the population in Luther's time were unable to read. When Luther used the term "Word" he was thinking principally of the word orally delivered in preaching, education, pastoral relations, fraternal counsels and other forms of intercourse. And he knew what is written in Luke 2:51, "His mother kept all these words and pondered them in her heart." When he warned against believing in a Holy Spirit which operates apart from and by the side of the Scripture, he assuredly had no intention of denying that the pricking of the conscience through the word or by the consolation which it affords is not seldom only operative a long time afterwards, when the experiences of life have prepared men for it. With the whole theology of his age he naturally derived from the passage in Romans 1:20 the assurance that man's reason can derive from nature a certain knowledge of God, even though it be imperfect and external.[25] That does not prevent all valuable and saving knowledge of God from being connected with the Word in the way just indicated. And it follows that *solo verbo* understood in this sense, remains in opposition to mysticism.

The opposition to mysticism is from my point of view no defect but a strong point in common Lutheranism. I really believe that the churches of other denominations as well, to whom God's revelation is no empty conception, can take a sympathetic attitude towards this position on mysticism, even if they cannot adopt it. In this connection, too, do I wish to make this point clearer. The mysticism of all ages has had a tendency towards pantheism, and its most genuine forms are inseparable from pantheistic thought. This is surely understood. For mysticism which as we have seen is of pre-Christian origin (only in this way can I explain its appearance among different

[25]Cf. for example, Kirchenpostille (Erlangen Ed.), 2d ed. p. 2 ff.

people in antiquity) comes from a spiritualization of natural religion, due to the deepest aspiration of man for God. Any spiritualization of natural religion, however, can only lead to pantheism, a process not remarkable through the fact that speculative reasoning which maintains the idea of God but emancipates itself from revelation finds a shelter for itself in pantheism. *Solo verbo* erects a wall against all pantheism. For where the conviction prevails that God has revealed Himself in the Word, the belief in a personal God has an unshakable foundation, though it is strongly felt that the boundlessness of the world, its order passing the measure of thought, and along with it its frightful riddles, place before our eyes the impenetrable majesty of God. Yet we cannot forget that the best in our knowledge of God does not come from this source.

The second point is closely connected. Mysticism, both in its intellectual system and in its actual practice is bound up with ontological postulates. I mean the relation of God to the creature, which it has in view, depends upon the order of creation. It existed from the time there was a creature, previous to all record of redemption. It is implanted in the essence of mysticism that as regards the highest thing it prizes most, *i.e.* for the mystic union itself, it does not require the history of redemption, including that which Jesus Christ was and did. In the preparatory stages, Christian mysticism undertook to give significance to the work of salvation. It has also given value to the Person of Christ, even to the details of the doctrine of the two natures, as a model for union with God. And in not a few of its forms the imitation of Christ, especially suffering with Him, is the title under which the death of the Old Adam is placed. But all this cannot prevent the fact that the mystical union itself rests on conditions independent of Jesus Christ. Luther's charge that mysticism desired to introduce a mediational Christ (without

Christ the Mediator) in the closest association with God, is therefore justifiable. And the most modern mysticism, *e.g.* the mysticism recommended by the introductions of the Diederich Publishing House noted above, shows the justification of this criticism in an especially clear way. A particular point is made in recommending mysticism from the fact that it is independent of the historical factors that have been outgrown by modern thought. Over against this, *solo verbo* asserts energetically that without the historical revelation witnessed to by the Word we actually have no sufficient knowledge of God. The mysticism of modern culture is natural religion and desires to be nothing else. The Word alone is the strongest possible emphasis of the truth that as in other respects so in the field of religion we receive the best we men have by means of history.

And the third point I wish to press involves an attitude to which mysticism is favourable but which is in opposition to an expanding tendency in the modern world. Our age is beginning to think socially and to social thinking, not to individualism, the future belongs. But individualism and subjectivism still prevail. Mysticism still accords with this individualistic and subjective tendency of modern men. There is no more individualistic form of religion than mysticism. It is true that many mystics of the past stress the Christian duty of loving one's neighbour; even in monastic life there remains opportunity enough for the activity of this kind of love. Besides, the most modern eulogists of mysticism are partly convinced that one of the dangers in mysticism to be seriously avoided is that while we are striving for individual blessedness we forget people in general, possibly even those for whom we are directly responsible.[26] Now, is not this a positive acknowledgment that mysticism completely isolates even mystics?

[26]Cf. for example, page 3 of the Introduction to the Twelve Spiritual Conversations of Madame Guyon, mentioned on p. 736.

Mysticism is properly and truly a religion for hermits. Even the noble form of mysticism which meets us in the four books on the *Imitation of Christ*, by Thomas à Kempis, shows this. It is no doubt true that all right and vital religion is the peculiar affair of the individual subject to a most direct degree. As certainly as every man by himself alone must fight with death, so must he certainly have his own faith, and he who knows nothing of the chamber where he is alone with God is certainly far from living Christianity. But everywhere, where the historic character of Christianity is understood, it is known that individual faith does not grow spontaneously in us. Other people, our parents, teachers and friends, and the ministers of the Church have brought to us the message of revelation, and through the reflection which God's truth has itself found in them the understanding for it has been opened in us. And because, too, in others belief is not spontaneous, we have in respect of our children, our scholars, our neighbours, the task of introducing them by word and deed to the understanding of the Word. Because Christianity is an historical religion it must stand in the historical life of each particular age. Whether in doing so the Church, its activity, and the duty of attaching oneself to it, or man's social life, is to be emphasized, is a question, of course, of great importance for the character of the different Churches. In the question we are discussing it is relatively indifferent. The significance of the community in both cases, for the individual, is plain. The *verbo solo* remains intact, particularly when we recall that Luther, in using the expression, was not thinking primarily of the word of Scripture which one reads in private, for the word, language, is the most original and powerful factor of human society. Mysticism of all ages has praised silence. And even if anyone cast on a desert island, is brought, alone as he is, to faith by the Word, read from a Bible saved with him, his Christianity

would even then seek at least the inner fellowship with those by whose service the Word has been brought to him, as well as with those whose Scripture speaks to him. For the New Testament is not an abstract stimulus of the mind towards God or an impersonal description of the way man attains to God. It is a personal witness not only of the will of God towards us but also a personal witness of faith, going back to the time of the most ancient Christianity. Even in the imagined case which I have put and which in practice is hardly thinkable, a right Christian faith has another origin than mystical isolation. And the term Word itself declares it. I do not need to stress the point. Plainly enough—"He who loves not his brother whom he sees, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" (I John 4:20.)

The *solo verbo* is a singularly sharp disavowal of mysticism. But the opposition to mysticism which boasts of its independence from history is not a specifically Lutheran affair. Everyone will understand it who has no use for a destructive union of confessions that would cast everything historical on the scrap heap and holds to the way of a constructive valuation of individual belief as the basis for a mutual understanding of confessions. Modern mysticism is for all who think in this way a common adversary, even if we gladly acknowledge that mysticism, because of its respect for the deep processes of the soul, has created a great number of profound conceptions, forms of intuition and symbols, by all of which other types of religion are tempted to adopt the speech of mysticism, for not every person is able to find an adequate linguistic dress for his feelings.

Modern mystics, then, are hard to convince. Threateningly and with self-assurance the Zwikauer prophets took leave of Luther in 1522,[27] when he tried to explain their errors to them. We too meet with similar proud

[27]Cf. Camerarius, Vita Melanchthonis, c. 15.

self-assurance in the ringing complaints of modern mystics over Church narrowness when we try to criticise their thoughts. We must leave them to themselves until perhaps the experience of life teaches them that "in the Word alone" there is more wisdom than in old mystical speculations.[28]

But for the sake of the thousands who because of the prophets of modern mysticism will have no understanding of historical Christianity if one does not show them where the limitations and dangers of this mysticism lie, it is the duty of all friends of constructive Christianity to emphasize the fact that the strength of Christianity does not lie in the knowledge acquired by the mystic of all times, even by the pre-Christian ones, but in *solo verbo*, in the historical revelation alone.

---

[28]Cf. Camerarius, *l. c.*

Philosophy and Belief

By Edward A. Pace, Ph.D., S.T.D.,
Catholic University, Washington, D. C.

In accordance with the aims of The Constructive Quarterly, prominence is naturally given to the treatment of those subjects which lie within the domain of Christian belief. The "convictions about Christ and His Church", which find expression in these pages, may be regarded as internal relations; and it is well that they first of all should be fully understood. The various meanings of faith, orthodoxy and similar things that lie at the foundation should be brought to view, if only to make clear the doctrinal positions that may later be explained in detail. "Loyalty to Christ" implies that He is accepted as the chief corner-stone on which all constructive work must rest.

But the study of external relations also is important. The theories and systems of thought which lie outside the immediate province of faith, press upon it at many points and demand consideration. Whatever the spirit in which the demand is urged, Christianity is obliged, both for its own sake and for the welfare of mankind, to heed the claims of science and philosophy if it is to "make its impact on the race." If the Christian religion were simply an emotional affair, which it is not, it might go its way happily unconcerned about the findings of research in any department of thought. And if the investigators confined themselves to their own field, which they seldom do, the Church might work tranquilly within her own borders. In the actual situation the

teaching of religious truth must appeal to the intelligence as well as to the feelings in order to permeate action and direct life; and the intelligence of men is constantly subject to the osmotic pressure of principles and conclusions which bode no good for religious belief.

That "continuous adjustment of internal relations and external relations," which is a prime requisite for the preservation of organic life, is equally necessary for the vitality of religion. Adjustment, however, is no weak yielding to impact from without, any more than it is the resistance of an impervious membrane to environing fluid. It is indeed a response, and the nature of the response is determined in part by the impression; but to respond is to act, and the action is vital just so far as it comes from within and tends to further the very self-activity from which it issues. An organism survives not by passivity nor yet by isolated rigidity, but by give-and-take processes which secure its own existence and enable it to profit rather than suffer from its external relations.

For a system of religion the case is parallel. It must be robust enough to withstand the encroachment of antagonistic forces, to maintain in their integrity the truths which form its innermost substance and so to transmit them unimpaired to successive generations of believers. And yet to do all this, it must have within itself a power of adaptation whereby it can deal, energetically and prudently at once, with the various and varying results of human inquiry and human speculation. It will not surrender its faith at the sound of alarums from without, nor will it be deaf to the words of a new truth, however strange the voice of the herald. Rather will it seek to make that truth a part of its own strength and therefore an added means of influencing the world.

Among the forces which Christianity encounters, the most aggressive is, I think, philosophy. It is not al-

ways perhaps to be seen in the forefront: there are tendencies and movements which seemingly owe it nothing or even in plain words disavow its control. None the less there is some philosophy, acted out if not thought out, in every sort of human pursuit and in every department of knowledge, be it scientific, historical, social or political or economic. The leaders, usually, are aware of the principles they are putting into effect; the followers, for the most part, look only to the end which, supposedly or in fact, they are gaining. Increased educational opportunities will, in all likelihood, help a larger number to realize that there is a philosophy behind them and in them; but education itself is at present one of the best illustrations of the hidden-spring movements by which the multitudes, not the masses only, are swept along.

As "a debtor to all men," the Church of Christ is bound, through its very loyalty, to strive for the spread of the truth, not alone among the thinkers and the cultivated classes, but among the less enlightened as well. If the few, with their eyes open, will hold aloof or keep up unending warfare, that is no reason for letting the many more go astray unwittingly. These, at any rate, must be warned and, if they are believers, must be protected. In the interest of Christendom at large, the Church has to reckon with philosophy and with the philosophies. The reckoning, now as in the past, will be a test of the vitality of the Church; but the result will lighten up some of the obscurities through which many souls are feeling their way towards unity.

What then should be the position of the Church in regard to philosophy, and what the manner of adjustment by which the teachings of Christ can be preserved and brought to bear more effectually upon the thought of the age? A more pleasing form of the question would be: What attitude will a united Christendom take and maintain towards the various philosophical systems which are

either indifferent or adverse to Christianity? A forward-looking question, no doubt, and, it may appear to some, a purely speculative one. But it is not an impossible question; history might suggest the answer. The purpose, however, of this paper, is not prophecy but a statement of fact. In what follows, I shall try to set forth the relations between philosophy and belief as these relations are held and carried to practical results by the Catholic Church.

Had Plato established a church, its warrant as a teacher of truth and its guarantee of permanence would have been the wisdom of its founder, the consistency of his doctrine, the force of his arguments, his success in meeting the intellectual needs of his time and, to some extent, his personal qualities. Where his theories came into conflict, either with the older systems of thought or with the more vigorous philosophy of his great disciple, none of the disputants could have alleged any superhuman origin in behalf of a doctrine. None would have cared to defend an article of the Platonic faith on the sole ground that Plato had proclaimed it. Nor would it have been prudent for any of his followers, after the Master's death, to set himself up as the one competent interpreter of *Phaedo* or *Republic*. The church would have been as strong as the genius of a great thinker and its appeal to reason could have made it; but no stronger. Its relation with philosophy would have been easily defined, since they would have been on the same level in seeking men's assent; and the process of adjustment would have been carried on and achieved by mutual criticism. So far as it depended upon Plato's design, the final outcome would have affected but a small portion of mankind: his church would have borne no message to the barbarians. And among the Greeks themselves, acceptance or rejection of a doctrine would have been decided by each individual according to the meaning he might put on Plato's writings.

The Catholic Church, founded by Christ, is a divine institution. It has from Him a commission to teach what He taught and to teach with the same authority. That Christ proclaimed a doctrine is sufficient to oblige men to believe it; and that He did proclaim it is vouched for abundantly by the Church, the living witness to His truth and the authoritative interpreter of what is contained in the deposit of faith, whether this be handed down by tradition or by Scripture. From Christ also the Church received the assurance that it would have at all times the guidance of the Holy Spirit and so be secured against the possibility of error. Christ undoubtedly foresaw that the wisdom of the world would rise up against the Church and its teaching and that philosophy would count among its champions men of greater ability, humanly speaking, than those who would uphold His doctrine. Left to the arbitration of reason alone, the issue must sooner or later have proved fatal to the Church. Still, He commanded His apostles to teach all nations and left them with the promise that He would be with them all days—not to a given period in the development of science and philosophy but even to the consummation of the world.

Such being the mission of the Church, it is forthwith evident that some relations with philosophy are out of the question. The Church cannot submit her teachings to the judgment of philosophy and abide by the latter's verdict regarding their value. The point to be settled is whether this doctrine has been revealed or not; and it surely is beyond the competency of philosophy to decide. And again, since philosophy as such has no accessible tribunal but many who speak in its name, the question would first have to be discussed as to which of the schools or rather which of the individual philosophers would hand down the ruling. Supposing, moreover, that the referee were happily chosen, how many would accept his dictum as final? Kant himself would be sorely taxed to frame a

proposition bearing on religion that would win universal assent at this day—the more so, it would seem, because his own philosophy is not entirely at one with itself. Should the Church, about a century ago, have endorsed the conclusions of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, or would it have been safer to stand by those of the *Critique of Practical Reason*? And in either case would Catholic doctrine today be in harmony with the outgrowths of Kantian philosophy? The Church has indeed shown a marvellous power of adaptation, but it is quite beyond any power to shift with a rapidity in keeping with the changes which the history of philosophy records for the past hundred years.

In the view of some thinkers, perpetual motion is of the very essence of philosophy. With others, somewhat more reckless, novelty is the thing to be sought; and if the new happens to coincide with the true, so much the better for the true. But such philosophers do not seem particularly anxious to get at a definite truth which shall have more permanence than the overworked working hypothesis. That, however, is their own affair, perhaps an exercise of their liberty; at all events, it does not call for discussion here. What must be pointed out is the difference between such an attitude and that of the Church which, by the terms of its institution, is constrained to hold fast as immutable the truths delivered to its keeping, and to insist that philosophy shall look more carefully at its own problems.

On the other hand, some of the philosophers have undertaken to effect, from their own viewpoint, an adjustment between religion and science by reducing to zero the claims of each. Spencer's "reconciliation" is of this sort. Religion is a search for the Unknowable; Science is a search for the Unknowable; therefore—The logical conclusion would seem to be that when the Unknowable becomes known and turns out to be the same in both pursuits, the harmony will be complete. Mean-

time the breach is there, and it has not been narrowed by the Synthetic Philosophy. Agnosticism, of course, is not concerned with the adjustment of science or philosophy with revealed religion. On the contrary, Spencer will have it that as religion has become "purer" it has given up its claim to any knowledge whatever of the First Cause. Still, the extremeness of the agnostic position is significant; it shows how far even the legitimate conclusions of reason can be disregarded for the sake of "completely unified knowledge."

On another account, it was worth while glancing at the agnostic solution, remote as it may seem to be from our present interest. Quite apart from the official agnosticism that speaks the language of philosophy, there is a widespread tendency to eschew as useless, because unanswerable, the fundamental questions about God, soul and immortality. Too often this practical agnosticism points for its justification to the divisions of doctrine and the fruitless discussions which are found among those who profess Christianity. If the theologians, it is said, are at variance, how is the plain man to decide? And the argument becomes more plausible when the impression is given that Christ intended each man to be his own guide in these matters. The philosophers will probably go further and retort that if, as stated above, the Church would find it hard to pick out a philosophy whose decision would satisfy all the schools, philosophy might be just as much at a loss in choosing one out of the numerous theologies as a court of last resort.

Keeping these difficulties in mind, one might be tempted to suggest that the only feasible plan is to let the individual hold to his belief and hold to his philosophy, and then hold them safely away from each other. In this thought-tight compartment scheme, there would be no contact, hence no conflict. As in the case of so-called multiple personality, one phase, say of belief, would alternate with

the other, *i.e.* of philosophy. By turns the individual could subscribe to every article of faith, and set it aside in favour of materialism, determinism, deism or atheism. The same statement would be true or false not by reason of its intrinsic meaning but in view of the mental phase which happened at a given moment to be uppermost.

Convenient as it might be, this theory of a twofold truth cannot be countenanced by the Church. There are different sources of truth and different motives of assent; but the truth cannot be at variance with itself. What God has revealed cannot contradict what reason demonstrates. The apparent contradiction between the two orders of truth is due, not rarely, to inaccurate statements of one or of both. It is the easiest thing in the world to set up straw dogmas and then wage war on them valiantly, in behalf of reason; and the assailants, so far as they give any recognition to religion, are the strongest in protesting against the attempt of theology to secure scientific exactness in its terms and formulas.

In many cases, however, the supposed conflict results from ignoring an elementary distinction, and regarding as equivalent "above reason" and "contrary to reason." Whoever admits that God is infinite, must further admit that there are depths in the divine wisdom which no created intelligence can fathom. Once this admission is made, it is clearly seen where contradiction, not in appearance only, would arise. To say that the finite can or should compass the infinite is either to distort the meaning of words or to utter an absurdity. But it is not less absurd to claim that what reason cannot apprehend or explain is on that account unreasonable, and that, consequently, belief is an affront to intelligence.

A solution which, in the judgment of many thinkers, is more acceptable, has as its main support the progress of knowledge. What now belongs to the domain of faith will, it is thought, gradually yield to persistent investigation. The element of mystery will vanish, new mean-

ings will be found for the old beliefs, and these will appear not only as consistent with reason but also as its legitimate products in the sphere of religion. It is a harmony in the making, so to speak, with evolution as the dominant note.

Here again the nature of revealed truth and the function of reason are misunderstood. While advance of knowledge and improvement of method will, as we may hope, provide new defences for each article of faith and bring its meaning into clearer light, reason will not thereby be enabled to comprehend what is now accepted by belief.

A revelation was necessary not simply to supply for the shortcomings of immature intelligence or to serve as a temporary guide during the period of relative ignorance. Some of its truths are so far beyond the attainment of reason that the highest reach of philosophy could not have discovered them. If, on the other hand, we consider the variations and errors that philosophy is charged with even in regard to truths like the existence of God which do come within its competency, the prospect is that the need of faith will be greater, not less, as time advances. But if, finally, the conciliation is to be accomplished by a reduction process which accepts in each doctrine only so much as reason may approve, there is no need of looking to the future for the result; the outcome of such an evolution is already quite obvious.

From the foregoing, it is plain that the Church does not and cannot sanction any and every scheme that is put forward as an adjustment of philosophy and belief. The proposed conciliations, however shrewdly devised, may labour under some inherent weakness which is easily detected even without the test of actual results. But the Church has the advantage of a long experience in dealing with theories and systems; and the Catholic position in this matter can be best explained by pointing to what the Church has done, or by noting at least some of the historical phases of the question. . . . . .

The mission of the Church was not to establish a philosophy that should enter into competition with already existing systems and on the same level with them. Like their Master, the Apostles and their successors taught "as having authority." Nevertheless Christianity, at the very outset, came into contact with the products of pagan thought and especially with the speculation of the Greeks. To some minds indeed nothing was to be gained but much to be feared from this intercourse: and if warnings like those of Tertullian had been literally heeded, the early Church would have barred the wisdom and the errors alike of pre-Christian thought. Yet within a short period both Plato and Aristotle were pressed into the service of the faith—into service, not into control. By a prudent eclecticism, the early Christian writers took from each school of philosophy just what they considered available for illustrating and safeguarding the truths of religion. They did not consider themselves as borrowing from the pagans or as accepting free contributions. As Origen and, after him, Augustine declared, they wrested from unjust possessors the gold and silver of truth, eliminating whatever was spurious or base.

The problem of the relation between philosophy and belief was formally stated and discussed by the Greek and the Latin Fathers. St. Augustine's solution—"*intellige ut credas, crede ut intelligas*"—shows that faith and understanding are on terms of mutual benefit. Boethius, by translating a good portion of Aristotle's works, proved that Christianity had nothing to fear from the use of the keenest dialectic, and, moreover, opened the way to that fuller knowledge of the "Philosopher" which was to form the basis of Scholasticism. In the "*fides quaerens intellectum*" of St. Anselm, and in his "*credo ut intelligam*," are contained the germs which reached their full development in the thirteenth century.

During the patristic age, Plato's influence prevailed; the Fathers, and in particular St. Augustine, were attract-

ed by the highly spiritual character of a philosophy in which ideas were the origin of reality and the idea of the good was supreme. But as time went on and as the spirit of inquiry grew, a more rigorous method than that of Plato was demanded. In spite of strong opposition, the advocates of dialectic finally triumphed. Their victory, however, was of less significance than the fact that Catholic faith, which had so long looked to Plato for its adjustment with reason, now turned without hesitation to a philosophy in which dialectical penetration was the principal factor.

It is especially in the building up of the Scholastic system that the attitude of the Church towards philosophy comes to view. The process by which the teachings of Aristotle became the rational basis for the exposition of Christian truth, was in keeping with the spirit of the age and with its most important movements. In the West, at least, Christendom was united in faith and discipline. Civil power and ecclesiastical authority dwelt together in co-operation. The spirit of association swept over the countries of Europe, organizing in confraternity and guild the members of each craft and profession. To the universities, which were then rapidly developing, men flocked from every nation; and in each university, all the departments of knowledge were represented. It was pre-eminently an age of construction and of unification. It was also an age of boldness and energy in which great undertakings were conceived and executed with enthusiasm rather than mechanical toil, with the joy of achievement rather than the hope of material compensation.

The environment, then, was favourable for that unification of intellectual and spiritual aspirations which Scholasticism had as its chief purpose. Happily, too, the movement was led by men who were remarkable both for ability and for sincere attachment to the Catholic Church. It was the ardour of their faith no less than

their love of philosophic speculation that prompted thinkers like St. Thomas Aquinas to adopt the principles and, in many instances, the conclusions of Aristotle. This course was the more necessary because of the encroachments of the Mohammedan teachers who had long been familiar with the writings of the Stagyrite and would gladly have used his ideas in support of their peculiar tenets. It is consequently instructive to see Aquinas, as in his *Contra Gentes*, reclaiming the doctrine of Aristotle from the interpretation put on it by Averroes and Avicenna. One is reminded of Origen's saying about the "unjust possessors." At the same time, it is significant that just when the weight of authority in matters of faith was so great, the Scholastics should have been so determined in holding for their cause the pagan philosopher.

They did not, however, follow him uncritically. If they recognized in his method and speculations the highest attainment of the human intellect, they also perceived his shortcomings and cast light upon problems which he had left unsettled or obscure. And while as a rule they preferred him to Plato, they did not fail to appreciate the beauty and depth of the latter. The same breadth of appreciation appears in all their discussions. When they take up a question for debate, they first present the objections that have been, or can be urged against their own position, sometimes giving an historical survey of the subject and always stating, tersely yet forcibly, each discordant opinion. In their attitude towards those who differed from them, they were neither narrow nor dogmatic; they were, in the genuine sense of the word, critical.

The method of the Schoolmen was simply the outward form in which the vital and directive principles of their system found expression. God, they held, is the source both of the truths which can be known by the light of reason and of those which are given through revelation.

He has impressed upon the intellect those first principles which lie back of all reasoning and which are, or should be, the ultimate test of the processes of thought in the natural order. When He reveals truth of a higher order, there can be no contradiction between it and reason, since God cannot be at variance with Himself. The ultimate ground of unity, then, is not the natural ability of the mind to know, nor its natural tendency to seek, the truth; it is the divine wisdom in its necessary, absolute consistency.

On this basis, the Schoolmen proceeded in their adjustment of the claims of reason and of faith. They did not admit that the one could lie inert or that the other could waive aside as useless all effort of the believer's intelligence. To each they assigned its own sphere and function, and from each they sought the guidance it could afford. Faith, they maintained, was not the less supernatural when it became "*fides quaerens intellectum*"; nor did reason abdicate its right when it strove to provide what faith was seeking. On the contrary, the most worthy exercise of reason was that by which it came to a clearer knowledge of what revelation contained.

The service which philosophy renders to belief is not of the menial sort. It consists, first of all, in making clear the meaning of that which is revealed. To demonstrate as of its own initiative the truths of faith is beyond its scope; but once the revelation has been made by God and accepted on His authority, philosophy enables the believer to obtain a deeper insight into the divine teaching. There is no attempt at comprehension, for that belongs to God alone; nor is there any suggestion that the mystery will find a solvent in keen speculation. There is, however, an advantage for reason in studying the content of revelation. As St. Thomas, adopting the words of St. Hilary, declares: "he who with piety goes in quest of the infinite, even though he come not upon that which he seeks, shall still find profit in moving onward."

St. Thomas further indicates the manner of this progress and gives a notable illustration of it in his treatise on the Blessed Trinity in the *Contra Gentes*. The eleventh chapter of the fourth book in that work is indeed typical of the Scholastic procedure. Beginning with the process of emanation in the lowest material things, the author traces it by a steady ascent through the various grades of organic function and the higher forms of created intelligence, until he reaches the conclusion that in God's understanding of Himself, intellect, object and concept are one and the same. Whereupon he adds: "Having considered these things, we can, in a way (*utcunque*) conceive how the divine generation (of the Word) is to be understood." This purpose he attains, first negatively, by showing how the generation is not to be understood, and then positively, proceeding by analogy from the intellectual function of the created mind to a more accurate concept of what takes place in God's intellect. The whole chapter deserves careful study, especially on the part of those who are in dread of the anthropomorphic tendency.

This scrutinizing of revealed truth demands a thorough grasp and a subtle analysis of those ideas and principles with which reason operates on its own territory. But once this task has been accomplished an additional advantage is gained. The believer is now in a position to meet the objections which are put forward, in the name of philosophy, against the doctrines of faith. These objections arise either from an incorrect view of the doctrine in question, or from an imperfect understanding of philosophical principles, or from an unwarranted application of principles that are rightly understood. In any case, the defender of the faith is called on to sift the true from the false in each philosophical statement that assails his belief, and thus furnish an answer, on philosophical grounds, to arguments which, plausible as they may seem, turn out to be false in their conclu-

sions and therefore of no avail as against the revealed doctrine.

How well the Schoolmen made use of philosophy in repelling attacks on faith may be seen by any one who reads an article in the *Summa* of St. Thomas and understands its structure. But one should not stop at the technique or its details. These are not the essentials of Scholasticism. The thought that lies behind them and the reasoning that is designedly cast into these unrhetorical forms must first be appreciated. Then perhaps it will be possible to realize that the aim of the writers was exactness of statement and precise definition of terms —qualities of expression that more fully accord with the demands of reason than do many elegancies of diction which too often screen error.

The synthesis of Scholasticism was not achieved in a day, nor was its progress free from conflict. While the leaders were of one mind in accepting the doctrine of Christianity, they differed considerably in regard to the meaning of philosophical principles and consequently in regard to the best way of securing a rational basis for their common beliefs. Hence the disputations, not merely in the formal style of university exercises, but also in the serious controversies which sprang up on nearly every subject. The men of that day contended for what they held to be true according to reason with as much vigour and individuality as any thinker before or since.

With them, moreover, the highest interests of religion were at stake, and knowing as they did that a weak argument was worse than a poor defense, they tested unsparingly the philosophic speculation of their closest allies. One might say without exaggeration that their very loyalty to faith made them more jealous and more watchful lest error should creep into what they or their co-workers might advance as sound reasoning.

Their attitude was justified at times by the attempts that were made, even in that age, either to widen out

beyond reasonable bounds the province of philosophy or to narrow it by unduly limiting the possibilities of reason. In less than a century after St. Thomas had finished his work, the Church was obliged to condemn a number of propositions which struck at the foundations of philosophy: *e.g.* that scarcely any certain knowledge of things can be got from their natural phenomena; that with the exception of the certainty of faith, there is no other certainty save that which is of the first principle or which can be resolved into that principle; that we know not with evidence whether any effect is or can be naturally produced. The condemnation of such views was in accordance both with the spirit of genuine Scholasticism and with the purpose for which authority was established in the Church. To keep reason from extremes is to show it respect and enhance its value.

As one extreme is usually followed by another, the Church finds it necessary now to restrain the tendency towards rationalism and again to maintain the prerogatives of reason. Thus after the "Enlightenment" of the eighteenth century came the opposite errors of fideism and traditionalism. Against these the Church issued the declaration that reason can prove with certainty the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul and the freedom of the human will. Furthermore, the use of reason precedes faith and leads man to faith with the help of revelation and grace. The true function, therefore, of philosophy in regard to belief is not to block but to open the way for the higher illumination which must come from God himself.

It may, however, appear strange that in this era of advancing thought the Church should maintain towards philosophy an attitude which was taken long before intellectual "freedom" had been won. Such a policy, it would seem, cannot stay the progress of "emancipated" philosophy; but does it not also defeat the aim of the Church by making the approach to faith more and

more difficult? Even granting that the desired adjustment is secured, so far as abstract theories of harmony are concerned, is not the whole movement of the age getting farther away from Catholic belief?

In reply, it should be noted that what is called "progress" is no sure or final standard of truth. There is, of course, such a thing as expansion of knowledge, but along with that there are many tendencies and movements which are progressive only in the sense that they break with the past or with the existing order. And when, as so frequently happens, the movements are in opposite directions, which is entitled to be called progressive? Plainly, a criterion is needed to determine what progress really is.

To say that error is progress would certainly be no help to philosophy. It is true that in scientific research mistakes may be instructive—not, however, because they are mistakes, but because they can serve as warnings. Progress consists in heeding the warning and getting back to the right path. Likewise, if it be admitted that some philosophical theories are erroneous, the first requisite for progress in philosophy is to set those theories aside. They can be excluded perhaps by a more careful conduct of the understanding, or they may eventually disappear as simply unfit to survive. But in the meantime, they are hindering the search after truth; and when that truth is of God's revealing, they have no claim to recognition and much less to the name "progressive." By rejecting them the Church contributes to progress so far as by this is meant a furthering of man's best interests.

From another point of view it can be shown why the Church is so vigilant in regard to error and so resolute in condemning it when silence would be the easier method. Mankind can wait patiently while science and philosophy get rid of the errors by which they are hampered in their respective lines of progress. But the doctrines of faith are doctrines of the salvation for which the individual must strive here and now. They are given not merely

as truths to be known but also as directions for the moral life. Obedience to the divine law presupposes the recognition of the law contained in revelation. Consequently, erroneous views regarding matters of faith have practical results which sooner or later must rob Christian life of its foundation. And though the Church cannot compel any one to accept the truth or to live according to its moral teachings, these must none the less be upheld in their purity and integrity. Failure to condemn error would be equivalent to failure in duty on the part of the Church.

The relation between belief and morality can only be touched on here in a closing paragraph. In the judgment of the Catholic Church, ethical theories that run counter to the precepts of the gospel cannot rightfully claim to be the teachings of reason. They are the more serious inasmuch as they set the will forward in wrong directions and draw it away from that reasonable obedience which faith demands. Decay of religious belief is often followed by a lowering of the moral standards; and conversely, the blunting of the moral sense tends to weaken belief. The efforts that have been made to devise a system of morality and of moral training without any religious elements, have little promise of success. It may well be, however, that they will render at least a negative service by showing that errors in philosophy, when carried to the test of action, produce results from which reason itself must finally recoil. And it is equally possible that a reaction towards higher moral standards will quicken anew the faith in those who have let its light grow dim or have shaped their living on other ideals.

Meanwhile, the Catholic Church points the way of true progress in which reason co-operates with faith, and philosophy with the teaching of revelation. It is a progress towards a goal not attainable here; "we know in part and we prophesy in part." But faith itself gives the certain assurance that "when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away."

The Value of the Old Testament to the Church

By D. M. Kay, D.D.,
Professor of Hebrew, St. Mary's College, St. Andrews, Fife, Scotland.

The tendency to overestimate the function of Scripture has been manifest at various periods. Men are deeply impressed by one part of a book and ascribe a high quality to the whole. Certain regulations become part of a social contract, acquire authority, and in another generation what is written is regarded as Divine Law. As it is easier to see exaggeration in others than in ourselves, let us look at the practice of Islam with a view to discovering the true relation of Scripture to life.

"The substance of the Koran," writes Gibbon (chap. 50) "according to Mahomet or his disciples is uncreated and eternal, subsisting in the essence of the Deity, and inscribed with a pen of light on the table of his everlasting decrees. . . . The various editions of the Koran assert the same miraculous privilege of an uniform and incorruptible text. In the spirit of enthusiasm or vanity, the prophet rests the truth of his message on the merit of his book, audaciously challenges both men and angels to imitate the beauties of a single page, and presumes to assert that God alone could dictate this incomparable performance. . . . At the end of two hundred years, the Sonna or oral law was fixed and consecrated by the labours of Al Bochari, who discriminated seven thousand two hundred and seventy-five genuine traditions from a mass of three hundred thousand reports of a more doubtful or spurious character."

Such is Gibbon's account of what the Koran is held to be by its adherents; and native writers justify his statements. In their view this book is enthroned in the focus of all existence; Allah has made the world to be a kind of commentary on the Koran. Is it wise to laden the memory of Arabia and Africa with the seven thousand sayings? Is the Koran of such inherent power that strangers will delight to read it? Could Latins echo the Arabic name and call it "*Legendum*"? Let Thomas Carlyle (*Heroes and Hero-Worship*) supply the answers.

"They have mosques where it (the Koran) is all read daily; fifty relays of priests take it up in succession, get through the whole each day. There for twelve hundred years has the voice of this book at all moments kept sounding through the ears and the hearts of so many men. We hear of Mahometan doctors that had read it 70,000 times. . . . It is as toilsome reading as I ever undertook. A wearisome confused jumble, crude incondite, endless iterations, longwindedness, entanglement; most crude incondite, insupportable stupidity in short! Nothing but a sense of duty could carry any European through the Koran."

In both these quotations there is an absence of sympathy with the Bible of Arabia. The devout Mohammedan who has tested the "book" by long and loving obedience to its precepts sees much in it which an alien cannot perceive. The foreign critic, anxious for literary charm, expectant of sublimity in the kind which moves him, finds only uninteresting regulations dark with the menace of pains and penalties. In like manner the War Office Manual for the Training of Infantry is dull and tedious reading; half an hour's reading will scarce describe the action of half a minute. But when every man in a battalion gives instant exact obedience to the swift command, the whole mass acquires a common purpose and a common courage, as surely as a crowd catches panic. The Manual in action can achieve

great things. Probably an intelligent Chinaman presented with the Pentateuch in broken fragments or in clumsily assorted mosaics might do his best to repeat Carlyle's verdict on the Koran. Yet the Pentateuch as applied to life has formed the Jewish community and has kept it intact amid the worst and the best that human society could contrive against it. Nevertheless after all due deductions, let us learn from Islam that Holy Scripture is a means to an end, and is to be used as an instrument in the work of the Church.

From the Bible itself the Church learns the same lesson. In the genesis of the Church, in the fellowship of its company, in the sustenance of its life, in doing its work for the world we have no intimation that the possession of a sacred Book is to be of *primary* importance. God is a Spirit and His worshippers are spirits; the converse of free living spirits can never be restricted to a pre-established phraseology. The mass of men in all ages have been and still are unable to read or to write; "the True Light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world" was not to shine on those only who could use cuneiform or alphabetic script or the printed page. The Gospel does not propose to ordain an order of scribes and recorders for the interpretation of Hebrew and Greek documents. The loss of land and independence, of sacrifice and Temple made Judaism cling to the Scriptures with more intense fidelity. The Hebrew Canon was closed against all additions from past or future; the text was fixed and even its errors became sacrosanct. A Jew would rather die than change a syllable, says Josephus. When the Old Testament was so esteemed, it is significant that Christ claimed to be its Judge, and that He Himself wrote no book. The "word of the Kingdom" is "heard" and "received," not read as the Old Testament is read. His words were not to pass away. Wheresoever in the wide world the Gospel should be preached, the kind deed of the woman

at Bethany should be mentioned. The heralds of the Gospel have a message which is not confined to a book; "it is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you" (S. Matt. 10:20). Learning by heart, committing words to memory, is permitted rather than encouraged when our Lord indicated how our aspirations might be expressed in prayer. He trusts to a baptism with fire, and to the influence of one soul on another through preaching. He made provision for the ineffable in Divine Communion by the institution of the Sacrament. Hence it appears that the Church is greater than the Bible because life is more than a description of life. The Church selected the books which were to be included in its Divine library. The example of Jesus Christ should protect the Church from the rabbinical excess which imputed a plenary verbal inspiration to the unpointed consonants of the Old Testament.

The value of the Hebrew Scriptures to the Christian Church will therefore depend primarily on maintaining the same attitude towards them as we find in Christ Himself. Compared with the New Testament, the Old has the position of a subordinate standard. For the Ebionites Christianity meant the coming of the Messiah to complete the Old Testament and to establish it universally. For the Gnostics, on the other hand, Christianity meant deliverance from the Old Testament, emancipation from the Demiurge and all his works. If the Christian religion is to understand its own origin and purpose, it must continue to use the Old Testament with due energy and care. Christ Himself is the Judge of the past, and in incidental references He used the Hebrew Bible much as He referred to the processes of sowing, fishing, etc., for the sake of illustration. But in describing the Kingdom He came to establish, He finds the Divine purpose foretold by the prophets and foreshadowed by the course of Israel's history. The writers of the New Testament show a still greater deference

to the fulfilment of prophetic aspirations in the Advent of Christ. Contact with Jesus Himself made them capable of receiving the Holy Spirit, not during His earthly presence with them, but after He had been parted from them by death. Obedience to the Spirit enabled them to corroborate much in the Psalms and the prophets. But if the Scripture be the Word of God, if it express the unchanging Law of God as Maimonides maintained, does it not constitute an imperative to be obeyed at all costs? The Decalogue has no preamble such as, "If you please, do not kill." "To obey is better than sacrifice and to hearken than the fat of rams"; is not to obey better also than to criticise? But which of us could hew Agag in pieces? The Christian desires to be obedient to the word of God, but he is not called to give blind obedience to the pre-Christian Scriptures. The Logos which pervades the Universe, which became Incarnate in Jesus Christ, appeals to the mind and heart of the Christian; He offers a heavenly vision to which we cannot be disobedient without incurring the condemnation of our own hearts. This fundamental truth of the Christian life makes a critical use of the Old Testament indispensable.

The neglect of the duty of criticism has not been without penalty. In Scotland during recent centuries there has sometimes prevailed a temper more Hebraic than evangelic. The sacred writers were but as the pen of the Inspiring Deity; every word of Scripture was equally authoritative, one verse was as valid for proof as another. The Chronicles were equal in sanctity with the Fourth Gospel. "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live" corrupted the natural compassions of a people willing to be kindly. When medical science discovered the use of chloroform in mitigating pain (especially the pain of parturition) an unchristian deference to the Old Testament quoted Genesis to show the necessity of pain. The surgeons made a happy and satisfactory defence by

alleging as a precedent the action of the Creator in throwing Adam into a deep sleep before He made Eve. The Directory for Publick Worship for Scotland prescribes the reading of the Old and New Testament in the public services of the land, in order to show that the Church is under allegiance to the word of God. The Confessions profess a deference with no reservation. "The Supreme standard of Faith and practice is the Word of God which is contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments." Despite these dicta of Synods, much study of the Scriptures has fostered a kindlier and a freer spirit. It has become obvious that the letters of St. Paul have an authority which does not pertain to the book of Judges. It has become clear that the personality of an apostle or a prophet has more permanent power than his opinions on contemporary events. A crude and primitive theism is rightly abandoned in favour of the supreme revelation of the Father in Jesus Christ.

Let one instance treated in some detail serve to indicate the nature of the change.

Sufficient study makes it undeniably patent that the Deluge narrative in Genesis has been arranged by an editor who has combined two distinct accounts. The one source (P) says the Flood lasted a year and ten days, that the waters arose from a partial undoing of the work of Creation, and that animals were preserved in pairs. The sacred name of the Deity was Elohim in that age, and sacrifice was an anachronism in describing that period. The other source (J) says the Flood increased for forty days and subsided in three weeks, that the waters were due to rain, that animals which were clean, *i.e.*, fit for sacrifice and for human food, were preserved by sevens, and that sacrifice and the Divine Name Jehovah were already known. As soon as the two sources are isolated and seen to be inconsistent, the infallibility of the Editor is untenable so far as history is concerned. The records of Chaldæa have provided a simi-

lar story from an earlier age. The Hebrew writers have set their own mark on the material supplied to them by Semitic tradition. God is One, therefore mythical stories about many gods become absurd. But is the theism that remains truly ethical in the Christian sense?

Both P and J believe that God is good. Both insist that a just and blameless life such as Noah's is the only title to Divine protection. The Flood did happen somehow, for everybody has said so for generations. Why did Elohim permit or cause it? Because the earth was filled with cruelty, says P; because man's heart was prone to wrongdoing, says J. Both take the view that punishment is meant to correct and to warn. As the result of the Deluge, P represents that the vegetarianism of the preceding age is annulled, and to diminish cruelty abstinence from blood is required and capital punishment authorized. The source J has discovered from his reflections on the Flood that though man's heart be apt to sin, the coercion of omnipotence will not avail to cure it. He promises seed time and harvest with no interruption for the future. Both writers are venturers in prehistoric regions; they are prophets who turn their gaze to the chaos and old night of human tradition, and do their best to say, "Let there be light."

But what of the character of Elohim as thus represented?—an extra-mundane Bishop of the race, controlling if not ordering the events of prehistoric time. He has made men, and they displease Him; therefore all land animals shall perish. Even the Chaldæan legend had misgivings about the theism of the catastrophe. The Goddess Ishtar pleaded that Bel should have no share in the libation because he had been rash and arbitrary in arousing the storm. Ea also reproached Bel for want of skill. "Lay his sin upon the sinner; lay his transgression upon the transgressor; but let not man be utterly cut off. Use a lion, or a leopard, or a pestilence or a famine to punish the guilty but wherefore wilt thou stir

up a flood?" Our objection is not that the science of these early chapters is superficial; we do not yet know the science of the weather, but that need not hinder us from doing justly and loving mercy. The error is more serious than scientific error. Lately the steamship "Empress of Ireland" sank in the river S. Lawrence, and many were drowned. The Salvation Army which had lost some of its adherents with the ship, made this the occasion for a call to penitence and careful living—a call which is never amiss. The "Titanic" sank in the Atlantic in April, 1912, and there were some who said "Behold, God's judgment on the millionaires!" The unchristian error in all these cases is the imputation of unworthy motives and methods to Elohim. What teacher would drown the backward members of his class? What Saviour would sacrifice a few believers to kindle penitence in the rest? What are we to think of the Enemy of millionaires, who cannot punish his foes without sacrificing his favourites among the steerage passengers? Ishtar and Ea were better theists than such moderns. "Those eighteen, upon whom the tower in Siloam fell, and slew them, think ye that they were sinners above all men that dwelt in Jerusalem? I tell you, Nay." (S. Luke 13:4.) "Your Father in heaven maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and the unjust." (S. Matt. 5:45.) A man cannot breathe under water, but that incapacity is no sign of Divine wrath. The hurt done to human life by lightning or floods is not directly intended to teach morality to man or beast; nor does it proceed from the direct volition of a personal Agent.

Readers, who have been taught to regard every Biblical statement as a celestial imperative beyond criticism, will find the conflict between the critical and the religious instinct unpleasant; but those who have acquired the evangelic temperament from Christ Himself will welcome relief from the need of accepting or of teaching their

children a harsh theism or ethic. The clergy of all the Churches are well aware of these imperfect elements in Scripture; and the preaching of the Word rarely offends by exalting the lower above the highest Scriptural teaching. But for home reading and for the teaching of the young, the Old Testament might be made an easier book to use.

Enough has been said against an uncritical deference to, or an improper use of the Hebrew Bible to conciliate even a Marcionite. It remains to indicate some considerations which would find favour with the Ebionites.

The memory of a thousand years is a treasure of value in the consciousness of mankind. In the life of the individual the recollections of childhood and youth are the most vivid and the most durable. They come from a formative period,

> "Just at that stage 'twixt boy and youth
> When thought is speech and speech is truth."

They are never to be repeated in the same life; the nobler the individual the richer are his youthful recollections. In the Hebrew Scriptures we have the last will and testament of a peculiar people. A race, which lived in the morning of history, is more likely to be fit to speak to the childhood and youth of all generations. Unhappily there was no Hebrew Homer, and Greece never edited her literature or catechised her children. A Bible gathered from Egypt or Chaldæa, India or China could not displace Isaiah and the Psalms. Rome had Vergil to proclaim her mission of conquest in the world; but the conquered could not join in the Roman triumph. Suppose a modern tribe in Africa confessed its faith and its wonder with as much charm and sincerity as Abraham and Deborah, the world would meet it with comparative religion and folk lore. The Bible has been made once for all, as a language is created once for all. It is fortunate for the world that antiquity has bequeathed a legacy from its best millennium in a form so convenient.

To inform and to amuse the world concerning its own infancy and youth is a slight service compared to the religious education of the race. Religion has always kept a tenacious hold of the past. Philosophy seeks to interpret reality by reviewing the strength and weakness of past interpretations, and is content with a "perhaps." Religion insists upon a sure word by which men may live and die. Moreover the faithful departed are not to religion as if they had never been. The New Testament mirrors the life of one generation, inspired, enthusiastic, urgent, mystic, wonderful. The Old shows age after age living in natural and fitful piety; and by the fact of its review of a thousand years, it yields a larger area for determining the methods of Divine Providence. To make the mood of the crusading epoch or of the sixteenth century a standard for all time would not seriously be proposed. And though by general consent the evangelic temperament has a Divine right to permeate every generation, yet the long preparatory education of the Hebrews protects the Church against millennarian illusions and exaggerated spiritualism. In the centuries when an eager asceticism delighted to draw its sanction from texts in the Gospel, the empire and the Church were being guided by the Old Testament to appoint annual festivals and to devise suggestive ceremonial in religious services. Charlemagne was ready to imitate Josiah, to admonish his clerics, to make Sabbath observance compulsory, to encourage tithe and to forbid the taking of interest for money lent. It has on the whole been good for Europe to hear Moses and the Prophets with awe and respect. Some say the theocratic ruler was thus induced to claim too much power; but the power was avowedly subject to the Gospel. Had this idea not presented itself, worse things might have happened. Better a theocratic Charlemagne reasoning with his clergy on good government than a Timour the Tartar uncorrupted by the Old Testament and making no claim to divine right.

The Church is sent to establish good will among men and the field is the world. Bible societies have translated the Bible in whole or in part into about four hundred languages and dialects. They have thus given a fount of literature and a corporate memory to many races. The fact that the stories come from long ago and far away, that good stories know no national boundaries, has disarmed the hostility of alien censorships, and allowed the Bible to circulate among strangers. The characters of the Patriarchs, of Samuel, of Daniel appeal more strongly, especially to uncivilized races, than abstract descriptions of the virtues. The Psalms are as timeless and nearly as landless as music or arithmetic. To overcome the barriers of language, it has been proposed that each nation should learn its own language and an agreed common or universal language. To make all men friendly, the common knowledge of the Bible would fill the place of the proposed common language. No text-book of ethics devised for the purpose would be likely to do the work so well as the Old Scriptures. Their circulation tends to diffuse knowledge and good feeling; and the Church has found in these regions that the Scripture "is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness." (II Tim. 3:16.)

The Old Testament may also be used to provide an area of conciliation and reconstructive effort. The dark background and hinterland of history belongs to no religion: all have equal rights among the antediluvians. Islam and Jewry have as great an interest in Abraham as the Church. The first Book of Faith has a message and a warning for all. Can the Jews read it and maintain that the advent of the Messiah is a negligible incident in the Divine government of the world? Dare Christians ask their neighbours to carry back the Christian fulfilment into the words of the past? Let us read the old records in their natural sense, not with allegorical

or rationalist or devotional or Jewish or Christian bias. By this means the monotheistic systems will understand each other better. More careful study of origins in Semitic custom and Hebrew tradition might reveal some causes of divergence among Christian communions. What is man? Can he be just and perfect like Noah, if he likes? Or is "every imagination of the thoughts of his heart only evil continually" in spite of man's best endeavours? An editor puts both views on record (Genesis 6) though prophets are doubtful on the subject. The antinomy—its origin forgotten—causes perplexity in Pelagius, in S. Augustine, in Calvin, in the Synod of Dort, and in the British House of Lords—in every case fruitful in divisive consequences.

Writers for THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY are invited (Vol. ii, No. 5, p. 18) to address in their thoughts "some typical representative of another communion." The late Œcumenical Patriarch—His Holiness Joachim III—was pleased twelve years ago to show a friendly interest in the work of the Church of Scotland in Constantinople. He also approved of the interchange of students of Divinity as a means of increasing mutual understanding, and he permitted a student of the Orthodox Church to study for a year in a Scottish university. With some of the clergy at the Patriarchate the writer of this article had the privilege of friendly discussion. The memory of the Christian courtesy of these dignitaries of the Eastern Church may, the writer hopes, have availed to banish unworthy narrowness from what is written.

We conclude that it is easy to think too highly of the written form of a Divine Revelation. The Founder of the Church encourages the view that stereotyped ideas and forms cannot be a substitute for a continuous vitality. The sacred Scripture of the Hebrews was highly honoured but also critically interpreted by the evangelists and apostles; and it remains indispensable for the Church.

But the highest must rule over the less advanced; and critical study should be encouraged in order that the picture of religious life in ancient Israel may be made more intelligible. As a memento of an early past, as supplying a period of a thousand years to be a criterion of future changes in the Church, as a manual for mission work, and as providing a field where linguists, historians and theologians of all Churches may help each other in removing causes of division, the Old Testament remains of unique value for the Church and for the world.

International and Interdenominational Research of the New Testament[1]

By Adolf Deissmann,
Professor in the University of Berlin.

Dr. Deissmann agreed with the Editor to write this article in November, 1913, and wrote it in the spring of 1914. Upon the Editor's request and after consultation with Dr. Harnack, Dr. Deissmann has agreed that the article shall be published in spite of the present situation.

Through the wastes of the Sinaitic desert a caravan is toiling toward the convent of St. Catherine. Its organizing impetus, however, was generated during a previous expedition, when two Scotch ladies, twins by birth and united in widowhood and scholarly tastes, discovered in the convent the precious palimpsest of a Syrian gospel codex. And now, as a result, British scholars are alert through this journey to assist in giving the scientific world access to the finally completed result of their labours.

The next step is that Bible students of every faith sit in busy toil over the published discovery, for which they are indebted to Mrs. Lewis and her sister, Mrs. Gibson. Among these workers is the aged Heidelberg orientalist Adalbert Merx, who has devoted the last twelve or thirteen years of his toil-filled life almost exclusively to the Syrian Codex Sinaiticus. And when on the 4th of

[1]Translated from the author's MS. by Rev. Willard H. Robinson, Jr., Berlin University (July 1914).

August 1909 he breathes his last upon the bier of Adolf Hausrath, in whose honour he has just delivered the academic memorial address, he has in the main completed the last of his four volumes on the new text-witnesses of the gospels, and moreover, the working partnership between the German Protestant and the Scotch Presbyterian ladies has at his suggestion found open expression in the theological Doctor's diploma which the Heidelberg faculty has sent to the two sisters, *honoris causa*.

II

For the definite settlement of the chronology of the Apostolic Age the data in the New Testament itself are not sufficient. The New Testament, moreover, did not come into being with the unity of a single volume born of a single historical purpose. It is a collection, rather, of numerous separate writings. Each of these writings originated independently of the others. Their primary interest is not in those facts and dates which to the pure historian would be so fundamentally important. Religious purposes of varying quality and intensity constitute their inspiration. The chronology of the New Testament labours, therefore, under the burden of wearisome calculations, and unanimity in all important details has as yet by no means been definitely reached. Meanwhile fresh archaeological discoveries alone can be sure of bringing us nearer our goal. In 1908, for example, in my book *Light from the Ancient East*, I confessed with deep regret, that the inscribed stone tablets needed to enable us to determine with exactness the years during which the procurators Felix and Festus and the proconsul Gallio were in office were as yet undiscovered. Yet at that very time, unknown to me, there was already at hand an inscription which permits us to reckon the year of Gallio (Acts 18:12) more exactly than had previously been possible. This inscription, discovered at Delphi, had been

left practically unnoticed by nearly all theological and philological scholars. Alexander Nikitsky, the Russian epigraphist, had in 1894-95 published a part of it, but his language and therefore his article were not very widely known. At a later date, in 1905, the French archaeologist, Emile Bourguet, published four fragments of the inscription, but without touching upon the New Testament problem in question. This was done for the first time, I think, in 1907 by his fellow countryman, A. J.-Reinach. He, in turn, was followed by Joseph Offord, W. M. Ramsay; the Roman Catholics, H. Coppieters and Louis Jalabert; the German Protestant, Carl Clemen; the Frenchmen, E. Ch. Babut and Alfred Loisy, and the American, William P. Armstrong. I myself have been acquainted with the inscription since 1909; and in 1911 in my book on Paul treated it at considerable length, giving a facsimile reproduction and a detailed interpretation. Since then, there has come in addition in Germany, France, the English-speaking countries, etc., a very considerable special literature, in which Protestants and Catholics, as well as representatives of other confessions, have taken the matter up. This voluminous and worldwide discussion, taken in its entirety, is a fine illustration of the theme of the present article, and moreover is one which from the outset could be pursued with the most unpartisan co-operation. Not the slightest dogmatic or confessional side-thought need creep in to disturb the impartiality of the investigation itself.

The books, magazine articles, and pamphlets in which the results of these investigations are now made public, are themselves published in six or seven languages. But let a man go back to the time when the investigation is still in the making, and he will receive a still more lively impression of the international and interconfessional character of modern Bible investigation. Let him look in upon one of the workers in his own workroom. Here he sees matter for the outgoing mail to all countries

and matter from the incoming one. The same post brings, it may be, a letter from America, a squeeze from Delphi, a private reprint of the work of a French Jesuit living in England, a postcard from Charlottenburg, and a first finger-marked proof with the corrections of his own work. And when our investigator has run through all this, we see him telephoning to the phototyper or to some associated epigraphist,—a truly worthy use of that otherwise and for the most part misused instrument. Thus the very study and working-table of the Bible investigator become a microcosm of modern science. There the secrets preserved in the priceless lines, inscribed upon the marbles of Greek lands, are being more and more revealed through the intellectual traffic and international commerce of thought, in which Russians, Germans, Englishmen, and Americans, Greek and Roman Catholics, Protestants, Anglicans, and Frenchmen are engaged. Thus every item of definite knowledge worked out by individual labour is appropriated by all with the same spirit of devotion, because it concerns the same New Testament, dear to all alike.

III

The paths of investigation, however, are not rarely the paths of error also. But wrong ways do no special harm if they finally bring us around to the right road again. This is true of international and interdenominational investigation. It, too, is sometimes united even along false paths. The existence in pagan texts of the word *agape*, so important for our comprehension of the world of mental conceptions in which the early Christians moved, has hitherto had no evidence in its support. The Frenchman, G. Cousin, and after him the American, J. R. Sitlington Sterrett, the latter on an epigraphical expedition in 1884-85, found in Tefeny in Pisidia a metrical inscription, certainly pagan, which appeared to contain the word, though in a mutilated form.

Thereupon the American, William P. Hatch, in a lexical study made use of the inscription as a pagan support for *agape*. I myself likewise referred to it, though conditionally, as also did the Scotchman, George Milligan. But Cousin and Sterrett have probably completed the mutilated word wrongly. In a Breslau dissertation Franz Heinevetter has recently, and I think rightly, completed the word as *aga*[*tho*]*n* instead of *aga*[*pe*]*n*. Thus vanishes this piece of evidence. That bare fact however does not make vain the labour expended on the word. To look for it in pagan inscriptions was, without doubt, to pursue a right method.

The entire history of this piece of research is typical for modern Bible investigation. The field in which we seek information concerning the New Testament, was long ago widened beyond the Jewish and Christian circles. International epigraphical investigation in particular has made special advances, and even although in a single case much work may be done in vain, yet on the whole, when by hundreds of detailed observations we concentrate on the smallest point our greatest united strength, we are without doubt moving forward all the more surely.

IV

Even international political events and enterprises do service to international Bible investigation. We are standing at the close of two Balkan wars. It is no paradox for New Testament science to hope for enrichment through the readjustment of national boundary lines. One of the most important fields of Apostolic history, Macedonia, is now for the most part in the hands of a Christian power. A freer path is thus opened for the archaeological investigation of Philippi, Thessalonica, Beroea, and the whole adjacent country. Here again we hope for intellectual gains, direct and indirect, for our knowledge of the early Christian centuries.

What significance, too, for our work on the New Testament has the commercial and political opening up of Asia Minor through the construction of the new railroads. It is the archaeological opening up of Pergamum, Ephesus, Miletus, and other places by unintended excavations! Especially have the railroads now afforded us a relatively easy solution for one of our tasks, and in future will help us along that line still more. I refer to the truly modern work, for every specialist in Bible investigation, of knowing the fields which he treats from a scientific viewpoint, not merely through the study of books, but also by personal visits and researches made on the ground. The coming decades will doubtless witness a large number of New Testament study-trips. On the ruins of Ephesus, Americans, Swedes, Germans and Frenchmen, Jesuits and Lutherans will shake hands with each other. In Jerusalem and Antioch we shall thankfully learn from Russians, Greeks, and Armenians. To Union Theological Seminary, to Lund, and to St. Petersburg we shall gladly send prints of our films from Tarsus, Angora, and Capernaum, having been ourselves enriched in turn through valuable pictures taken by other associated foreign travellers in the Orient. It is one of the richest of experiences, when, in the East on the stage of our holy history, men become acquainted with colleagues hitherto known only in a literary way. They become intimate friends at a moment's notice. A lively interchange of ideas begins, and we smilingly compare the mental picture we have made of our colleague from reading his books, with his actual appearance in the flesh. In place of the pale and crazy fanatic, with his strange and exaggerated hypothesis, there stands beside his horse, peeling a Jaffa orange, a weather-browned, kindly-looking specimen of humanity, whether Catholic or Protestant, it matters not to us. The joy in that which is sacred to us both shines out of his eyes, and all our scientific and technical criticism, which

had perhaps unloaded itself at home in a sanguinary review, falls away before the question which among colleagues should be chief: What can I learn from this man? This main question, when applied to the international and interdenominational situation of the present, makes out of the chaos of investigators of the New Testament, who seem to differ so widely on confessional points, an organism of fruitful collaboration.

There all can learn from all, and all do learn from all. Let us go on to consider some special types of this cosmopolitical Bible investigation, in so far as it concerns the New Testament.

V

The scientific work which the Christian East accomplishes for the New Testament is, as a rule, not so well known in the West, or at any rate not so highly valued, as it deserves. When we pass the last few decades in review, we must first of all thankfully confess that the Christian East has presented us with a large number of highly important ancient Christian texts, which have been lately discovered and published by native theologians and philologists. We may cite a few examples: the discovery of the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles by Bryennios, the finds for which we are indebted to Armenian scholars, the investigation of the Meteora-convents by Nikos Weïs, the work on the Koridethi gospel book, which was begun by the Russians,—all these are achievements, without which in fact we cannot well do.

It is true that the Russians, Greeks, and other Eastern peoples do not take the lead in the historical criticism of the New Testament. But it would be a mistake to set this fact down to the discredit of the East. For during those very centuries which saw in France, Germany and England the rise and progress of historical criticism of the Bible, Providence laid far other than historico-theological tasks upon the Greek Church as its chief

duties. *Inter arma silent Musae.* The exigencies of the times denied to the Greek Church in that era the calm and meditative features of the investigating Clio. They gave her, rather, the face marred by deep distress and the countenance passionately moved by the loftiest sacrificial love which belong to a *Magna Mater* who as *Mater Dolorosa* suffers affliction for her children. The practical and gigantic task of saving the Greek nation threw all scholarly and smaller efforts into the background, and like a noble mother the Greek Church splendidly achieved this end, and laid for the Greek state a firm foundation.

But since the land of Greece has breathed a freer atmosphere, and has had leisure for other tasks, the part she has taken in modern Bible-investigation, at first naturally more receptive, has become more and more active. Works like the Commentaries of Emmanuel Zolotas on the epistle to the Galatians and the gospel of John are laudable indications of the special earnestness with which the theological faculty of the University of Athens has entered into sympathy with modern international investigation.

The small knowledge of the Russian language, of which we have already complained, unfortunately forms a hindrance in the way of a just estimate of Russian investigations. Nevertheless even one who does not understand Russian may gain from the really phenomenal knowledge of the international literature of investigation which is outlined for example in the works of Nikolaj Glubokovsky a high respect for the modern scholarship of the St. Petersburg exegete. And a competent judge, an expert in the language, recommended his great book on Paul to me as a striking accomplishment, so far as its contents are concerned.

In one great point the Bible-investigators of the East have an *a priori* advantage over us: They have a knowledge of the East acquired from childhood onward. They

know its anthropo-geographical structure. They breathe its spiritual air, and inhale its fundamental religious atmosphere, in which even among the Russians very ancient impressions have been preserved. Herein they possess as a natural endowment something which we must acquire for ourselves indirectly and with great toil: They have the native instinct for Eastern things, and especially for antique and popular Eastern things. In the field of Paulinism, for example, false attitudes of inquiry, which have been possible only in the West, do not often occur among them, and we shall do well especially in the more definite problems of religious psychology, which often occupy the exegete of the Pauline epistles, to call in the judgment of our Greek and Russian colleagues, who will often intuitively perceive what is the correct attitude, just because they have a closer contact with the soul of the East.

VI

Of the present Roman Catholic investigation of the New Testament we can speak only with high respect. In Germany it stands just now in an age of bloom. We cannot, however, be blind to the great dangers which threaten it because of the decisions which the papal Bible Commission, founded by Leo XIII, makes in regard to special points. If investigation has above itself an authority to which it must yield in important questions of detail, it thereby so far forth loses its scientific freedom, and finds its scientific credit endangered. And as to dangers, which is the greater: that which attaches to complete freedom of investigation or that which attaches to investigation protected, that is limited, by a commission? We cannot rightly answer the question, unless we really believe in the New Testament. He who is personally acquainted with the living forces which reside in this book of books will feel assured that no power in the world, not even that of scientific

criticism, can succeed in destroying it. All movements of science, all self-attacking and self-destroying hypotheses of international scholarship, must serve only to make the true essence of the New Testament stand out all the more clearly. Mistakes in Bible investigation are just as natural and necessary as correct perceptions. The guarantee of their ultimate rectification lies in the very course of the investigation itself. Thus far it has not in reality upheld a single error. The hypothesis, which is put to the sharpest test of the critical microscope and examined by hundreds of pairs of eyes, cannot in the long run, if it is false, conceal its weaknesses, and will vanish away.

For this reason commissions for the authoritative settling of single difficult questions are unnecessary. Their claims have no other value than that which belongs to the scientific opinions of all other individual scholars. They also, like those others, are immediately drawn into the vast stream of international and interconfessional debates, and no nimbus of inviolate authority can save them from the oft-times reproachful criticism of contemporaries and successors. The commission is bound by its statute to beware of an exaggerated admiration of the works of those who differ with it in belief. It should itself nevertheless beware of belittling the criticisms made upon its own decisions by those who in their turn differ with it: *magna est vis veritatis et praevalebit.*

By what means then does the Bible Commission work? By none other means than they possess on whose works it passes judgment. It often, in fact, recognizes the limits of its own knowledge. It always does this when it is obliged to turn to those trusted advisors, by whose judgment its decisions are influenced. It has indeed already happened that it laid claim to trusted advisors, who could not really have given a scientific judgment on the question, because they were not competent to do so.

I do not, to be sure, mistake the noble motives, which led to the forming of the Bible Commission. The church has her motherly anxiety about the paths of error, into which her children might perhaps enter, and takes anxious care, in an age of shifting hypotheses, to maintain fixed truths in regard to holiest things. The best scientific apologetic, however, consists not in the prohibition of certain definite paths, but in the permission to walk without limitation, along every avenue of investigation. A church which allows her theologians to investigate without restraint will, in the long run, make a deeper impression upon the consciousness of the civilized world, than a church which fetters her science with the chains of authority.

The Bible Commission should therefore beware of making definite solutions of single problems. It should concentrate the high measure of authority which it possesses upon those great scientific problems by whose solution it will accomplish a considerable service for science in general. When in 1907 it commissioned the Benedictine order with the preliminary work for a new edition of the Vulgate, it did a greater service than by all its single decisions put together, and the Istituto Biblico in Rome, founded by Pius X for supplementing the work of the Bible Commission, is a creation which with its Biblical museum, uses more modern methods of Biblical investigation than have hitherto been entrusted to many Protestant investigators. This institute prescribes to its members, as the conclusion of their studies, a journey through the Holy Land. By means of its Biblical museum it also prepares them for the journey. This is such an excellent method, that the only thing for us all to do is to adopt it. It is almost self-evident today to the classical Philologist and Archaeologist, to the Egyptologist and the Indologist, that he must by personal inspection become acquainted with the home of the civilizations he investigates. The

same necessity has indeed been gradually recognized by Old Testament investigators also. But for Protestant New Testament science the method must be carried out in a far different way than has previously been pursued; and the "holy" land of the New Testament extends much farther,—to Galatia, Ephesus, Macedonia, Greece and Italy.

In this realistic method of enlightened investigation Catholic scholars have on the whole hastened on ahead of us. A part of that which celibacy denies them in knowledge of the common psychic life of humanity, and therefore in their equipment for the reproduction of psychic states and conditions, it returns to them in the way of a greater independence in the disposition of time and means. On the whole, Catholic theologians are more mobile and have made richer and more fruitful use of their easier possibilities of New Testament study-travel.

The healthy realism of this Catholic investigation becomes clearest perhaps when one looks through the pages of the *Revue Biblique* which for the most part is devoted to the work of the French École Pratique d'-Études Bibliques in Jerusalem. This united accomplishment is significant, and French Catholicism may well be proud of it. But the German *Biblische Zeitschrift*, although its main aim is a different one, reaches the highest levels. All that can be attained through care and diligence, even considering the present situation of Catholic Bible investigation, is here achieved. I consider the *Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen* which Max Meinertz publishes to be a characteristic and on the whole very delightful German undertaking. Even the professional who thinks himself largely acquainted with the literature is surprised at the copiousness of these discussions which represent in special studies the scholarship of all the various schools and nations. That the scientific trend of this whole investigation is a conservative one is not to be wondered at. If we view the whole inter-

national and interconfessional investigation of the New Testament as a great parallelogram of forces, the Catholic work co-operates in a frequently fruitful way by the care and caution of its method in the needful criticism of criticism.

In one important point of detail the Catholic investigator of early Christianity has a certain fundamental superiority to the technical methods of scientific production. In newer Protestant works the strongly mystical element in Pauline and Johannine piety has become more clearly recognized. Protestant investigation had previously grasped these two chief apostolic types with a more doctrinal and dogmatic hand. There are still important problems lying in solution here. But whoever has any understanding at all for mystical religion will increasingly recognize how intensely it was at work in early Christianity. But the feeling for historic mysticism is gained primarily by contact with living mysticism and for just this contact the pious Catholic is predestined, for his worship finds its very life-breath in Christian mysticism. We Protestants like to call the apostle Paul "our" apostle. Certainly we are not without justification for doing so. But Paul belongs in at least as great a degree to the Catholics, just by virtue of his Christ-mysticism. And for the exegesis of certain Pauline passages the Catholic brings with him a psychic preparation which is often lacking in the Protestant. While the Protestant puts a mystical Pauline sentence under his doctrinal microscope in order to discover some single "teaching" of Paulinism, the Catholic hears in it the tones which have been entrusted to him in the twilight of his experience at the Mass. He hears not the blows of a hammer nailing up theses, but the quiet rhythm of the mystic confession: *ecce panis angelorum!*

VII

The non-Catholic investigation is divided into two great groups: the Continental and the British-American.

In the Continental group German investigation has the preponderance, because of the great bulk of its production and on the whole also because of the abundance of the problems set by it. The work of the Dutch, Swiss, Austrians, Danes, Swedes, and Norwegians is, however, as far as methods and results are concerned, of equal value with the German. The word "Protestant" does not with entire fitness describe all these non-Catholic groups alike. But in view of the largeness and mutuality of their inter-relations I may be permitted to use it just here to indicate the aspect they have in common.

The most striking characteristic of the Protestant investigation of the New Testament is that it works in a large number of different directions which may nevertheless in the main be reduced to two groups: a more conservative one which as such tends to restore union with Catholic and Eastern investigation, and another which is more progressive. By the latter especially, German investigation of both the groups just mentioned is greatly enriched on account of the valuable co-operation of non-theological scholars in which classical philologists, ancient historians, and jurists have united with the theological colleges in an *eranos* of contributing and critical forces.

That element in the progressive investigation which spends its excess of strength in the mere gymnastic exercise of assaulting the historicity of Jesus and of the apostle Paul is today no longer characterized by the enthusiasm with which, at the outset, it announced the "ungenuineness" of the majority of the Pauline epistles, etc. On questions of genuineness the progressive element, taken as a whole also, has become more conservative, although certain very recent indications point to the fact that a small wave is on the way, which as it passes will bring back to us the old errors of a narrow over-cleverness and an unduly sharpened acuteness of vision.

In any case, other problems for the time being occupy the foreground. He who under these circumstances speaks of the religio-historical method does not fully comprehend the situation, for that term gives only a partial impression of the present status. As a matter of fact, the question of the hour deals with something much greater, namely, a deepening of our entire historical method and a consequent turning to an enormously extended field of investigation. In contrast with the "literary-critical" method which, moreover, treats—and mistreats—as literary, texts which are fundamentally non-literary, is the consideration of the New Testament from the viewpoints of the history of language, the history of religion, and the history of civilization. This is the great scientific programme of the present. And through it at last is to be reached a historical and psychological understanding of early Christianity, the conditions that preceded it, its rise, its interpretation by the world in which it was ensphered, and the creative independence which it nevertheless exercised within that world.

The historico-linguistic investigation of the New Testament has, since the nineties of the last century, gathered rich fruits from the newly-discovered texts which, dating from the time of the turning of the tide of religion, have been preserved on stones, papyri, potsherds, and in other ways. In this work Germans vie with Swiss, Britains, Americans, and Swedes in the systematic exhausting of the new sources, and the *philologia sacra*, for several centuries either sternly repressed or overgrown with dogmatic vine-work, now stands, including text criticism, in an age of full bloom. All the newer commentaries on the New Testament published on both sides of the Atlantic show clearly the influence of this philological movement.

In like manner the religio-historical investigation has been developed not only by using in its interest a more full and scholarly knowledge of Hellenism and late

ancient religion, but also by emphasizing the distinctively religious character of early Christianity as contrasted with the doctrinal form of approach so long and so widely predominant before. The study of apostolic piety from the viewpoint of the Christus-cult has, as W. Bousset's significant book, for example, shows, been itself fruitful. In place of the careless working of the surface of the New Testament for "teachings," interest is now more strongly centered on the religious forces which were the living power behind the "teachings" of early Christian times, and which on the one hand are certain to stand out in clearer historical lines, and on the other hand will throw a light upon the practical realization of our holy book in our own day. The main historical problem is always more and more clearly seen to be the rise of the Christus-cult.

Not so much taken into account, but just as needful is the viewpoint of the history of civilization. Through the undoubted misconceptions of Kalthoff, Kautsky, and others many have allowed themselves to become alarmed. But there can be no doubt that in spite of the errors of its youth, the historical study of the worship and the social conditions of early Christianity has its rights. The evangelic and apostolic age does not indeed seem to us to be a mere movement of social emancipation, but its close spiritual interblending with the people which flourished under the high civilization of the ancients is becoming more and more clear. Actual union with that high civilization was not reached in any consciously energetic way until the second century. Out of all this spring important viewpoints, which especially concern our method of forming judgments concerning the New Testament itself, in particular the gospel of John and his letters.

Looking at these two main types or directions of Protestant investigation as a whole, we find that the conservative predominates on the British-American side;

on the Continental side, however, the progressive is uppermost. It is true that in Theodor Zahn we Germans, for example, possess a great conservative power whose influence is considerable and will perhaps become still more so. It is also true that there are British and American books enough of a very advanced type. But in the English-speaking world radicalism is always conceived of as something "German," and we are very apt to class conservative critics with the English. The entire make-up of British and American scientific thinking is, in the field of Biblical investigation, a different one from ours. They are cautious and conservative, but their caution is coupled with a prudent realism, and in the undulating movement of approval, rejection, and reapproval it has often held to what was right. In contrast with us, moreover, British-American scholars have the advantage of greater acquaintance with the East; and congenial sympathy with its religions is easier for them. Our own scientific *Charisma* is an energy of critical comprehension which retreats before no difficulty, is inexhaustible in formulating new problems, and ventures boldly down into every abyss. If it comes up again out of such abysses to daylight with sound limbs, it feels itself ready at once to climb into the airship of the loftiest hypothesis, and feels no concern as to how the landing will be made.

If to us Germans the investigations of the world of English writers often appear phlegmatic, so on the other hand our own variety may easily have for them an acrobatic effect. But amiable epithets like these do nobody any good. The two great groups are everywhere thrown back upon each other, and the possibilities of mutual enrichment just here are so great, that every piece of hand-in-hand co-operation of the Continental and British-American investigators is sure to result in great steps of progress.

This may be shown, in conclusion, by a single example. In every scientific investigation of the New Testament, the premise is acquaintance with the Greek Old Testa-

ment, the Septuagint. No one who knows the facts will deny that in the nineteenth century the knowledge of the Septuagint, which New Testament investigators in general possessed, was a small one. On the part of many it is still restricted to the Septuagint passages quoted in the New Testament. The splendid exceptions serve only to prove the rule. Many have allowed themselves to be kept from the study of the Septuagint, because a critical edition is not yet at hand. The authoritative statements of Lagarde, who often pointed to this deficiency and to the best of his ability worked to do away with it, made many scholars uneasy. (The statement sounds paradoxical, but is nevertheless a fact.) Then British investigators had the courage to organize the gigantic enterprise of a Septuagint concordance, and to make its textual material newly accessible, not in critical editions to be sure, but in carefully printed ones. Hatch and Redpath, with their three-volume concordance, Swete, with his short edition and his *Introduction*, and Brooke and McLean, with their great edition of the Septuagint which is gradually appearing at Cambridge, are the pioneers in this new work. For New Testament science the concordance especially meant the opening up of an enormous field of knowledge. At the same time it also afforded a splendid aid for critical work on the Septuagint text. And now German science has begun to repay the debt it owes to England in regard to the Septuagint by the organization of the "Göttinger Septuaginta-Unternehmen," which in the spirit of Lagarde will work for the restoration of the critical text of the Greek Old Testament. Both undertakings, the English and the German, complete and support each other to the best of their ability.

VIII

International and interconfessional investigation of the New Testament is a parallelogram of forces. Along

one line it pushes boldly forward, along another it looks carefully about, digging, boring, testing, rejecting, learning and often unlearning. Daily gathering fresh enthusiasm for their sublime object, scholars of every people and denomination push towards the same great goal which science has set before them,—the discovery of new truth. The fact that hundreds upon hundreds of specialists, as generation follows generation, devote their best powers to the Old Book, yet never can make an end to their investigations, proves the inexhaustibleness of its contents. And the fact that even in the fire of sharpest criticism it has victoriously asserted its life-power, may well give to those who believe they should protect its sacredness by outward means, courage to leave the New Testament, with proud confidence, yet longer in the brightest light of modern investigation.

Progress a Permanent Element in Religion

By W. A. Guerry, D.D.,
Bishop of South Carolina.

Bishop Boyd Carpenter states in his Bampton Lectures that there are three permanent elements in religion: (a) the sense of dependence on God; (b) the desire for fellowship with God; (c) the necessity for progress. "These, and more might be added, are enough to show that in the minds of men who have studied the question though following different schools of thought both the idea of Fellowship and that of Dependence are among the essential features of religion, but to these two features I venture to add a third—Progress. This expresses belief in the forward and upward movement of creation; the belief in personal spiritual progress, and the conviction that not for ourselves alone do the wheels of time move forward but they bear all things onward to an age in which the children of men shall be blessed. My reasons for adding this feature are simple. Progress refuses to be excluded."

The idea of Dependence raised to its highest power and purged of superstition and of the grosser forms of anthropomorphism finds its truest expression in the Christian doctrine of the Fatherhood of God. The desire for Fellowship with God,—that deep hunger and longing of the heart and soul of man to come into closer touch with the Invisible and Eternal—finds its most complete satisfaction and fulfilment in the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation of God in the flesh. Finally, the need for

Progress which is just as much an essential and permanent element in religion as either of the other two is provided for in the doctrine of God the Holy Ghost whose mission it is to guide us into all truth. No religion can survive or long retain its hold upon the faith and allegiance of men which is not capable of adapting itself to new conditions, which cannot assimilate new truths, or lend itself to restatement and reinterpretation in the light of the science and philosophy of the day. But perhaps there is nothing which so distinguishes Christianity from all other religions as its capacity to assimilate new truths, and to adjust itself to new conditions of thought and life. It has been the glory of Christianity that from the beginning it has shown itself capable of change and development.

The history of religion presents no greater contrast in this respect than that which is afforded by a comparative study of Mohammedanism and Christianity. It is impossible to speak of the religion of Islam without admiration and respect. Not only because it is the religion of so many millions of God's children, but because it is essentially a Monotheistic religion and emphasizes the unity and spirituality of the Godhead. But Islamism, while strong in its sense of dependence upon God, and in its desire for closer fellowship and communion with him, is yet weak in the element of Progress. The religion of Mahomet has tended steadily to become more and more fixed, and stereotyped in its forms of worship and in its outlook on life. The result has been that the civilization of all peoples who have lived long under the dominion of Mohammedanism has tended to become fixed and immovable. The one thing today which perhaps more than any other holds Turkey back from taking her place among the more enlightened and progressive nations of the world is her religion. A reformed Islamism, or one which showed itself capable of assimilating the results of modern science and Political

Economy, would be something so fundamentally new and different from the old, that men would not recognize it for the same thing. I do not make this comparison here to disparage Islamism, but only to furnish a striking object lesson on a large scale of the fate which awaits any religion, however true and spiritual, which opposes Progress and gets out of vital and close touch with what men are thinking and feeling in each age of the world's history.

While Christianity has shown itself capable in great crises of adjusting itself to new conditions and of keeping abreast of the best thought and scholarship of the day, it is nevertheless true that there have been periods in the history of the Church when she has shown herself singularly blind to the signs of the times. She has often been forced reluctantly against her will to accept the well accredited results of science and of historical research, by the weight of an overwhelming and enlightened public sentiment which has gone ahead of the thought and scholarship of the Church and demanded recognition of what the majority of educated and cultured people had come to accept as true. The Church has no more dangerous foe to combat than that spirit of ultra-conservatism which allows her clergy and leaders to get out of sympathetic touch with and understanding of the times in which we live. Each age calls for a restatement and reinterpretation of Christianity in terms of the thought and scholarship of the age so that men may understand it and be saved by it. I do not think that we of the clergy are aware to what extent the man in the pew often fails to understand our terminology and our point of view. We still use the language of the Middle Ages or of the Reformation period, much of which has become obsolete and meaningless. For example, when the preacher today speaks of the "Atonement," or of the "Vicarious Sacrifice of Christ," or of the "Doctrine of Justification by Faith," what idea do these words con-

vey to the modern man? There was a time when the doctrine of Justification by Faith formed a part of the daily life and conversation of men. They discussed it around their firesides, and heard it expounded from every Protestant pulpit in Europe. But today the preacher who would take for granted that his congregation understood what was meant by the doctrine of Justification by Faith would be assuming too much. The result is that too often there is a barrier between the preacher and his people. There is a lack of sympathy and intelligent understanding. The man in the pew is listening to a terminology which is a relic of a by-gone age. The Gospel is not preached in "a language understanded of the people."

I am not pleading here for a new Gospel; the essential truth of Christianity remains the same. There is a sense in which "the faith once delivered" must remain permanent and unchanged, but in every age it is absolutely essential to the growth and spread of Christianity in the world that it be restated and reinterpreted in the language and experience of the age. Let us take, for example, the comparatively new study of Psychology and the light which it throws upon the phenomena of man's religious experience. In the undoubted facts of the spiritual life in the soul we have the starting point of a new apologetic for Christianity. Here is a rich and fertile field which is just now beginning to be explored. Those who have read Prof. Rudolph Eucken's recent book *Can We Still be Christians?* will recall his able and illuminating treatment of the facts of man's religious experience. While he fails to do justice to the claims of dogmatic and historic Christianity, no one in our times has written more convincingly and powerfully of the reality of the spiritual life and of the necessity of religion as a permanent factor in the life of the race.

But periods of transition and readjustment to new conditions have always caused great anxiety and distress

to a great many pious and devout souls. It seems to many as if the very foundations of Christianity were being undermined and swept away by the new science and the "new theology" of today. I am far from holding any brief for what is called "the new theology," nor am I competent to speak for the new science; but it is perfectly clear to me that Christianity must come into vital touch and sympathy with the age. It must deliver its message in language which the modern man can thoroughly understand. It must accept the well accredited results of modern scientific research and investigation. It must show itself willing to adjust itself to modern conditions of thought and life. It must lend itself to a reinterpretation of its central truths, which will at least not seem to contradict results of independent study in other fields of research. In their zeal to make Christianity thoroughly modern and up-to-date, many are prone to accept some of the postulates of modern science as final, when further study and research will show that such conclusions are hasty and ill-considered. We should, therefore, equally avoid the rashness with which some men rush into print and proclaim "a new theology" divorced from miracles and without the historic basis of Christianity as set forth in the Creeds, and that blind and ultra-conservatism which insists on ignoring the enlightened and progressive scholarship of the world, and which clings to a theology and a terminology which the age has clearly outgrown.

A study of the development of Christian doctrine would do much to reassure us in this crisis by making us see that the principle for which we are pleading is not new, but from the beginning has been that which has kept Christianity alive in the world and prevented it from going the way of so many other religions which have become hopelessly archaic and stereotyped. This process of reinterpretation and restatement in the language and philosophy of the day is as old as the New Testament

itself. Take for example the Gospel according to St. John. Why was it written? What made its composition an imperative necessity? As long as Christianity had remained an obscure Judaizing sect the first three Gospels might conceivably have served the purpose of a religious community which still continued to be composed largely of Jews and which saw and felt no contradiction in worshipping with their Jewish brethren in the synagogue on the seventh day and also with the "company of the faithful" on the first day of the week. But when Christianity threw off the swaddling clothes of an effete Judaism and entered upon its worldwide career, and came for the first time into vital touch with Greek thought and civilization, it immediately became necessary that some one should be found who could restate Christianity in terms of Greek philosophy, and commend it to the genius of the Greek people. This is what St. John did. He did not hesitate to borrow the language of a disciple of Plato and apply it to the person and work of Christ. I do not think we moderns begin to appreciate what a bold and even radical departure this was for St. John to make. He appropriated the word Logos and with it much of the philosophy of the school of Philo, and he made it a term with which to describe the person of Christ and His relation to the cosmos. St. John did a work for Christianity which it is impossible to exaggerate, a work which needs to be repeated in every age of the Church, and in none more than in the present. Or, to take one more illustration; at the close of the fourth century, when Christianity had conquered the Roman Empire, the age under God produced St. Augustine, whose theology was nothing less than a restatement of Christianity in terms of the thought and life of the age in which he lived. St. Augustine stressed the sovereignty of God. He exalted authority and obedience, and he became the exponent of a school of theology which dominated the thought of Western Europe

for a thousand years, and whose influence is still felt.

Again, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, although the Established Church was opposed to the Reform Movement, yet history shows us no more striking illustration of the power of progress inherent in Christianity than that which is afforded by the Reformation. Once again the religion of Jesus Christ stood in the vanguard of human progress. In the impetus which the Reformation gave to Bible study, and in the value which it attached to the worth of the human soul, in its struggle for religious and civil liberty, it laid the foundations of modern scholarship and modern democracy.

Once again, to draw an illustration from more recent times. In the eighteenth century, when Deism and Rationalism had swept over England, and it was confidently predicted that Christianity would soon be dismissed along with other discredited and outworn superstitions, a great mind like Bishop Butler was raised up to reinterpret Christianity in terms of natural science. He was the first of modern theologians among English-speaking Christians to catch the new scientific spirit and to point out the analogy between laws of nature and laws of grace in the Kingdom of God, and that there cannot be any contradiction between a true science and a true religion. The *Analogy* may be laid aside and looked upon by many as an outworn apologetic, but in its day it did a great work for Christianity, and its argument is still valid. Since Bishop Butler's time there have been a host of writers in the same field. In more recent times there have been few who have done more to reconcile the results of modern science with religious belief than Henry Drummond. In his *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*, and in his *Ascent of Man* he has done much to popularize modern science and to disarm opposition to the theory of evolution as a working hypothesis from the religious point of view. These were not

books of any permanent value. Indeed Drummond said before his death that he wished he could live to rewrite the *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*, for there were many things in that book that he would like to change. But his book served a valuable purpose at the time.

All such reverent and scholarly attempts to restate Christianity in terms of modern philosophy and modern science are to be welcomed and encouraged, even if we feel obliged to dissent from some of their conclusions. So urgent and imperative has been the demand for some restatement of Christianity that would meet the needs of the modern man that two years ago a group of young scholars at Oxford University put forth a book called *Foundations*, which was an attempt to restate Christianity in terms of modern Biblical and historical scholarship. One need not feel obliged to endorse all the conclusions of the writers—I find myself in essential opposition to more than one of these conclusions—but the thing to be borne in mind is that such attempts to bring Christianity into close and vital touch with the great movements of the age are to be encouraged as necessary to the success of Christianity. Progress is not an accident but an essential of religion. If Christianity is to commend itself to the spiritual needs of the modern man, then it is absolutely necessary that this work of reinterpretation and restatement should continue until we work out a philosophy of Christianity and an understanding of the Creeds which shall at once conserve the knowledge and experience of the ages and yet commend Christianity to the genius and intelligence of the modern man. Writers like Prof. Eucken and Prof. Rauschenbush, one from the side of philosophy and the other from the side of sociology, have recently brought home to us the need of some such reinterpretation of Christianity as that which I have outlined.

In this brief review of the thought and progress of the Church much depends upon our conception of truth.

For purposes of illustration we may liken the search for truth to a mountain climber who begins his ascent in the valley far below, where his view is circumscribed by the surrounding hills, and where the shadows in some secluded dale or dell are not dispersed even by the rays of the noon-day sun. As he climbs his outlook is broadened and he catches glimpses of the valley spread out before him. Higher up the clouds and mists settle down upon the mountain-side, and once more his view is contracted, and he sees only the narrow path before him. But yet once again, higher still upon the mountain-side, he stands upon a ledge of rock, and looks out over the whole broad expanse of valley and hill, and his soul rejoices in the prospect. The man has not changed. Human nature is the same. The truth has not changed. But his point of view has changed. His outlook has been widened, his understanding broadened and deepened. He sees truth both in its historical perspective as an organic whole, and also in its relation to present-day problems and needs. But while the forms in which Christianity has been stated may be outgrown and man-made systems of theology which have served to keep Christianity alive in their day and to commend it to the men of the period may have become obsolete, it is well to remember that essential Christianity has remained the same. The Historic Christ is the same "yesterday, today, and forever." It is we who change. Each age brings with it a deeper understanding, a wider outlook, some new and unlooked for development of Christian doctrine. Each age, and ours is no exception, witnesses the old and ever new miracle of the returning spring of truth.

The mistake which so many make in their attitude towards new truth is the mistake of confounding essential Christianity with that which is its purely human and accidental expression and interpretation. Let us take the doctrine of the Atonement as a case in point. The

Atonement is an accomplished fact, and men have been saved by it without at all understanding the theology which undertakes to explain it. The time was when the prevailing theory of the Atonement was that Christ's death on the Cross was a debt paid to Satan. This monstrous doctrine prevailed for a thousand years, until Anselm propounded quite a different theory. He denied that man belonged to the devil or that Christ by His death in any way recognized the claim of Satan to sovereignty over the world. Man, he said, is not a child of the devil, but a child of God. But he has sinned so deeply and grievously that he is hopelessly in debt to his Father; a debt of such magnitude requires for its liquidation an Infinite Victim. The debt must be paid, and man must render satisfaction according to the measure of his sin. This he cannot do. "There is therefore no one who can make this satisfaction except God himself, and no one ought to make it except man, hence it is necessary that a God-man make it."[1] The chief merit of the Anselmic theory is that it clearly repudiates the ancient immoral notion that a man is the child of the devil, and that Christ's death is in any sense a ransom paid to rescue us from the power of Satan. It was a great step forward to have it asserted that God could not be satisfied with anything less than a perfect obedience. Under the influence of Feudalism Anselm reduced the honour of God to the shallow level of prestige which must be saved from insult. He has no real insight into the nature of sin, and hence his theory of the Atonement is purely forensic and in the nature of a commercial transaction. The theory that the death of Christ is in the nature of a debt paid to satisfy the justice of God makes salvation to consist primarily in an escape from punishment rather than in a change of heart, and it follows inevitably from this that God the Father

---

[1] *Anselm's Theory of the Atonement*, Foley, p. 129.

came to be regarded as the "rigorous creditor," and the Son as the generous benefactor. It was but a step from the theory of Anselm which represented Christ as paying a debt for us which we were unable to pay, to the view which prevailed so largely at the Reformation that Christ's death was a Substitute for ours. Luther represents Him as enduring the curse of God for us. Calvin in his "Institutes" says of our Lord's death, "He was made a substitute and surety for transgressors, and even treated as a criminal Himself to sustain all the punishment which would have been inflicted on them."

The defect of any theory of satisfaction or substitution is that it involves the suffering of the innocent for the guilty. It is true that life is full of instances of vicarious sacrifice. In the ordinary course of human events the innocent must suffer for the guilty, but such suffering cannot in any sense be considered as a punishment. Moral responsibility cannot be transferred, and the infliction of so much suffering for so much sin by means of a purely mechanical substitution is clearly unjust and immoral. We need not therefore be surprised that in our own times there has been a tremendous reaction against the irrational and in some respects immoral view of the Atonement which has prevailed so widely in the history of the Church.

The Anselmic view in turn has given way to a more enlightened and reasonable interpretation of the Atonement. Such for example is the view presented by Dr. Moberly in his *Atonement and Personality*, and by Dr. DuBose. These writers teach that the Atonement is not in any sense a commercial transaction but has its basis in character, and consists essentially in a spiritual oneness with God. Christ is our Atonement because He is our At-one-ment. In Christ God and man have become one. The human will has become one with the Divine will, human righteousness one with Divine righteousness. Unity of personality and of will

constitute the only atonement. It is not a price paid to Satan, nor a satisfaction to appease an angry God, but a character and a life. In the perfect sinlessness and holiness of Christ man has been fully reconciled to God. Sin has been done away with. The Divine justice has been satisfied, not because of the infinite worth of the Victim, but because of the perfect obedience of the Son of God, even unto death. Christ is our Atonement, not in a vicarious or substitutionary sense, to save us the trouble of striving to become one with God, but as giving us a supreme manifestation of both the fact and the method of the Atonement which we must follow. Christ is therefore much more than an Object Lesson of Atonement; He is the power to conform us to the inspiring ideal. Christ's righteousness and life are ours, not only as Example but as Cause ("Because I live ye shall live also"), and not only as Cause but also as Substance of our life. ("I am the way, the truth, and the life"; "He that hath the Son hath life.") In other words, these writers teach that Christ is our Atonement exemplarily, causally, and really or substantially, as being in us, wholly appropriated by faith to be wholly imparted in fact. We see ourselves complete in Christ, risen, freed from sin, at-one with God, reconciled, made perfect in love, not "instead of us," not by way of substitution to save us the trouble of becoming one with Him, but as setting us an absolute standard of holiness which we must forever approximate and also as supplying the grace and the power to conform us ever more and more to His Divine image and likeness. Now, in all these centuries of profound study and reflection upon the fact and truth of the Atonement the Church guided, as we believe, by the Spirit of God, has been slowly approximating a truer interpretation and understanding of so great a truth. While there are great mysteries in Christianity, and always will be, there are no mysteries which cannot be investigated. Separate mysteries under the

light of fuller knowledge may disappear and become merged in that sense of "Greater Mystery," which includes all the rest and which must ever remain beyond our ken.

Truth is not something finished and mechanical, like some great pyramid by the wayside of life to which each passing generation of men has added a stone to raise the pile that much higher—a mere accumulation of material. Truth is something organic and living, like that "Tree of Life," which the Apostle saw growing by the banks of the "River of Life," which bare twelve manner of fruits, and its leaves were for the "healing of the nations."

Social Work in America

By Edward T. Devine,
Director of the New York School of Philanthropy, Professor of Social Economy in Columbia University.

Social work in America is conditioned by (1) political democracy, (2) a habit of voluntary initiative, (3) an alert social conscience, (4) acute social problems, and (5) extraordinary economic resources.

Democracy is not merely a fact of political constitutions. It is a constant working assumption that birth and wealth and privilege are actually external accidents, and have no power to determine inherent worth. Whatever inconsistencies cynical critics may discover, this assumption remains the ultimate and controlling fact of American national feeling and action. This democracy will become more perfect by the extension of the suffrage to women, since many women are not effectively placed in families or are not appropriately represented, when they are, by their male electors. But to those who accept the principle that the family is the normal social unit the hastening of this reform in the electoral basis is to be urged, not on the grounds of abstract democracy, but rather on the pragmatic grounds of the difference it will make in social well-being. That this democracy has not further invaded the industrial field is a more serious limitation, and it is for this reason that we speak as yet only of political democracy. But industrial democracy also is breaking through the hard crust of American individualism and is already an ideal for which hundreds of employers and hundreds of thousands

of workingmen are prepared to make any necessary efforts and sacrifices.

Every open-eyed visitor from across the seas is struck by the fact that Americans rely to a greater extent than their contemporaries in Europe or Asia on the voluntary initiative of the individual and less upon government or any other—as it appears to them—external authority. And, inconsistent as it may seem with the fact of political democracy, the government has, far more than to the people of many a European state, appeared external. It can levy taxes, declare war, and regulate interstate commerce. But, except in the local postoffice, it has little direct personal touch with the average citizen. Most of them never see the flag on a battleship or at the head of a regiment of the regular army. The Government—*i.e.* the national government —performs few of the functions which in a centralized state like France or even Russia might bring it continuously to the attention of the private citizen in such a way as to make him rely upon it to meet ordinary needs. He knows well the President, certain cabinet officers, and the leading members of Congress, and he is ready to support them with enthusiasm or to call them sternly to account for the way in which they perform their specific duties. He is neither a hero worshipper nor a nonentity. But it never occurs to him to think of the Government as the natural agency to take the initiative in matters seriously affecting his personal welfare, except of course as it may be affected by changes in the tariff, in railway rates, or international relations. There remain the various local governments: state, county, town. But as to these also the average citizen has heretofore been a somewhat sceptical strict constructionist. Certain important functions belong to them certainly, and there are certain obvious civic duties which no man should shirk; but the free and independent American citizen of a generation ago would no sooner have expected the

state or the city to influence his choice of a home, or the character of his business, or to take care of him in illness, or to prevent his being injured at his work, or to compensate him if he were, or to instruct his wife in the care of his infant child, or to protect his food, or to furnish recreation for his adolescent children, than he would really have expected Providence to perform a special miracle in his behalf in response to a prayer for rain in a dry season. It is true that the conception of the State has been slowly changing. The democrat is coming to see that the State is not an external authority at all, whether benevolent or exploiting, that the army and police force are not instruments for upholding the interests of a class; but that for the State to do certain things for all its citizens may be the most complete democracy, may be only using the convenient political machinery as a means of doing certain things economically and advantageously. We have therefore the beginnings of accident compensation laws, town planning, recreation centers, instruction of mothers by public health authorities, pure food and drug legislation, and even projects for sickness insurance. Nevertheless the old habit of personal independence remains. While the State is trusted more and more, there remain many fields in which voluntary organized or unorganized effort is preferred to State coercion. This capacity and preference for voluntary initiative is a salient factor in social work.

That there are conditions in American industrial communities affecting health, character, and general welfare so acute as to give scope for the most varied and resourceful social work has been made evident by numerous official and voluntary investigations. At the end of a year of painstaking and thorough inquiry, the New York State Tenement House Commission of 1900 declared that "adequate light and air, perfect sanitation, even passable home environment, cannot be provided by the best tenement house which is commer-

cially possible on Manhattan Island." How much short of this were the actual accommodations in which tenement dwellers were found is evident from the following terrific indictment:

> "The tenement districts of New York are places in which thousands of people are living in the smallest space in which it is possible for human beings to exist—crowded together in dark, ill-ventilated rooms, in many of which the sunlight never enters and in most of which fresh air is unknown. They are centers of disease, poverty, vice, and crime, where it is a marvel, not that some children grow up to be thieves, drunkards, and prostitutes, but that so many should ever grow up to be decent and self-respecting. . . . . The most terrible of all the features of tenement house life in New York, however, is the indiscriminate herding of all kinds of people in close contact, the fact that, mingled with the drunken, the dissolute, the improvident, the diseased, dwell the great mass of the respectable workingmen of the city with their families."

A few years later, the Pittsburg Survey, undertaken by a periodical of social work, *Charities and The Commons*, and financially supported by the Russell Sage Foundation, revealed conditions as to low wages, overwork (a twelve-hour day and a seven-day week), and intolerable housing, which were the more disturbing because it was confidently believed that they were by no means confined to the great industrial community of western Pennsylvania, although perhaps most obvious there because of the great development of the steel industry of that locality.

Such problems are due in part to the rapidity and extent of our economic prosperity. The towns and cities have grown so fast that perhaps no one could have been expected to foresee and prevent the evils of overcrowding, inadequate sanitation, erratic transportation plans, unequal distribution of school houses, play grounds, and parks, obsolete court procedure, absence of markets and other necessary features of a national community life in thickly populated districts. Yet this very fact is most encouraging. If the hardships from which workingmen and their families suffer are due to maladjustment, to neglect of the conditions of rational growth, there is far more hope of remedy than if they

lie in actual poverty of resources. And this is the case in regard to nearly all of the more serious social problems in America. They are due to maladjustment, not to poverty or to depravity. There is abundant wealth, abundant productive power in society to deal with them, and it is primarily a question of directing such productive energy in right directions; to some extent a question of asserting social control over the greed and the neglect of individuals.

RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF SOCIAL WORK

Thus we have considered four of our five factors conditioning American social work: political democracy, individual initiative, serious and acute social problems, and abundant economic resources. In the center of them, flanked on the one hand by democracy and the habit of voluntary initiative, and on the other by great problems and great resources, we have ventured to place an acute social conscience, a distinctly religious phenomenon. The churches came to our ancestors from sources already widely sundered. The impress of language, nationality, and conflicting traditions had affected them; and there were no local shrines on our own continent to which their divided adherents could pay common homage. Nevertheless, there have been forces continuously at work making for union. It is a full century and a half since analogous forces began to show political results. The colonies became a nation because of their geographical remoteness from their common origin, their economic necessities, and their consciousness of a common destiny. It is now half a century since the Civil War set free still other analogous forces to create an industrial America, unified, prosperous, but somewhat reckless of the human factor upon which that industrialism depends. Slowly through this century and a half, and more rapidly in the last half century, the moral and religious life of America also has been yielding to the unifying and social-

izing influences of geography, economics, and politics. The assimilating forces of America act upon recently arrived immigrants rapidly and obviously. They act none the less surely upon the varied elements in our older populations. Southern planter and Northern Yankee, frontiersman and townsman, do not differ so much from one another but that the hammering of necessity and the subtle touch of a common culture can mould them to an even clearer type, varied, but distinctive and recognizable.

One of the most potent of these influences is the universal and inveterate habit of travel, for serious and for slight reasons—for permanent change of residence, in search of employment, in search of an economical place to live when work is slack. Until the Civil War, men travelled east and west. Then the Southern country was revealed to the North. For nearly a generation the experience meant little of advantage to the South because of the material destruction wrought by the war and the political and moral chaos of the next few years. But the children and grandchildren of the defeated Confederates are now sharing in a prosperity which for the first time is national, democratic, and social. Among other persistent and powerful social forces making for a common national life are the public school system; the daily press, with common news services and standardized editorial traditions and ideals; a labor movement affecting all industrial centers; and farmers' alliances, granges, and a rural press, affecting the entire agricultural population. To these may be added the movement for the emancipation of woman and her "invasion of industry." To such influences sectarianism in religion succumbs as surely as sectionalism in politics, or provincialism in speech and in ideas. The process is slower, but it is inevitable. Those who approach in the same way the great issues of their daily lives will inevitably become tolerant, then sympathetic, in their fundamental

religious attitude. For mutual contempt and bigotry, men must be farther apart from one another, less intelligible to one another, less conscious of their essential community of interests, purposes, and habits of mind, than are the people of the United States. The progressive movement in politics and the recent anti-saloon movement are excellent illustrations of the rapidity and ease with which a congenial idea can permeate this homogeneous national life. Not even France or England, compact as they both are and boasting a national unity for many centuries, is more thoroughly at one with itself, more responsive to influences which sway and mould the national conscience.

Social work is a comprehensive term, including all conscious efforts to prevent hardship and injustice, to improve working or living conditions, to raise the general standard of living, or to help individuals who are prevented by misfortune from realizing the standards to which they have been accustomed. The relief of distress and the increase of efficiency are its goal. It may be public or private, official or voluntary, organized or individual, national or local, secular or religious, philanthropic or self-defensive; but of course it cannot be exploitive, anti-social, or antagonistic to any essential institution or condition of the general welfare. Social work presupposes that it is possible to distinguish between what is and what is not in the interest of the common welfare, that even when there is a conflict of class interests it is not impossible to discern the permanent and paramount good of the larger society, and to strive for it consistently with whatever sacrifice of lesser, transitory, and selfish advantages may be involved. In fact, there is seldom any such conflict which presents any serious difficulty to the socially-minded. There is usually a price to pay, but not a substantial good to sacrifice. Society, to the social worker, presents itself not as a large number of competing and warring groups,

struggling for their respective shares of wealth already created, but rather as a large number of co-operating and friendly groups, striving to overcome evils and hardships which afflict all in greater or less degree, and to increase the social surplus in which all share. If this ideal is still far from the fact, it is perhaps nearer to it than is the ideal of those who proclaim irreconcilable and deepening class antagonisms and hatreds; while there is surely ample justification for assuming a fundamental harmony of interests when this is done, not as a basis for an indifferent *laissez-faire* economy, but as a basis for active efforts to make this harmony a more and more nearly complete reality.

Social work, so conceived, naturally takes on a religious sanction, and those who are its leaders come quickly to realize that the service of mankind which is its essential character is nothing else than that service which religion itself enjoins. To relieve poverty and cure disease, to care for the widow and the orphan and to visit those who are in prison, to reunite broken families and strengthen the sense of family responsibility; to prevent industrial injuries to workingmen, which by death leave widows and orphans, or by disablement leave crippled dependent men, or workingmen of reduced earning capacity; to reduce the death-rate and lengthen the span of the working life; to provide recreation facilities and reawaken the spirit of play; to socialize business, industry, politics, courts of justice, and religion itself as objectively represented in the existing churches—surely these tasks are essentially religious, and they are the tasks which engage the enthusiasm and the energy of social workers.

Such work is sometimes described as unsectarian, undenominational, or secular, because it is too broadly social, too nearly universal in its appeal, to be confined to any particular ecclesiastical organizations. It should rather be described as inter-denominational, as religious

in the most absolute and complete sense, as truly catholic and ecumenical, because, while there is nothing in it which divides or offends, there is in it everything which satisfies the passion for ministry, the instinct of brotherhood, the consecration of the individual to the promotion of that kingdom for which all Christians pray.

It is thought that in the field of philanthropy men of different churches find it possible to work together because the interests involved are comparatively slight, and superficial. Nothing could be further from a sound analysis. Men of different faiths are social workers in many a common cause because those causes are so deep and fundamental that they underlie all differences due to historical accidents or metaphysical subtleties; because they reach down to the very foundations of our being, where formal creeds and particular polities become indifferent. Having learned to work and think together in these matters, there is profound hope that the experience may lead to other forms of union, to a more complete understanding on matters which heretofore, by dividing men, have thwarted the divine purpose.

SOCIAL SETTLEMENTS

Social work may be said to have begun in America with the settlements and organized charity. These two movements, each somewhat more than a quarter century old as national movements, were introduced from England. Both however quickly adapted themselves to the conditions of American cities. Stanton Coit's Neighborhood Guild in New York, later the University Settlement, Jane Addams's Hull House, Graham Taylor's Chicago Commons, Robert Woods's South End House in Boston, Lillian Wald's Nurses' Settlement, and Mary Kingsbury Simkhovitch's Co-operative Greenwich House, are among the successful attempts to apply the conviction that "social intercourse could best express the growing sense of the economic unity of society." The

first of these settlements began only two years after the founding of Toynbee Hall in London, and the most famous among them, Hull House, after three years more, in 1889. The motives which constitute the subjective pressure towards social settlements are divided by Miss Addams into three great lines. The first contains the desire to make the entire social organism democratic, to extend democracy beyond its political expression; the second is the impulse to share the race life, to bring as much as possible of social energy and the accumulation of civilization to those portions of the race which have little; the third springs from a certain renaissance of Christianity, a movement toward its early humanitarian aspects. If Canon Barnett's dictum is true that "the elements of religion are better spread by the example of life than by the preaching of doctrines," then the settlements now multiplied and flourishing in nearly every large town are a striking testimonial to the religious character of social work. It is true that the settlements tend, like the churches, though of course in their own way, to become institutional. They take on many activities which are more appropriate for the municipality or for some other voluntary agency. But as to this, there is constant self scrutiny and extraordinary readiness to reconsider any such enterprises from time to time and to transfer, especially to public agencies, any activities which they are fitted and ready to perform. Exploration and experiment are recognized as among their chief functions.

ORGANIZED CHARITY

Naturally enough, the charity organization movement dates its early inspiration from one who was also among the forerunners of the settlement movement, Edward Denison, who in 1867 joined the Rev. J. R. Green in Stepney, London, for personal service in his parish. He recognized that personal residence among the poor

was desirable, but he recognized also that "case work" with individuals based upon investigation and adequate relief is the most fundamental of all kinds of social work. "I go to-morrow," he writes, "before the board at the workhouse to compel the removal to the infirmary of a man who ought to have been there already. I shall drive the sanitary inspector to put the act against overcrowding in force, with regard to some houses in which there have been as many as eight and ten bodies occupying one room."

In these two sentences Denison forecast the two great lines upon which organized charity in America has proceeded: the adequate and appropriate care of the individual and of the individual family in need, and the promotion of sanitary and social reforms by the enforcement of existing acts, the enactment of new laws, or such other means as might be appropriate. For the first fifteen years, attention was given in charity organization societies mainly to the investigation and relief of individual cases of distress. The ideas inculcated were (1) accurate knowledge of the cause of destitution, (2) cooperation among all those who have a legitimate interest in the problem, (3) personal service in the form of friendly visiting, (4) adequate and efficient relief, and (5) prevention, if possible, of the recurrence of need. These are not new ideas; they are older than Christianity. Ancient Judaism incorporated them into its system of relief of the poor, and time after time, as charity became conventional or artificial, they have been rediscovered. St. Bernard and St. Francis understood them. St. Vincent de Paul reinterpreted them to his generation. Chalmers and Ozanam saw them clearly and applied them respectively in Scotland and France. Hartley founded an important society in New York in 1843, widely copied in other cities, based upon similar principles. But the present general acceptance of them and that appreciation of what they involve in social poli-

cies which is characteristic of American social work must be credited to Josephine Shaw Lowell and other leaders of the charity organization movement of the early eighties, and to their energetic successors who have known how to transform the individualistic ideas of that period into a broader and more social philosophy acceptable to the twentieth century.

BROADENING SCOPE OF SOCIAL WORK

For the first fifteen or twenty years, as we have said, this movement concerned itself mainly with individuals and families in distress, though there were striking instances of participation in social reforms. About 1900, however, there occurred a development, first noticeable in the New York Charity Organization Society, which has proven to be nothing less than revolutionary. In rapid succession this society established (1) the Tenement House Committee, (2) the Committee on the Prevention of Tuberculosis, (3) *The Survey* (a weekly magazine of constructive philanthropy growing out of earlier periodicals called *Charities*, *The Charities Review*, *Jewish Charity*, and *The Commons*), (4) The School of Philanthropy (for the training of social workers), and (5) the Committee on Criminal Courts. Although nominally departments of a particular society, all of these five enterprises, and the broad policy of which they are typical illustrations, have had an influence far transcending the community which that society has intended especially to serve, and from whose citizens its financial support is derived.

The Tenement House Committee, under the energetic leadership of Lawrence Veiller and under the statesmanlike chairmanship of Robert W. de Forest, undertook nothing less than to secure a radical revision of the tenement house laws in the interest of tenants. Within a remarkably short space of time, with the sympathetic support of Governor Theodore Roosevelt and many others, this was

accomplished in 1900. As to new tenements thereafter built, a standard was established by law which made all tenements as nearly "model," in respect to light and air, safety from fire, and moral protection, as the existing conditions permit; and a municipal department was created to enforce the new laws. For the fourteen years since these laws were enacted, the Committee has stood like a bulwark to defend the rights of the tenants against vicious and persistent assaults of speculative builders and greedy landlords, and has been gradually working out plans for further progress. Recently there has been established, at the initiative of this Committee, a National Housing Association to promote wise legislation and reforms throughout the country.

Probably no other form of social work is so thoroughly representative of its spirit, and so prophetic of the form which it is likely to take, as the movement for the prevention of tuberculosis. There are special reasons for the early development and the vigorous prosecution of this movement. Tuberculosis is a disease of the masses. It affects men and women of the working age. From fifteen to forty-five its ravages are greatest. It is often a chronic disease, involving the heavy expense of a long illness with a corresponding loss of income. While it affects all classes, it is especially associated with poverty, overcrowding, alcoholism, and ignorance. It is a communicable disease. While curable under favourable circumstances, and ultimately, it is hoped, preventable, it requires large expenditures, early diagnosis, a prompt sacrifice of income, to make a cure even probable, very large expenditures for hospital and sanatorium care, and for education, to make prevention even a possibility. In these social aspects of the disease lies the problem and the opportunity for the social worker. There are, on the other hand, grounds for encouragement: such as the large number of permanently arrested cases; an actual reduction of the death-rate from tuberculosis at all ages,

as a result of definite anti-tuberculosis campaigns and as a result of the general rise in the standard of living; a great advance in scientific knowledge of the nature of the disease and its prophylaxis; an increase of popular education and interest in the subject, resulting in a greater willingness to levy and to pay taxes for sanatoria, clinics, and a public health service, and the popular insistence on higher standards of cleanliness, especially on removing the menace involved in the filthy habit of public expectoration. These results have been secured through an educational propaganda organized and carried on with marvellous skill. The local committee in Manhattan and Bronx Boroughs is still an integral part of the Charity Organization Society, including in its membership the principal public health and sanitary officials, municipal officials who are responsible for the care of the poor and for enforcing the tenement house law, physicians, social workers, and others representing various agencies whose co-operation is regarded as essential. The committee is supplemented by a similar committee of the Brooklyn Bureau of Charities for that Borough, by several local committees and associations in other cities, and by a department of the New York State Charities Aid Association which covers especially the rural counties. These local organizations in the State of New York, as in other states, are further strengthened and supported in their work by a strong National Association for the Study and Prevention of Tuberculosis, which has produced a succession of substantial volumes of Proceedings, including from the beginning both medical and sociological discussions. Each year, on the initiative of the National Association, the churches of the entire country are asked to set apart one service in which the duty and responsibility of the churches and their members in this crusade are duly emphasized. The technique of the tuberculosis movement includes exhibits; illustrated lectures; educational leaflets; press service; organized campaigns to

secure funds for hospitals, sanatoria, and clinics; visiting nurses for purposes of instruction; registration of all living cases and of deaths; disinfection of rooms in which patients have died; special employment for those who have cured or arrested disease; free sputum examinations; early examinations, including the examination of other members of the family in which there is a known case of tuberculosis; and a persistent, unremitting campaign of education as to the value of fresh air, plain substantial food, and hygienic cleanliness. In short, all that will contribute to the lessening of the danger of infection and the increase of resisting power is involved, and for this reason the campaign against tuberculosis has undoubtedly had a great effect on the general death-rate, while it has contributed perhaps more than any other single factor to the creation of that much needed health ideal, that positive conception of abounding physical well-being, from which all specific health programmes should start.

Whatever form of social work engages one's attention —the prevention of disease, the reform of criminal procedure and of the treatment of prisoners, the prevention of child labour, the promotion of healthful play and recreation, the decrease of alcoholism, the socializing of industry —we discern the same freshness of enthusiasm, the deep passion for social justice, the infinite concern for individuals, the resolute determination to assert the superiority of human interests over material interests, the necessity for social control in the common interest, the confident faith in unshackled and redeemed humanity. In a remarkable will a few years ago, Mr. John Stewart Kennedy gave more than thirty million dollars to educational, religious, and social work. A university, a hospital, a library, an art museum, shared liberally in this munificence. The great activities of his own religious denomination and several colleges had their part in it. Few conditions were attached to any of these gifts. For the

most part, the trustees and officers were left entirely free to use the money given to them in their own discretion for the uses and purposes of their several institutions.

The New York School of Philanthropy, to which Mr. Kennedy had made a previous gift for endowment, received one of the sixty-four shares into which, for purposes of bequest, the estate was divided. Although made to the Charity Organization Society, which by its charter is non-sectarian and debarred from any form of religious propaganda, and which, for purposes of professional education, is affiliated with Columbia University, whose teachers and students represent all religious faiths, this bequest was obviously inspired by the same religious faith which dictated other and larger gifts to the church itself. Into all kinds of public and voluntary social work its students will carry the social spirit, the humanitarian spirit, the spirit of brotherhood, of consecrated service to the common good.

SOCIAL WORK AND CHRISTIANITY

It would be interesting to trace the part which Christianity itself, through the preaching of the Gospel and the maintenance of its distinctive institutions, has had in the development of this social spirit. Certainly it would be difficult to exaggerate that part. The nation and the colonies from which it was made were founded by Christians. Its constitutions and laws have been mainly created and interpreted by Christians. If these laws and constitutions are without bigotry and sectarianism, this is merely because this represents the Christian ideal of government as it is held and cherished in the United States. Our fathers separated church and state, church and school, church and industry, not exclusively in the interest of state, school, and industry, but in the common interest of religion and these other essential features of our social life. With us the independent, voluntarily supported church is the vigorous, influential, and normal

religious institution. What Christianity has done therefore for social work is to create the atmosphere in which it has been born, to nourish the idealism which is its life, to furnish common backgrounds of religious emotion, of traditional obligations and sanctions, which may indeed affect different individuals and classes in varying degrees, but which affect us all, however unconsciously, in a very considerable degree.

Without Christianity social work would never have taken its present forms, would never have made such extraordinary progress, and would not today stand in such profound humility and such boundless faith before the greater tasks of the future.

IN WAR TIME

Since the above was written the great European war has come, bringing to social workers in America two pregnant questions: one as to their tasks at home, the other as to the relations between Americans and the nations at war.

Doubtless to many such movements as those which we have discussed began at once to seem irrelevant, trivial. Why bother about the trifling hardships of the poor in our American cities when over there civilization itself has collapsed, great nations out of whose loins our American colonies and dominions have sprung are literally locked in a death struggle, the manhood of a continent, perhaps of more than one continent, thrown away like a flower? How can any one care about child labour, or overcrowding, or the friendly visiting of the forlorn, when the great nations of the world, save ours alone, are at one another's throats?

It is a time for steady nerves, for clear vision, for the revaluation of values. What we have been saying about poverty, disease, and crime; about juvenile courts and probation and child labor; about housing, sanitation, and play; about the social spirit in business, in industry,

religion and education:—these things are true. We must hold to them steadfastly today—the more so if the eyes of our fellow workers in other lands are not free to see them, nor their ears to hear them, nor their hearts to feel them. We are perforce through a dark period of the world's history the torch-bearers of a great cause—the cause of rational, scientific, constructive, persistent, co-operative social work.

Of even deeper import is the other question. Of what sort is the neutrality which America in this crisis of world history shall bear to her European neighbours? Shall it be a neutrality of the law or one of the spirit? Shall it be in opposition to or in harmony with the spirit of social work as we have interpreted it at home? Shall we scrupulously and with infinite pains bind ourselves not to transgress the laws defining the duties and obligations of neutrals, or shall we find, in unfeigned friendship for all the nations, a freedom from any such conscious restraints? Are we neutrals because that is our selfish interest or because we have unselfish appreciation and even affection for both Germans and French; sincere friendship for both Austrians and Russians; actual admiration for both Serbs and Hungarians; kinship for the English; but kinship also for the German people who fight the French, as they acknowledge, with regret, and the English with heavy hearts?

Are we neutrals, in short, because that is the correct and appropriate attitude, externally imposed upon us, or because it is the inevitable and spontaneous response of our hearts, the natural and only conceivable response, to the cry of Europe's desolation and madness? Have we imagination enough to enter into the feelings of each side; of each of the several nations, one after another, so that we bear their burdens, understand their temptations, forgive their sins against our common life, lift up our hearts in their victories, bow down in their humiliations, feel the deep passion of their racial antagonisms,

and grope with them at last towards that reasonableness and mutual forbearance upon which alone, when the hour strikes, enduring peace may once more be built?

Private judgment upon the causes of the war, and upon the merits of the claims and charges on either side, is certainly not to be denied us, although it is a rash man that will attach any great importance to his private judgment on the issues involved in such a conflict before the evidence has been sifted and tested. Every one that does so indicts not a nation only, which Burke says is impossible, but at least two great nations; for that the wars are popular, rather than dynastic, is clear.

But whether one judges or not, the great privilege of neutrality, of unbroken friendship, remains. Twice England and America have faced each other in arms, as Russians and Austrians, French and Germans, Slav and Teuton face each other now. The memory of those ancient wars has long since lost its sting, and for a hundred years there has been unbroken peace between us. That great fact we were about to celebrate with rejoicing. But with each of the other nations involved in this stupendous conflict America has been always at peace. With all of them alike we have had more friendly relations than they have been able to maintain with one another. The two present allies of central Europe were at war when our own so recent civil war came to an end. The understanding between France and England is so recent that novelty adds to its zest. There is no nation among them all that has not given to us hostages of its best manhood; to which we have not gone for inspiration, for recreation and good fellowship, for instruction and noble counsel. Wherefore we shall steadfastly maintain our friendship for all, unwavering, hearty, ungrudging and unconditional.

The President has warned us to be neutral in thought and speech. That is well, where such advice is needed, and in some places it is sadly needed; but if we are posi-

tively neutral instead of negatively, such warning becomes superfluous. We may speak our sentiments freely when there is nothing in them to give just offense; when active sympathy for success is mingled with equal sympathy for the corresponding defeat. Either side which claims our sympathy unmitigated by regret for every grievous injury to the other side, asks what is unreasonable. Neutrality, in the sense in which it is our extraordinary opportunity at this time to possess and exhibit it, has no desire to assess blame or nicely to compare the incomparable.

Towards all the peoples of Europe, Asia, Africa, and America that may be drawn into the vortex of war, we shall do well to cherish, in the social spirit, sentiments of neighbourliness and good will, so that, in so far as in us lies, peace may come quickly and all nations may have cause to remember that in their time of peril we gave them no cause for offense, had no ear for slander against them, listened to their just grievances with sympathy, and with open and understanding minds to their aims, purposes, and ideals.

Such a neutrality has content, a fascination comparable to that of war itself, a justification both now and hereafter.

War and the Need of a Higher Nationalism

By H. Symonds, D.D., LL.D.,
Vicar of Christ Church Cathedral, Montreal.

Among the books which influenced me in my boyhood there is none which I remember more vividly than Creasy's *Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World.* I gather from various sources that this popular work is somewhat under a cloud in these days but I shall ever retain my affection for the book that first taught me to regard history as an interesting study. Wars occupy a less important place in the opinion of historians than of old. The history of the peoples' struggles with life, the development of their legislation, of their literature, of all that we mean by their civilization, these are the really important matters. Yet wars have marked great turning points in the development of the nations and there is no opinion about the present stupendous conflict that seems more general than that such a turning point is indicated in the events of to-day.

I

For the purposes of this article the outstanding feature of the war is the fact that whilst many nations are engaged in it they are, with the exception of Japan, all Christian, and Christians of every kind: Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Anglican and Protestant. Can we wonder if Positivists, Materialists, Agnostics, Skeptics of every kind, to say nothing of Mohammedans, Brahmans and others, should point to the war as the final

proof of the failure of Christianity? To say that it is not Christianity that has failed but the lack of it will I fear help but little. Must there not, it will be retorted, be something radically wrong with a religion that after nineteen centuries of practice issues thus?

The conclusion is not inevitable. Christianity has still glorious triumphs to its credit, obscured though these may be to the extent of eclipse. But eclipses pass, and the glories of Christianity in the production of character, in the fostering of humane sentiment, in care for the sick and suffering, in missionary zeal, in all those things of which Mr. Loring Brace wrote some thirty years ago in *Gesta Christi*, stand secure. But it ought to be frankly and even emphatically urged by Christ's people themselves: (1) That organized Christianity has broken down and must be reconstructed, and (2) that Christianity has failed in the field of international relations.

I propose in this article to deal only with the second of these positions. How little influence Christianity has had in this matter of international relations the present war sufficiently proves. What we are concerned to show is that the nations have never more than remotely or obscurely discerned the Christian relation. They are still largely governed by old pagan ideas. Our first task then must be to retrace the path of Christian theory and practice with reference to international relations to a period prior to the emergence of any, even the faintest, conception of the human race as a unity, as Humanity or Mankind.

The best information we can get on this subject is to be gained from the Old Testament. The religion of the Semitic peoples of the Holy Land and surrounding countries is known as Henotheism. Each people, or rather we should perhaps say each land, had its own indigenous god: Jehovah, Asshur, Moloch, Chemosh, and so on. Each god was interested only in the dwellers

of its own land. The nations believed in the *existence* of all the other gods, but it naturally believed *in* its own. Take such a passage as II Kings 18:34, where the Rabshakek taunts the citizens of Jerusalem: "Where are the gods of Hamath and Arpad? Where are the gods of Sepharvaim, of Hena and Ivvah? . . . Who are they among all the gods of the countries, that have delivered their country out of mine hand, that Jehovah should deliver Jerusalem out of mine hand?" The Rabshakek does not question the existence of the gods of Hamath and the rest, nor of Jehovah. His point is that Asshur the god of Assyria is stronger than any of them. Nor is there any reason to doubt that the Hebrews up to about the time of Amos, and the rank and file long afterwards, shared in this view of the matter. The extraordinary strength of this idea of the god as indigenous to the land is illustrated in the story of Namaan the Syrian, who, cured of his leprosy by the power of Jehovah's prophet, declares that henceforth even in Syria Jehovah shall be his god. But how can he worship Jehovah in Syria? There is one way. He must take home with him some of the soil of Jehovah's land to Syria, and then upon a little altar made of it he can offer a sacrifice to Jehovah. This explains Namaan's strange request, "Shall there not then, I pray thee, be given to thy servant two mules' burden of earth? For thy servant will henceforth offer neither burnt offering nor sacrifice unto other gods, but unto Jehovah."[1]

The separateness of the gods, and their owning of separate territories, with the hostilities and rivalries involved in such a condition of things, is the reflection of men's thoughts about their own relations as members of different nations. The nations are clearly thought of as quite distinct entities, with no ties of natural kinship. From motives of advantage they might sometimes enter

[1]II Kings 5. Does the same thought underlie the words of the Psalm 137, 4: "How shall we sing Jehovah's song in a strange land?"

into alliances, but their natural condition was that of hostility. No obligations to live peaceably together were laid upon them. What we mean by humaneness was unknown to them for they knew not what we mean by humanity.[2] Hence the extraordinary duplicity and ferocity of Jael towards Sisera is highly extolled by Deborah.[3]

It was monotheism, the doctrine of one God of all the world that was the necessary presupposition of the idea of Humanity, and it was monotheism that introduced a new conception of international relations. It is the glory of the prophets of Israel to have introduced monotheism to the world. Amos strikes a new note when he introduces Jehovah as the Lord of all the nations. It is a further and equal glory of the prophet that his religion was ethical. Not only one God but a righteous God. Damascus, Gaza, Edom, Ammon, Moab are one after another condemned because of their cruel injustices. But that which exalts this prophetic word still higher above the ordinary religious notions of the times is the equal if not greater condemnation meted out to the prophet's own people. A God of all the world, who judges all the nations in righteousness, this is the lofty message of the Hebrew prophets to mankind.

The promise and potency of ethical monotheism find glorious expression in a passage quoted (perhaps from some other prophet) by both Isaiah and Micah. The prophet in a kind of vision sees the nations coming up to Jerusalem to learn about the one God and His laws. Now what is the result of this assembling of the nations to learn the ways of Jehovah? Here is the familiar answer: "They shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning hooks: nation shall not

[2]Yet after all they *were* akin though they knew it not, and so doubtless individual acts of humanity were frequent. The story of Ruth leaving her own people is an example. But kindness rested upon no theory or conviction either theological or humanitarian.

[3]"Blessed of all women shall Jael the wife of Heber the Kenite be." Judges 5: 24.

lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more." The conclusion is perfectly logical. When the nations who, hitherto, have warred in the name of their national gods have learned that there is one God, and only one, a God of righteousness, how can wars continue? Alas! two thousand six hundred years later war on the most frightful scale is waged between nations all of whom (except Japan) acknowledge the same God. Is it not clear that there is something very wrong with our conception of the bearing of our religion upon our national relations?

This doctrine and vision of the prophets is taken up by our Lord, who finds types of superior faith in a hated Roman, of superior religion in a declassed publican, of superior love in a heretic Samaritan, and who sets forth the final test of life in the parable of the sheep and the goats in terms of love. It finds its first approximately systematic statement in the letters of St. Paul, wherein it reaches its climax in what I may perhaps call the classical or typical Catholic utterance, "in Christ Jesus there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision or uncircumcision, Barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free."

How shall we express the Christian conception of the relationship of nation to nation as it arises out of the Gospel?

It may be said that the logical issue of Christianity is a cosmopolitanism in which national distinctions disappear altogether. A kind of cosmopolitanism does spring out of Christianity. The cosmopolitanism of the Catholic Church. But the dissolution of national distinctions, and the merging of the nations into one humanity does not seem to me to be necessary to the realization of the Christian ideal. There is something even higher than this, *viz.*, the conception of the nations as members of a family of nations, each of which brings its contribution to the commonweal. No one would contend that the doctrine of the brotherhood of all men

involved the destruction of the family. No more is it necessary that the same doctrine should do away with the nation. What the brothers and sisters of a family should be to each other that the various nations should be to each other. It has often, in reference to Church Unity, been pointed out that variety in unity rather than uniformity is Nature's lesson. Just so, the destruction of national types, even if possible, would not enrich but impoverish the wealth of human life. Nations have their own gifts, their own advantages, their own opportunities. They have also their own defects, their own disadvantages, their own limitations. Here is the opportunity of national brotherhood—each nation contributing its share to the mighty whole of a happy and harmonious humanity. That nature does not tend to the obliteration of national types would seem to be shown by the fact that even in these days of common ideals of culture and education and of easy and rapid communication we see new types coming into existence. A typical American is a very different kind of person from a typical Englishman, and we are seeing even on this side of the Atlantic a typical Canadian coming into existence, who is quite a different person from the typical American.

Now it does not appear that the nations of the world calling themselves Christian, with, in most cases, State Churches indicating some national acceptance of Christianity, have ever regarded their relationship from the Christian point of view. We must not stop to ask why. It may be partly because Christianity has been regarded from a too individual point of view. Yet this is not true of all parts of Christendom. It may be because Christianity has too often been presented as something having mainly to do with some other world than this. It may be because it has been steeped in a kind of soft sentimentalism, devoid of practical strength and value. But however it may be, the melancholy fact is obvious.

In their international relations the nations are almost purely pagan. They still regard each other as naturally hostile. The bad tradition that we have already described—without its excuse—of the fundamental hostility of nations still persists. The very term which describes the great end and aim of international politics in Europe—"the balance of power"—is a sufficient proof of this. To produce a condition of things in which the nations though armed to the teeth *dare* not go to war has been the avowed object of statesmen. There has been no faith, no vision, no idealism, nothing but the crassest pagan materialism. Perhaps it is a good thing it has broken down. We have seen displayed splendid talents. Perhaps no age of the world has ever seen greater statesmen, and this is the end of it all. Truly the wisdom of the world is folly with God.

II

What lesson to the Church springs out of the consideration of these general principles of Christianity, and of their failure in application? Must we not in candour admit that upon the Churches rather than the statesmen rests the larger share of the responsibility? Has the Christian doctrine of international relations ever been forcibly and persistently set forth by Catholic or Protestant? Has not the Papacy in the past been involved in non-Christian diplomacies? Have not Protestant State Churches set what they deemed Patriotism above Christianity? We have watched these pagan diplomacies, and we cannot recall a voice of protest from organized Christianity, and certainly no clear teaching on the matter has been given. To me it seems clear that after the war the most hopeful and healthful thing for all the Churches would be to unite in a hearty general confession that "we have erred and strayed from God's ways; we have left undone those things that we ought to have done, and we have done those things that we ought not to have done,

and there is (in this matter of International or Catholic Christianity) no health in us." Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant all in the same galley. The Churches greatly emphasize the importance of confession to God on the part of the individual, whether directly or through the medium of a priest. Can the Churches as social communities make their confession, or shall we go on in the same muddling way until the groaning chariot of material progress once more breaks down?

This magazine places in the forefront its *Constructive* aims. Therefore it behooves one who writes in it to be constructive. But to offer constructive advice on a subject of so vast a character demands no little temerity. I must earnestly beg my readers to believe that I throw out my ideas simply as a small contribution by way of suggestion. It is only by the frank contributions of many minds that truth is ever gained. I hope, therefore, that it will be believed that whilst I write boldly and frankly, I do so in no dogmatic spirit. I am of course convinced in my own mind. But I am also well aware that it is only given to individuals to see small sections of the great orb of truth.

The Church glories in the title of Catholic. But have we not lost something of the basic, primary, essential significance of that word? Or rather shall we not say that the *primary* signification has been thrust into the background and certain *secondary* significations which may or may not be true have been pushed into their place? It is too often forgotten that there are not only the errors of fact, but the errors that spring from the dislocation of the true order or importance of facts. The word Catholic with the Greek means Orthodox, or the acceptance of an entire and in some respects a highly complicated system of doctrine. To the Roman it means primarily obedience to the See of Peter. The word is used also in reference to the organization of the Church, and of its worship. So we read of Catholic

order and Catholic ritual. The question to be asked is, is any of these significations primary? Are they not all secondary?

Mr. Lacey, the well-known Anglo-Catholic, whose learning and ability no one will question, has recently published an interesting little book on this subject of "Catholicity." The Church, he says, is called Catholic in two senses, firstly, a quantitative sense, and secondly a qualitative sense. In the quantitative sense it is Catholic because it is worldwide. But it is worldwide because of some quality in it which makes it worldwide. That quality cannot be given any clear cut definition. The Church is Catholic precisely because it is too large for that sort of particularity. If you attempt this kind of definition you will find you have merely defined a sect. Mr. Lacey finds the root of the matter in the famous words of St. Peter: "I perceive of a truth that God is no respecter of persons, but in every nation he that feareth Him and worketh righteousness is acceptable to Him." But it was given to St. Paul to beat down "the middle wall of partition"; and then to proclaim with lyric fervour the united Church in which there is neither Jew nor Greek but all are one in Christ. "Thus the Church is Catholic because in its essence it transcends all national and local particularities. It is the Church of Humanity." The other essential feature of Catholicity is the "proclamation of one transcendent God," who is revealed, so far as our present life is concerned, in Jesus Christ. And the Christian revelation "is not contained in a scheme of words clear cut and precise. It is in Jesus Christ Himself," and in certain "fruitful ideas, with a power of development."

Shall we be too broad then if we say that Catholicity is primarily the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, revealed in Jesus Christ? And shall we be too bold if we add that just as soon as you exalt anything that diminishes the inclusiveness of this circle into a

condition of Catholicity, you are at least, in danger of becoming uncatholic, *i.e.* sectarian?[4]

What now, is the bearing of all this on Nationalism? Catholicity in the broad sense in which we have now described it conditions Nationalism, not Nationalism Catholicity. Catholicity conditions Patriotism, not Patriotism Catholicity. The human race and nothing less is the Family of God. The nations then are members of the Family of God, and their attitude towards each other is the simplest of problems theoretically, however difficult it may be to carry out in practice. But it may be confidently asserted that this view of the relationship of nations to each other has never been theoretically held by statesmen. Unselfishness as between nation and nation, self-sacrifice as between nation and nation are things unknown. To what extent do the nations of the world consider the bearing of their commercial treaties upon the prosperity of other nations? Unlimited competition, national suspicion, supported by vast armaments, these are the axiomatic principles of international politics.

Out of the present distress then there leaps to the front of all constructive effort, the need of a Higher Nationalism. The nationalism of today still rests upon the pagan principles described in the beginning of this article. The supreme effort of Christianity in the years that lie before us is to root up this poisonous plant from a far distant past that brings forth wild grapes by

---

[4]I am aware that I am here on highly disputable ground, and I have tried to express myself with moderation. Personally I feel that no one who can say sincerely that he believes in one God the Father, and in the brotherhood of man, and that the meaning and nature of the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man are revealed in Jesus Christ, should be excluded from communion in the Catholic Church. If we really believe in the guidance of the Spirit, we may feel sure that the evils that may spring from such a wide inclusiveness are less than those which have as a matter of fact sprung from the exclusion of those who love God and man in the very spirit of Jesus.

which the children's teeth are set on edge, and plant the Lord's vine in the Lord's vineyard. Just as in Isaiah's day so in ours, instead of righteousness there goes up to heaven a lamentable cry.

The Higher Nationalism is a very different thing from Cosmopolitanism nor will it make any lesser demand upon the virtue of Patriotism. Only the Higher Nationalism will demand a nobler Patriotism. If we think of each nation as a member of the great Federation of the Race, if we think of that nation as a brother in the Family of God, if we think of it as possessing its own peculiar advantages of wealth and opportunity, of intellect and temperament, all of which may be contributed to the general stock of well being—the only true wealth —then we can see that the more national we are, and the more truly patriotic we are, the more we contribute to the general good. Here is the ideal as it found expression in the words of an eminent Englishman of letters: "Let us conceive of the whole group of civilized nations as being, for intellectual and spiritual purposes, one great confederation, bound to a joint action and working towards a common result, a confederation whose members have a due knowledge both of the past, out of which they all proceed, and of each other. This was the ideal of Goethe, and it is an ideal which will impose itself upon the thoughts of our modern societies more and more."[5]

Here, as it seems to me, is the most urgent task for all lovers of unity. It must take time and a long time. The habit of mind needed for the production of the Higher Nationalism cannot be planted and become a flourishing growth in a day. It needs first to be ardently preached. But mere preaching is not enough. The organized Church is the medium for the realization of this new international ideal. And since for its produc-

[5]Matthew Arnold, *Preface to the Poems of Wordsworth*, quoted by Lord Haldane, *The Conduct of Life*, p. 127.

tion no present organized Church or the whole aggregate of Church organizations suffices, we must earnestly, patiently, and above all candidly expose the causes of the failure of organized Christianity, and lay broader foundations upon which we can all take our stand, and build up by united effort a city that shall indeed be four-square, whose length and breadth and height shall reveal a perfect symmetry, in whose light the nations of them which are saved shall walk, and into which the kings of the earth shall bring their glory and honour.

Independent Teaching in France During the Last Ten Years:[1]

French Clergy in the War

By Eugène Tavernier.

To appreciate the zeal of Catholics in behalf of independent teaching for the past decade it is necessary to consider the conditions in which they were placed by the struggle directed against them for many years by official free-thought. This strange struggle, abated a little at times but always taken up with renewed force, dates from 1882. It is then that the laicization of the schools was begun, the great task conducted by the Government with all the resources which special laws and public finances furnished.

Of what consisted, or consists, this laicization of the schools which has so greatly occupied and so greatly agitated contemporary France? The work had for its aim the destruction, little by little, of Christian teaching, and the substitution of free-thought teaching, founded on a morality of free-thought, which was never elaborated, and which its partisans, after thirty years of effort, now despair of ever being able to organize.

During the preparatory period Jules Ferry, who was appointed to direct the whole enterprise, said very solemnly at a Masonic reunion (July 9, 1876): "Social morality has its justification, its origin, in the human conscience which enables it to *live by itself*, and, finally, to throw off

[1]That is, *Teaching independent of the State*, the only possible way of conveying in English *enseignement libre*, which does not mean "free teaching" as we understand it (*enseignement gratuit*).—Translator.

theological crutches and to walk freely to the conquest of the world." Such is the policy which has been followed more and more extensively for thirty years. M. Viviani, a Minister, gave an accurate résumé of all this effort when he said before the Chamber (November 8, 1906), "We have bound ourselves to a *work of irreligion.*" But in general, and especially at the beginning, it was not spoken of so plainly. Jules Ferry himself who declared war on divine authority before the Free Masons immediately afterwards had to use language much less menacing in continuing the irreligious work. Many times Paul Bert and a great number of other people assured him that the effort to laicize the schools was by no means directed against belief. They declared that it had no other aim than to establish peace between Catholics and free-thinkers. They wished to deceive the country.

For this reason the work of laicization was divided into many successive periods, separated one from another by times of partial repose. At first it was concerned with the public schools alone. Thirty years ago a very large number of the public elementary schools were in the hands of the congregations, the Brothers or Sisters. In the beginning the congregations were put out of the public schools, not all at once, but gradually. Aside from the necessity of sparing the susceptibility of the country, there was another motive for not laicizing the public schools at one stroke; this was the financial question. Many of the schools of which the *communes* disposed had been founded, often from an ancient day, by families, by individuals, by means of gifts and legacies; and under the condition that the *commune* use the money for carrying on an *école publique congréganiste.* When a school thus established was laicized, the condition of its foundation was violated and the original contract became null. Then, naturally, the heirs of the donors claimed reimbursement of the money which had been

deposited for the benefit of the Brothers and Sisters. For a long time cases of this kind involving academic establishments were multiplied throughout the whole country. Ordinarily the *communes* were ordered to pay back the money of the founders of the school. These in their turn hastened to create independent schools in which the congregations were installed. As in many places official lay schools were established, Catholics continued to impose upon themselves an ever heavier and heavier burden: the more so since the Government had at its service the State finances and all the official administrative influences. In reality, Catholics paid, and they continue to pay, a double budget:—as citizens of a country governed by an irreligious party and as defenders of their faith.

By their very courageous and generous efforts they succeeded in keeping up nearly everywhere an independent Catholic school side by side with the official lay school. They naturally employed as instructors and instructresses the men and women of the religious orders expelled from the public schools, and also a goodly number of new members of the congregations. Briefly, independent teaching, that is to say, Catholic teaching, continued, in spite of the immense resources which the State and the larger number of the municipal councils used in abundance, and often made itself a redoubtable rival of the official (free-thought) schools. The fanatical *laicisateurs* could not resign themselves to being thus held in check, at least in a relative way. Since they were not able to prevent the existence of the independent Catholic school nearly everywhere and the attraction to it of a large number of pupils, they resolved to deprive it of teachers. The greater number of the teachers were members of the congregations: then, the suppression of all the congregations was begun, the destruction of the teaching congregations, and thus the ending of the independent schools, or at least the greater part of them.

After having been prepared for two years, this brutal

measure between 1901 and 1904 was confided to Minister Combes, a former seminarist, a former seminary professor! In order to execute the destructive measure this Minister used every activity and all possible rigour. From one end of the country to the other he set in motion the police, the *gendarmerie*, even the army, hurling them against the schools in which Brothers or Sisters were found. In 1903, in a space of three months, 20,000 *écoles congréganistes* were thus closed and destroyed. This was practically the end of the pretended neutrality which had at first been presented as a system of general pacification, from which it was said the congregations had nothing to fear. Thirty years earlier Jules Ferry, speaking before the Senate, declared that Catholics were frightened and were complaining without real cause. He promised that the congregations, expelled from the public schools, would find in the private school a peaceful and secure refuge. He said to Catholics: "Found as many congregational schools as you desire." But in 1903, the teaching congregations, which had done nothing blameworthy except to continue to be maintained by the inspiring confidence of the people, saw themselves dispersed by law and by force.

What were Catholics, thus deprived of an indispensable personnel, to do? Abandon the struggle? No, they would not even dream of it. They set to work to find in the very methods employed against them other resources with which to continue to defend themselves and to re-establish their schools. In general they were successful.

And this is how they have done it: The teaching congregations were destroyed just as the others were, but the men and women who had composed them were still in existence. The greater number of them, after they were dispersed by the Government, asked the Holy See to have their vows annulled and to permit them to live as laymen. This is what is called secularization, and a great number of men and women belonging to the

religious orders had recourse to it. Authorized by the Holy See to leave their congregations, they became again in the eyes of the State nothing but laity, and they escaped the law which forbade teaching given by the congregations, and, in addition, the very existence of the congregations. Having been secularized, they were able, individually, to be employed anew in the independent schools. Thus the recruiting of a great number of teachers was continued for the independent schools which, having suffered gravely in such a crisis, were little by little reorganized and today still form a considerable aggregation of enterprises.

The readers of THE CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY will surely feel that there was occasion for making a résumé of the preceding events to give an exact idea of the difficulties that French Catholics had to surmount in order to protect and to develop independent teaching. But it is still necessary to insist upon another point to which I have already alluded. Hostile legislation and the burden of a double budget did not form the sole obstacle which Catholics encountered in the academic field. There were also administrative practices of a wide range which opposed many of their efforts. For instance, in addition to the large subsidies for the building and maintenance of the official schools, the municipalities procured for them all sorts of favours, direct and indirect. The municipalities gave out books, clothing, sometimes nourishment to the pupils, and money to the fathers and mothers whose children attended the official school, which also received considerable benefits from the same source for fêtes and entertainments. Finally, the families who receive aid from the municipality are in fact compelled to send their children to the official school. Innumerable petty officials endanger their careers and their positions if they permit themselves to give preference to the independent school. In effect, the other schools which pretend to be neutral enjoy official patronage

which is manifested in many forms. The public authorities entice the children into the neutral school and keep them there by every means. Catholics are obliged to maintain their schools to ensure Christian teaching under extremely unequal political and administrative conditions.

They have succeeded in spite of all the difficulties which have been renewed and, especially during the last ten years, continually increased. At the present time private teaching has 8,300 instructors and 28,700 instructresses, and to these should be added 1,650 instructresses who direct what are called the *Ecoles maternelles*, schools for very young children. Of the 8,000 instructors, about 5,500 were formerly members of congregations; half the whole number of instructresses is composed of former nuns who have been secularized; 1,200, who have never been members of congregations, prepared themselves for their duties in special establishments called *Ecoles normales* or *Cours normaux libres*. The foundation of the *Ecoles normales*, or the *Ecoles normaux libres* is one of the most important and commendable forces employed by Catholics. Here the necessary training is given instructors and instructresses. The *Ecoles normales* and the *Cours normaux* are the training schools of the independent teaching. For a long time Catholics were unprovided with this indispensable and valuable equipment. Not alone was there a lack of money on the part of those who, after having paid their share for the official teaching, are obliged to bear the expense of the independent teaching and of public worship, the salary of the priests, the maintenance of the churches and the construction of new churches (without mentioning innumerable works of charity and of propaganda). Moreover, money was always found in the end. But the difficulty lay in the organization of a normal school system, an organization which demanded a special staff, methods developed in accordance with long professional

experience—a whole world of things to be understood and put into working order. French Catholics were wholly destitute of all this because during the régime of the Concordat, at least during the period of its loyal application, they had in official elementary teaching an aid rather than an adversary. But in 1882, when the religious conflict began, they had opposing them a Government which had at its command all the means of administration and nearly all the influence. It is in actual daily battle that they have been compelled to improvise their means of defence,—it matters little how—face to face with the difficulties of each day. To assemble an army and to put it in the best condition for combat necessitated a methodical and complete plan; especially was time necessary for preparation and reflection. This indispensable time the enemy took care not to give to the Catholics, thus depriving them of the means of acquiring the experience which would have enabled them at once to make a victorious resistance. The awkward difficulties of which I am about to speak were aggravated still further by a complication of a particular kind. The situation might be compared to that of an army which in actual war saw itself obliged to acquire new strategy and new arms.

After the first period of the struggle which had expelled them from all the municipal schools Catholics were able, thanks to the groups of congregations which furnished well trained teachers in abundance, to found independent schools nearly everywhere. Up to 1901 the number of Catholic schools and their pupils continually increased. There was at that time in these schools 1,380,000 children, that is to say, a quarter of the school population. It is precisely because of their continued success that governmental free-thought, knowing itself menaced, deemed it necessary to have recourse to new measures, more vigorous than its former ones. Not alone were 20,000 schools brutally suppressed within three months, as I have said above, with the aid of the

police and of the army, but the teaching congregations were at once dissolved and dispersed just as the others had been, and it was absolutely impossible for them to furnish the independent schools with the teachers which were needed.

Then Catholics were obliged to recruit their teaching staff in another way. The bishops took the affair in hand, and so the training of instructors and instructresses, which for many years had been given to the care of the congregations, has during the past ten or twelve years become an important diocesan affair. Little by little each diocese has become a centre of academic activities carried on under the supervision of the bishop. In almost every place there is a diocesan director of the independent elementary teaching, who is often assisted by one or many inspectors. This authority combines the necessary judicial and pedagogical direction for instructors and instructresses of the independent schools of the dioceses. It organizes examinations of school masters and mistresses, gives out diplomas, regulates the nomination and advancement of teachers. Most of the dioceses hold each year a congress in which the condition of independent teaching is studied with great care by competent people. These occasions, which are becoming more and more appreciated, are not limited to pronouncing upon or applauding eloquent speeches, nor to reading or listening to more or less general and optimistic reports. Rather, those taking part in them study in a technical manner the suggestions and plans presented; the development and perfection of organized independent teaching occupies everyone. A series of important measures has been taken to ensure for the staff possible conditions of existence and security for the future. The old stipends have been augmented and have been combined with a system of regular increase in accordance with the length of service and merit of the teachers. Another equally needed programme has been established to ensure to the teachers a salary on retire-

ment when they shall have reached a suitable age. This indispensable part of a permanent organization has not been made possible without increased sacrifices borne by the generosity of Catholics, who have continued to give valiantly the necessary co-operation.

The sums used for the foundation and maintenance of the independent schools amount to 40,000,000 francs each year. I am borrowing these figures and also other information from a conscientious and detailed work recently published by M. Gibon, secretary of the *Société Générale d'Education et d'Enseignement*, of which M. Keller is president. For thirty years Catholics have voluntarily supported this budget. The 40,000,000 francs dispensed by them each year since the beginning of the long struggle amount to 1,280,000,000 francs. And let it not be forgotten that the voluntary budget of the independent schools is maintained by tax-payers who bear their share of the cost of the official teaching. How much does this official teaching cost France? The expense is increased each year with an incredible rapidity. Before laicization it did not exceed 41,000,000 francs. In 1882 it was raised to 105,826,000; in 1892 to 168,500,000; in 1902, to 208,500,000; in 1911, to 281,000,000, and it continues to increase. This crushing burden, imposed on all citizens (Catholics as well as others) has its origin, in great part, in the obstinate determination of the *laicisateurs*, first, to destroy the schools of the congregations, then, to combat wherever possible the new independent schools, neither of which had cost, or do cost, the Government anything.

Catholics continue and will continue to pay the 40,000,000 francs each year. They pay this and they will pay even more, for the actual total only represents the salaries of the independent instructors and instructresses. In addition, there is the important outlay for the rent or purchase of houses in which the schools are installed; for procuring books, clothes, and sometimes food, for

the pupils; and finally, to maintain the activities connected with the schools—*patronages* (meeting-places for fête days and holidays), vacation homes, etc. The total amount of the gifts which Catholics make each year for their independent schools certainly exceeds very greatly 40,000,000 francs.

There are other activities associated with the schools which necessitate certain expenditures, rather of zeal than of money. Among these we may mention one which is found nearly everywhere and which is called the *Association de chefs de famille.* This *Association* which has a threefold aim originated under very remarkable circumstances. It represents a great effort to combat the propaganda of irreligion which is carried on by means of the public schools which are supposed to be neutral. I have already said that this official neutrality cannot really exist, especially in France, because of its national traditions and the actual state of the public mind. It is a mask purposely chosen, behind which, more or less disguised, are the intentions of unbelief. But there are different ways of manifesting unbelief. Inasmuch as the free-thinkers and especially the authors and defenders of the pretendedly neutral teaching affirm voluntarily that they do not wish to combat religion, one may take them at their word and compel them to treat Christian beliefs with a minimum of respect. It is necessary at once to know exactly and unquestionably what happens and what is said in the official school. It became imperative, then, to provide for its regular supervision. This is the primary aim which has brought about the *Association de chefs de famille.*

At first the task seemed very simple and very easy, and gradually it really becomes more and more so. But to accomplish it effectively French Catholics have been compelled and are now compelled from time to time to make that considerable effort which is necessary

to change a long established habit. Accustomed for a long time to see religion taught and more or less respected in the public schools, Catholics did not think it necessary, did not, indeed, believe it possible, to supervise them regularly and especially with effectiveness. They did not know how to go about it. Moreover, the Government, the pedagogical authorities, and the administrative practices wholly forbade their interference. The official teaching world had an inflexible rule never to be held accountable by any individual citizen, especially by any Catholic. The people were kept absolutely separated from the public teaching and were thought to have no right of supervision or of control, still less, of protest.

It was the excesses of the *laicisateurs* which little by little provoked a modification of this abnormal condition. Many of the official instructors, carried away by the thought of their power and by the boldness of their fanaticism, were accustomed to treat religion with disdain and even to blaspheme in the presence of their pupils. When one of these scandals took place and the children told it to their parents, they would speak of it to others, and finally it would come to the knowledge of some Catholic journal, either liberal or simply honest, which then published a protest. But the academic authority took no account of this protest, or rather it was content with inflicting upon the guilty teacher an insignificant punishment, often a ridiculous one. So it happened that the unbelieving instructors looked upon themselves more and more as teachers of irreligion, and they multiplied the testimonies to their fanatical zeal. One after another scandals came to light here and there, placing before all eyes the spectacle of profound disorder which was spreading throughout the official teaching. The majority of Catholics realized the necessity for action, and gradually they followed the example set by a little community in the Department of the Aisne, called Saint-Rambert-en-Bugey.

Here, in 1905, there was formed the first *Association de chefs de famille*, which without asking permission of anyone, assumed the supervision of the lay school. Parents began to examine the books used by the master and interrogate the children about the speech, actions and conduct of the instructors—in a word, about what was said and done in the school. Then they formed an association legally established and provided with by-laws which regulated the purpose of the enterprise, the assessments required of members, the composition of the council of direction, the fixed periods for the general meeting, etc. The idea was thought excellent and was imitated in many places.

Soon these associations, having become numerous, had occasion to show what they could do towards compelling the lay instructors to observe at least a minimum of respect towards religion. Thus when an instructor is guilty of scoffing at the children who are being prepared for their first communion, when he blasphemes against the creeds, against the Catechism, or permits himself to ridicule religious practices, the parents protest in the name of the *Association* to which they belong. Often this intervention suffices to restrain the instructor, to make him more reserved, more seemly in his speech and actions. When this measure does not have the necessary effect, the *Association* addresses itself to the leaders, to the inspector of the school, to the prefect, to the minister; but in such a case it needs the support of men of influence—mayors, departmental councillors, Deputies, Senators. A veritable struggle is begun, for the pedagogical and political authorities will not sacrifice or disavow one of their agents until it becomes too inconvenient to protect him. Often the *Association de chefs de famille* is obliged to have recourse to Parliament to secure the suppression of scandals caused by the instructors. Catholic Deputies and Senators have vigorously protested before the Chambers, and in spite of the resistance of

the Government and its friends they have secured at least a moral advantage, for, on the whole, they have discouraged the audacity of many, if not of all the fanatical instructors.

In the Department of the Haute-Garonne a group of fathers recently were courageous enough to induce the courts to interfere in the case of a struggle of this kind and to cause the instructor to be fined. This was a very important innovation which naturally called for extraordinary effort. In effect, according to the French law, office-holders enjoy special guaranties, which almost always protect them from protests made by mere individuals. To the law is added custom which is also very powerful. It is a novelty to see agents of the Government reprimanded and fined by reason of a complaint which does not emanate from their chiefs. Thus, in the case of which I am speaking, the instructor was guilty of odious acts—he dictated to his scholars not only blasphemies but things that were wholly immoral and obscene. He was a veritable maniac of irreligion and uncleanness. The proofs of his wickedness were indisputable; they were written in the exercises of the school, by the hand of the pupils, his authority over whom he abused. Moreover, the Government, although very much embarrassed at having to protect such an individual, did everything possible to prevent the protest being made effective. It employed all the artifices furnished by the formalities of which what is called *la procédure* is composed. It desired to have the measures taken by the parents declared void. The case was argued for a year in many courts. The leaders of the official teaching could not resign themselves to seeing the people obtain the right to exercise over the school such an effective supervision and to demand before the courts the suppression of scandalous abuses. Other departments and indeed the whole world of free-thought seemed to be as greatly affected as if the basis of public authority

had been menaced. The people of the Haute-Garonne were not discouraged, however. The case was continued; after long debates the judges fined the guilty instructor 500 francs. This incident has much more significance in France than would be thought possible elsewhere, especially in the United States where the right of individuals to protest against the action of officials is recognized as a very ordinary thing. With us the habit of protecting officials from complaints brought by mere citizens has up to the present time had an almost unassailable force. The case of which I have just spoken and the condemnation which resulted from it represents a profound change in the custom, more or less indicative of a progress that will surely extend.

Associations similar to that in the Haute-Garonne are very numerous today. As a whole, they represent an organization of more than 100,000 heads of families. Many of these Associations are parochial or cantonal. Many of them extend throughout an *arrondissement* or a Department. In order to increase their power they are formed into groups, and the groups form federations which have at their head a great Central Committee, established in Paris at the offices of the *Société d'Education et d'Enseignement.*[2] The suppression of the gravest abuses of the free-thought instructors is thus assured. This system continues to extend and to strengthen itself.

The *Associations de chefs de famille* are not content with supervising the pretendedly neutral teaching and with protesting before the courts against the scandals of the official teaching. They are pursuing another activity; they are carrying on an energetic propaganda of ideas in order to modify the laws and customs. First of all, it is a question of obtaining from the *communes* an equal and just system for all poor children, the pupils of both the independent and the public schools. For

[2] *Memento de l'enseignement libre,* by M. Gibon (Bureau of the *Société d'Education et d'Enseignement,* Paris).

a long time the municipal councils have been accustomed to reserve for the official school all the aid (money, clothes, and books) which they are able to distribute to the children of poor families. However, by means of protests made by the press and also in Parliament Catholics have persuaded a certain number of municipal councils finally to dispense their charity with justice. Today quite a considerable number of *communes* distribute their aid equally among the pupils of the two kinds of schools. This equitable method ought to be made general. The *Associations de chefs de famille* are applying themselves with a perseverance that meets with ever greater success.

This progress of justice in the dispensation of academic charity makes one hope for another result which until now seemed impossible because of the state of the public mind brought about by thirty years of implacable laicization. The *Associations de chefs de famille* are beginning to demand of the municipal councils equality in the handling not only of alms for the children of the schools, but of the communal subsidies used for elementary teaching. For thirty years, as I have already said, the official schools have been the only ones to receive from the *communes* financial support provided by the public funds. Catholics who build independent schools pay twice—for the official schools, which are neutral and evil, and which they do not want, and for their schools, which they alone maintain. Many of the neutral schools, scorned by the population, are almost empty; nevertheless there the instructor or instructress receives from the State a large salary, augmented by the subsidy of the *commune*. Catholics, on the other hand, are compelled to meet all their needs from their own resources alone.

Thus it has been for thirty years. In the beginning the bishops energetically protested against such injustice. They are not discouraged; in November, 1910, at a great Congress held at Lille, Cardinal Luçon, Archbishop of

Rheims, said: "When the legislator distributes subsidies from the public funds to all the schools, in proportion to the number of pupils, that will be justice." This work of justice is everywhere demanded today by the *Associations de chefs de famille.* It will still be needful to put forth further efforts to produce the necessary change in the laws, customs, and ideas, but there is visible progress. It is beginning to be understood that the régime imposed upon Catholics for thirty years is the negation of equity and commonsense. During this long period Catholics have seen all the public forces used against them—influences and funds which formerly operated more or less in their favour. For thirty years Catholics have found themselves obliged to replace with their own resources all the official support that they had possessed for centuries, and to establish everywhere new activities to combat not only the enterprises but also the new laws which the partisans of atheism continually invented. In this very year the activity of the free-thinkers has not ceased. Last May the Chamber voted a law which increased all the former rigour devised against Catholics. This law punishes by a fine (16 to 100 francs) or by imprisonment (6 days to a month) every citizen, layman, priest or bishop, who persuades parents not to send their children to a school where religion is affronted. Catholics will defy the fine and the prison as they have defied the other difficulties, and they will end by attracting to their side public opinion which is more and more wearied by this hateful and useless struggle.

Another very important and significant circumstance has arisen and has already produced blessed results which permit the hope of a complete change ere long.

I am writing this article while war stirs France and Europe, and is preparing, according to all reports, a new environment. In this country the war has acted as

a shock which has banished many prejudices, animosities, and other evil elements. The ordeal and the glory of our country, the bravery of the soldiers, the patriotic inspiration, which call forth the spirit of sacrifice and the spirit of fraternity, all this has brought about a profound and visible change in the common mind.

The conduct of the clergy during the war has done a great deal to hasten and to make permanent this change. For twenty-five years the ministers of religion (not only the seminarists but also the clergy who have been ordained and are dedicated either to parochial work or to teaching) have, like other citizens, been compelled to become soldiers. This obligation was established by the free-thinking sectarians in the hope that the sojourn in the barracks might weaken or destroy a great number of clerical vocations. Then, after having borne very courageously and worthily the two years in barracks, the greater number of the aspirants for the priesthood take up again the way of the seminary. Afterwards they accept regularly, on appointed days, their part in the military exercises and manoeuvres to which they are called as reservists. Their presence in the regiments has exercised a very happy influence on the crowd of soldiers who have no idea of religious things.

The war has made very plain this unforeseen and happy result of a law inspired by impiety. At the first signal the seminarists and priests, curés and religious, have rejoined the army to take their places in the combat. At the beginning of the war there were nearly 20,000 in the ranks. Among them were found and still may be found members of the congregations whom hateful and impious laws had driven from France. Many of the priests and members of the congregations arrived at the barracks in their cassocks. Many were obliged to wait, some for a short, some for a long time, for their uniforms. All, in their cassocks, took part in military duties and labours. All have displayed a frank, dignified and cor-

dial disposition which has called forth respectful and eager sympathy for them. And not a single act has caused any voluntary offence on the part of these citizens, torn suddenly from the environment where they were exercising their special vocation. There has been manifested their desire simply to accept, without regret and without hesitation, a duty which ill accords with the office of a priest at the altar. Everyone has recognized something peculiarly praiseworthy in such an abnegation, patriotic, civic, Christian.

Then, the field of battle has seen numbers of these 20,000 priest-soldiers, vicars, curés or members of congregations, give an example of courage, brave under fire, fighting and dying like heroes. A long list of them, for their military exploits, have received the honour of being praised before the whole army. In the midst of soldiers and a soldier himself, the priest, whom the free-thinker pretends to treat as an inferior citizen, has suddenly proved a living manifestation of the spirit of discipline and sacrifice.

Finally, another thing which seemed about to be forgotten has been understood—that faith and prayer, aside from their individual importance, have a patriotic and social rôle. Between two battles the soldiers, formerly so indifferent to the things of religion, went to church in a multitude. In different places, an hour before the battle, the regiments took part in a Mass, celebrated in the open air upon an improvised altar by a priest-soldier surrounded by other ecclesiastics whose military uniform was completed by a sacerdotal emblem! Many other similar events have followed which, commented upon by the newspapers, have produced an extraordinary impression throughout the whole country. Without doubt that impression will endure. The violent shock of the war has set in motion new feelings which will assure the full maturity of the efforts generously made for thirty years by French Catholics.

Religious Liberty and Religious Education

By William Lawrence, D.D.,
Bishop of Massachusetts.

Principles of government are accepted by the people before their practical applications are worked out; and, in the outworking, statesmanship, clear thinking and patience are required. The principle of religious liberty has been accepted by most civilized nations, especially by those which within a century and a half have realized themselves as nations. Few of them, however, have faced frankly the application of the principle to the religious education of the youth.

The United States has from its beginning as a nation recognized religious liberty. The Bill of Rights of Virginia affirmed "All men are equally entitled to the full and free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience." The Constitution forbade religious tests of officers of Government. The first amendment to the Constitution reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."

At that time the population was homogeneous, the dominant citizens Anglo-Saxon, the religion of the people Christian, a large majority Protestant, a minority Roman Catholic. It was assumed practically that the Christian religion should be recognized in all public functions. The very Congress that passed the first amendment was opened with prayer by a Christian minister. The Bible was read and the Scriptures ex-

pounded in the schools of most or all of the States, and the Christian Sunday was upheld by law as a Christian institution for worship and rest.

The incoming to this land of people of all faiths and no faith, the emphasis of certain tenets by different religious bodies, and a change of popular opinion as to what religion really is, are compelling us as a people to review the situation and to consider where this principle of religious liberty is carrying us. The principle will stand, how will it work out in this country in the coming generations? In this land of religious liberty how will the youth obtain their religious education?

If religion is of no account and if a people can thrive and a nation stand firm and pure without religion, the question of religious education is quickly settled—Have none.

One danger before us today is that many people who are not ready to admit that there is no need of any religion are, as a matter of practice and because of the difficulties of the situation, bringing up their children without religion. They assume that faith will survive somehow. In other words, they are not facing the question or thinking clearly.

Another group (and there is a reaction in their direction just now) assume that inasmuch as the home and the Church can not adequately meet the situation, the State must be made responsible for it. There are suggestions of the use of public funds for denominational schools, of public school hours for religious teaching by denominational teachers. There is an unrecognized but potent impression that the public schools may teach definite religion or something approaching it.

Are we thinking clearly?

If a nation is in religion and race perfectly homogeneous, some such action is possible. Indeed, is it not because the older Christian nations were thus homogeneous that they have supported the State teaching

of religion? Is it not clear that under the conditions of today, with the movements of population, the mixture of races, and the mingling of faiths and no faith, this practice must give way? What do the recent experiences and unhappy struggles in France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and England teach us but that religious liberty involves the withdrawal of the State from the support of all definite religious teaching?

It is singular that some religious leaders in other nations and in this country should feel regret at the loss of the State support of religious education when the cause to suffer most from it has been religion and the Church.

The citizen of today, the upholder of religious liberty may well keep a few principles in mind.

True religion is at the beginning personal. A child can be taught religion only by a teacher who is religious. Hence if the State is to teach religion through her teachers she must see that they are religious and that they believe what they teach. In order to do this she must set religious tests and thereby act contrary to the Constitution and to the principle of religious liberty.

Again, the teaching of religion in the day school or in the school curriculum is not essential to religious education.

If such teaching be in a private or parochial school where teachers, children and their parents are all sympathetic in their faith,—very good. Even then, however, only a fraction of religion is taught. For have we not put an over-emphasis upon the didactic and dogmatic elements in religion? upon what can be taught by word and book? These are of course essential, but they have only a partial relation to the development of religious faith as expressed in character and action.

In the history of religions, even of the Christian religion, have we not been made too familiar with the prevalence among the people of an exactness of religious knowledge

and a clearness of dogmatic belief which, for the lack of true religious education, has not been fulfilled in force and beauty of character or in real religious life?

Looking at the subject in a very practical way as it bears upon a child in this country, may not this be the situation?

The State is bound as aState to provide in its schools teachers of high character. The State is also bound as a State to provide such teaching and practice in ethics as will develop in the boys and girls such character as will make them worthy and high-minded citizens.

If the home and the Church do their part in developing the religious life of the people, the great majority of the teachers, drawn as they are from the body of the people, will be sympathetic with religion, many of them devoutly religious. While they have no right as State paid teachers to teach their religious faith, they, being men and women, can no more prevent their religious sympathy and character being felt by the scholars than they can repress their race tradition or their ancestral characteristics. There will thus be unconsciously created a religious atmosphere in the school. Now, let a child enter that school. If the mother and father each in their own way have done their part, the child enters the school already touched with the spirit of his family faith; if, as he goes home night after night, and as he worships with his parents once a week and takes part in the study of the Sunday School, he is led to feel that his faith touches every part of life, that his religious education is interwoven with his home, the day school, the playground and the Church, he develops in the maturity and intelligence of his faith as he develops in knowledge, character and a sense of responsibility. The whole tenor of his religious development has been that of privilege and opportunity rather than compulsion. Religion is not essentially associated with the school desk and the lesson in arithmetic, but with all the happy influences of life.

A boy thus educated in the atmosphere and under the sanctions of religious liberty will make, I believe, the typical religious citizen of the next generation.

To educate a boy in a State school which definitely tries to teach religion is in this country fortunately impossible. To educate a boy wholly in a Church or parochial school is to cramp him with a limited conception of religious faith and a limited exercise of it. Such teaching in the earliest years of childhood is more natural than in the later years. A boy, however, who is to meet the responsibilities of this country, with its mingled races, faiths and traditions, will do well to gain his religious culture in home, Church and through the atmosphere of the public school, that through the school and its democratic mingling he may know and have sympathy with the typical characters which he will meet in the activities of manhood. Intelligent and firm in a faith which has been wrought out through the experiences of youth, he will have gained such character and poise that he may hold his faith and deepen and broaden his experiences in manhood.

In this sketch of the religious education of an American boy under the aegis of religious liberty I am met with one insistent objection—it cannot be done, the parents will not or cannot do their part,—the Church will not or cannot do its part.

My answer is that liberty brings responsibility. We have been boasting of liberty. We must now, if we are to think clearly and act consistently, realize the responsibility. The eye of the people has in the past been upon the school as the centre of training and teaching, especially in religion,—the eye of the people must turn (I believe that it has begun to turn) upon the home and Church as well.

Individualism as such has run its course. The liberty to beget children and to turn them over to the State to train is the claim of those who would undermine

religion and liberty. We are just at the beginnings of the readjustments of our habits to the principle of religious liberty. We of this country are fortunate in not having the encrustated traditions of older nations to break. We have, however, work enough ahead to demand statesmanship, clear thinking, and patience. Religious education in the midst of religious liberty involves the rehabilitation of the forces of the parents, the home and the Church—that they may work with the school and other institutions and influences in the creation of a citizenship based on religious faith and fired with the spirit of religious liberty.

The Late Bishop of Cremona's Last Letter to the Editor of This Journal

This letter is published as an essential supplement to Mgr Bonomelli's letter which appeared in the issue for September, 1913.

A few days ago I received your very kind letter of the 4th of September, and I heartily thank you for the letter, for what you say and for the amiable manner in which you say it.

The work in which you invite me to participate is one which for those who believe and reason is of immense importance, religiously and politically. If it should be crowned with a happy issue, it would change the face of the earth. The union of the three great Churches —the Roman, the Greek Orthodox and the Anglican— would arrest the invasion of scepticism and universal irreligion which threatens the three Continents, and would prepare a future that should be new in every respect. It is, therefore, the duty of every man to assist the great undertaking in whatever way he best can; never to lose heart in presence of the enormous difficulties.

What are the means to attain this most exalted object? We, who have the grace to possess the faith of Jesus Christ, know that the first and chief means granted to all, and an available means, is prayer. From all quarters of the globe let there go up to the Father of Mercies the cry, in the name of Jesus Christ:

Holy Father, have pity upon us all, Thy children. Thou, who canst do all things, look not upon our offences, for those sins which are known to Thee; call us all, draw us all within Thy Church, which represents Thee here upon earth, as children to their mother. Dissipate the

clouds of error, of misunderstandings, of prejudices, which have separated, and still keep them separated from it.

This cry, rising every day from our association, cannot remain unheard.

The other most efficacious means to be used by us is to labour—by word, by work, by example, in every way—for the enlightenment of minds, but always with charity. Away with the spirit of contention; away with irritating controversies, with the memory of offences given and taken on all sides in past ages—let us forswear them altogether. All, all of us—we have to confess it before God—have done wrong and done foolishly, if not in the matter of doctrine and the truth, without doubt in regard to methods and charity. We must never deal harshly, or arrogantly, with those who, though in error, are still our brethren, who like us believe in Jesus Christ, and for every one of whom Christ died. We have all, in greater or lesser degree, been wanting in that charity in which even those in error should always find themselves united.

If those, who in whatsoever manner, preside over and govern the three great Christian Churches would begin to treat each other as brethren, eschew angry and invidious language, and give proof of that charity of which Jesus Christ gave us so many and such sublime proofs, our minds would be prepared to receive the truth, from whatever quarter it came. *Let us be united in brotherly active and enduring love,* and we shall soon find ourselves *united also in the truth.* I have never seen one erring soul converted by acrid discussions or *subtle syllogisms:* what is needed is *tolerance, charity and sincerity.* This is all. If I can in any way whatever be of assistance to you in this most holy work, tell me and I will do it.

If you come to Italy, be pleased to grant me the honour of entertaining you at Cremona. God be with us!

Most fraternally,

Cremona, 29 September, 1913. GEREMIA BONOMELLI.

John Tauler

By Bishop Boyd Carpenter.

With the enlargement of human knowledge come changes in the standards of thought. The laws of thought may be unchanged but the standards by which we measure the value of thoughts unconsciously change with the access of fresh knowledge. But advance in knowledge is seldom along a straight line: we do not leave old ideas wholly behind us as we leave a point on a straight line. The advance is more like a spiral; though there is an upward movement, there is a circular movement also, and we find ourselves brought back to what we may describe as a point similarly situated with that on the lower circuits of the spiral.

Today thought has brought mysticism into fashion. We may suggest a parallel: mysticism claimed attention in the times when new knowledge and experience stirred men's thoughts. In the age when the great centralizing power of the Empire was giving way before the spirit of nationalism, when existing philosophical and theological notions were felt to be inadequate, men turned to mysticism. Earlier still, when the material hopes of Christian believers broke down, the spirit of Christianity was enshrined and preserved in Gospel and Epistle by a method of thought which we must describe as mystical. The mystic has always rested upon spiritual interpretations of life. This has been his weakness, and his strength. Today, when materialism has suffered defeat, when the materialistic defences of Christian belief have been put in doubt and when materialistic explanations of life have been abandoned, mysticism comes again into her kingdom.

Thought and knowledge have co-operated in this, but there are other stimulating experiences which may tend to develop psychological energy besides that of knowledge. Necessity, it was once said, was the mother of invention. Put a man in a tight corner, and it is astonishing how many unthought of resources he can marshal into action. The stern discipline of experience is perhaps a rough mistress, but she can call into activity brain force which the mere diffusion of knowledge might fail to stimulate. I mean no disparagement of knowledge—"Let knowledge grow from more to more," but let us remember that periods of great mental and literary activity were often preceded, not by a sudden inflow of knowledge, but by great searchings of heart. Times of great pressure, of difficulty, of conflict appeal to deep feeling, awaken anxious questioning, and operate as wholesomely stimulating powers to mind and heart.

It is well to remind ourselves that the steps towards nobler conceptions of life and faith have often been taken when experience, not philosophy, has led the way. "Man," writes Dr. Charles, "was destined by God to discover the doctrine of a blessed future life, not through logical processes of the intellect, but through religious experiences."[1] The moments when nature attains her highest are those in which the whole being is stirred. Then all powers work in harmony, and conviction comes, not because a logical process has been followed, nor yet because a great emotion has been felt, but because thought and feeling and moral sense combine, and man is lifted into a higher plane than that of freezing reason's colder part, and conviction comes with a logic of life, to which reason assents and in which emotion and conscience are satisfied. Then

> "Mind and soul according well
> May make one music as before
> But vaster."

[1] *Drew Lecture on Immortality*, p. 9.

It was in an age of stress and change that the mystical group known as the Friends of God made their appearance. It was an age of conflicting interests and ideals. The Empire and the Papacy were in antagonism: the sense of national worth was growing into active power. Cities were too often the centres of rival ambitions and opposing intrigues. Religious conviction had little hold upon official life in the great centres of influence. Sceptical attacks on authorities hitherto deemed sacred were not unknown. Sigier's "*invidiosi veri*" (unpalatable truths) had been heard in Paris. The Franciscans were preaching poverty: the Dominicans were exalting learning and seeking out heresy. Men's hearts were troubled: fear was on every side, and a deep hunger for spiritual sustenance was felt by multitudes. The mystic teachers brought their supply of nourishment for the hungry.

There is a great deal about mysticism which is baffling and even repellent. To the ordinary man it is elusive. It is like a cloud which changes colour and form as it moves across the sky. It is difficult, men say, to bring it to close quarters: it, like so many other great things, seems to defy definition. In a short paper like the present I must not be tempted to pursue this line of thought. Here it will be enough to give the old reply to such complaints—"There are mystics and mystics." Just as no reasonable man judges English people by the bounders who flaunt their vulgarity away from home, or Americans by those travellers who are prone to "talk tall," so let no one judge all mysticism by those who have let their pens run loose or allowed their fancy to riot unrestrained. Some ideas are best studied in the concrete, and so perhaps we may find interest in that good man and true mystic—John Tauler of Strasbourg. He has some claim on our consideration. Neander called him "the greatest of those remarkable mystics of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries who prepared the way for the Evangelical Reformation." Archdeacon Hardwick, in

speaking of the men of the mystical school, placed John Tauler of Strasbourg at the head of them. His work on the *Following of Christ* has been published under the sanction of Roman Catholic authority, and, if I understand him rightly, was in the judgment of Matthew Arnold to be preferred to the famous *Imitation*, ascribed to Thomas à Kempis.[2] This mystic who won the appreciation of Romanist and Modernist was commended by the great champion of the Reformation. "I have never seen in Latin, or our own tongue," wrote Luther of Tauler's works, "a theology more sound or more according to the Gospel." Samuel Taylor Coleridge placed him with St. Augustine and Pascal: "In devotional literature I find nothing that does not pale before Augustine, Tauler and Pascal."

John Tauler was the son of a well-to-do burgher in Strasbourg. We are apt to throw the veil of romantic imagination over mediaeval towns. We think of them as picturesque; but the picturesque is often intolerable when brought too near to us. The soft hues with which time clothes some old building, or the happy harmony of tone which invests an old world city may repel the taste while they delight the eye. We may revive for our imagination some mediaeval town, but we would probably refuse to live in it. "*Le moyen âge*," wrote Taine, "*a vécu sur un fumier.*"[3] The hopeless dirt, the incredible stench, the want of drainage, the scant light in the houses, the accumulated garbage out of doors, would soon combine to make us prefer a lodge in some vast wilderness to residence in a mediaeval city. Those old haunts of chivalry and love would be intolerable to the modern American and Englishman who expects his daily bath and an ample supply of fresh air. We are told that Queen Margaret of Navarre, when showing

---

[2] *Nineteenth Century*, April, 1887—"A Friend of God."

[3] *Dante and His Time*, Karl Federn, p. 8.

her hands, said in proof of their beauty that they had not been washed for a week.[4]

It is with the mediaeval city of Strasbourg that the life of John Tauler is connected. The town, from its position at the point where the natural highways between France and Germany, Switzerland and Belgium meet, has always enjoyed commercial importance. It holds, moreover, a position of strategic value, and it has often been exposed in consequence to the stress of war. Even now it lies in the centre of the Titantic struggle which affects us all. It is with the Strasbourg of the close of the thirteenth and the opening of the fourteenth century that we are concerned. In Tauler's day the nave of the great cathedral was completed and Erwin of Steinbach was at work upon the design of the beautiful west front and its screen of double tracery. The lofty spire with its rich openwork and the famous clock belong to a later date. The early story of Strasbourg is the story of other mediaeval cities; it is the tale of conflicts between the citizens and the bishops who claimed suzerainty over them; it is the tale of intrigues between the partisans of the Pope and those of the Empire.

The year of Tauler's birth (1290) becomes vivid to us when we recall that it was the year when Dante was mourning the death of Beatrice, when to his imagination the fair city of Florence which he loved was left desolate by the death of one whose face and character made brightness in her streets. We might pause to glance around; we should see Art under Cimabue raising her head; we should, if we looked so far, see William Wallace carrying on his brave fight against England; but it is more important for our purpose to note the great moving forces of the world into which Tauler was born. The great Empire which had so long held the world had fallen: the Empire which claimed to succeed it was but

[4] *Dante and His Time*, p. 9.

the shadow and parody of a great reality. The old world had been broken up by the barbarian invaders. "The battle between the new Christianity and the old barbarism was but half won. The savagery of the Teutonic world, the corruption of the classic world, jostled at every turn the mysticism and ideal purity of Christianity."[5] The ideals of Christianity were slowly influencing the noble, though rough, natures of these Germans. The controversies of the Church had led to a stiffened conception of religion. St. Thomas Aquinas, whose fearless and unimpassioned nature was ready to investigate every problem in heaven and earth, impressed his genius and method upon the world of thought. "God must be revealed," such is Milman's description of Thomas Aquinas' position—"God must be revealed by syllogistic process. . . . On both sides of every question he casts the argument into one of his clear, distinct syllogisms, and calmly places himself as arbiter, and passes judgment in one or a series of still more unanswerable syllogisms."[6] Such is the historian's view of the Angelic Doctor. Thomas Aquinas died sixteen years before Tauler was born; but his influence was rapid and decisive, and there were not wanting those who speculated whether or not the soul of St. Augustine of Hippo had passed into the mediaeval writer.

The influence of Thomas Aquinas upon Tauler's mind may be measured by the fact that "he seldom cites any of the schoolmen, with the exception of 'Master Thomas.' "[7] Tauler's mind did not lean towards the discovery of God by syllogisms. He belonged to that group of earnest and spiritually minded men, who sought, not logical satisfaction, but illumination of soul. He was a man who read and reflected; but his reflections, and still more his spiritual experience, brought dis-

[5]A. L. Smith, *Church and State in the Middle Ages*, p. 17.
[6]Milman, *History of Latin Christianity*, vol. 8.
[7]*Tauler's Life and Sermons*, p. 76.

satisfaction with the cumbrous tomes of irrelevant erudition. When the soul is athirst for God, syllogisms will not satisfy it. "These great masters of Paris," Tauler says, "do read vast books, and turn over the leaves with great diligence, which is a very good thing; but these (spiritually enlightened men) read the true living book, wherein all things live: they turn over the pages of the heavens and the earth, and read therein the mighty and admirable wonders of God."

Similarly, he says that "in the school of the Spirit, man does not learn through books, which teach through outward images addressed to the senses; but here the truth, which of its nature does not speak by means of images, is spoken into the soul itself." He shares the desire, felt so strongly in all ages and uttered so urgently in our own day, to escape from the tyranny of the ideas of time and space. "Nothing hinders the soul so much in its knowledge of God as time and place. Time and place are parts, and God is one; therefore if our soul is to know God, it must know Him above time and place, for God is neither this nor that, like these complex things around us, for God is one."[8] With this it is interesting to compare Dante's words in which he tells that in God are enclosed, and therefore surpassed, every *Ubi* and *Quando*,

"Non per aver a sè di bene acquisto
Ch'esser non può, ma perchè suo splendore
Potesse, risplendendo dir: 'Subsisto',
In sua eternità di tempo fuore,
Fuor d'ogni altro comprender, come in piacque,
S'aperse in nuovi amor l'Eterno Amore.
Nè prima quasi torpente si giacque;
Chè nè prima nè poscia procedette
Lo discorrer di Dio sovra quest'acque." Par. xxix, 13-21.

"Not to acquire some good unto Himself
Which is impossible, but that His splendour
In its resplendency may say, 'Subsisto'

[8]Sermon on the Second Sunday in Advent, *Life and Sermons of Dr. John Tauler*, p. 190.

In its eternity outside of time,
Outside of all other limits as it pleased him
In new loves the Eternal Love unfolded.
Nor as if torpid did he lie before:
For neither after nor before proceeded
The going forth of God upon these waters."

In the highest realm of experience, the distinctions of time and place melt away.

"E questo cielo non ha altro dove
Che la Mente Divina." Par. xxvii, 109, 110.

"In this heaven there is no otherwhere
Than in the mind divine."

When pure love fills the soul its impulse to reach the highest goal is quickened—such was Dante's thought, and such is Tauler's who quotes approvingly this passage of St. Gregory: "It is the nature and property of love to rise unceasingly from itself to God with holy aspiration, never resting till it hath reached and embraced the Higher Good; for nothing on earth can draw down or imprison its flame, but it soars ever upwards towards God above itself."[9]

Tauler's life is almost wholly identified with Strasbourg. Here he was born; here he preached; here he met with that spiritual experience which was accompanied by a long silence and was succeeded by sermons which in such wonderful fashion moved the hearts of men. But there was forged in Tauler's day a strong link of affection between Strasbourg and Basle. From Basle came that man of such strange personal influence, whose conversation wrought such a change in Tauler's spiritual attitude and teaching. This is not the place to tell that story which is such a fascinating and beautiful example of Christian and brotherly intercourse. The "man," as the story calls him, became the teacher of the "Master." The "Master" who was the admired preacher of Strasbourg became the ready disciple of the

[9]Sermon for the Third Sunday in Advent, *Life and Sermons*, p. 197.

"man." The religion which had been perhaps too much a theory was transformed into a religion of deep personal experience; and in mature life Tauler attained a power and influence deeper and more lasting than with all his popularity he had achieved in his younger and more vigorous days.

This change took place, it seems, in 1338, when Tauler was forty-eight years old. It meant that the hold of faith was now stronger than before. This experience, perhaps, prepared him for the further trials which were to come. The conflict between the Papacy and the Empire brought trouble upon Strasbourg. The Pope opposed the claims of the Emperor Louis and gave his support to the rival Emperor Frederick: when it became evident that the cause of Louis was likely to triumph, the Pope resorted to excommunication and interdict. Tauler was a Dominican and the majority of the monks adhered to the policy of the Pope, and forsook their people at his bidding. Tauler remained at his post, and even enlarged the sphere of his ministrations. The death of the Emperor Louis in 1347 did not bring relief from conflict. The people of Strasbourg refused to accept the "Parson King" who had been elected under Papal influence. The interdict remained. Famine and pestilence fell upon the city. The Black Death followed. In Strasbourg no fewer than 16,000 were said to have died. In the midst of these horrors Tauler, resolute and faithful, continued to minister to the sick and suffering. His soul was stirred, and he joined with two devoted friends in an address, which set forth the wickedness of withdrawing the consolations of religion from the people because of political disputes. It declared that Papal disapproval cannot make a man a heretic. Thus with high courage and self-sacrifice Tauler continued his labours. For thirteen years more he worked among his fellow-citizens and countrymen. A spirit of toleration was happily blended with his religious earnestness.

He was no persecutor. He had drunk deep into the fountain of life, and he knew that a right spirit was more than orthodoxy. In 1361 the end came: a long illness —it is said twenty weeks of suffering—ushered in the close of his useful life. He sent for his friend, the "man." Once more the "Master" and the "man" are face to face. "Dear Master, how fares it with thee? Then said Tauler: Dear son, I believe the time is near when God is minded to take me from this world: therefore, dear son, it is a great comfort to me that thou shouldst be here at my departure." For eleven days these friends had intercourse, and then Tauler breathed his last. It was the 16th of June, 1361.

His monument, a plain slab of stone, was originally in the Dominican church. It had upon it a rude sketch of a figure pointing to the Lamb of God. It was removed to the church which is now the Protestant Temple Neuf; it survived the siege; it stands against the wall of the church where I saw it some thirty years ago with the figure, which still attests the devotion of a life spent in pointing souls to the Lamb of God.

Matthew Arnold, twenty-seven years ago, commented on the teaching of John Tauler in an article entitled, "A Friend of God." He told how the fourteenth century was a time of famine of hearing the Word of God. He spoke of the hunger of men's souls, and he pointed to the *De Imitatione* of Thomas à Kempis and Tauler's *Following of Christ* as being responses to this hunger of the age. Characteristically he sought to mark the different characters of these two responses. The response of Thomas à Kempis was given in the sentence —"No way to life or peace but the Way of the Cross." The response of Tauler was contained in this sentence from the *Following of Christ:* "Sin killeth nature; but nature is abhorrent of death; therefore sin is against nature, therefore sinners can never have a joy." This, said Matthew Arnold, is the negative side of the re-

sponse. Its positive side is this: "They who have left sins and come to grace have more delight in one day than all sinners have ever gained." The two responses have much in common. Tauler, no less than Thomas à Kempis can glory in the Cross of Christ; but, as I understand it, in Matthew Arnold's view, the emphasis in Tauler is on the sweet reasonableness and naturalness of the Christian Religion: while in Thomas à Kempis the emphasis lies in the crucifixion (so to speak) of nature. To use modern language—the Christian faith appears in Tauler as a true evolution following nature, while in the *Imitation* it is a reaction against nature, a killing of the natural. There is the difference between a happy development and a violent change.

It is easy to carry this thought of contrasted responses too far, and Matthew Arnold was careful to remind his readers that Tauler would probably have subscribed to the response which said that the Way of the Cross was the way to peace. "If Christ must needs suffer and enter by the Cross into the Kingdom of His Father, without doubt so must every friend of God have somewhat likewise to endure." Here Tauler expresses the need of the Cross in life. Matthew Arnold was right in saying that Tauler, like Thomas à Kempis, would see in the Cross the symbol of spiritual life and progress. But nevertheless the characteristic difference which he pointed out still remains. The Cross, in Tauler's view, though it involves suffering and calls for endurance, is regarded as a step of spiritual assimilation; the soul in the Cross becomes one with Him who endured the Cross. He does not speak of the Cross as against nature: it is to him the fulfilment of nature's higher capacity: it is the avenue to fruitful service of the world. Thus he writes, "O, how blessed are these men and how fruitful is their cross, not only to themselves, but also to all Christendom! This cross leads and brings them to the ineffable Cross of the divine nature, of which Paul was

thinking, when he prayed for his friends that they might 'be able to comprehend with all saints what is the breadth and length, and depth and height, and to know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge.' . . . Now he who will reach up unto the cross of Christ's divine nature, must first be fashioned into the likeness of His crucifixion in the flesh."[10]

Here the need of the Cross is as emphatically expressed as it is in the *Imitation;* but the look is not against the flesh but towards the spirit; the attitude is not of one who triumphs over nature, but is of one who reaches forward to some higher realization of nature. It is this aspect of Tauler's thought which caused Matthew Arnold to say that "it is the natural truth of religion and Christianity which occupies these friends of God. The truly natural thing is virtue, Christian virtue." Vice is unnatural. "In order to be a thoroughly natural man, 'one who enters into himself, listens to the eternal word, and has the life full of ecstasy and joy,' a man must 'set aside all things and follow Christ. Christ is the everlasting aim of all men.' "[11]

In harmony with this belief that Christian virtue is natural, we find Tauler saying that "We must mortify and subdue nature with nature." Again, he warns those who are set on this task of subduing nature not to cut off precious gifts in their zeal to cut off evil lusts. We may prune but must not mutilate nature. "Nature is in itself good and noble. Why shouldst thou hew away aught that belongs to it?"[12] Though he says this, he also realizes how much above nature the soul is lifted by grace. "Ah! these are sweet and lovely children of God, raised above nature by their likeness to Him."[13] To him the Cross was in one sense a fulfilment of nature:

[10]Sermon for Ash Wednesday, *Life and Sermons*, pp. 263-64.
[11]*Nineteenth Century*, April, 1887, p. 500.
[12]Sermons, p. 249.
[13]*Ibid*, p. 222.

in another, it lifted the soul above nature, for men could be partakers of the divine nature.

But Tauler's special helpfulness may be measured by his good practical sense. The tendency of mysticism, it has been said, is towards pantheism. The statement is only true when the speculative intellect cuts itself loose from life. Even so great a teacher as Eckart, amid much that is noble and inspiring, sometimes wanders into profitless speculation. Tauler seldom does: he is restrained by a wholesome commonsense. Though his soul sometimes takes flight into regions of religious ecstasy, yet he never forgets earth and its simple duties. For instance he says, "One can spin; another make shoes. I tell you that if I were not a priest, I would esteem it a great gift that I was able to make shoes, and I would try to make them so well as to be a pattern to all." Or again: "The Almighty God never bestows His gifts upon us only that we may possess them, but that we may use them . . . for He expects fruit from the seed He sows."

Or this, again, which shows the greatness of self-mastery. "A great Church father says, 'There are men who work greater wonders than even the Apostle Peter or all other saints who raised the dead, made the blind to see, and the lame to walk, and these are they who subdue their lusts and desires, and conquer their will in all things; and that the man should accomplish this conquest over self out of love to God is a far greater deed and more pleasing to God than to bring to life thousands of the dead.' "

Thus there is a practical and strongly ethical flavour in Tauler's teaching, which nevertheless does not degenerate into mere moralism. He sees not only what the life and habits should be; he sees what the heart should be; he realizes that to be truly like God, the heart must be dominated by that Spirit which is the most Godlike that we know. The soul must reach what he calls

"the highest school of the Holy Spirit," wherein "neither time nor images can help us, but contact is all that is needed, the which may happen without time within the space of a moment. St. Gregory says: 'The Holy Ghost is an admirable Master-Workman; He fills a fisherman and makes a preacher of him: He fills a persecutor and transforms him into a teacher of the Gentiles: He fills a publican, and makes him an Evangelist. Who is this Master-Workman? He needs not time for His teaching; by whatever means He chooses, so soon as He has touched the soul, He has taught it, and His mere touch is His teaching.' "

And this teaching of the Spirit means the sharing of that divine love of which the Cross is the symbol. The width or breadth of this Cross, where it is shared by men, means that they "love God with their whole hearts and themselves and all men through God; and endeavour with all their might 'to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace.' They shun all giving of offence and scandal and are useful, and hurtful to none. And therefore they suffer gladly all that befalls them in their work of love, that they may bring many souls to God."[14] Similarly in speaking of the benefit of meditation he says, "By such exercises, with love, the soul becomes very quick to feel God's touch, far more than by any outward practices of devotion. For the inward work is always better than the outward; and from it the outward works of virtue draw all their power and efficacy. It is as if thou hadst a noble excellent wine, of such virtue that a drop of it poured into a cask of water would be enough to make all the water taste like wine and turned it into good wine. This would be a great miracle; and so it is with the noble, excellent inward work of the soul, compared to the outward."

And then, after speaking of men whose love is shallow and comparing them to a very broad but shallow vessel,

[14] *Sermons*, 263.

he says, "These men can meditate upon our Lord, and with great desire and fervour, but they are hardly two inches deep." He explains this by saying that they" lack humility and a common Godlike love" towards all mankind. He then quotes Augustine's words, "Salvation does not depend on the length of time that a person has been converted to God, nor on the number of good deeds performed, but solely on the greatness of his love."

Tauler is an excellent type of mystic. He can venture upon the great deep—the soul's abyss, as it has been called, but like the Angel of the Revelation he stands with one foot on the earth and another on the sea. He realizes life and he realizes its spiritual significance. Nature is good and noble: in her presence and on her bosom is the place of our education, but we can rise above her, because we are bound by and are responsive to heavenly affinities. He has intellectual sympathies, and he marks the danger of surrendering our thoughts too much to "images and reference to before and after": he would have "souls stand free and alone in (this) the Eternal Now." But he can touch, as we have seen, the practical side of life, and return from a lofty flight to the bosom of nature, for she is noble. We may perhaps say of him as has recently been said of Clement of Alexandria,[15]— "His occasional hints of gnostic vision and insight are given only sporadically here and there, as a man might scatter seeds. . . . His ideal of the higher life may be open to many criticisms, but at least it provided for the heart and character."

This capacity to recognize the intellectual and practical needs of man's nature is perhaps well illustrated by this quotation, with which I close: "Now thou mightest say, 'God is infinite, a supreme Good without limits, and the soul and all creatures are finite and bounded; how, then, can the soul love and know God?' Hearken: God is infinite and without end, but the soul's desire is an abyss, which

[15]*Clement of Alexandria*, Rev. R. B. Tollinton, Vol. II, p. 83.

cannot be filled except by a Good which is infinite; and the more ardently the soul longeth after God, the more she wills to long after Him; for God is a Good without drawback, and a well of living water without bottom, and the soul is made in the image of God, and therefore it is created to know and love God. So, because Christ is a Master of the Highest Good, the soul ought to love Him, above all things; for He is love, and from Him doth love flow into us, as out of a well of life. The well of life is love."

With this quotation I take leave of that dear Friend of God, John Tauler.

THIS BOOK MUST BE
RETURNED

APR 23 1917

CONSTRUCTIVE QUARTERLY. VOL. 2 1914.

APR 28 1917

MR 2553
Thesis

CBPaC

3 2400 00273 0459
MIT LIBRARY